War economy in World War II
The war economy in the Second World War was the transformation of the national economies into a central administration economy through the total mobilization of economic resources to secure the material supply of the army and the food of the population in order to achieve the war goals in the Second World War at any price. In doing so, all warring parties made a series of decisions that undermined market mechanisms. The war economy had a decisive influence on the course of the war and its outcome. While the respective military tactics were decisive at the beginning , the quantitative superiority of the war production of the Allies had a major influence on the course of the war from 1942 onwards. Nazi Germany and Japan pursued a blitzkrieg tactic , for which a high utilization of the existing industrial facilities should be sufficient for the production of a wide range of modern weapon systems (broad armor) and were not prepared for a longer war. The Allies' goal was to win World War II like a war of attrition . The Soviet Union had systematically since 1928 a highly standardized mass production of weapons brought (low armor). After the start of the war, Great Britain and the USA had also started deep armaments and prioritized the war economy over the consumer goods industry in the allocation of scarce resources such as material, personnel and means of production. Only after the blitzkrieg strategy had obviously failed, a reorganization of the war economy in the German Reich and Japan took place from around 1942 onwards towards deep armaments, which then led to production levels similar to those of the Allies ( armaments miracle ). In 1944 the production of war goods comprised 40% of the gross national income in the USA, 50% in Great Britain and Japan and a little over 50% in the German Reich.
A widespread war strategy was also to cut off the opposing parties from imports of raw materials and food. The German Reich developed a great deal of ingenuity in substituting raw materials.
The war economy in World War II led to a significant expansion of women's work , especially among the Allies . In the German Reich, Japan and the Soviet Union there was also forced labor .
Economic ideas of the warring parties
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The global economic crisis had led to destructive economic policies such as protectionism , currency war and beggar-thy-neighbor politics in most countries . What the Axis Powers had in common was a great deal of pessimism about the restoration of a liberal world economic order characterized by free trade. At the same time, they saw that the United States and the USSR represented greater economic areas that could function independently and were large enough to take advantage of the economies of scale . The German Empire and Japan in particular sought to create such an economic area.
In addition to economic benefits, Nazi Germany and Italy also hoped for spiritual benefits from a war. The basis of the fascist and national socialist ideology was a departure from the ideas of the Enlightenment . In the war they saw a tool to drive people out of selfish self-interest, human freedom, progress and democracy in order to create a more “pristine” collectivist society.
German Empire
Hitler took the view, widespread in the German Reich, that Britain's entry into the war in World War I was the result of imperial competition with the aim of eliminating the German Reich as an economic competitor. He saw a high degree of self-sufficiency as necessary in order to have a free hand strategically and militarily. The memory of the very effective sea blockade by the Allies during the First World War also played a role. A large-scale economy had been sought in the German Reich for a long time . In this plan, Germany, together with its industrialized neighbors France, Belgium and Bohemia, would be the industrial heartland. The peripheral countries would provide raw materials and food. The metropolitan economy should offer a larger market with intensive trade relationships, whereby increasing trade should increase the employment rate and per capita income. Racist considerations also played a role in the idea of large-scale economy. According to this, the people of the economic periphery are not capable of a higher economy for racial reasons. Following the concept of the large-scale economy, the German Reich had concluded some bilateral trade agreements with Southeastern European countries since 1933, which enabled more favorable conditions than the trade agreements with other industrialized countries. Some demanded prepayment for imports from the German trading partners, who were short of foreign currencies. These cooperative trade agreements were also of great benefit to the war economy. Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria exported between 40% and 50% of their entire goods to the German Reich. Oil was an important commodity for Romanian trade, and food and armaments for Hungary. German companies invested heavily in Hungary and thus indirectly helped with industrialization.
Hitler's thought circled in a strange universe and is difficult to grasp because of its irrationality. On the one hand, he saw a "Jewish world conspiracy" which ruled the USA, Great Britain and the Soviet Union and which encircled the German Reich. On the other hand, he was of the opinion that a high standard of living, as in the USA, could only be achieved through a large living space. He strove for a racist habitat policy in Poland and parts of the Soviet Union, with the aim of conquest and depopulation. This planning was diametrically opposed to the more traditional idea of large-scale economy using the existing peripheral economies and, because of its senseless cruelty, led to the fact that the temporarily conquered eastern regions, despite their area and population size, were of little use to the war economy of the German Empire.
