Project 27

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Project 27 (P-27) was the code name for the extraordinary intelligence service in Switzerland. It was conceptually realigned in 1979/82 after the special service was dissolved in the Intelligence Service and Defense (UNA) subgroup . In 1990 the organization Projekt 27 became public through the report of the Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry EMD (PUK EMD). In contrast to Project 26 (P-26) , the cadre organization for the resistance in enemy-occupied Switzerland, the Federal Council wanted to continue Project 27.

After the journalist Urs Paul Engeler the head of the project 27, Ferdinand J. Knecht , (code name "James") in the Weltwoche had unmasked on 13 December 1990, the Federal Council decided to cancel the extraordinary intelligence service and the valuable sources in the intelligence service to convict.

prehistory

As early as the Second World War , it became clear that the official Swiss intelligence service was dependent on other intelligence source networks. Since Switzerland does not have a standing army , but has to mobilize first in the event of an attack, the advance warning time (time from the detection of an opposing deployment and the mobilization of its own troops ) is decisive for a successful defense. With the advancing development of weapons and the deployment of parachute troops in the Cold War , the warning time fell continuously, and ways and means were sought to increase this warning time again through better intelligence reconnaissance.

At the end of 1973 Albert Bachmann was commissioned to suggest ways to improve the intelligence service. On August 24, 1974, Bachmann handed over his study to division general Carl Weidenmann , deputy chief of the intelligence and defense subgroup (UNA). He proposed an organization that is outside the federal administration and should operate two separate networks:

  • Pegasus : A network for the acquisition of military strategic information with the aim of ensuring timely mobilization. Bachmann envisaged Swiss business people and press representatives abroad and with connections abroad as news sources.
  • Argus : A network for the acquisition of operational-tactical messages in the border areas for the army command. Bachmann envisaged the Swiss abroad who lived in the relevant procurement rooms as news sources.

In 1975 the military delegation of the Federal Council was informed of the plans by the Chief of Staff Johann Jakob Vischer and requested some further clarification. Once these had been submitted, on June 28, 1976, it approved the proposals to create the two networks. It was determined that the Federal Council and the Chief of Staff should not be involved "in order to be able to keep the state government and army command out in the event of a breakdown".

In 1975 Albert Bachmann took over the private news organization from Hans Hausamann (Ha) in agreement with his superiors in addition to his work at the UNA .

In 1976 Albert Bachmann was appointed head of the Special Service Section within the UNA, which was responsible for preparing the resistance in the event of an occupation (see P-26 ). In addition, he should set up the two networks Pegasus and Argus . In the summer of 1977, division general Richard Ochsner took over the management of the UNA and in 1978 commissioned Bachmann to work out two variants for a news organization. He stated that the realization of Argus was to be foregone "because the political risk of gathering news in neighboring countries in peacetime was considered too great". Instead, he proposed the creation of a “Private Foreign Intelligence Service” (PANA) alongside the PEGASUS (“P”) organization. Ochsner decided that it was only PEGASUS to be pursued. At the same time he was looking for a successor for Bachmann in the area of ​​resistance preparation.

On September 5, 1979, Chief of Staff Hans Senn informed the entire Federal Council about the resistance preparations and PEGASUS, which was now called the Extraordinary Intelligence Service (AOND) . On the AOND he stated:

“ The procurement of foreign news in the military and, insofar as strategically relevant, in the political, economic and technical area can only be carried out by the regular news procurement organs up to a degree due to the risk.

If you want more, you have to resort to a special news organization [...]

Today, the training and deployment of the extraordinary intelligence service run, so to speak, on a trial basis. The members of the camouflaged, multiple shielded procurement apparatus work full-time or part-time, under private contract or free of charge. [...] »

- Report PUK EMD, p. 239 f.

The entire Federal Council took note of these statements without discussion, which was regarded as tacit approval.

