Transit through the Gotthard 1940–1945

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Double traction of Ce 6/8 II / III in Stein am Rhein , two typical freight locomotives of the Gotthard Railway

The transit connection through the Gotthard played a central economic and political role during the Second World War (1939–1945) for both National Socialist Germany and Fascist Italy .

1940-1942

Longitudinal section (1914)

The transit through the Gotthard tunnel allowed the Nazi war economy to deliver raw materials, especially for arms production, to Italy. Switzerland ensured the transit connection between Italy and Germany with the Gotthard Railway . As a neutral country, Switzerland was thus in a conflict of interest. The question was raised whether Switzerland should allow the Gotthard transit of the Axis powers or prohibit German-Italian transports across Swiss territory in order to distance itself as best as possible from the Hitler regime.

During the Second World War, the Gotthard tunnel became, due to its importance for the Axis powers, "actually the most decisive political factor in the power play between Italy-Switzerland-Germany," noted Gottlieb Duttweiler in a letter dated June 15, 1940 to General Guisan . Above all, the coal transports from Germany to Italy were a thorn in Duttweiler's side. An average of up to 26 coal trains, equivalent to 50 wagons of 15 tons each, were transported to Italy through the Gotthard every day. The transport volumes on the Brennerbahn corresponded to about a quarter of the volume that the Gotthard handled, the same applied to the trains on the Tauernbahn or Semmeringbahn and further on via the Pontafelbahn . In addition, Italy had little coal reserves and was therefore dependent on coal transports from Germany. Since it was no longer possible to transport coal from overseas, Switzerland as a transit country was not the only, but the most important route for Italy to meet its large demand for coal through imports from Germany. The transit through the Gotthard thus played a central economic role in Italy in World War II.

In a letter dated June 15, 1940, Duttweiler expressed opposition to Switzerland's practice of approving coal transports from Germany to Italy and proposed the following countermeasure: The Gotthard tunnel, if it is on Swiss soil, should be blasted and mined. Duttweiler explained this procedure by stating that the Gotthard line would be interrupted for a long time after it had been blown up for coal trains to Italy. The additional mines would make clearing up work difficult to carry out, and there would be further delays or even a standstill in rail traffic through the Gotthard. For economic reasons, however, the SBB rejected explosions and mines as planned in Duttweiler. For the SBB, freight transport through the Gotthard was a secure source of income that had to be maintained. From the conversation notes of September 1, 1941, however, it became clear that a reduction in the number of trains to Italy could represent another possible solution to the German-Italian problem.

A year later, on 29 June 1941, negotiations revolved (see Minutes du procès-verbal conseil d'administration of the CFF ) between Switzerland and the Hitler regime to the question of whether Switzerland is not the Gotthard line internationalize could . "Les Puissances de l'Axe cherchent à faire internationaliser les lignes du Gothard et du Simplon". For the Third Reich, the internationalization of the Gotthard line would have meant better economic connections to Italy, while Switzerland would have lost sole control over the Gotthard transit. The SBB categorically rejected such an internationalization of the Gotthard Line: "Pour la Suisse, il n'y a qu'une seule attitude possible: repousser catégoriquement toute demande faite dans ce sens." In the end, the Gotthard route remained in Swiss hands.

Gotthard Treaty

Contracts concluded with Germany and Italy in 1869 and 1882 made it difficult for the federal government to buy back the Gotthard Railway . For reasons of sovereignty, Switzerland could not continue the contractual provisions of that time and had to opt for tariff concessions in transit traffic. The Gotthard Treaty of 1909 was unsatisfactory for Switzerland. The two neighboring countries, Germany and Italy, were granted most-favored nation treatment on the entire SBB network. This favoritism led to discussions and conflicts between Switzerland, Germany and Italy between 1943 and 1945. The aim was to agree on the number of train journeys with goods in transit on the Germany – Italy and Italy – Germany routes.

1943-1945

In 1943 the debate revolved around transit traffic, train services and the question of how many trains with coal, potatoes and grain should be transported from Germany through the Gotthard to Italy. It was Switzerland's intention to draw up a “timetable” that would precisely record the train services between Germany and Italy. On the one hand, Switzerland tried to keep the train services through the Gotthard low (claim not to endanger the neutrality of the country), but at the same time it was also forced not to jeopardize the benevolence of the Third Reich, because Switzerland, for its part, was on that correct functioning of imports from Italy and Nazi Germany. The supply of goods, such as food for the Swiss population, was definitely not wanted in favor of a reduction in transport services on the part of the Axis powers. From a Swiss point of view, neutrality was combined with the reliability of the Swiss Federal Railways in enabling the exchange of goods between Germany and Italy. The table of maximum services in transit traffic between Germany and Italy gives an overview of the train services carried out by SBB.