In detail, the economic ideas within the NSDAP were quite diverse and inconsistent. Laws were also passed with which economic efficiency gains were combated by legally protecting labor-intensive forms of agriculture and handicrafts, combating large retail companies and preventing people from migrating from agriculture to industry as far as possible. Since rearmament already created full employment in peacetime, the start of the war with the drafting of millions of men into military service inevitably led to production losses. The SS set up their own highly inefficient and inhumane economic empire with the concentration camps.
Italy
In Italy there were attempts to set up an open-plan economy of their own. However, this was difficult due to the strong expansion of German trade relations to Southeast Europe. There were also attempts to create synthetic industries that were important to the war effort through protectionism and subsidies, but efforts lagged well behind those of the German Reich. Overall, there were no adequate attempts in Italy to prepare economically for a longer war.
Japan
The Japanese war aims were primarily economic. Similar to the German Empire, the aim was to develop its own large-scale economy , which was called the coprosperity area, with the sole aim of strengthening the Japanese economy and not of radical social or racist goals. The Japanese economy would have formed the industrial core area and the peripheral economies would have been included primarily for the supply of raw materials and food production via trade agreements. Korea would have been responsible for the rice supply, Manchuria for iron, coal and food, deer (province) for coal and cotton, Dutch East Indies for oil and bauxite, Malaysia for tin and rubber and Dutch Formosa for sugar. The catch with the planning was that some mineral resources had not yet been developed and the utilization of the coprosperity zone In some cases, high investments in equipment and transport infrastructure required, although for Japan both capital and the time factor were scarce goods.
The Allies
The Allies feared the economic consequences of World War II because after the experience of World War I they assumed that an expensive war with high inflation and social unrest after the war would inevitably lead to a global recession. The greatest concern was in the USSR, where the violent economic and social transformation into communism created unrest. On the other hand, from the spring of 1939 onwards, Stalin laid increasing emphasis on the Leninist doctrine of the inevitability of war against the capitalist states. The German-Soviet non-aggression pact of August 1939 was on the planning Stalin's help is that the German Empire, France and England in a long and bloody war of attrition mutually weakened, while the Soviet Union was able to upgrade undisturbed. In Russia, during the First World War, the experience was that a lack of war material led to very high losses of soldiers' lives. For Stalin, the high pressure industrialization also had the purpose of not losing the coming war as a “battle of the machines” for greater arms production. The Soviet five-year plan for the years 1928–1932 with the aim of industrializing the Soviet Union actually made a significant contribution to the fact that the Soviet Union won the German-Soviet War . Industrialization made it possible to produce many more weapons and factories were built in areas of the Soviet Union that, despite the initial successes of Operation Barbarossa, were beyond the reach of German troops.
Overview of the dynamics of arms production
A comparison of the armaments expenditures of the great powers shows that the German Reich was by far the best-prepared war party before the outbreak of World War II, followed by the Soviet Union.
The actual amount of arms expenditure was secret at the time. In fact, the later Allies overestimated the extent of the armament of the German Empire. This led to the fact that Great Britain entered the arms race in 1936, but essentially only expanded and modernized the fleet and the air force in order to prevent a possible invasion and to gain time until the British war economy could be trimmed for mass production. Although it was evident that the armaments of the German Empire were directed primarily against France, France increased its armaments spending little. Here all hopes rested on the impassability of the static Maginot Line .
| country | United States | Soviet Union | Great Britain | France | German Empire | Italy | Japan |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Armaments expenditure from 1935 to 1938 in billions of $ | 4.3 | 12.5 | 4.8 | 3.7 | 15.9 | 3.8 | 5.5 |
At the same time, the German Reich's expenditure on military purposes was high, but armament was by no means a paramount priority. The Axis Powers had opted for a blitzkrieg strategy. The German Reich therefore switched to armament in order to quickly create a modern, powerful army for a series of short wars. This was not only intended to avoid the misery of a war of attrition, as had been experienced in World War I , it was also the only realistic option with regard to the problems with the raw material supply and the resulting lower potential for mass production. Hitler hoped to be able to knock down his opponents one after the other with quick, surprising blows and thus avoid a war of attrition. Immediately after the start of Operation Barbarossa , the focus on armaments was therefore to be shifted to the Air Force with the Goering program so as not to lose any time in the fight against the Western powers. According to Adolf Hitler's plans, the war should begin in early 1940 because of the dynamism of the arms race, as the German Reich had a lot of modern military equipment at that time due to the early armament, whereas the Allies still had much outdated military equipment in their arsenals. As a result of the Allies' rearmament, the war prospects would, in Hitler's view, become steadily worse from 1940 onwards. Despite the early start of rearmament in the German Reich, the armies of France, Great Britain and the Soviet Union were equal on paper when the war broke out. For example, the French heavy tanks Renault Char B1 and the Soviet T-34s were far superior to the Panzerkampfwagen I and Panzerkampfwagen II of the Wehrmacht, which were available at the beginning of the war . The German Reich did not start the Second World War out of a feeling of superiority, but driven by Hitler's fatalistic worldview that war was inevitable and that the prospects for victory would get worse and worse from 1940 onwards. The Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Colonel-General Walther von Brauchitsch , and Franz Halder, as Chief of Staff of the Wehrmacht, were so appalled at the plan to strike against France and Great Britain in November 1939 that they forged coup plans in the winter of 1939/1940.
