Battle of Weihaiwei

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The Battle of Weihaiwei took place in northern China from January 20 to February 12, 1895 during the First Sino-Japanese War . In the course of the battle, the Japanese forces succeeded in capturing the Weihaiwei naval base . As a result, Japan controlled the sea route through the Gulf of Bohai to the Chinese capital Beijing after the previous battle of Lüshunkou . China also lost the remnants of its modern fleet, which anchored in Weihaiwei.

prehistory

The Chinese navy suffered a heavy defeat in the sea ​​battle at Yalu in September 1894. The remnants of the modern Beyang fleet withdrew to the fortified Weihaiwei naval base . The Japanese army advanced towards Beijing after their land victories on the Liaodong Peninsula in Manchuria . On January 14, the Japanese leadership decided to take under the aegis of Prime Minister Ito Hirobumi Weihaiwei. This should be done by landing troops on the Shandong Peninsula , which captured the base from land. The aim of the operation was to eliminate the remnants of the Beiyang fleet in order to secure the sea route through the Gulf of Bohai for Japanese supplies and troop transports. For this purpose, the 2nd Division and parts of the 6th Division were deployed under the command of Ōyama Iwao .

course

Schematic representation of the operations in battle

On 18./19. On January 1st, 1895, Japanese naval units bombed the city of Dengzhou to divert attention from the actual landing site. The Japanese troops embarked in Dalian the following day and landed at Rongcheng on the Shandong Peninsula from January 20 to 23 . The departure of the troops towards Weihaiwei began on January 26th, 1895. On January 30th, Japanese forces reached the city from three directions and captured the fortifications to the west and east of the city. The attack on the city began the following day. Japanese troops captured the city on February 2 after defending Chinese forces disbanded and escaped. The port was defended separately and blocked by mechanical obstacles on the sea side. On February 4, the Japanese were able to break through the port blockade with a torpedo boat attack . From February 7, there was a coordinated attack by the army and navy on the port.

On February 12, the Chinese commander of the Beiyang fleet, Ding Ruchang , attempted to sink the remaining ships himself. When he was threatened by the mutinous crew as a result, he committed suicide, which was followed by three of his remaining captains. Remaining seaworthy ships of the Navy tried unsuccessfully to leave the port. As a result, what remained of the Chinese resistance capitulated.

consequences

The Japanese fleet released the remaining prisoners and had Dings' remains escorted from the port with military honors. The Chinese commander-in-chief had previously been offered safe conduct for his person to Japan by Admiral Ito Sukeyuki , as this was linked by a personal friendship with Ding. The suicide was seen by the Japanese as a selfless act of saving face and asking for mercy for the prisoners. Emperor Guangxu acknowledged the events by ordering the governor of Shandong Province to execute returnees from the battle. After taking Weihaiwei, the Japanese troops were able to bring the entire Shandong province under their control and controlled access to the capital Beijing in the Yellow Sea with the Liaodong peninsula opposite . The Chinese side abolished their admiralty administration after the defeat, as the modern fleet ceased to exist after the loss of the Beiyang fleet. At the Chinese court, traditionalist circles reacted by demanding an attack on the main Japanese islands. This should be carried out by improvised forces or foreign mercenaries. In view of the actual military situation, the demand had no consequences.

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Dr. Guangqui Zhou: Sino-Japanese War. in Xiaobing Li: China at War - An Encyclopedia. Oxford, 2012, p. 404
  2. ^ Edward J. Drea: Japan's Imperial Army - Its Rise and Fall 1853-1945. Lawrence, 2009, pp. 89f
  3. ↑ a b c d e S.CM Paine: The Sino Japanese War of 1894 - 1895 - Perceptions, Power and Primacy. Cambridge, 2003, pp. 222-235
  4. ↑ Dr. Guangqui Zhou: Sino-Japanese War. in Xiaobing Li: China at War - An Encyclopedia. Oxford, 2012, p. 404