P-26

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The P-26 (Project 26) was a secret cadre organization to maintain the will to resist in Switzerland in the event of an occupation. It was installed in 1979/1981 as the successor to the special service in the Intelligence and Defense Subgroup (UNA) and was disbanded in 1990 - still in the process of being set up - following the announcement by a parliamentary commission of inquiry (PUK) by the Federal Council. In peacetime no armament was provided for the P-26 members, and the recruits did not know each other across cells. It was planned that they would only have been active on the orders of a government in exile , possibly remaining abroad , in order to serve as a source of news and a last resort to exert influence. A combat mission was not intended, but reserved for the army .

Certificate Veronika

prehistory

For fifty years from 1940 to 1990, the army command not only prepared the defense of Switzerland against National Socialist aggression and an attack in accordance with Soviet military doctrine, but also considered the defeat of its army. The civil defense book designed by Albert Bachmann , which was handed over to the Swiss population by the Federal Council in 1969 and which, because of its tendency to “militarize civil society”, met with rejection in left and pacifist circles, was also intended to serve this purpose . Until 1990, logistical structures were set up under strict secrecy in order to be able to organize the resistance after an enemy occupation of the country if necessary.

The first secret resistance organization, Aktion Nationaler Resistance (ANW), was founded on September 7, 1940 at a time of great threat. The news captain Hans Hausamann , the news corporal and later ambassador August Lindt and the president of the Swiss Social Democrats, Hans Oprecht had invited to the inaugural meeting in the 2nd class station buffet in Zurich . Also there were the later SP Federal Councilor Max Weber and the editor Albert Oeri, known for his indomitable resistance against the Nazis, as well as well-known theologians such as Leonhard Ragaz and Karl Barth and the Migros founder Gottlieb Duttweiler . The standing together of all Federal Council parties did not end with the Second World War, well-known exponents of all four Federal Council parties were always involved in the resistance preparations, such as the CVP Federal Councilor Alphons Egli, who died in 2016, with the code name “Blasius”. In 1990 they were all obliged to maintain absolute secrecy when they were threatened with prison sentences. On behalf of Hans Hausamann, the radio corporal, Bürgenstock hotelier and radio amateur Fritz Frey built 50 "Tg 105" secret transmitters, 21 of which were placed with recruited radio operators and regularly put into operation by the end of the war. The last of these ANW radio operators was released from secrecy in 2009 by Federal Councilor Ueli Maurer in the Bundestag building and he owed him. Major Hagen had been released from work to recruit and operate the secret "G-Netz".

From 1948 to 1965/66 there were resistance preparations within the territorial service of the army.

In 1968, responsibility for the preparations was transferred to the newly formed special service of the Intelligence and Defense Subgroup (UNA). From 1969 to 1975 Heinrich Amstutz (1924–2012) headed the special service. During his time from 1971 to 1976, the later Federal Councilor Alphons Egli was assigned as a militia officer in Army Staff Section 420.3 staff member of the Special Service.

From 1976 Albert Bachmann (code name "Tom") headed the special service. Heinrich Eichenberger (code name "Felix") was head of the field organization. After the Schilling / Bachmann affair in 1979, which brought Schilling a conditional prison sentence and which ended with Bachmann's release, the special service was reorganized and the two areas of resistance preparation in the event of an occupation and the extraordinary intelligence service unbundled in terms of organization and personnel.

Efrem Cattelan (1990)

On October 1, 1979, Efrem Cattelan , Colonel in the General Staff, took over the special service from Colonel Bachmann and, after a period of familiarization, continued the areas of recruitment, training and logistics created by Bachmann. After the code name “Special Service” became public as a result of the investigation of the Schilling case by a parliamentary commission, the resistance organization received the new code name Project 26 (P-26) on January 1, 1981. The designation, which Chief of Staff Hans Senn approved as the last official act, refers - like parliamentary group 426 - to article 426 of the overall defense concept of 1973, which describes the resistance preparations in the article with this number.

Legal basis

The origin of project 26 was in the security policy report of the Swiss Federal Council of 1973:

“An occupation of the country must not mean the extinction of all resistance. In this case, too, an opponent should expect not only rejection but also active resistance. This certainty must be a positive element for us in his profit and loss account. [...] But all opportunities to create favorable conditions for active resistance must be taken early on. "

- Federal Council security policy report from 1973, item 426

The Bachmann working group of the GPK, chaired by the later EMD head, Jean-Pascal Delamuraz , came to the following conclusion in its 1981 report on the special service under Bachmann:

«The task and position of the resistance organization and the special intelligence service today correspond to the requirements that must be made from the standpoint of the rule of law and democracy. The internal administration supervision of these areas is not sufficient. "

- Colonel Bachmann matter, report of the working group of the Business Audit Commission to the National Council on its additional investigations of January 19, 1981, item 55

In 1973 and 1981, Parliament took note of the preparations for project 26 and confirmed the legality of the organization. As part of the overall defense, it was constitutional and financed exclusively with state funds. The details of the resistance preparations, however, had to remain top secret, if the structures of the organization were not betrayed at the beginning of an occupation and destroyed by the enemy.