The Blitzkrieg strategy was successful in the Western campaign , but ultimately failed in the German-Soviet War due to the tough resistance of the Soviet Union. This turned the Second World War into a war of attrition. Contrary to the propaganda of the Nazi regime and the Allies, the armaments industry of the German Reich was by no means working at full speed in 1941. In the course of the general armament, the focus was on expanding the final armament production according to the possibilities of the existing facilities, but not on the expansion and modernization of the production facilities and machinery required for mass production. It was only with the failure of the Blitzkrieg strategy in the winter of 1941/42 that the economic priorities of limited armament were reconsidered. As a result, the German Reich began planning and preparing a war economy based on maximum output. S. d. "Total war" only after Great Britain and the Soviet Union had already made great strides in implementation. The high increase in armaments production in the German Reich in 1943 and 1944 showed that there were still considerable unused reserves. The Allied armaments production, on the other hand, had already peaked in 1942/43. In 1944, 66% of all industrial workers in Great Britain worked for armaments production, in the USA it was 59%. As an example of Hitler's "cannons and butter" policy and the attempt to maintain a high standard of living for the German population despite the war, the British historian Max Hastings reports on the astonishment of the director of the British Bombing Survey Unit Solly Zuckerman that in German Reich the zoos had fed the entire range of zoo animals throughout the war, while in Great Britain the "useless mouths" had been slaughtered at the beginning of the war.
As Joseph Goebbels in February 1943 in the Sports Palace speech to total war advocated, was that in the Soviet Union, Britain and the US with the total commitment of the economy in favor of the war economy - under heavy repression of civilian production - long armaments reality. The National Socialist regime, on the other hand, had difficulty converting the parallel armament organizations. Alan Milward believes that the regime was not sure of its position either and that it was worried about additional public resentment when civil production was being pushed back. The NSDAP was never able to get the majority of the votes in an election and the retention of power was based on repression. In contrast to Great Britain after the evacuation of Dunkirk or the USA after the attack on Pearl Harbor , there was no key experience in the German Reich with which the population could be motivated to make great sacrifices for victory. In addition, the Nazi government had hoped that the United States would be too weakened by the Great Depression to be able to make greater efforts in arms production and significantly underestimated the efforts of Great Britain and the Soviet Union.
The economic power of the Allies was always greater than that of the Axis powers. At the beginning of the war, the Allies' gross national product was around 2.4 times as large. In 1941 it was only twice as high. This was mainly due to the fact that France and parts of the Soviet Union had been occupied. Between 1942 and 1944, the economic power of the Allies rose sharply, mainly because the Soviet economy stabilized and expanded rapidly and the US economy grew by almost 50% during this period. In 1944, the Allies' gross national product was three times that of the Axis powers. A comparison of arms production shows that the Allies not only had the greater economic power, but that their arms production was also disproportionately high. They produced two and a half times as many rifles, three times as many machine guns and fighter jets, and five times as many tanks and mortars. Great Britain and the USA were not prepared for the start of the war. In contrast to the German Empire, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the USA operated deep armaments from the beginning of the war . Through highly standardized mass production, they were able to quickly outdo the production figures of the Axis powers. Towards the end of the war, the German Empire had increased production to a similar level. In 1944 the production of war goods comprised 40% of the gross national income in the USA, 50% in Great Britain and Japan and a little over 50% in the German Reich.
According to the economic historian Alan Milward, the raw materials situation in some countries was more difficult than in others and some countries were more exposed to the effects of war, but overall the productivity and flexibility of the economy of the respective country and the determination and skill in the administration of the Second World War were War economy the most essential factors for the volume of arms production.
| Total arms production (in thousands) during World War II | Rifles | Submachine guns | Machine guns | artillery | mortar | Tanks and self-propelled guns | Warplanes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Allies | 22,701 | 10,868 | 4.154 | 1,208 | 433.4 | 184.2 | 299.5 |
| Axis powers | 8,460 | 698 | 1.313 | 395 | 81.6 | 39.6 | 114.6 |
Production regime and arms production
theory
There are two models for determining an economy's potential for war production: the concept of absolute potential and the concept of relative potential.
