Naval Battle of the Komandorski Islands
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| date | March 27, 1943 |
|---|---|
| place | about 180 km south of the Komandorski Islands in the North Pacific |
| output | tactical draw. US strategic victory |
| Parties to the conflict | |
|---|---|
| Commander | |
| Troop strength | |
| 1 heavy cruiser 1 light cruiser 4 destroyers |
2 heavy cruisers 2 light cruisers 4 destroyers 3 transport ships |
| losses | |
|
1 badly damaged heavy cruiser |
1 damaged heavy cruiser |
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The naval battle of the Komandorski Islands was fought on March 27, 1943 local time during the Second World War in the Pacific War between American and Japanese ships. It was part of the Battle of the Aleutians and took place on the open sea about 100 miles (180 km) south of the Komandorsky Islands in the North Pacific between Kamchatka and the Aleutians . The battle ended in a tactical draw that resulted in a strategic victory for the Americans. Since the American ships were based on Honolulu time , March 26th is often given as the date.
prehistory
At the same time as the Battle of Midway , Japanese troops occupied the Aleutian islands of Attu and Kiska on June 6 and 7, 1942 . Although the Americans intended to retake the islands, due to the low strategic importance of the theater of war, the necessary armed forces could not yet be provided. In addition, the icy climate in the Bering Sea made any military action difficult . The American actions were limited to attacks against the supply lines of the island garrisons, while large parts of the Japanese and American fleets fought the much more important battle of Guadalcanal in the Solomon Islands .
After the cruiser USS Indianapolis sank the unaccompanied freighter Akagane Maru on the way to Attu on February 18, 1943 , the Japanese formed a convoy with a strong escort for the next transport. The convoy, consisting of three transport ships, started on March 23, 1943. His escort under the command of Vice Admiral Boshiro Hosogaya consisted of the heavy cruisers Nachi ( flagship ) and Maya , the light cruisers Tama and Abukuma and the destroyers Wakaba , Hatsushimo , Ikazuchi and Inazuma . With almost three warships per transport ship, this was one of the most secure convoys of the entire war.
After the American Navy learned of the upcoming convoy through intercepted Japanese radio messages, they in turn formed Task Group Mike under Rear Admiral Charles McMorris to intercept the convoy. The task force consisted of the heavy cruiser USS Salt Lake City , the light cruiser USS Richmond (flagship) and the four destroyers USS Bailey , USS Coghlan , USS Dale and USS Monaghan . The American side assumed that this task force, which was quite strong for the northern theater of war, would have no problems in destroying the Japanese convoy. The strength of the Japanese escort was unknown to the Americans.
The battle
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After the "Mike" task group had searched in vain for the convoy in mostly bad weather for nine days, it finally got radar on March 27, 1943 at 7:30 am - and shortly afterwards visual contact with ships in the north. At this point in time, the Japanese lookouts identified as hostile the ships they had been observing for half an hour in front of what they saw as the brighter southern horizon. Believing it was superior to the convoy, the American association quickly approached.
Hosogaya ordered the transports to turn north with the destroyer Inazuma as escort. The remaining destroyers, led by the light cruiser Abukuma , lay down between the convoy and the Americans. Hosogaya himself stayed a little further east with Nachi , Maya and Tama in order to push himself between McMorris and Alaska, thus cutting off the way back to their base for Task Group Mike .
Although McMorris had now recognized the strong superiority of the Japanese escort, he continued to approach north. Only 5 minutes after Nachi and Maya had opened fire at 8:40 a.m. at a distance of 18 km, did he turn to a south-west course, with which he went on an escape course from the Japanese cruisers in the northeast. The Japanese took up the chase, being careful to always be able to block the Americans from getting to the convoy.