Parliament could not have known about the effective dimensions of the P-26 organization; In 1980/81, however, the auditing commission had been briefly informed, which claimed the overall supervision of the secret services. She did this for a few years, but seems to have stopped bothering about it from around 1984. Although there was no legal basis for the organization, it was on a constitutional basis.

assignment

In the event of an occupation of Switzerland by a foreign power, the P-26 would have provided the cadres (equipped with the necessary resources) for continuous resistance against the aggressor. It should not be left to chance or the opponent how the Swiss Confederation finds its way back to independence. In contrast to resistance organizations in World War II, the four resistance structures that followed each other from 1940 to 1990 never had a military or even combat mission; from the beginning it was the political mission to support the morale of the population under a totalitarian occupying power and the Federal Council in Exile as the only remaining one News source and sole operational tool to serve.

Among the strategic cases of an attack by the Warsaw Pact forces , there was the case of the "partial occupation" in which only the armored Central Plateau would have been occupied. In this case, the last 40 resistance regions, each with two separate cells, would have been managed by the inland command staff in the “Schweizerhof” facility in Gstaad and via the associated transmitter at Saanen airfield, or from the replacement command post on the Brünig , using encrypted shortwave radio . The daily incoming situation reports from the 80 transmitter locations would have been continuously processed by the management staff into a daily situation report for the occupied area and transmitted to the Federal Council in its management system K20 in Kandersteg via cable and beam connections. These situation reports would have been the most important basis for the Federal Council, which is in the Reduit, to assess the situation in partially occupied Switzerland.

Even with a full occupation of Switzerland, the main task of the four cadre organizations for the resistance in enemy-occupied territory, which had existed for 50 years, would have been the intended Federal Council in exile, which, according to the general staff department , would have operated in London , Ireland or Canada ( Ottawa ) as To serve as the last source of news and the last instrument of influence in Switzerland occupied by the Wehrmacht or the Soviet Union . The Federal Council in Exile would have been the ultima ratio of self-assertion. "The ultimate goal of the resistance", it says on behalf of the Chief of Staff for Project 26, "is the restoration of Swiss sovereignty under the rule of law within today's borders."

Threat situation

Information board: Soviet general staff map from 1988 with object characteristics (in the red rectangle) for the Rüdlingen bridge (building material: ЖБ [= Железобетон / reinforced concrete]; bridge length: 110 m; roadway width: 5 m; load capacity: 30 t)

Finds from the archives of the KGB show that there were plans for a military advance by the Warsaw Pact via the “neutral corridor” ( Austria and Switzerland) up until the summer of 1988 . The maps that the Soviet General Staff tracked contained information on the load limits of Swiss bridges. During the police operation to occupy the Polish embassy in Bern , espionage documents from the Eastern Bloc were found in 1982. After the end of the Cold War , a hiding place for weapons and equipment was uncovered in Belfaux , which was protected by explosive devices and was probably set up by Soviet agents in 1966.

The highest-ranking defector of the Soviet bloc , the Czechoslovak Major General Jan Šejna , fled to the United States in 1968 and reported in his book “We will bury you” that Soviet war plans to occupy Switzerland also included the use of airborne troops. In the event of a war against Germany, the plan was to occupy Switzerland in order to prevent the defeated “fascists” from withdrawing to Switzerland. The plan also envisaged “protecting” Swiss neutrality with Warsaw Pact units in case the West had tried to take action against Warsaw Pact military actions in Austria or Yugoslavia .

The Swiss military were convinced that a Soviet offensive to the west could be triggered practically from a standing start, that is, without any recognizable preparations.

Scenarios

In 1982, Efrem Cattelan formulated possible developments (" scenarios ") in the top secret basic concept that could lead to a military occupation of Switzerland and thus to the deployment of the resistance organization:

  1. March through : This leads to a partial occupation of the country. The aim of this campaign is not primarily to conquer Switzerland.
  2. Incidence : This initially leads to a partial occupation. But the goal is to conquer the country. If it is achieved, the third case occurs.
  3. Occupation : In this case Switzerland was conquered and occupied militarily. Whether it will then remain within its current limits or whether it will - z. B. according to languages ​​and cultures - the larger European regions is allocated to the occupying power. Should that happen, the objectives and mandate to the resistance organization will not expire. At most they can be made more difficult.
  4. Subversion : In the last case, internal subversion through blackmail, infiltration and / or the like appears possible. In this case too, the goal is to occupy the whole of Switzerland.
  5. Europe : For the time being, scenarios in the European area were deliberately left out.