In 1944 the situation worsened again. At the beginning of the year, negotiations between Switzerland and the German Reich began again. The discussion revolved around the issue of guaranteeing Italian-German transit through Switzerland. On the one hand, the Swiss federal railways were financially dependent on these transports by the Axis powers, on the other hand, the Allies tried, for economic reasons (transport of armaments such as steel, semi-finished products and sheet metal), to restrict the south-north line of transit traffic through Switzerland and one To request quota. However, the transport of pure war material was never allowed. "A break in economic relations with Switzerland, which would make a complete isolation of Switzerland necessary" was also rejected from the German point of view, because Nazi Germany was too interested in the transit function of Switzerland during the entire Second World War until the end of 1945.

literature

  • Georg Kreis : Switzerland in World War II , Innsbruck-Vienna 2011.
  • Bernhard Wigger: The Swiss Conservative People's Party 1903-1918. Politics between culture war and class war . In: Religion - Politics - Society in Switzerland . No. 18. Friborg Switzerland 1997.
  • Klaus Urner: Let's Swallow Switzerland. Hitler's Plans Against the Swiss Confederation, Lanham u. a . 2002.
  • Gilles Forster: Transit ferroviaire à travers la Suisse (1939–1945). Independent Expert Commission Switzerland - Second World War - Commission Indépendante d'Experts Suisse - Seconde Guerre Mondiale, Volume 4, 2001. ISBN 978-3-0340-0604-0 .
  • Independent Expert Commission Switzerland - Second World War: Switzerland, National Socialism and the Second World War . Final report. Pendo Publishing House, Zurich 2002, ISBN 3-85842-601-6 . P. 230 ff. PDF

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. ^ Georg Kreis: Switzerland in World War II, Innsbruck-Vienna 2011.
  2. ^ Letter from G. Duttweiler to H. Guisan dated June 15, 1940: "Betr. Gotthard and Simplon Tunnels » in the Dodis database of Diplomatic Documents of Switzerland
  3. ↑ Conversation notes of September 1, 1941: “Meeting of September 1, 1941 with Section Head Wildhaber, Lucerne, regarding the reduction in the number of coal trains Germany-Italy” in the Dodis database of Diplomatic Documents of Switzerland
  4. ↑ Procès-verbal du conseil d'administration of the CFF on May 29, 1941: "Procès verbal de la 43e séance du 29 may 1941, tenue à Bâle, dans le bâtiment aux voyageurs de la gare, at 11 h 1/4" in the database Dodis the Diplomatic documents of Switzerland
  5. ↑ Procès-verbal du conseil d'administration of the CFF on May 29, 1941: "Procès verbal de la 43e séance du 29 may 1941, tenue à Bâle, dans le bâtiment aux voyageurs de la gare, at 11 h 1/4" in the database Dodis the Diplomatic documents of Switzerland
  6. ↑ Procès-verbal du conseil d'administration of the CFF on May 29, 1941: "Procès verbal de la 43e séance du 29 may 1941, tenue à Bâle, dans le bâtiment aux voyageurs de la gare, at 11 h 1/4" in the database Dodis the Diplomatic documents of Switzerland
  7. ^ Bernhard Wigger: The Swiss Conservative People's Party 1903-1918. Politics between culture war and class war . In: Religion - Politics - Society in Switzerland . No. 18 . Freiburg Switzerland 1997, p. 38-39 .
  8. ↑ Minutes of April 5, 1944: “Compte-rendu d'une séance des négociations économiques entre les représentants alliés et suisses sur la question du transit” in the Dodis database of diplomatic documents of Switzerland
  9. ^ Memorandum from E. Ballinari from March 4, 1943: “Notice, Oberbetriebschef III. Department, Ernesto Ballinari (CFF), 03.04.1943 » in the database Dodis the Diplomatic Documents of Switzerland
  10. ↑ memorandum of 4 February 1944, "Notice sur le trafic de transit" in the database Dodis the Diplomatic Documents of Switzerland
  11. ↑ Table with information about the trains Germany – Italy from March 12, 1943: Maximum performance in transit traffic Germany – Italy 'in the database Dodis the Diplomatic Documents of Switzerland
  12. ^ Letter from W. Harster to the Reich Security Main Office of February 25, 1944: "Transit traffic through Switzerland south-north" in the Dodis database of diplomatic documents in Switzerland
  13. ^ "Letter from RL Nosworthy to P. Prunas of January 30, 1945" in the Dodis database of Diplomatic Documents of Switzerland