The absolute potential x is determined as follows:
p is the peacetime net national income , r the reserves available, s the savings that can be made if capital replacement does not occur at the same rate as in peacetime, e is the volume of external resources, and f the efficiency losses due to administrative friction. In order to achieve this full theoretical potential in practice, no major political, social and administrative difficulties should arise. For example, the German war economy was only able to reach its full potential in 1944 after the National Socialist government reversed part of its own legislation. The full potential is reached when the limit in the use of raw materials and / or manpower has been fully exhausted. Work efficiency can usually be increased through capital investments, which also happens regularly in times of war. Cutting off the enemy from the supply of raw materials is one of the oldest war tactics. However, it should be noted that certain raw materials such. T. are replaceable if a higher price and a slightly lower quality are accepted. The German Empire in particular had developed a great deal of ingenuity when it came to substituting raw materials. There were z. B. A great deal of effort has been made to synthetically produce petroleum and rubber. The Soviet Union had processed plywood instead of aluminum for certain components for aircraft production, thereby reducing the aluminum requirement by 30,000 tons. In the German Empire, the occupied part of Europe and, to a lesser extent, Great Britain, motor vehicles were equipped with generators that could use gas or solid fuel.
Trying to reach the absolute potential has potentially serious social and political implications. For this reason, only a relative potential is usually tapped, so that private consumption and investments in civil industry are not restricted to the maximum.
The relative potential W is determined as follows, derived from the absolute potential x:
c is the volume of private consumption that should not be curtailed, i is the volume of investments in civil industry that should not be curtailed, and d for inefficiencies that are accepted in order to protect the political and social system from disruption preserve.
Overview Changeover to central administration economy
In a theoretical free market economy , resources are only allocated through the mechanism of supply and demand . In the welfare state or the social market economy, the state acts on the allocation of resources via monetary policy and fiscal policy by influencing the supply and demand mechanism. In a central administration economy, however, decisions on the allocation of scarce resources are made directly by a central, mostly state authority.
As soon as the warring parties decided to aim for the greatest possible arms production, they all made a series of similar decisions aimed at undermining market mechanisms. The extent of the central administration economy naturally varied from country to country. The Soviet Union already had a communist central administration economy. The USA and most other countries were initially reluctant to take selective interventions, but then developed systems of prioritized allocation of raw materials according to the logic of the arms industry. Due to the foreign exchange shortage since the mid-1930s and the self-sufficiency policy, the German Reich had already established approaches to a central administration economy, which was completed on November 26, 1936 with the general ban on wage and price increases and the introduction of quotas.
Many mistakes were made in the distribution, especially at the beginning. In order to enable smooth aircraft production, for example, not only the availability of various raw materials but also the availability of personnel and machines in aircraft production and in the suppliers had to be ensured. A shortage in just one place created a bottleneck that limited overall aircraft production and at the same time lowered the production efficiency of the entire aircraft industry through underutilized capacities. Furthermore, it often happened that there were resource bottlenecks that hit two top-priority war productions at the same time. In these cases, priorities had to be identified within the priorities. In order to make these decisions correctly, detailed knowledge of the economy and the individual production processes was required. These decisions had to be checked by a higher authority, which also had a democratic (or in dictatorships a different kind of legitimation). In the Soviet Union, all economic decisions were made centrally anyway, but the decisions were often based on uninformed or realistic assumptions. In the German Reich there were control bodies for the organization of broad armament even before the war began, but they were not networked enough for deep armament. In Italy and Japan such bodies only existed in rudimentary form in 1939, and none at all in the USA and Great Britain. In the USA and Great Britain there were concerns about the democratic legitimation of such a body, and in the USA there were also problems with the federal division of tasks. In the German Reich, Adolf Hitler did not want to equip anyone else with such extensive powers.
In the United States, the War Production Board was finally established for this purpose in 1942 . One of the first regulations in the USA was the control and distribution of raw materials by a public decision-making body in order to ensure the defense objectives. The distribution took place in such a way that all consumers of scarce raw materials communicated their requirements to the organization of the Controlled Materials Plan , a sub-organization of the War Production Board. The War Production Board then distributed purchase authorizations. The raw material suppliers had to report their production quantities and sales and were only allowed to sell to authorized buyers. Later, according to the requirements, personnel and production resources were to be distributed to the industry according to defense-related criteria.