While the first three scenarios also made sense to later critics, the "coup d'état" triggered a political outcry after the PUK report was published in 1990. The critics overlooked the fact that it was not the "overthrow" that led to the activation of P-26 by the Federal Council, but only the military occupation. The entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan in 1979 may have served as a model.

Summary of the Federal Council

«Our previous security policy, established in 1973, has proven to be correct during the time of confrontation between East and West. With its general peacekeeping part on the one hand and its defensive elements aimed at credible national defense on the other, it formed a solid basis for overcoming our security problems during the Cold War. "

- Report 90 of the Federal Council to the Federal Assembly on Switzerland's security policy of 1990

organization

The P-26 was an elitist cadre organization that consisted of small cells of two to four people and would have built up around 80 regions of resistance in an emergency. The members did not know each other across cells. It was planned that the Federal Council and its management staff would have led the resistance of each of the 80 resistance regions from exile individually over daily encrypted shortwave radio . With the central leadership, it would have been possible to mobilize nationwide propaganda campaigns without direct communication between the individual cells.

Each head of a resistance region had a radio operator, an action group head ("Department News and Propaganda"), a courier (with his material depot) and a genius specialist (who was trained, among other things, to block enemy train trains or sabotage enemy telephone networks with simple means) Available. The merging of regional resistance cells would only have taken place immediately before or even after the occupation of Switzerland. The cadre organization would then have recruited and trained the actual resistance organization on orders from the political leadership. Even this expanded structure would not have had a combat mission.

Each head of a resistance region recruited a base team at the “place of life”, and each member won recruited the next member who was needed to cope with the tasks in the staging area. The people, who were usually between 45 and 50 years old (mostly men, a few women) were approached with the greatest discretion. The chiefs of a resistance region usually recruited members from their circle of friends and found new members, e.g. B. in the Masonic Lodge of Chur or in the Swiss Alpine Club (SAC). Everyone only knew as many team members as necessary, and that was mostly just two people. They looked for willing people who were seen as reliable members of society, such as directors, association and party presidents, or politicians. The Swiss militia system had the advantage that the men up to the age of 55 regularly completed their military service and thus had a relatively high degree of military training. Before the chosen ones were put into the picture via the cadre organization, a secret staff unit in the Federal Military Department (EMD, now VBS) had the candidates' history checked by police specialists. The P-26 members had a single, top priority: "Silence".

The head of the P-26, Colonel in the General Staff Efrem Cattelan ( code name "Rico", business camouflage "Personnel Placement Consec" in Basel), received the order in 1979 to continue the organization from Colonel Bachmann. The extended command staff of the P-26 consisted of civil servants, professional soldiers and members of the militia. There were three EMD officials in the administrative staff section and seven instruction officers and officers in the training staff section. When it was dissolved in 1991, the organization consisted of 320 people, about 10 percent of whom were fully trained. The target population was based on 800 people in 80 resistance regions.

medium

Means such as civil disobedience , propaganda , ridiculing the opponent, sabotage against the infrastructure and other actions were in the foreground. In order to be able to form the nucleus for a later resistance organization in enemy-occupied territory, suitable cadres and specialists had to be recruited during peacetime, the necessary special materials had to be stored and the necessary infrastructure created at home and abroad. The P-26 was not intended and would not have been able to continue the army's fight against the occupiers as a combatant unit.

education

The P-26 was based on the militia principle, which is upheld in Switzerland . The members were radio operators, explosives experts, logisticians and people with special knowledge in propaganda and press work or were trained in them. They were trained individually or in small groups (in the latter case with mask and cover name) in their respective functions in secret locations and covered by “plausible stories”. The former Krattigen artillery works under the cover name “Alpengarten” and, from mid-1983, the “Schweizerhof” fortress in Gstaad , where a pistol shooting range was also available, served as training locations. The courses usually lasted three to four days, often from Friday evening to Sunday. In total, the members attended ten to twelve courses, which resulted in 30 to 40 training days, spread over a period of around five years. Above all, they practiced creating dead mailboxes , shaking off a persecutor and generating propaganda material with everyday means. The genists , known internally as pioneers, also practiced with explosives, acids, alkalis and solvents. The maxim for acts of sabotage was: "Little damage, but high symbolic value".

Instructors and experts of the P-26 and its predecessor organizations were trained from 1949 to 1990 in a training center of the British foreign intelligence service MI6 . This training included a conspiratorial lifestyle, organizing non-violent resistance, sabotage techniques and behavior training in the event of arrest and subsequent isolation. According to Efrem Cattelan, only instructors went to the UK for training. They were arrested and interrogated there for exercise purposes on suspicion of espionage. During exercises, the local police received mug shots of the people. The uninitiated security forces believed that a sabotage group was on the way. Members of the P-26, for example, had the order to blow up a refinery - and they carried fake explosives with them.

equipment

Central warehouse S of the P-26
Earth container

Around 25 percent of the basic equipment was in four camps of the General Staff Services (GGST) group of the Federal Military Department (today VBS), including above all sensitive material such as explosives, weapons (pistol for self-defense, the self-developed G 150 precision rifle in caliber 10, 4 mm for triggering “trigger charges” and “material sabotage”) and ammunition. This would only have been distributed in an emergency. The basic equipment of the resistance cells was packed in airtight chrome steel containers so that they could be stored hidden in the ground if the resistance cells were recruited for months or years. Weapons and explosives were under the direct control of the Chief of Staff until the P-26 was liquidated.