In the autumn of 1979 the Schilling / Bachmann affair occurred, as a result of which the National Council's business audit committee investigated the background and the person of Albert Bachmann and reported to the National Council on January 19, 1981, whereby the AOND was designated a special intelligence service for reasons of confidentiality:

«The task and position of the resistance organization and the special intelligence service today correspond to the requirements that must be made from the standpoint of the rule of law and democracy. However, the internal administrative supervision of these areas is insufficient. »

- Colonel Bachmann matter, report of the working group of the Business Audit Commission to the National Council on its additional investigations of January 19, 1981, item 55

During the deliberation, there was no opposition to the two organizations. A motion to establish parliamentary oversight over the two organizations was not pursued.

Conception and order project 27

Basic concept

Major Mario Petitpierre , as the new Deputy Chief of Intelligence and Defense, revised the previous basic papers and issued the basic concept for Project 27 on February 1, 1982. He assumed that the regular intelligence service could only take risks to a certain extent in obtaining intelligence . «The extraordinary intelligence service, as a largely independent foreign intelligence agency, has to close these gaps. For these reasons, he is outside the army and administration. " This was intended to ensure that the political authorities could have credibly distanced themselves from the extraordinary intelligence service P-27 in the event of a breakdown.

assignment

The mandate of project 27 was:

“ The extraordinary intelligence service procures military, political, economic and technical information that can serve to extend the warning time. »

- PUK EMD report. P. 245

Leadership and subordination

The head of project 27 was employed under private law on a contract basis and subordinated to the Deputy Chief of Intelligence and Defense (UNA). Individual departments of the UNA were informed about this service so that they could formulate appropriate orders. After the change in the head of the organization in the spring of 1986, he was directly subordinate to the chief of staff and remained only "operationally" subordinate to the sub-chief of intelligence and defense.

The first boss was at the head of the organization from 1980 to 1985, which only existed on paper in 1980. The second boss, Ferdinand J. Knecht (1986 to 1990), also came from the private sector and only came into contact with Project 27 when he was employed. Both had an extensive international network of contacts from their private-sector activities.

Organization and resources

From 1980 to 1985, project 27 comprised the boss, a secretariat and a "scientific" position that dealt with the evaluation and processing of incoming reports. From 1986 an electronic monitoring station was added, which recorded foreign radio broadcasts and broadcasts from foreign news agencies.

According to the two bosses, P-27 did not include agents or residents. A mishap like the Schilling case in 1979 was seen as too great a risk for the organization. Various employees in part-time and contract relationships evaluated the information from foreign sources and prepared reports for the attention of the regular intelligence service.

financing

The financing of project 27 was based, like project 26, on regulations of the chief of staff. An advance inspectorate and an inspection by the head of the Swiss Federal Audit Office ensured the lawful use of the funds. In contrast to other areas of the federal government, all documents were checked but, as is customary in the intelligence service, destroyed immediately afterwards. The money came exclusively from federal funds. While the PUK EMD criticized the financing, the financial delegation of the National Council and Council of States took the position in 1991 that the criticism was incorrect.

Consultative Council ("Konrat")

A consultative council («Konrat») was formed for the extraordinary intelligence service Project 27 (P-27), which, like group 426 in Project 26 ( P-26 ), had an advisory function. In 1990, this Konrat included four active and former members of the Federal Assembly ( Eduard Belser (SP), Paul Eisenring (CVP), Massimo Pini (FDP) and François Jeanneret (Lib)) as well as two other advisors who were independent of the Federal Administration. Representatives of the federal police also took part in the meetings, which take place once or twice a year, including the head of counter-espionage. The head of Project 27 was also present sporadically.

According to the basic concept, this advisory body should have advised the Deputy Chief of Intelligence and Defense on any special operations of the extraordinary intelligence service. However, since no operational missions took place, the Konrat was not used in this function.

