Chocolate topping
The term Pralinengipfel was coined by the Bundestag member Christian Schmidt and describes a security policy summit of Belgium , Germany , France and Luxembourg on April 29, 2003 in Tervuren , a suburb of the Belgian capital Brussels . In their final declaration, the four participants proposed the establishment of a European Security and Defense Union , which should initially only include those EU member states that are willing to deepen their integration efforts.
Actors and Actor Interests
Attendees
The recently re-elected German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder , the French President Jacques Chirac , who was also confirmed in office in 2002 , the Luxembourg Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker, known as a mediator, and the host, the Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt, took part in the summit in the Brussels suburb of Tervuren . The latter was at the time in the middle of the election campaign with a view to the upcoming elections to the Chamber of Deputies in Belgium on May 18 .
This brought together the heads of state and government of four states in Brussels, who not only had the status of founding members of the European Union, but also a keen interest in intensive defense policy cooperation in Europe. In the run-up to the meeting during the deliberations of the EU Constitutional Convention, France and Germany in particular appeared as strong, active supporters of further integration. Among other things, at the end of November 2002 they proposed to allow so-called enhanced cooperation in the area of the ESDP in order to enable its further development and deepening regardless of the consent of all 15 member states.
In contrast to the Federal Republic of Germany, France, which had already left the NATO military structure in 1966 , has always advocated the establishment of its own European structures and has placed no particular emphasis on observing the principle of “no duplication” (Albright 1998). The fact that Belgium has distinguished itself as one of the pioneers in Europe's defense integration efforts for over 30 years can be attributed, among other things, to the fact that, as a small country, it sees this as the only way to achieve "minimal credibility in matters of defense" ( Schoutheete). Finally, as a founding member of the EEC, Luxembourg, according to Prime Minister Juncker, felt obliged to be part of this “great European initiative” (quoted from Bergius).
Non-participants
However, the consideration of the actor constellation is only complete when it is established that certain states were not invited, although their participation would have been understandable and would have made sense with regard to the implementation of the resolutions to be taken. Prime Minister Verhofstadt did not consider Italy or its immediate neighbors, the Netherlands , even though they also belong to the sextet of the EU's founding states. Furthermore, he neglected Spain , which made it unmistakably clear through its participation in the Eurocorps that it wants to promote and support the further development of common European defense structures. As a founding member of the WEU, the United Kingdom also deserved a place at the negotiating table.
This imbalance, however, can be explained relatively conclusively against the background of a then acute non-European security policy decision: the attitude towards the Iraq war of the United States. While the four summit participants emerged as staunch critics of the invasion of Iraq, the United Kingdom, bound by its special relationship , as well as the conservative governments of Spain, Italy and the Netherlands supported the action of the USA - even in writing on January 30, 2003 in a joint letter. and a little later also sent notable contingents of their own troops to Iraq. In Brussels, there was exactly the intersection of those states that had already played a pioneering role in European defense cooperation as participants in the Eurocorps and who rejected the US Iraq campaign (see also Iraq crisis 2003 ).
Content of the final declaration
Ultimately, it was the synthesis of these two similarities that shaped the content of the joint declaration at the end of the two-hour discussion: a more self-confident approach to the USA through a clear strengthening of the “European pillar” in NATO . To this end, the agreement between the four heads of state and government went far beyond the Franco-German proposals of November 2002. Enabling increased cooperation in the field of defense policy should therefore lead to the establishment of a European Security and Defense Union (ESDU) by those EU member states that are willing and able to do so. This would mean much more than a finer coordination of national policies: According to the presentation of the four summit participants, such a defense union should also give rise to a military obligation to provide assistance, which gives it the quality of a regular system of collective defense and thus the concept of what is now largely in the EU would revive the risen WEU.
The final declaration also includes an agreement between the four participants on concrete measures to deepen military-political cooperation. These range from upgrading the Franco-German brigade , which has existed since 1989, with the help of Belgian and Luxembourg troops to form what is known as an initial entry unit, to coordinating efforts in the areas of NBC defense , emergency humanitarian aid and strategic air transport, to setting up multinational ones Training and command centers. The latter should, in the medium term, enable the EU to carry out military operations independently without having to resort to NATO institutions and organizational structures. According to the agreement, a “nucleus of planning and management capacity” should be set up in Tervuren as a preliminary stage to such an EU headquarters.
