Philip Manow

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Philip Manow (* 1963 in Hamburg ) is a German political scientist and professor of political science at the University of Bremen .

Life

Manow studied political science, economics and history at the Philipps University of Marburg and the Free University of Berlin . From 2002 to 2007 Manow was head of the research group "Politics and Political Economy" at the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies in Cologne. In 2004 Manow initiated the political science data collection ParlGov, which he has been running with Holger Döring ever since. The data infrastructure contains comparable data from 39 western democracies from around 1700 parties, 990 elections and 1500 governments (as of 2019). It is constantly being continued.

In 2007 he was appointed to a professorship for political and administrative science at the University of Konstanz . From 2009 he held the professorship for Modern Political Theory at the Institute for Political Science of the Ruprecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg . Since 2010 Professor of Comparative Political Economy , Center for Social Policy at the University of Bremen .

At the Wissenschaftskolleg Berlin in 2014 he started the project “Things and Places of Democracy”, which is about what the practice of politics and the means of politics say about politics. The tangible side, such as the ballot box , the parliamentary protocol , the ban mile , the large screen at the party congress etc. are examined from an empirical and cultural-scientific point of view.

In 2018 Manow was elected to the Berlin-Brandenburg Academy of Sciences .

The political economy of populism

In his book Die Politische Ökonomie des Populismus Philip Manow tries to analyze the different left and right populisms in Europe . According to Manow, within the European Union and the individual nation states one has to “ differentiate socio-economically ” in order to understand the various forms of populism.

Philip Manow attributes “populist protest to two globalization processes : international trade and migration .” He distinguishes between labor and refugee migration and the respective political economy.

Manow differentiates between four ideal types of political economy within the European Union .

  • North: Scandinavian Social Democratic Political Economies
  • West: continental European – conservative (including the Anglo-Saxon – liberal) political economies
  • South: South European (-clientelistic) political economies
  • East: the countries of Eastern Europe

According to Manow, right-wing populism in the north is directed against migration. Here Manow differentiates between the Scandinavian social democratic economies, in which the populist protest is directed against refugee migration, and the Anglo-Saxon liberal economies, in which the protest is directed against labor migration, especially from Eastern Europe. The Scandinavian social democratic economies with their apparently generous basic security favor refugee migration, which is rejected by the “labor market insiders”. The Anglo-Saxon liberal economies have deregulated labor markets and in the low-wage sector , the “labor market outsiders” fight with migrant workers for jobs.

The carriers of the populist protest are “labor market insiders” in the Scandinavian social democratic economies. In the Anglo-Saxon liberal economies, the carriers of political protest are the “labor market outsiders”. Manow includes all employees under “labor market insiders” who “state a) on the basis of an open-ended employment contract b) work more than 30 hours a week; as outsiders, all those who either want to work but are unemployed, or work less than 15 hours a week on the basis of fixed-term contracts or even work without any contract at all. "

In Germany, the votes of the partly right-wing extremist AFD rose in 2017, although unemployment has fallen since 2005 . The " current loss of status in 2017 , a currently experienced social or economic deprivation can therefore hardly" be used for the election of right-wing parties. According to Manow, it is "rather the unemployment experienced in the past that, in connection with the refugee policy after 2015, solidified into a syndrome of resentment."

The voters of the AFD are not the “losers of modernization or globalization”, the “labor market outsiders”, but the “labor market insiders”. Manow explicitly denies psychological or culturalist explanations for the choice of populist parties, but behind it seems to be "a conflict about the" fair distribution of resources ", and that means a perhaps culturalized, but essentially socio-economic dispute."

The unemployment experienced by the “labor market insider” in the past correlates with a high proportion of voters in the right-wing AFD. In the east of Germany it is the economic changes after the fall of the wall that make people aware of their own "economic vulnerability". In the West, it is the consequences of Agenda 2010 that lead to the perception of “being put back and being economically outclassed”.

In the south, according to Manow, it is more left-wing populism that sees the economic situation and unemployment as the most pressing problem and not migration. According to Manow, the second globalization process is the cause: international trade and the associated austerity policy . In the southern European countries, “insiders and outsiders” give left-wing populists their voice. Employees in the public sector behave in exactly the opposite way in the two political economies: in the north, such a likelihood of a populist election is reduced, in the south it is increased by it.