Detection and dissolution

In the course of the fiche affair in the Federal Department of Justice and Police in 1989, the Federal Assembly set up a parliamentary commission of inquiry on March 12, 1990 to investigate major incidents in the Federal Military Department (PUK EMD). The PUK EMD also examined the so-called “secret services” in the EMD. Through their report of November 17, 1990, the general public learned about projects 26 and 27, the existence and purpose of which, however, had been published in the press much earlier.

Criticism of the PUK EMD

In its report, the PUK EMD mainly criticized the lack of an explicit legal basis for project 27 and the lack of parliamentary oversight and control. She fundamentally questioned the extraordinary intelligence service. It was founded with a view to operational reconnaissance, but such activities never took place, which is why it is not needed in this form.

The Federal Council, on the other hand, did not simply want to dissolve P-27, but wanted to check whether an extraordinary intelligence service would necessarily have to be located outside the army and administration. In particular, he wanted to check whether P-27 could be integrated into the group for general staff services, as requested by the PUK EMD.

resolution

Two weeks after the head of Project 26 (P-26) was exposed, Weltwoche journalist Urs Paul Engeler succeeded in uncovering the head of Project 27, Ferdinand J. Knecht (code name "James"), another scoop. On the same day, the Federal Council decided to dissolve the extraordinary intelligence service P-27 and transfer the valuable sources to the intelligence service.

literature

  • Hans Senn : On guard during the Cold War. Review of my life . Society for military history study trips, issue 28, Wettingen 2007.
  • Business Audit Commission of the National Council: Conclusions of the Bachmann Working Group on December 15, 1980.

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ PUK EMD: Report of the PUK EMD of November 17, 1990 . Bern, S. 242 ff .
  2. ^ Statement of the Federal Council on the report of the PUK EMD of 23 November 1990 .
  3. ↑ Urs Paul Engeler: The Secret Service from Zürichberg only caused yawns . In: Weltwoche . No. 50 , December 13, 1990, pp. 33 .
  4. ↑ P-27 is also canceled . In: Neue Zürcher Zeitung . December 13, 1990, p. 21 .
  5. ↑ Hans Senn: On guard in the Cold War . S. 81 .
  6. ↑ PUK EMD: Report of the PUK EMD of November 17, 1990 . S. 235 .
  7. ↑ PUK EMD: Report of the PUK EMD of November 17, 1990 . S. 236 f .
  8. ^ GPK working group, Bachmann affair: Conclusions . December 15, 1980, p. 4 .
  9. ^ GPK working group, Bachmann affair: Conclusions . December 15, 1980, p. 4 .
  10. ↑ PUK EMD: Report of the PUK EMD of November 17, 1990 . S. 238 .
  11. ^ Report on the matter of Colonel Bachmann. January 19, 1981. Retrieved July 31, 2016 .
  12. ↑ Official Bulletin of the Federal Assembly: Consultation in the National Council on the Müller postulate regarding supervision . March 3, 1981, p. 55 ff .
  13. ↑ PUK EMD: Report of the PUK EMD of November 17, 1990 . S. 242 f .
  14. ↑ PUK EMD: PUK EMD report of November 17, 1990 . S. 245 f .
  15. ↑ Finance delegation: Report of the finance delegation of the federal councils on their activities in 1990/91 to the finance commission of the National Council and the Council of States . Point 21 and 45, April 26, 1991.
  16. ↑ P-26 and P-27 Advisory Boards . In: Neue Zürcher Zeitung . No. 275 , November 26, 1990, pp. 18 .
  17. ↑ Two Liberals on the Secret Service Advisory Boards . In: Neue Zürcher Zeitung . No. 277 , November 28, 1990, pp. 22 .
  18. ↑ PUK EMD: Report of the PUK EMD of November 17, 1990 . S. 255 .
  19. ↑ z. B. Walliser Bote , January 21, 1981, p. 7. online
  20. ↑ PUK EMD: Report of the PUK EMD of November 17, 1990 . S. 267-271 .
  21. ^ Statement of the Federal Council on the report of the PUK EMD of 23 November 1990 .