Spantax flight 995

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Coordinates: 36 ° 39 ′ 48 ″  N , 4 ° 29 ′ 3 ″  W.

Spantax flight 995
Spantax McDonnell Douglas DC-10 EC-DEG.jpg

The accident machine in July 1981 in Zurich
Accident summary
Accident type Deal from the runway
place Malaga airport
date September 13, 1982
Fatalities 50
Survivors 344
Injured 110 (1 person on the ground)
Aircraft
Aircraft type McDonnell Douglas DC-10-30
operator Spantax
Mark EC-DEG
Departure airport Madrid-Barajas Airport
Destination airport John F. Kennedy International Airport
Passengers 381
crew 13
Lists of aviation accidents

Spantax flight 995 (BX 995) was the charter flight of a McDonnell Douglas DC-10 from Madrid-Barajas airport to John F. Kennedy airport in New York with a stopover at Malaga airport , which was due to take off from Malaga on September 13, 1982 of a puncture shot over the end of the runway and crashed.

accident

plane

The aircraft with the registration number EC-DEG was a DC-10-30CF made by McDonnell Douglas with the serial number 46962/238. The DC-10 was equipped with General Electric CF6-50C1 engines . The machine was delivered to Overseas National Airways on June 6, 1977 . Spantax initially leased the aircraft from October 1978 and acquired it in December 1978. At the time of the accident, the aircraft had had 15,364 operating hours. She was fully fueled for a transatlantic flight; the take-off weight was 527,657 pounds (approx. 239,300 kg), around 94% of the maximum take-off weight.

the accident

The DC-10 took off from Madrid-Barajas with 13 crew members and 130 passengers at 7:36 a.m. UTC for Málaga, where it arrived at 8:20 a.m. For the onward flight to New York, 251 passengers were added. At 9:58:50, BX 995 received take-off clearance from Tower Málaga on the 3,200 m long runway 14. The aircraft accelerated from a standing start. During the take-off run , shortly before or while reaching the decision speed v 1 , the captain noticed vibrations, its intensity after rotation , d. H. after lifting the front wheel increased. He then decided to abort the start . At this point the remaining taxiway was no longer sufficient for a safe stop.

The DC-10 reached the end of the runway with a residual speed of 110  kn (approx. 200 km / h) IAS and after 290 m hit the building of the landing course transmitter . In this impact, engine number 3 was torn off and the building of the landing course transmitter was completely destroyed. The debris of the engine was found about 20 m away. The aircraft then broke through a 60 cm high concrete wall with a metal fence that bordered the airport area. The N-340 national road was right next to the airport . BX 995 collided with three vehicles, breaking through the middle guardrail before it finally collided with an agricultural building and came to a standstill about 450 m after the end of the runway and 40 m to the left of the center line . The fuselage was badly damaged by the impact on the building, the right wing was cut off by three quarters, as was the right part of the tail unit. As a result of the damage to the wing, the fuel tank was broken open , so that kerosene escaped at the scene of the accident , which immediately ignited. The fire started at the stern and spread to the entire aircraft, completely destroying the DC-10.

Doors 4L and 4R could no longer be opened due to the deformation of the fuselage, so that the entire rear section had to be evacuated through doors 3L and 3R. Photos of surviving passengers showed that passengers were still leaving the aircraft through door 3L when the fire fighting was already in progress. This was partly due to the fact that some passengers did not want to leave their hand luggage behind.

The airport fire brigade had already been informed by the tower when the plane shot over the runway. She arrived about five minutes after the accident. The approach to the accident site was made difficult by the rubble lying around. At the same time, the fire brigade of the Spanish Air Force stationed on the premises was also alerted.

Victim

At the time of the accident there were 394 people (381 passengers, 13 crew members) on board. Eight people died immediately when the fire broke out near exit 4R , which after the collision with the generator house was able to penetrate the passenger cabin due to the damage to the aircraft fuselage . At the same time, the rear section was filled with thick smoke. The other 42 victims were passed out in smoke from inhalation of carbon monoxide and also died as a result of the fire. All of the fatalities were in the third section.

The majority of the survivors suffered from smoke inhalation . Further injuries, especially broken bones and cuts, were the result of the evacuation.

The driver of a delivery truck was seriously injured when the plane crashed into his vehicle while crossing the highway.

Determination of causes

The investigation into the accident was carried out by the Spanish Accident Investigation Commission Comisión de Investigación de Accidentes e Incidentes de Aviación Civil (CIAIAC) in collaboration with the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB).

The flight recorder (DFDR), model 573A, and the voice recorder (CVR), model V-557, were examined by the manufacturer Sundstrand on behalf of the investigating authorities . Due to the prolonged fire, the CVR had merged into a solid block and could no longer be evaluated. After an extensive restoration, the DFDR could be read out by Sundstrand and the saved data was then transferred to the NTSB for evaluation. The evaluation showed that the recordings broke off when engine 3 was torn down, presumably because the power supply was interrupted.