During the peacetime, the resistance cells only had radio equipment with accessories, encryption exercise documents, maps on a scale of 1: 25,000, compass, binoculars and medical supplies as well as medicines.

The regional bosses' equipment containers also contained a “Kobra” cipher, a mains charger and batteries, two kilograms of gold as bars and plates in various denominations, additional maps, a SIG Sauer P220 with three magazines, 120 pistol cartridges, medical supplies and medication. The gold was not only intended as a means of payment, but, as Efrem Cattelan explained, also intended to bribe people, for example to obtain information under occupation conditions. After the P-26 organization was exposed, the Swiss public were also presented with war weapons such as submachine guns and hollow armor shells from secret stores .

financing

The P-26 organization needed an average of around 3 million Swiss francs per year, a total of around 25 million, for its current expenses (wages, compensation, rents, pay, food, accommodation and small purchases) . the tranches varied between 1.2 million (1985) and 10.7 million (1989). According to the PUK EMD, the funds came from various EMD credit sections, namely the War Commissioner. The procurement of weapons, equipment and explosives, on the other hand, was partly carried out by the armaments services group .

The modern radios and the gold plates were a special case. The “ Harpoon ” radio system (around 200 individual devices, plus the central units) cost Switzerland 15 million Swiss francs. Before making this purchase, the parliamentary advisory board was informed. In 1986 the chief of staff approved 6 million francs, for which gold was purchased for the "war chest" in the following years.

Known members

  • Efrem Cattelan (1931–2014), head of the P-26 organization (1979–1990) (alias: "Rico")
  • Hans-Rudolf Strasser (1936–2016), then Head of Information at the EMD (code name: «Franz»)
  • Markus Flückiger, geography teacher at the Hofwil teacher training college, courier manager for the Bern region (alias: "Cyrill")
  • Susanne Günter, nurse, later chairwoman (FDP) of the city parliament of Schaffhausen, chief courier (code name: "Veronika")
  • Alfred Hebeisen (1923–2011), teacher at the Hofwil teacher training college, head of the Bern region (code name: "Numa")
  • Susi Noger, canton school teacher, radio operator at P-26 (code name: "Tina")

Well-known members of the predecessor organizations

  • Alphons Egli (1924–2016), former Federal Councilor CVP, code name “Blasius”. From 1971 to 1975 he was involved in the further development of the resistance as part of the special service (predecessor of P-26).
  • Jeanne Hersch , (1910-2000), philosopher. May have been there in the early stages of the special service.
  • Walther Bringolf (1895–1981), National Councilor SP, was involved in the ANW.

Exposure and dissolution

In 1989 and 1990 a cascade of affairs shook confidence in politics and in the national authorities in Switzerland. The unmasking of the secret organizations P-26 and P-27 was not at the beginning, but at the end of this series. The trigger was the scandal surrounding the first Swiss Federal Councilor and head of the Justice and Police Department (FDJP) Elisabeth Kopp . The events surrounding Ms. Kopp and her spouse led to the establishment of the parliamentary investigative commission “PUK FDJP”, which came across 900,000 files (index cards) that the Federal Police had secretly put on people and organizations (→ file scandal ). Since cross-references to the military department were found in some of the files, calls for an extension of the investigation to the EMD were made.

Even before the PUK EMD was set up, the “Schweizer Illustrierte” published an article in February 1990 on the “secret army of EMD spies”. As a result, articles on this topic also appeared in other media. The story from the time of Colonel Albert Bachmann was rehashed. Sections of the Swiss public reacted indignantly when the media spread that weapons depots had been opened and that people had been trained to resist. In order to clarify the allegations, the Federal Council parties agreed to set up a PUK for the EMD.

Parliamentary investigation "PUK EMD"

On the occasion of the parliamentary debate on the establishment of a PUK EMD, Federal Councilor Kaspar Villiger made his first public statement on the resistance preparations in front of the National Council on March 8:

«A resistance organization that you know cannot fulfill its duty in an emergency. All I can tell you is that these are not secret armies. I don't think it could have been called that even in Bachmann's time. It is not a particularly large cadre organization, which until now was solely responsible to the chief of staff, although the organization represents an instrument of overall defense - active and passive resistance - and was set up independently of the army. "

