Sea battle at Yalu

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Sea battle at Yalu
Sino-Japanese naval battle in 1894
Sino-Japanese naval battle in 1894
date 17th September 1894
place before the mouth of the Yalu
output Japanese victory
Parties to the conflict

China Empire 1890Empire of China China

JapanJapan (naval war flag) Japan

Commander

China Empire 1890Empire of China Ding Ruchang Liu Buchan
China Empire 1890Empire of China

JapanJapan (naval war flag) Itō Sukeyuki Tsuboi Kōzō
JapanJapan (naval war flag)

Troop strength
8 cruisers
3 armored ships
5 torpedo boats
8 cruisers
2 armored ships
2 more ships
losses

850 dead
500 wounded
five cruisers sunk
serious damage on all other ships

90 dead
200 wounded
four ships badly damaged

The Sea Battle of Yalu or Sea Battle in the Yellow Sea ( Chinese  黃海海 戰 ) took place on September 17, 1894 during the First Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895). The Japanese fleet was able to inflict a decisive defeat on the Chinese Beiyang fleet at the mouth of the Yalu in the Yellow Sea , with the Chinese fleet losing five warships .

prehistory

The Chinese Northern Fleet was more modern than the other Chinese squadrons and only entered service in 1882/83. The strongest units (the armored ships Dingyuan and Zhenyuan , each 7792 t, 15.7 knots, armament 4 × 30.5 cm and 2 × 15 cm cannons) were built at the Vulcan shipyard in Stettin , Germany. The fleet was led by Admiral Ding Ruchang , a former colonel in the cavalry who relied on advice from American and German sea personnel. Due to the desperate conditions at the time in the late Chinese Empire (Manchurian Qing Dynasty ), the fleet also suffered from a lack of usable ammunition. This turned out to be fatal in battle. Ultimately, it was the better level of training and the higher rate of fire of the Japanese fleet that made the difference.

course

Admiral Ding, who was to escort a troop transport, commanded the coastal armored ship Pingyuan ( 平 遠  /  平 远 , also Ping Yuen ) and two torpedo boats on arrival at the mouth of the Yalu on September 16 to accompany the transport group up the Yalu. This left him with ten ships anchored in the estuary to take cover: the two armored tower ships Dingyuan ( 定 遠  /  定 远 , also Ting Yuen ) and Zhenyuan ( 鎮遠  /  镇远 , also Chen Yuen ), eight protected cruisers ( Yangwei ( 揚威  /  扬威 ), Chaoyong ( 超 勇 , also: Chao Yung ), Jingyuan ( 經 遠  /  经 远 , also King Yuen ), Laiyuan ( 來 遠  /  来 远 , also Lai Yuen ), Jingyuan ( 靖遠  /  靖远 , also Ching Yuen ), Zhiyuan ( 致遠  /  致远 , also Chih Yuen ), Guangjia ( 廣 甲  /  广 甲 , also Kuang Chia ), Jiyuan (also Tsi Yuen )) and three torpedo boats.

The next day, September 17th, at 10 a.m., the plumes of smoke from the Japanese fleet under Admiral Ito came into view from the southwest. Ding then had his ships develop from the keel line into the Dwars line and approached from the northeast in a wide wedge formation , the center of which was formed by the two tower ships. The four ships that had accompanied the troops up the Yalu followed astern.

Contemporary representation of the battle

The Japanese fleet was divided into two divisions. The four newest and fastest cruisers Yoshino , Takachiho , Akitsushima and Naniwa headed under Rear Admiral Tsuboi Kōzō as the "Flying Division", followed by the main squadron with the cruisers Matsushima , Itsukushima , Hashidate and Chiyoda as well as the old armored ships Fuso and Hiyei , the gunboat Akagi and the armed transporter Saikyo Maru .

At 11:40 a.m., the opponents made visual contact. The flying division in front initially approached the Chinese center with the armored ships and then swiveled slightly to port on Thing's right wing, where four cruisers were located. When Tsuboi was close enough, he fired his modern rapid-fire guns at the Chinese cruisers while steaming across their bows and performing a Crossing the T maneuver.

Thereafter, Tsuboi's division turned north and fired at the four Chinese ships that were coming from Yalu and were chasing after Ding's ships. After they were pushed aside, Tsuboi steered south and got into the rear of the main Chinese power, which was now in combat with Ito's main squadron. This allowed Ding's formation to be taken under fire from two sides, which decided the battle. The Chinese formation got into disarray, with the cruiser Chaoyong colliding with the also turning Jiyuan . The cruiser Yangwei ran aground.

The Japanese main squadron orbited the remaining Chinese ships heading west for 2.3 km clockwise. The slower Japanese ships in particular received several hits, even though the Chinese ships were sometimes equipped with inadequate ammunition. After a heavy hit in the riot ammunition on his flagship Matsushima around 3:30 p.m., which caused the loss of more than a hundred men, Admiral Ito switched to the Hashidate . Tsuboi's Flying Squadron was finally able to separate the two cruisers Jingyuan / King Yuen and Jingyuan / Ching Yuen from the ironclad and sink them.

At 5:30 p.m., after both fleets had used almost all of their ammunition, Admiral Itō broke off the engagement. The enemy stayed in sight until dark. The Chinese lost five cruisers and suffered severe damage on all other ships; four ships were badly damaged by the Japanese.

consequences

After the defeat in the naval battle, the Chinese fleet first withdrew to Port Arthur . When this port was threatened by Japanese troops, another retreat to Weihai in Shandong Province followed . After the Japanese finally landed there, the Chinese fleet finally capitulated. Admiral Ding - universally valued as a man of integrity and courage - committed suicide with several officers. The ironclad Zhenyuan was taken over by the Japanese Navy and - slightly modified - was in service there as Chin'en until 1914. A replica of the armored ships can be seen today in the port of Weihai.

From this battle it was concluded that the shell fire of the middle artillery had a high tactical value. The large number of fires subsequently led to the "deforestation" of warships on the German side.

literature

  • Elmar B. Potter, Chester W. Nimitz: Sea power. A history of naval warfare from antiquity to the present , Manfred Pawlak Verlagsgesellschaft, Herrsching 1986, ISBN 3-88199-082-8 .

Individual evidence

  1. Georg v. Alten (Hrsg.): Handbook for Army and Fleet , Volume 5, German publishing house Bong & Co., Berlin 1913, pp. 130 f.