Manow further claims that the Eastern European economies do not fit into the pattern described so far. It is true that the “labor market insiders” tend to vote for populist parties here, but earlier “episodes of [of] unemployment significantly reduce the probability of a protest vote ”. Manow rather suspects that the rural regions "see themselves as losers from globalization and choose PiS , Fidez or (...) Smer ".

Finally, Manow points out that populism is Europeanizing and is directed against the European Union . This can be seen from the growing success of the populist parties in the European elections . These successes in turn have repercussions for the national parliaments. "The left southern European and right-wing northern European protest against globalization as the free movement of goods and money on the one hand and of people on the other hand is ultimately directed against a Europe that has enormously intensified those movements over the last three decades."

Manow writes in Merkur in April 2018 that “one cannot avoid a substantive discussion of the respective populist currents”. "If you begin to ask about the causes of these differences, that is, to get involved with the political content, it will perhaps be possible to develop a better understanding of this increasing political protest behavior."

Fabio Wolkenstein sees that “Manow's book provides an important impetus to systematically think populism and political economy together”. Wolkenstein criticizes two points. Firstly the term populism, which has not been delimited precisely enough. Secondly, Wolkenstein criticizes that it would be better not to exclude “culturalist explanations” a priori.

Publications (selection)

  • In the shadow of the king. The political anatomy of democratic representation. suhrkamp, ​​2008, ISBN 978-3-518-12524-3 .
  • Religion and welfare state. The denominational foundations of European welfare state regimes. 2009, ISBN 978-3-593-38752-9 .
  • Original political fantasies. The Leviathan and its legacy. Konstanz University Press, Paderborn 2011, ISBN 978-3-86253-011-3 .
  • The central minor issues of democracy. About minutes of applause, hairdos and ten-point plans , Reinbek near Hamburg 2017, ISBN 978-3-499-63277-8 .
  • The political economy of populism. suhrkamp, ​​Berlin 2018, ISBN 978-3-518-12728-5 .
  • (De-) democratization of democracy. suhrkamp, ​​Berlin 2020, ISBN 978-3-518-12753-7 .

Essays

Web links

Commons : Philip Manow  - collection of images, videos and audio files

Individual evidence

  1. ^ Philip Manow on the website of the Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin
  2. ↑ ParlGov · parties, elections, cabinets. Retrieved December 12, 2019 .
  3. ^ Philip Manow on the website of the University of Bremen
  4. ↑ Philip Manow, The Political Economy of Populism. P. 125.
  5. ↑ Populism is a protest against globalization , Deutschlandfunk Kultur , February 2, 2020.
  6. ↑ Philip Manow, The Political Economy of Populism. P. 61.
  7. ↑ Philip Manow, The Political Economy of Populism. P. 61f.
  8. ↑ Philip Manow, The Political Economy of Populism. P. 68.
  9. ↑ Philip Manow, The Political Economy of Populism. P. 115.
  10. ↑ Philip Manow, The Political Economy of Populism. P. 99.
  11. ↑ Philip Manow, The Political Economy of Populism. P. 99f.
  12. ↑ Philip Manow, The Political Economy of Populism. P. 99.
  13. ↑ Philip Manow, The Political Economy of Populism. P. 100.
  14. ↑ Philip Manow, The Political Economy of Populism. P. 100.
  15. ↑ Philip Manow, The Political Economy of Populism. P. 101.
  16. ↑ Philip Manow, The Political Economy of Populism. P. 113.
  17. ↑ Philip Manow, The Political Economy of Populism. P. 117.
  18. ↑ Philip Manow, The Political Economy of Populism. P. 117.
  19. ↑ Philip Manow, The Political Economy of Populism. P. 118.
  20. ↑ Philip Manow, The Political Economy of Populism. P. 118.
  21. ↑ Philip Manow, The Political Economy of Populism. P. 138.
  22. ↑ "THEN WE WILL CHOOSE A DIFFERENT PEOPLE ..." POPULISTS VS. ELITE, ELITE VS. POPULISTS , Mercury, April 2019.
  23. ↑ Fabio Selva: Reading note to Philip Manow: The Political Economy of populism (Frankfurt, 2018) , theorieblog.de, March 1st of 2019.
personal data
SURNAME Manow, Philip
BRIEF DESCRIPTION German political scientist
DATE OF BIRTH 1963
PLACE OF BIRTH Hamburg