Nevertheless, on March 12, 1990, the National Council and the Council of States decided to set up a Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry (PUK EMD). In the “Report of the Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry (PUK) on the special clarification of incidents of great significance in the Federal Military Department (EMD)” of November 17, 1990 (Report No. 90.022), the PUK EMD under the direction of Council of States Carlo Schmid (CVP) The structure, organization and activities of the resistance organizations P-26 and the extraordinary intelligence service P-27 were examined in detail. The PUK not only examined the documents, but also spoke to members of various hierarchical levels. The official reports and documents are confidential until 2041. The PUK criticized the preparations. With regard to the members of P-26, she stated that "the loyalty to the constitution of these persons is not in doubt and that they are not assumed to have any anti-constitutional intentions." However, she saw in a secret organization a "potential danger to the constitutional order" and stated that

«That this de facto control of the P-26 organization by the highest state authority is not given. There is a risk of abuse through self-activation. It increases because of the clandestine structure of P-26. (...) The danger that an activation could be triggered without or even against the will of the highest political state authorities makes the organization an instrument of power for people who are not subject to any democratic control. "

Shortly after the report was published, Weltwoche journalist Urs Paul Engeler uncovered the head of the organization, Efrem Cattelan, on November 28, 1990 . On December 12, 1990 - also by Weltwoche - Ferdinand J. Knecht was exposed as head of the extraordinary intelligence service Project 27 (P-27).

«Group 426»

During the discussion on the final report of the GPK investigation in the wake of the Bachmann / Schilling affair in 1981, Parliament was informed that the Chief of Staff was dealing with members of parliament for consultation purposes.

The «Group 426», which serves as an advisory board and consists of federal parliamentarians from five parties - the number 426 referred to the security policy report of the Federal Council of 1973, number 426 - was accused of contradicting parliamentary rules, in particular democratic legitimacy , parliamentary control and domination by the political leadership. The "Group 426" in 1990 included the National Councilors Sepp Stappung (SP), Jacques-Simon Eggly (Liberals), Vreni Spoerri (FDP), Hans-Rudolf Nebiker (SVP) and Councilor of States Jakob Schönenberger (CVP). The chief of staff informed them about individual aspects of project 26 and obtained their personal political opinion. They had no supervisory or control function. The PUK EMD was not interested in that. She spoke of a "violation of the primacy of politics " and criticized: "The members of the advisory board should have ascertained questions of political leadership, parliamentary control and financial supervision." In particular, the establishment of such a body was criticized and that it cannot be that a chief of staff can hold a «parliamentary councilor».

«Cornu investigation report»

As a follow-up to the PUK-EMD report, the examining magistrate Pierre Cornu prepared the “final report in the administrative investigation to clarify the nature of any relationships between the P-26 organization and analogous organizations abroad” and published an abridged version on August 5, 1991 . The integral version is still secret today, because the files on the organization P-26 (archive inventory E 5563) of the staff of the group for general staff services between 1969 and 1995 are subject to the "extended protection period" of 50 years.

In its response to the motion submitted in March 2005 by National Councilor Josef Lang for the early release of the entire report, the Federal Council argued, among other things, that early full publication of the Cornu report would strain Switzerland's relations with several friendly foreign countries. With the publication of the report, relevant geographical and organizational details of friendly states would be made public by Switzerland, which expressly wish to keep them secret (“overriding public interest worthy of protection”). In addition, it should be noted that numerous people, most of them still alive, gave information to examining magistrate Cornu under the aspect of confidentiality. These people would therefore continue to have the right to privacy protection and the protection of their statements (“predominant private interest worthy of protection”). The motion became invalid due to non-treatment within the required period. A second motion by National Councilor Lang from 2009 was rejected by the bourgeois majority in 2011.

According to the Cornu investigation report, the P-26 cooperated neither with the CIA nor with NATO . There was also no contact with Gladio . There was only limited training cooperation with the British intelligence service MI6. However, Cornu stated that “there were close ties to the British, who knew more about the Swiss resistance than the Federal Council and the heads of the EMD”. Participation in an international structure would have violated Switzerland's neutrality.

Daniele Ganser claimed that Switzerland had close ties with the British secret service MI6 and used the Harpoon radio system. The “Harpoon” radio system was never in operation in Switzerland for Project 26, but was only being procured when the existence of the secret organization became public. Harpoon's ciphers were also specific to each client (only governments could be considered as customers), so that there was no pan-European radio network over this network. Radio links between neighboring cells or even to headquarters in other countries would, on the contrary, have jeopardized the vital security concept of all resistance organizations.

On April 25, 2018, the Federal Council decided to publish the anonymized “version for the media” of Pierre Cornu's administrative investigation from 1991. According to the report, it is almost impossible that Swiss organizations have had relationships with international resistance committees.

Archiving of files and missing documents

The training and management documents of project 26 were microfilmed and stored together with a list of names in the safe of EMD head Kaspar Villiger before they were handed over to the Federal Archives in 1993. They are subject to an extended protection period of 50 years and are not freely accessible until 2041. This also applies to the PUK EMD documents. The historian and FDP politician Titus Meier received permission to view his dissertation and was able to evaluate the files of Project 26 for the first time.

