Pseudo-explanation

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The term pseudo-explanation (from the Greek pseudo (o) ψεύδειν / ψεύδεσθαι; ψεύδειν / ψεύδεσθαι) designates in the philosophy of science a series of sentences that apparently have the structure and function of scientific explanations , but which nevertheless do not meet the requirements of scientific explanations. The term pseudo-explanation is used in the context of a metatheory or methodology to mark certain attempts at explanation as unscientific or invalid at all. The selection of the claims for scientific explanations depends on the underlying theory of scientific explanation. Sham explanations are not only logically incorrect explanations, but also those in which the logical structure of the argument is confusing or obscured or the deductive final form is inadequately applied.

Logical flaws

Any attempt at an explanation based on a logically defective conclusion is in any case a pseudo- explanation . In the derivation of the phenomenon to be explained ( explanandum ) from the explanatory facts ( explanans ), there must be no inconsistency and no gap. The explanans must also have a reason that is independent of the explanandum , as otherwise there is a circular reasoning or a petitio principii , or the reasoning represents a materially invalid conclusion (see fallacy ). It is therefore at least problematic if the declaration uses an ad hoc term.

No explanations are u. a .: descriptions or narratives (as there are no legal statements); the mere use of terms, classification schemes or typologies. The use of analogies is also inadequate . Even orientation hypotheses are too unspecific to be able to explain a fact with their help.

Scientific explanation as a normative concept

As already mentioned, the choice of claims for scientific explanations depends on the underlying theory of scientific explanation.

The deductive nomological model is a classic model of scientific explanation. It provides that an observable fact is logically derived as an individual case of a true, general law and certain boundary conditions (both together form the explanans ) ( Hempel-Oppenheim scheme ).

According to this scheme, the explanation of an occurrence of lightning and thunder by a decision of the god Zeus would clearly be a pseudo-explanation, since "It is the will of Zeus that it flashes now" is not a general law.

However, alternative models of scientific explanation are also being considered and it is questioned whether e.g. B. Willful actions of persons can be explained by this model or modifications thereof, or do not belong to its scope.

According to Popper, a nomological hypothesis should have successfully passed as many independent tests as possible so that it can be accepted as a causal law. A statement that excludes too few empirical cases (because it has too little empirical content) is what Karl Popper calls an ad hoc statement.

The term “pseudo-explanation” in Hans Reichenbach's use is directed against speculative philosophy, which should be replaced by a scientific one.

Blurring of the concept of pseudo-explanation

What scientifically represents a satisfactory explanation and / or what is permissible observation data and what criteria are to be used to decide about it is determined very differently depending on the metatheoretical position within the philosophy of science, methodology or epistemology . This is especially true if, as in the distinction between nomothetic and idiographical research, between systematically explanatory sciences on the one hand and historically descriptive sciences on the other hand, a fundamental dividing line is intended.

Calling an explanation “apparently” requires knowing what a “correct” explanation should look like. To determine this exactly, however, presupposes a certain metatheory that stipulates what can be called a “correct explanation”. The proof of a logical error also requires a satisfactory and recognized logical reconstruction of an attempted explanation. When a theoretical text is formalized by a system of axioms, it is not always easy to determine which of it constitutes a nomological hypothesis or which of it constitutes a definition (i.e. an analytical statement ). Every attempt at an explanation can therefore be formalized in a wide variety of ways . And if a certain formalization is inconsistent , this does not say anything about the logical truth of other possible versions.

It is also conceivable that theoretical terms that are not observable and / or measurable in and of themselves, as well as fictions (i.e., strictly speaking, empirically false statements) play a fruitful role for knowledge in the empirical sciences. In this context one speaks of “conceptual instruments”, for example in the case of the fictitious force in physics , in the case of dispositions or in the ideal type according to Max Weber in sociology.

Recently, the intention of various authors to obtain knowledge has been reduced to “explanations in principle” or through a “causal mechanism”. With some research methods, such as the simulation method, it is also controversial whether or under what conditions a “real” explanation can be achieved in this way.

Functionalist explanations

Whether functionalist explanations can be scientific in the strict sense is a controversial question. According to Ernest Nagel, a “functionalist explanation” derives the existence of a system element from the fact that x is necessary for the functioning of the system S. In the meantime, when logically reconstructing the underlying explanatory scheme, one encounters the use of undefined central reference terms, such as "society's survival" or similar, among functionalists.