In the German Reich, this task fell to the Reich Ministry for Armaments and Ammunition , but the four-year planning authority under Hermann Göring retained responsibility for coordinating raw materials and food supplies. With the division of competencies to the four-year plan authority unclear in detail, the Reich Ministry of Economics under Walther Funk was also responsible for the coordination of the war economy. Because of the split competencies, central decisions continued to be made by Hitler by order of the Führer. The conflict of competence was unsustainable in terms of armaments and Göring's incompetence led to a loss of confidence in his authority. With the Fuehrer's Armament Order of March 31, 1942, the Reich Ministry for Armaments and Ammunition became the relatively central planning authority.
In Japan, many decisions were made by the Zaibatsu corporate conglomerate . Until November 1942, several ministers were responsible for coordinating the war economy in the five industrial sectors of ships, aircraft, coal, iron and steel, and other metals. In November 1942 an attempt was made to achieve greater networking through a ministerial coordination committee. In January 1943 Prime Minister Tōjō Hideki took over the coordination of the war economy himself, but had to be "advised" by seven representatives of the Zaibatsu. For this purpose, the Shōkōshō (Ministry of Trade and Industry) was transferred to the newly founded Gunjushō (Ministry of War Material). In November 1943 Tojo lost his competence in economic policy again. The activity of the later Minister for War Material Fujihara essentially consisted in mediating between the various parts of the army (army, fleet, air force) and additionally the Zaibatsu, whereby the Zaibatsu continued to occasionally thwart the plans.
Great Britain has been urged by the US to tighten planning. The US and UK coordinated their production and resources from 1942 through the Combined Production and Resources Board and the Combined Raw Materials Board . In this context, the Americans demanded B. Detailed information on the raw materials available in the UK. The Ministry of Production was set up in February 1942 to tighten the coordination of the British war economy and was headed most of the time by Oliver Lyttelton . The purpose of the Ministry was to coordinate the requirements of the Ministry of Supply , the Ministry of Aircraft Production and the Admiralty, which were responsible for arming the armed forces, with the Ministry of Labor and National Service , which was responsible for the distribution of workers to the civil economy War economy and the armed forces was responsible. In Great Britain, the distribution of the domestic scarce raw materials was partly left to trade organizations. The advantage was that experts made the distribution. The downside was that not everyone could get away from considering the interests of their own company and industry in the distribution. The problem was not so great that Britain's greatest shortage was in labor, the distribution of which was closely monitored. Firms that could not get enough workers were also not interested in buying raw materials on a large scale.
The plans for armaments production were based on almost all warring parties from estimates that were far too optimistic with regard to the supply of raw materials. The problem was somewhat less in Great Britain and Japan, where most of the raw materials were imported and also physically checked and statistically recorded.
Furthermore, there is a strong inflationary tendency during war. On the one hand, the state increases government spending and borrows money for it, which increases the amount of money and the demand for raw materials, armaments, uniforms, etc. At the same time, full employment arises and employees have a strong negotiating position in wage negotiations, while consumer goods production often falls. This increases the demand for consumer goods while the supply decreases. This also creates inflation. The First World War showed that unrestrained inflation hinders the allocation of resources to the arms industry and leads to social upheaval. Furthermore, there is a risk that confidence in the currency will decline and the population will no longer make savings that can be made available to the state in the form of loans. The inflationary trend was counteracted on the one hand by increasing taxes. On the one hand, this was a necessity in view of the high costs, and on the other hand, the social balance should be preserved through tax progression . In the UK, the top income tax rate has been increased to such an extent that the incentive to make a profit has been almost entirely removed. On the other hand, wage and price controls of varying intensity were created.