Criticism in politics and the press
politics
The four-way summit in Brussels was largely viewed negatively by politicians on both sides of the Atlantic. To the other European governments, especially Spain, Italy and the Netherlands, the meeting seemed like a conspiracy against the US and its supporters on the Iraq issue. They criticized the fact that the deepened cooperation of individual EU members, as would be envisaged in the context of increased cooperation, excluding the other European powers, would not strengthen the EU vis-à-vis the USA, but - on the contrary, because of the accompanying forces Division of the Union - a weakening.
The British Prime Minister Tony Blair complained that such efforts would promote the development of a “multipolar world”, which, in view of the international relations at the time, was not useful and therefore not desirable (cf. Bergius). He went even further and complained that the four’s catalog of measures had “split the EU at its core” (quoted from Bacia). The Spanish Prime Minister José María Aznar expressed the fear that the implementation of the proposals could lead to a weakening of NATO (cf. Schwennicke / Wernicke). The United States was particularly offended by the plans for a European headquarters, as this represents a dangerous break with the principle of "no duplication" - in fact, NATO has sufficient operational planning and command and control capabilities that it can make available to the EU if necessary - and thus necessarily entail “decoupling” and “discrimination”.
Consequently, US Secretary of State Colin Powell demanded with a certain smugness that the Europeans should rather concentrate on developing their operational skills: "What we need are more resources and a strengthening of the existing structures and armed forces, not more headquarters." after Bolesch). Due to the fact that the host Belgian Prime Minister was said he wanted to use the mini-summit as pure foreign policy "show appearance" (Bolesch) in the final sprint of his campaign, the meeting was in advance because of the alignment location Brussels as a stronghold of chocolate makers of mockingly nicknamed "Pralinengipfel".
Press
In the press, the concept adopted at the Brussels four-summit was largely positively received, but at the same time regretted the “bad staging” (Bolesch). Due to the nature of the matter, the “conspicuously conspiratorial” circumstances of this “special discussion group” led to the meeting being viewed exclusively “from the point of view of a double split - intra-European and transatlantic” (Frankenberger), which was “reasonable” and consistent “initiative (Bolesch) does not do justice. On the basis of the insight that “whoever has little has little to say” (Schwennicke), the need to strengthen Europe's military capabilities through coordination and a well-thought-out division of labor was particularly emphasized. "At most, well-intentioned" is this "attempt to help a European defense on its feet." (Ibid.)
outlook
The summit and the subsequent discussions provided an important impetus for the further development of the ESDP. In any case, the advance of the four revealed an urgent need for action, whereupon the European Council commissioned the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy , Javier Solana , to formulate a European Security Strategy (ESS) in the summer of 2003 . With the Treaty of Lisbon , a new Article 46 was inserted in the EU Treaty in 2007 to enable so-called permanent structured cooperation in the field of defense policy . In contrast to enhanced cooperation, this is not subject to any approval requirements, and the Council of Ministers does not decide on the establishment of such cooperation unanimously, but by a qualified majority.
Individual evidence
literature
- Bacia, Horst: Four-way summit in Brussels: “A second pillar in NATO”. In: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung , April 30, 2003.
- Bergius, Michael: attackers in defensive stance. In: Frankfurter Rundschau , April 30 / May 1, 2003.
- Bolesch, Cornelia: chocolates, badly packaged. In: Süddeutsche Zeitung , April 30 / May 1, 2003.
- Bolesch, Cornelia: Four-way summit establishes European defense union. In: Süddeutsche Zeitung, April 30 / May 1, 2003.
- Dembinski, Matthias: The Iraq war as a test of the common European foreign and security policy. In: Ehrhart / Schmitt (Hrsg.): The security policy of the EU in becoming. Nonos, Baden-Baden 2004.
- Dietrich, Sascha: European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). Baden-Baden: Nomos 2006.
- Frankenberger, Klaus-Dieter: Round of four. In: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. April 30, 2003
- Joint declaration by Germany, France, Luxembourg and Belgium on the European security and defense policy , printed in: Internationale Politik 58 (2003), issue 9, page 65ff.
- Haine, Jean-Yves: ESDP and NATO. In: Nicole Gnesotto (Ed.): The security and defense policy of the EU. Paris: Institute for Security Studies n.d.
- Schoutheete, Philippe de: La cohérence par la défense - Une autre lecture de la PESD. Paris: Institut d'Etudes de Sécurité 2003.
- Schwennicke, Christoph: Summit of the windmakers. In: Süddeutsche Zeitung, 12./13. April 2003.
- Schwennicke / Wernicke: Core Europe wants its own general staff and protection force. In: Süddeutsche Zeitung, April 10, 2003.