The battle was mainly fought with the 20.3 cm (8 inch) guns of the heavy cruisers, as the distance was still too great for the smaller guns of the light cruisers. The Salt Lake City could only use the five guns of the two aft turrets due to the aft position of the enemy. Nachi and Maya , however, fired at Salt Lake City with their full broadsides of ten 20.3 cm guns each . Because of their higher speed (34 to 30 knots), the Japanese cruisers were able to run in a zigzag course during the battle, always keeping Salt Lake City at an angle of min. To have 30 ° port or starboard. Admiral Hosogaya made a conscious decision to shoot broadsides at great distances instead of first reducing the distance with a direct course and thus increasing the hit probability. In doing so, at least for a time, he would only have been able to shoot with the four forward-pointing guns of his cruisers.
Despite the great distance and the fourfold superiority of the Japanese in firepower, the Salt Lake City scored the first hits. Within a short time, she met the Nachi three times , with the circuit for the fire control system of the Japanese cruiser being damaged. Due to a failed attempt by the Japanese repair team to fix the problem, the entire power supply to the Nachi's main guns failed, which meant that the turrets could not be pivoted or the elevation of the pipes could be changed. Only after half an hour could the power supply be restored at 9:30 a.m. so that the Nachi could intervene again in the battle.
The Maya uncovered during which the Salt Lake City with good lying fire one, but maneuvered Captain Bertram J. Rodgers the cruiser so skillfully that the Maya scored only two futile results. In the meantime, the light cruiser Tama was approaching the American unit to bring it within range of its 14 cm (5.5 inch) guns. When he got within 10 miles of Salt Lake City at 9:45 a.m. , Capt. Rodgers briefly left the American formation and fired at the Tama with several full broadsides, whereupon it changed course and remained at a greater distance. On the other side of the formation, the Abukuma had come close enough to open fire. The Richmond responded with her 6 inch (15 cm) guns, whereupon the Abukuma went back a little further. Over the next hour, however, she came close enough several times to shoot Salt Lake City .
At around 10:00 am, the steering gear failed on Salt Lake City due to the many close hits. The rudder had to be switched to manual control, which meant that hard rudder positions were no longer possible and the cruiser could no longer perform its successful evasive maneuvers to the same extent. At 10:10 a.m., a 8-inch shell hit Salt Lake City and penetrated the armor and an engine room without exploding before exiting through the bottom of the ship. Due to the resulting leak, the cruiser began to absorb water. Admiral McMorris then ordered the American destroyers to put a wall of smoke behind the bandage with artificial fog in order to hide the damaged cruiser from the Japanese cruisers. The fogging was very successful, not least because the weather conditions (mirror-like sea and little wind) were ideal for this maneuver. As soon as the wall of smoke was thick enough, the American Association changed course to the southwest, having continued to course west during the last hour of the battle.
Admiral Hosogaya followed this change of course, but could no longer see his target. All he saw was the cloud of smoke that told him where his enemy was and that his latest hits had obviously done serious damage. By this point his tactics had worked and his position was superb: he was in the superior position (he was still between McMorris and his base), he was faster, he had the stronger powers, and the most powerful enemy ship was damaged. Now was the time to decide the battle by reducing the range with his faster cruisers on direct pursuit. At closer range the accuracy would increase and the American ships would be destroyed by its superior firepower. To the astonishment of his officers and opponents, however, he did not do so, but decided to continue zigzagging broadsides into the cloud of smoke. However, his heavy cruisers did not score a single hit within the next 45 minutes.
At 11:00 am, McMorris had his ships change course to the south. Amazingly, Hosogaya maintained its south-westerly course for another half an hour. This widened the distance between the opponents again and the Americans began to slip out of what was actually a safe trap. At 11:03, however , the Abukuma managed a hit on Salt Lake City , the shock of which broke several internal ship lines and oil flowed into one of the aft engine rooms. The problem was solved after half an hour, but the oil level was so high in the meantime that the aft machines had to be stopped. As a result, the cruiser could only run 20 instead of 30 knots between 11:25 a.m. and 11:38 a.m. He also got a list of 5 °. In addition, the aft turrets reported that after almost three hours of fighting, they had almost used their inventory of armor-piercing shells. Then, contrary to all safety regulations, the armored doors of the front ammunition chambers were opened and the heavy 20.3 cm grenades were transported with small transport vehicles (which were otherwise only used within the ammunition chambers) over the ship's deck to the aft towers. In addition, other crew members formed a chain below deck to pass sacks of powder through aft. It was clear to everyone that open magazine doors and lax powder handling were the main causes of the sinking of three British battlecruisers in the Skagerrak Battle , of which there were hardly any survivors. Since the ammunition supply for the aft towers did not always keep up in this way, grenades were fired several times with impact fuses instead of the usual armor-piercing projectiles. These shells, intended for use against unarmored targets, exploded, unlike armor-piercing shells, when they hit the surface of the water. The sporadic bombardment with these shells led the Japanese to believe that American planes would bomb them through the closed cloud cover.
