Battle of Karame
The Battle of Karame was a skirmish on March 21, 1968 over a Fatah base in the Jordanian town of Karame between the attacking Israeli forces on the one hand and Palestinian militants ( Fedayeen ) and Jordanian troops on the other. It took place in the aftermath of the Six Day War and, from the Israeli point of view, was intended to suppress terrorist attacks on Israel. In the course of the battle, the camp was completely destroyed. All participating sides claimed a military success.
prehistory
After the Six Day War in 1967, the Palestinian Paramilitary Organization ( PLO ) intensified its terrorist attacks against Israel. It operated from bases on Jordanian territory. Karame was one of Fatah's main bases of operations due to its location near the border near the Jordan River and the Allenby Bridge . Above all, however, Karame was a Palestinian refugee camp (managed by the UNHCR ), which in March 1968 was occupied by around 30,000 Palestinian refugees and protected by around 300 fedajin.
The Israelis countered the Palestinian attacks with a retaliatory campaign and massed troops on the other side of the Jordan. The Jordanian military intelligence service noticed the troop deployment in March 1968. The Jordanian leadership interpreted this as preparation for a major Israeli attack on the Jordanian capital Amman and brought two brigades of the 1st Jordanian Infantry Division into position near the Jordan bridges. A total of around 15,000 Israelis stood ready over a width of 80 kilometers.
course
On March 21, Israeli troops launched their attack on Karame. Most of the troops were supposed to cross the Allenby Bridge in battle and take action against Karame. A small part was supposed to cross the Jordan with the help of a pontoon bridge. These two attacks were intended to encircle the city. Meanwhile, a smaller force was supposed to carry out a mock attack on the King Abdullah Bridge. At the same time, paratroopers should be dropped off directly in Karame by helicopter. The Israelis were aware of the presence of the 1st Jordanian Infantry Division.
The Israelis succeeded in crossing the Allenby Bridge. The air landing in Karame also succeeded. The crossing of the Jordan by pontoon bridge was also successful, but this part of the troops could not break through the fortifications on the Jordanian side. As a result, the city's containment failed. Despite bitter resistance from Palestinian fighters and Jordanian soldiers, the Fatah camp was almost completely destroyed. Before the end of the day, the Israeli troops withdrew in an organized manner across the Jordan. The Jordanian side did not pursue it.
losses
The Israelis put their losses as 15 dead and 76 wounded, military historians in the GDR estimate the Israeli losses in 1987 at 28 dead and 69 or 80 wounded as well as 25 tanks and 3 fighter planes.
The Jordanian side put the Israeli losses with 250 dead and wounded as well as 40 tanks and 4 airplanes, the own losses with 207 dead and wounded and the losses of the Fedayeen with 80 dead and 40 dragged away prisoners. According to other sources, the Jordanian army lost 61 dead and 108 wounded, while Fatah lost around 100 dead and around 100 wounded. About 120-150 fighters were captured. Israel initially stated the number of fedayeen killed as 150. The former Israeli military doctor and historian Asher Porat later stated that most of those killed were civilians, and of 196 Jordanians and Palestinians killed, only 90 were armed.
consequences
The Israeli side described the operation as a success because its primary goal, the destruction of the Fatah camp, was successful. To what extent a confrontation with the Jordanian troops was the aim and part of the Israeli plan is not known. The Jordanian side declared the battle a defensive victory. Fatah glorified the battle as the first military victory against Israel, even if the camp was destroyed and its leader Yasser Arafat had to flee the camp during the fighting. As a result of the battle, the organization gained a great leap in popularity in the Arab world. The Jordanian public and the armed forces perceived the Palestinian assessment of the events as a negation.
First, the Israeli attack led to increased military cooperation between Jordan and Iraq and Syria. In July 1968, joint maneuvers by Jordanian, Iraqi and Syrian troops were held in northern Jordan. At the end of 1968 Jordan and Iraq and (under Egyptian pressure) Syria agreed to form a joint military high command for the Arab "Eastern Front" against Israel. In March 1969, this agreed high command was finally installed in as-Suwaida in southern Syria , and an Iraqi general became the nominal commander-in-chief. The Iraqi troops stationed in Jordan since the 1967 war to protect against Israel were increased from 10,000 and 12,000 men to 17,000 and 20,000 men.
The attacks by Fatah and the Israeli counter-attacks, however, intensified the antagonism between the Palestinian organizations and the Jordanian government, which saw the country's stability at risk. This development finally culminated in Black September and the expulsion of the Palestinian commandos from Jordan.
Individual evidence
- ↑ a b c d e f Michael Wolf: Between assassination and UNO - On the history of the Palestinian resistance , pages 123–127. Military publishing house of the GDR, Berlin 1985
- ^ A b c d e f Robin Bidwell : Dictionary of Modern Arab History , p. 222. London / New York 1998
- ↑ a b c d e f g h Kenneth Pollack: Arabs at War - Military Effectiveness, 1948-1991, Lincoln, 2002, pp. 330-335
- ↑ a b Der Tagesspiegel of March 22, 1968, page 1: Israel's troops crossed the Jordan
- ↑ a b Martin Robbe : Scheidewege in Nahost , page 239. Military publishing house of the GDR, Berlin 1987
- ^ Haaretz, May 13, 2011: Debacle in the Desert
- ^ Donald Neff: Battle of Karameh Establishes Claim of Palestinian Statehood , Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, March 1998, pp. 87f, available online as html ( Memento from May 29, 2009 in the Internet Archive ); last accessed on October 19, 2011
- ↑ Kamal Salibi: The Modern History of Jordan , 2nd edition, London, 1998, p. 175
- ^ Gustav Fochler-Hauke (Ed.): Der Fischer Weltalmanach 1969 , page 347. Fischer, Frankfurt (Main) 1968
- ↑ David Dishon: Middle East Record, Volume 4, 1968 ; Pages 161-164. John Wiley & Sons, Jerusalem 1973
- ^ Area Handbook for Iraq , page XVI. US Government Printing Office, 1971
- ^ John E. Jessup: An Encyclopedic Dictionary of Conflict and Conflict Resolution, 1945-1996 , p. 32. Greenwood, Westport 1988
- ^ Arab Report and Record , p. 129. Economic Features Limited, 1969
- ^ Winnipeg Free Press, Sept. 4, 1969, p. 27: HQ Believed Found For Arab Command
See also
Web links
Amir Oren: צה"ל חושף לראשונה את הכישלון בכראמה , Ha'aretz , April 23, 2011 / Debacle in the desert , Ha'aretz, May 13, 2011.