The researcher pointed out to the business audit delegation in 2016 that the files of the Cornu investigation were missing in the Federal Archives and asked the GPDel to clarify the whereabouts of the files. In February 2018, the DDPS announced that 7 folders and 20 files on the Cornu report could not be found. These are mainly interrogation protocols. At the same time it was announced that the blackened original Cornu report would be published. In February 2019, GPDel informed the public that the files could not be found. It also became known that the list of names has now been handed over to the Federal Archives.

"Secret army"

The term "secret army " goes back to an article in the weekly magazine Schweizer Illustrierte in 1990. Under the title “Sniffing State of Switzerland - The Secret Army of EMD Spies” it was claimed in the opening credits of the article that “2000 men and women were trained in bombing and silent killing”. The term "secret army" was used by numerous media outlets.

Later reception

End of secrecy, thanks and belated honor

On August 19, 2009, in response to a request from the Graubünden CVP Council of States, Theo Maissen , the entire Federal Council decided to thank the veterans of the secret army resistance organizations from 1940 to 1990 for their quiet service. At the same time, it lifted the strict secrecy that had been maintained for 69 years.

As a token of thanks to the members of the resistance organization for their commitment to the fatherland, Federal Councilor Ueli Maurer invited 92-year-old Albert Stierli, the last living radio operator of General Guisan's secret network G during the Second World War in Switzerland, to the Federal Palace . Thanks followed from the governments in the Great Council Chamber in Chur (4 regions of Graubünden and Buchs SG), in the museum in Benken by the government of the Canton of Glarus, in the Klostergut Paradies by the government of the canton of Schaffhausen. The government of the canton of Uri then invited the resistance regions of central Switzerland to Altdorf town hall. In May and June 2012, members of the government of the three cantons thanked the resistance regions of the cantons ZH, SO and BE at Kyburg Castle and the Spiez Castle Church. In May 2015 25 veterans were honored by Isaac Reber , Head of the Baselland Security Directorate , at Ebenrain Castle . After the three (sic!) Ticino resistance regions were thanked by the Ticino military director Norman Gobbi in summer 2015, the thanksgiving events for the resistance regions of French-speaking Switzerland and Valais came to an end on November 17, 2015 in the Salle des Rois de l'Arquebuse in Geneva . The address was given by Security Director Maudet. The members of the management staff under Colonel Amstutz (1968–1975) and Colonel Bachmann (1976–1979) were thanked on silent occasions in the Benken Museum.

Felix Nöthiger, as head of the Musée Résistance Suisse , which is being set up in the former “Schweizerhof” training facility in Gstaad, issued an obituary notice for Hans-Rudolf Strasser v / o Franz on July 11, 2016 The advertisement he wrote himself after his death met with great media coverage.

Nöthiger also acts as secretary of the alumni association "Club 717" (named after the corresponding number in the concept for overall defense) and has initiated the implementation of dismissal events in various cantons. These events are not public and their announcement caused a media stir in 2015 when the Basel government wanted to rely on a non-existent Federal Council resolution.

Exhibitions

  • Sparks for the Resistance , Yesterday's Department on “Army Day Comm'08” in Frauenfeld , from September 13th and 14th, 2008 (not public)
  • Between June 5 and July 3, 2010, a public exhibition on the P-26 organization was shown for the first time in the bunker of the Schaffhausen armory .
  • Special exhibition P-26 - Secret Preparations for Resistance in the Cold War in the Museum Altes Zeughaus Solothurn , August 30, 2019 to April 13, 2020.
  • Museum in the Zeughaus Schaffhausen Special exhibition "Resistance - Résistance" until the end of 2020
  • Swiss Military and Fortress Museum Full-Reuenthal Exhibition about the P26 in the former "central warehouse castle". The only publicly accessible P26 system in Switzerland.
  • MUSÉE RÉSISTANCE SUISSE 1940 - 1990 Museum in four languages ​​on the history of the resistance in the former "Schweizerhof" guided tour in Gstaad. Opened in 2017, limited access to the museum, public access to the Funk collection. Responsible: Pro Castellis , Seestrasse 31 8806 Bäch pro-castellis.ch
  • MUSÉE RÉSISTANCE SUISSE 1940 - 1990 German-language museum on the history of the resistance in the former central warehouse "BURG" ZLB of the GSA for P-26 in Benken SG. Opened as the first resistance museum in 2009. Open to groups. Responsible: PRO CASTELLIS, Seestrasse 31 8806 Bäch pro-castellis.ch
  • TOP SECRET special exhibition on the P-26 in the fortress museum SASSO SAN GOTTARDO on the top of the Gotthard Pass. German and Italian June 2019 to October 2020. Design by Pro Castellis.