This kind of argument runs a concealed tautology (on the premise of the Hempel Oppenheim schema on the use covert tautology addition). If the term “structural-functional method” is understood to mean explaining any relationships that belong to the examined object by determining the place of this object within the interaction relationships of the higher-level system , then it is necessary to specify these system relationships (e.g. in a model ) that they are verifiable.

Case studies for bogus declarations

Example of an ad hoc term

In one of his comedies, Molière brings a famous example with which he denounces the unscientific nature of medical training at the time:

Examiner: Why does opium put you to sleep?
Examinee: Because it possesses an euthanasia power whose nature it is to euthanize.

Since the “euthanasia” that opium allegedly possesses can only be seen in the fact that the ingestion of opium does not refer to any fact that could be determined independently of the explanandum, the alleged explanation is based on a petitio principii .

Example: instinct

In the past, every kind of human activity was tried to be explained in psychology by the fact that it followed an internal cause that drives these actions. Instinct theories use innate mechanisms for this: the hunter hunts because he follows a hunting instinct. Drive theories claim energies that are peculiar to the human species and lead to corresponding actions: The collector collects because he follows an instinct to collect. Such “explanations” only describe the behavior to be explained in other words; beyond that, they do nothing.

Latent needs

In economics , the thesis of consumer sovereignty is often defended with the argument that a new offer created by a company satisfies the previously “latent” needs of consumers. The explanation cannot be empirically verified in this form. Because until consumers have bought the product in question, these hidden needs cannot be identified. The causal conditions asserted by the theory in question must be able to be determined logically and empirically-operationally independently of the action to be explained. If the action to be explained is taken as an indicator of its own cause, the argument goes in circles.

Example: functionalist stratification theory

In sociology , functionalist stratification theory explains the fact that the members of the upper class receive a higher income because they fulfill a correspondingly more important function for society. How important a function is for society is determined by how high the income is that the same “top performers” receive. This is a circular argument .

Example: expectations in business cycle theory

According to Joseph A. Schumpeter , the explicit or implicit use of expectations or “anticipations” of economic subjects as exogenous variables in a business cycle model leads to a pseudo-explanation. Because such psychological factors are part of the mechanism of action of the economic process, which should be mapped overall in the business cycle model, and thus endogenous variables. It is therefore not methodologically permissible to use these psychological facts as causes to explain the model occurrence.

According to Oskar Morgenstern , the more or less perfect foresight of economic agents plays a significant role in business theory, "which has not yet been clarified".