At 11:50 a.m., the worst crisis arose on Salt Lake City : While trying to correct the list by counter-flooding empty fuel tanks, an engineer accidentally dumped water into a tank that was not yet empty, from which the pumps were currently producing oil the boiler fired. Since the suction opening of the pumps was at the bottom of the tank, but oil floats on top of water, the pumps immediately drew water, which extinguished the fires under the boilers. At 11:54 a.m. the cruiser came to a standstill. Given the situation, Admiral McMorris ordered the destroyers Bailey , Coghlan and Monaghan to torpedo the Japanese cruisers . The Dale was to continue to maintain the smoke curtain, while he and the Richmond stood ready to take over the crew of the Salt Lake City in case the ship had to be abandoned (the Salt Lake City had signaled engine failure from enemy shell hits, such damage would hardly be possible been fix). The American destroyers carried out their torpedo attack without scoring torpedo hits. However, they scored several hits with their 12.7 cm guns, one of which put a Nachi turret out of action. During the attack, Admiral Hosogaya was forced to take an evasive course to the west and direct fire on the American destroyers. He scored three hits on the Bailey , one of which hit the front boiler room of the destroyer and destroyed two boilers just before the torpedoes could be ejected.
At 12:03 p.m., after surviving the torpedo attack, to the amazement of the Americans, Hosogaya stopped fire and broke off the battle. His officers did not agree. They obeyed, but "silently cursed the caution of their commander who robbed them of a victory they had already won".
The Americans fired at the Japanese cruisers for a further eight minutes while they headed east towards Alaska as quickly as possible after the Salt Lake City had sufficient steam pressure again for its turbines.
Consequences of the battle
The naval battle of the Komandorski Islands was one of the few naval battles in the Pacific War in which surface ships fought against each other without the support of airplanes in daylight and under good visibility. With the heavily damaged Salt Lake City and the medium damage on the Bailey, the Americans had to take more than the Japanese, who suffered medium damage on the Nachi . However, the American losses were not as high as one would have expected given the Japanese superiority. Tactically, the encounter was a draw, as neither side could sink the other's ships or otherwise gain a direct advantage from the battle.
As a result of the battle, Admiral Hosogaya decided to run back to Japan in the convoy. The Americans had thus achieved their strategic goal and cut off supplies to the garrisons on Attu and Kiska. Hosogaya justified the decision to turn back with the fear of a possible further battle with a possible second American association. His cruisers had used up 70 percent of their ammunition, and the long hunt at high speed had drained his destroyers so much fuel that they barely had any reserves for another battle. He was also concerned about American air strikes.
In Japan, Hosogaya's behavior was later sharply criticized. He had been far superior in terms of material and location, but had no successes in proportion to this. Strategically, it had been his mission to protect the transport ships, which he had succeeded. With his retreat after the battle, in the opinion of the High Command, he turned this strategic success into a defeat without need. He was therefore replaced and transferred to the personnel reserve. During the war he was no longer given any new command. From now on, submarines were used to supply the garrisons.
Rear Admiral McMorris, however, was honored for his services in the battle and Chief of Staff of Admiral Chester W. Nimitz . He had rescued his bandage from a difficult position by clever maneuvering. The fact that he himself had brought him into this position by approaching the Japanese for too long was forgotten. Commanders on all sides preferred commanders who showed too much fighting spirit against a superior opponent than those who proceeded cautiously against inferior opponents.
Web links
- Detailed Description battle (English)
- Detailed battle description of the US Navy from 1945 (English)