Television broadcasts

See also

literature

Web links

Commons : Project 26  - Collection of Images

Individual evidence

  1. ^ Statement of the Federal Council on the report of the PUK EMD of 23 November 1990.
  2. ↑ a b c d e f g h Philipp Hauenstein: Switzerland - Resistance Organizations 1940–1991 , on globaldefence.net.
  3. ↑ Titus J. Meier : P-26 or the story of the Swiss secret army In: NZZ am Sonntag . 15th July 2018.
  4. ↑ In 48 hours on the Rhine? Spiegel, January 28, 1980.
  5. ↑ a b Swiss Federal Archives (ed.): Incidents in the EMD - Report of the Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry (PUK EMD) . November 17, 1990, p. 179 ( Online [PDF; 12.1 MB ; accessed on February 12, 2019]).
  6. ↑ Alphons Egli was a member of the resistance organization. Retrieved September 10, 2016 .
  7. ^ Alumni Association Spez D and Project 26: Heinrich Eichenberger obituary. January 27, 2018, accessed January 27, 2018 .
  8. ↑ a b Matter: P-26. The secret army that wasn't. 2012, pp. 28, 34.
  9. ↑ Titus J. Meier: P-26 or the fairy tale of the Swiss secret army . In: NZZ on Sunday July 15, 2018.
  10. ↑ Report of the Federal Council to the Federal Assembly on Switzerland's security policy (concept of overall defense; PDF, 2.1 MB) of June 27, 1973.
  11. ↑ Chronology - Security Policy Concept in Switzerland since 1996 ( Memento of December 9, 2014 in the Internet Archive ), at ETH Zurich , accessed on June 14, 2012.
  12. ^ Meier: Resistance in the case of occupation . 2018, p. 246-247 .
  13. ^ Meier: Resistance in the case of occupation . 2018, p. 357-359 .
  14. ^ A b Thomas Knellwolf: "We bunkered explosives, fuses, gold" . January 1, 2010. Archived from the original on October 2, 2009. Retrieved March 15, 2015.
  15. ^ Meier: Resistance in the case of occupation. 2018, p. 251.
  16. ↑ Carolin Foehr: What the KGB hid in Belfaux. , Freiburger Nachrichten, October 8, 2009.
  17. ^ Andrew / Mitrokhin: The Sword and the Shield, 1999, p. 371.
  18. ↑ Quoted in: Stefanie Frey: Switzerland's Defense and Security Policy during the Cold War (1945–1973) . Verlag Merker im Effingerhof, Lenzburg 2002. ISBN 3-85648-123-0 .
  19. ^ Matter: P-26. The secret army that wasn't. 2012, p. 253.
  20. ↑ NZZ of July 26, 2013: Terror recipes for everyone . In 1957, Major Hans von Dach from Bern wrote the book Total Resistance to prepare Switzerland for a Soviet invasion.
  21. ↑ Meier: Resistance in the Case of Occupation 2018, p. 254.
  22. ^ Matter: P-26. The secret army that wasn't. 2012, p. 48.
  23. ↑ Meier: Resistance in the case of occupation 2018, p. 257.
  24. ↑ Swiss Security Policy in Transition , Report 90 of the Federal Council to the Federal Assembly on the Security Policy of Switzerland of October 1, 1990 (Report 90.061; PDF, 3.5 MB)
  25. ^ Matter: P-26. The secret army that wasn't. 2012, p. 16.
  26. ^ Matter: P-26. The secret army that wasn't. 2012, p. 82.
  27. ^ PUK EMD: Report of the Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry PUK EMD (report 90.022) . Bern November 17, 1990, p. 202 .
  28. ↑ Hans-Rudolf Schoch: The artillery works Krattigen A 1952 . Frutigen 2015
  29. ^ Matter: P-26. The secret army that wasn't. 2012, p. 64 ff.
  30. ^ Meier: Resistance in the case of occupation. 2018, p. 340.
  31. ^ Meier: Resistance in the case of occupation. 2018, p. 335.
  32. ^ Matter: P-26. The secret army that wasn't. 2012, p. 85 ff.
  33. ^ Matter: P-26. The secret army that wasn't. 2012, p. 91.
  34. ^ Matter: P-26. The secret army that wasn't. 2012, p. 103.
  35. ^ Matter: P-26. The secret army that wasn't. 2012, p. 91.
  36. ^ Matter: P-26. The secret army that wasn't. 2012, p. 107.
  37. ↑ a b c On a secret mission - Members of P-26 break their silence. In: Schweizer Fernsehen ( “Reporter” ), December 16, 2009.
  38. ↑ Obituary, Neue Zürcher Zeitung of July 11, 2016, p. 6.
  39. ↑ Explosive obituary from P-26 member: «Franz '» comrades are counting on Kaspar Villiger in Blick online from July 12, 2016
  40. ↑ a b Peter Keller: We were really needed . In: Weltwoche . No. 9 , September 23, 2009.
  41. ↑ St. Galler Tagblatt AG, Switzerland: When Susi was called Tina for a short time. Retrieved July 18, 2016 .
  42. ↑ Susi Noger. In: Play SRF. Retrieved July 18, 2016 .