Single receipts

  1. ^ Karl R. Popper : The objective of empirical science. In: Hans Albert (Ed.): Theory and Reality. Selected essays on the science of the social sciences. JCB Mohr (Paul Siebeck), Tübingen 1964, p. 73.
  2. ^ Karl R. Popper: The objective of empirical science. In: Hans Albert, (Ed.): Theory and Reality. Selected essays on the science of the social sciences. JCB Mohr (Paul Siebeck) Tübingen 1964, pp. 73f.
  3. ^ Paul Feyerabend: The problem of the existence of theoretical entities. In: Ernst Topitsch, (Ed.): Problems of the philosophy of science. Festschrift for Viktor Kraft. Vienna 1960.
  4. Hartmut Esser: Sociology: General Basics. Campus Verlag, 1999, ISBN 3-593-34960-4 , p. 56f.
  5. The use of the proper name 'Zeus' is particularly relevant . The general statement “Then and only then, if Zeus wants it, there will be lightning” is not a general nomological law, since it contains an individual constant.
  6. ^ Karl R. Popper: The objective of empirical science. In: Hans Albert, (Ed.): Theory and Reality. Selected essays on the science of the social sciences. JCB Mohr (Paul Siebeck) Tübingen 1964, p. 74.
  7. Hans Reichenbach: The rise of scientific philosophy. Friedrich Vieweg & Sohn Verlag, Braunschweig 2nd edition 1968, p. 6.
  8. ^ Rainer Greshoff, Uwe Schimank: Integrative Social Theory ?: Esser - Luhmann - Weber. VS Verlag, 2006, ISBN 3-531-14354-9 .
  9. VS Švyrjev: On the relationship between the theoretical and empirical level of knowledge. In: Studies on the Logic of Scientific Knowledge. Akademie Verlag, Berlin 1967. (Moscow 1964), p. 102f.
  10. ^ Paul Feyerabend : The problem of the existence of theoretical entities. In: Ernst Topitsch (ed.): Problems of the philosophy of science. Festschrift for Viktor Kraft. Vienna 1960.
  11. ^ Raymond Boudon: Individual Action and Social Change. A no-theory of social change. British Journal of Sociology, 34, 1983, pp. 1-18; Hartmut Esser: Does the sociological method expire? Soziale Welt, 40, 1989, pp. 57-75; Jon Elster: Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge, New York, Port Chester, Melbourne, Sydney repr. 1990, ISBN 0-521-37606-8 , pp. 3ff .; Edgar Kiser, Michael Hechter: The Role of General Theory in Comparative historical sociology. American Journal of Sociology, 97 (1), 1991, pp. 4f.
  12. Gisela Loeck: Is simulation an explanation? Journal for general philosophy of science, 17, 1, 1986, pp. 14-39.
  13. ^ Ernest Nagel : The Structure of Science. London 1961. Chap. 14 / II; Renate Mayntz : Critical remarks on the functionalist stratification theory. Cologne journal for sociology and social psychology, special issue 5, Cologne 1961.
  14. ^ Carl G. Hempel : The Logic of Functional Analysis. In: Llewellyn Gross: Symposium on Sociological Theory. Row, Peterson: Evanston 1959, p. 295.
  15. ^ VA Smirnov: Levels of knowledge and stages of the cognitive process. In: Studies on the Logic of Scientific Knowledge. Akademie Verlag Berlin 1967. (Moscow 1964), p. 67f.
  16. The conceited patient.
  17. ^ Joseph A. Schumpeter: Business cycles. A theoretical, historical and statistical analysis of the capitalist process. Volume I, Göttingen 1961, p. 149 f .; Thomas Kuhn: Scientific Revolutions. Chapter 7 In: Richard Boyd: The Philosophy of Science. MIT Press, 1997, ISBN 0-262-52156-3 , p. 154.
  18. Quare opium facit dormire?
  19. Quia est in eo virtus dormitiva cuius est natura assopire.
  20. Martin Irle : Textbook of Social Psychology. Psychology Publishing House Dr. CJ Hogrefe: Göttingen Toronto Zurich 1975, ISBN 3-8017-0096-8 , p. 143.
  21. "Since the concept of latency here fully coincides with that of real possibility (potency), the assumption of the awakening of latent needs only contains the not very interesting statement in this context that the updated must have been possible according to the possibility A statement that applies to every event. ”( Hans Albert : Economic Ideology and Political Theory. Verlag Otto Schwartz & Co: Göttingen 2nd edition 1972, ISBN 3-509-00564-3 , p. 65)
  22. ^ Rainer Schnell, Paul B. Hill, Elke Esser: Methods of empirical social research . Munich / Vienna 1998, ISBN 3-486-58708-0 , p. 92.
  23. Erhard Roy Wiehn : Theories of social stratification. A critical discussion (= studies on sociology. Volume 9). Piper, Munich 1968, ISSN  0585-6205 , p. 92 (1982: ISBN 3-492-01652-9 ).
  24. ^ Joseph A. Schumpeter: Business cycles. A theoretical, historical and statistical analysis of the capitalist process. Volume I, Göttingen 1961, p. 149 f. (Eng. Business Cycles. A Theoretical, Historical, and Statistical Analysis of the Capitalist Process. New York 1939); for Schumpeter's criticism of Keynes in this regard, see Allen Oakley: Schumpeter's Theory of Capitalist Motion. A Critical Exposition and Reassessment. Edwar Elgar, 1990, ISBN 1-85278-055-X , p. 88.
  25. ^ Oskar Morgenstern: Perfect foresight and economic balance. In: Hans Albert, (Ed.): Theory and Reality. Selected essays on the science of the social sciences. JCB Mohr (Paul Siebeck), Tübingen 1964, p. 254 (from: Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie, VI (3)

Web links

literature

  • Hans Reichenbach : The rise of scientific philosophy. Collected works in 9 volumes. Vieweg + Teubner Verlag, 1977, ISBN 3-528-08361-1 .
  • Karl R. Popper: The objective of empirical science. In: Hans Albert, (Ed.): Theory and Reality. Selected essays on the science of the social sciences. JCB Mohr (Paul Siebeck) Tübingen 1964, p. 73 ff.
  • Wolfgang Stegmüller : Explanation, prediction, scientific systematization and non-explanatory information , Ratio, 8, 1, 1966, pp. 1–22.
  • Karl-Hans Hartwig: Critical-rational methodology and economic research practice. On the concept of law in economics. Frankfurt am Main, Bern, Las Vegas 1977.
  • Hartmut Esser : Sociology: General Basics. Campus Verlag, 1999, ISBN 3-593-34960-4 , esp .: 4: The logic of explanation.