The investigations showed that the profile of the left, retreaded tire of the nose wheel had come loose and the remnants of the profile remaining on the tire hit the flap of the landing gear. The tire had already been retreaded three times and had made 14 takeoffs and landings since the last renewal. The tread renewal had been carried out incorrectly, as far as the fragments of the tire were still available.

However, the failure of the tire on the nose wheel was not the only decisive factor in the fatal outcome. Various phases of a flight that are viewed as critical are trained by the pilots of all airlines in the flight simulator . This is used to automate certain behaviors that can be called up in these critical situations. The take-off, especially immediately before reaching the decision speed, is a flight phase that is viewed as critical. When simulating take-offs, the training focuses on the failure of an engine. Until the decision speed is reached, the usual procedure is to abort the take-off; after the decision speed is exceeded, the start is continued with the remaining engines. However, tire failure was not part of training programs on simulators. To make a decision, pilots must be able to clearly identify a problem. There are various systems in the aircraft for this which help with identification by means of optical or acoustic signals, instrument displays and other features. Once the problem has been identified, the measures to be taken are laid down in procedural instructions.

At this start, the decision speed v 1 was 162 kn and the rotation speed v R was 169 kn. The vibrations began approximately at v 1 . At a speed of 166 kn the DFDR recorded a pull on the elevator. At a speed of 177 knots, the elevator was pressed again. This was the presumable point in time when the master decided to abort the take-off.

The flight captain stated in his questioning that he decided to stop when the vibrations had reached such an intensity that he feared that the aircraft could become uncontrollable. In addition, there were perceptions that were not in line with tire damage. Since he had already taken his right hand off the throttle at the time of the decision to abort take-off, a short time passed before he was able to activate the thrust reverser . At the same time it slipped a little off the throttle, so that the lever for engine 3 slipped out of the hand, whereby engine 3 was still delivering thrust. As a result, the full braking thrust was not available. Instead, the thrust was distributed unevenly, so that the DC-10 swerved to the left.

The CIAIAC eventually concluded that the tire failure was the main cause of the accident. The aborted take-off after the decision-making speed was not in accordance with the intended handling instructions, but it was justifiable due to the unforeseen and extraordinary circumstances.

Based on the result, the CIAIAC made a recommendation that pilots should also be prepared for take-off malfunctions during exercises in the flight simulator that are not related to the engines.

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Technical report on accident occurred on September 13th, 1982 to McDonell Douglas DC-10-30-CF aircraft, reg. n. EC-DEG, at Malaga Airport. (PDF; 9.3 MB) Comisión de Investigación de Accidentes e Incidentes de Aviación Civil, accessed on April 22, 2010 (English, the source is referred to as “ Technical Report, CIAIAC, page number”).
  2. ^ Registration History, McDonnell Douglas DC-10-30CF, EC-DEG
  3. ↑ a b Technical report. (PDF) CIAIAC, pp. 8–9 , accessed on April 22, 2010 (English).
  4. ↑ a b Technical report. (PDF) CIAIAC, p. 25 , accessed on April 22, 2010 (English).
  5. ↑ Spantax vlucht 995 crashes bij opstijgen. Nieuwsdossier, accessed April 24, 2010 .
  6. ↑ a b Technical report. (PDF) CIAIAC, pp. 21–22 , accessed on April 22, 2010 (English).
  7. ↑ Technical report. (PDF) CIAIAC, pp. 18–20 , accessed on April 22, 2010 (English).
  8. ↑ Technical report. (PDF) CIAIAC, pp. 49–50 , accessed on April 22, 2010 (English).
  9. ↑ Technical report. (PDF) CIAIAC, p. 27 , accessed on April 22, 2010 (English).
  10. ↑ Technical report. (PDF) CIAIAC, pp. 40–47 , accessed on April 22, 2010 (English).
  11. ↑ Technical report. (PDF) CIAIAC, pp. 50–53 , accessed on April 22, 2010 (English).
  12. ↑ Technical report. (PDF) CIAIAC, p. 58 , accessed on April 22, 2010 (English).
  13. ↑ Technical report. (PDF) CIAIAC, pp. 59–60 , accessed on April 22, 2010 (English).
  14. ↑ Technical report. (PDF) CIAIAC, pp. 61–63 , accessed on April 22, 2010 (English).
  15. ↑ Technical report. (PDF) CIAIAC, p. 69 , accessed on April 22, 2010 (English).
  16. ↑ Technical report. (PDF) CIAIAC, pp. 70–71 , accessed on April 22, 2010 (English).