  43. ↑ Luzerner Zeitung of September 10, 2016: SECRET ARMY: Former Federal Councilor Egli was in a secret organization
  44. ↑ sh.ch (PDF) From the answer of the government council of the canton of Schaffhausen to the small inquiry 1/2010 regarding honoring members of the secret organization P26 raises questions. Quote: "The long-standing and well-deserved Schaffhausen City President, SP President and National Councilor Walther Bringolf was just as much a member of the cadre organization for the resistance as the well-known Geneva philosopher and social democrat Jeanne Hersch."
  45. ^ Matter: P-26. The secret army that wasn't. 2012, p. 264.
  46. ↑ a b Sniffer State Switzerland - The secret army of EMD spies . In: Schweizer Illustrierte . February 26, 1990, p. 15 ff .
  47. ^ Official Bulletin of the National Council, March 8, 1990, p. 308
  48. ↑ a b PUK EMD: Report of the parliamentary commission of inquiry PUK EMD (report 90.022) . Bern November 17, 1990 ( Report of the PUK EMD Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry (Report 90.022) [PDF; accessed on December 19, 2009]).
  49. ↑ a b Official Bulletin, November 28, 1990, Council of States. P. 899 f. Retrieved May 30, 2010 (Archived on Commons ; 3.3 MB)
  50. ^ Meier: Resistance in the case of occupation. 2018, p. 451.
  51. ^ Matter: P-26. The secret army that wasn't. 2012, p. 278.
  52. ↑ Meier: Resistance in the case of occupation 2018, p. 370.
  53. ^ Roll- call vote of June 6, 2011
  54. ↑ 90.022 Business of Parliament. Incidents in the EMD. Parliamentary commission of inquiry, In: parlament.ch of March 13, 1990.
  55. ↑ Pierre Cornu: Final report in the administrative investigation to clarify the nature of any relationships between the organization P-26 and analogous organizations abroad. Abstract for the public. September 19, 1991, p. 2 .
  56. ^ Pierre Cornu: Final report of the administrative investigation. September 19, 1991, p. 11 .
  57. ^ Felix Nöthiger: Book manuscript Résistance Suisse 1940–1990 and material collection of the research project Resistance 2005–2015 REWI of the Military History Society of the Canton of Zurich
  58. ↑ Anonymous "Cornu Report" from 1991
  59. ^ Marc Tribelhorn: New details on the international relations of the P-26. In: NZZ. April 26, 2018. Retrieved April 27, 2018 .
  60. ^ Meier: Resistance in the case of occupation. 2018, p. 417.
  61. ^ Meier: Resistance in the case of occupation. 2018, p. 36.
  62. ↑ SDA: files on the secret army P-26 should be in the federal archive. May 3, 2016, accessed February 17, 2019 .
  63. ↑ Disappeared P-26 files remain lost. In: Neue Zürcher Zeitung. January 29, 2019, accessed February 17, 2019 .
  64. ^ Secret Army in the Mountain - Play SRF . November 27, 2012. Retrieved March 16, 2015.
  65. ^ Münchenstein: Chief of the former P-26 secret army has died . May 31, 2014. Accessed March 16, 2015.
  66. ↑ Martin Matter: "The P-26 was not a gang of freaky Rambos" in the Tages-Anzeiger on July 12, 2016
  67. ↑ Security Directorate: Thanks to veterans of the resistance regions in Central Switzerland ( Memento of the original from March 9, 2014 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. , on Uri Cantonal Administration , accessed on June 8, 2012, PDF pp. 12–13 @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.ur.ch
  68. ↑ Simone Matthieu: TV review: Veronika's secret mission in the service of Switzerland. ( Memento from December 19, 2009 in the Internet Archive ) In: Tages-Anzeiger , December 17, 2009
  69. ↑ Lucien Fluri: Former "Secret Army" P-26: Secrecy in flesh and blood. In: Aargauer Zeitung. July 14, 2012, accessed July 15, 2012 .
  70. ↑ Tages-Anzeiger: Veterans of the illegal P-26 honored , accessed on July 20, 2015
  71. ^ The P 26, forever in the bunker. In: tagesanzeiger.ch/. Retrieved July 15, 2016 .
  72. ↑ “Undercover in the Basel area: Secret honor for P-26 veterans” , on “Blick”, accessed on May 14, 2015.
  73. ↑ Baselbiet government sits up veterans lobby. May 15, 2015, accessed April 24, 2017 .
  74. ^ HS publications: publishing house for publications on Swiss fortifications, bunkers and fortresses, Frutigen
  75. ↑ Berner Zeitung of May 6, 2017: P-26 in the Hagerbach test tunnel ( Memento of August 10, 2017 in the Internet Archive )