Overview of machine tools
Before the war, the USA and the German Reich had by far the largest volume in machine tool production and also produced a considerable amount for the world market. There was only a small machine tool industry in Britain and France, which put tight limits on belated rearmament efforts. Both countries imported large quantities of machine tools from the USA in 1939 and 1940. In Great Britain machine tool production multiplied during the war and imports decreased proportionally. In Japan the production of machine tools rose from 15,000 in 1936 to 67,200 in 1938. In the further course of the war the production figures did not increase any further, but the share of specialized machine tools in the total volume rose from 1% in 1943 to 15% in 1944. Specialized machine tools have the disadvantage that they are only created for one function and can therefore not be used flexibly. But they have the advantage that they allow a higher production speed than unspecialized machine tools. The production justifies itself only for a stable production program. From this one can conclude that from 1944 onwards Japan was aiming for highly standardized mass production. In the German Reich the share of specialized machine tools was only 8%. In contrast to the USA, toolmakers in Great Britain and the German Reich were not allowed to visit armaments production for reasons of secrecy, which already restricted the possibility of manufacturing specialized machine tools. In the US, the proportion of specialized machine tools was already higher than in any other country before the war. This was one of the reasons why labor productivity per worker in the USA was twice as high as in the German Reich and five times as high as in Japan. While machine tool production in the USA multiplied again from its high starting level, it rose relatively little in the German Reich.
| Index of the volume of machine tool production in the USA and in the German Reich (1939 = 100) | 1939 | 1940 | 1941 | 1942 | 1943 | 1944 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| United States | 100 | 221 | 387.5 | 662.2 | 599 | 244.1 |
| German Empire | 100 | 116.3 | 129.5 | 125.7 | 116 | 102.5 |
In addition, machine tools were used more intensively in the USA and Great Britain. In the German Reich, 2.35 workers worked on a machine tool in one shift . In the UK there were 5.7 workers and there were three shifts.
Development of the production regime and arms production by country
German Empire
Years of peace
As early as 1933, wages were fixed at a very low level with a statutory wage freeze. The unions were also forcibly eliminated as early as 1933 (see: General German Trade Union Confederation # Political Disputes in the Final Phase of the Weimar Republic ). Workers and trade unions were brought into line on the German Labor Front . The shortage of labor was countered by issuing general compulsory labor and a ban on changing businesses. Since the armament of the Wehrmacht from 1937 onwards led to a labor shortage, many workers succeeded in overriding the restrictions. There was an "economic class struggle"; Secretly, information was circulated about which companies paid the best. As a result, many workers switched to large-scale industry, and many small businesses found themselves in particularly great shortage of personnel.
According to the four-year plan , the German Reich should be ready for war by the beginning of 1940. In addition to armaments production, raw material production was also greatly expanded. Overall, the goal of self-sufficiency could not be achieved despite great efforts. Shortly before the war, stocks of essential raw materials and food were created, which could cover the total needs for six months. The Reich leadership was aware that a longer war would lead to critical shortages, which is why a successful “ blitzkrieg ” was seen as the only realistic strategy. General Thomas repeatedly warned that the German Reich was not preparing for a real war and that “the production of consumer goods would have to be drastically reduced in order to free up resources for the war economy, that the number of ammunition factories would have to be increased, that more women would have to be employed and that a central point should be created in order to achieve a priority allocation of resources. ”In a speech on November 29, 1939, he exaggeratedly formulated that one had to free oneself from the idea that it was possible“ England with radios, vacuum cleaners and To defeat kitchen appliances ”.
During the war, Anglo-American analysts assumed a much better supply situation in Germany. When the real production capacities became known after the war, people were amazed at how reckless Hitler had started the war.
Wartime
At the beginning of the Second World War (until mid-1940) 3.4 million workers were drafted into military service, which reduced the number of workers by 8.6%, while at the same time the number of those employed in the armaments industry fell again by 3.1% increased. To compensate for this, the average working week increased from 46.5 hours to 49 hours. Furthermore, guest workers were recruited following the idea of large-scale economy. By 1944 the number increased to 7.5 million foreign foreign workers and Eastern workers . That was an impressive 20% of the entire workforce in the German economy.
At the beginning of the Second World War, armaments production was severely slowed down by a lack of transport capacities. The Reichsbahn had been systematically neglected in favor of other projects, which reduced the number of freight wagons from 670,000 (late 1920s) to 575,000 in 1937. With the outbreak of war, a large number of transport capacities for troop transports were also shut down. The result was that only a few raw materials could be transported to the factories and production declined. This not least led to an “ammunition crisis” in the Wehrmacht. It was not until the seated war and the production of new freight cars that arms production increased again from February 1940.
After the defeat in the Battle of Moscow , Fritz Todt (who died shortly afterwards) and subsequently Albert Speer were authorized by the Fuehrer's order for armaments of March 31, 1942 to order drastic measures to standardize the armaments industry. At the same time, a strictly planned state economy was in fact increasingly integrated and a new basis was created for the survey system. Hitler's concern remained that the down-prioritization of civil production would spark additional resentment among the population. When the Wehrmacht was successful again in Russia, Speer had several heated discussions with Hitler from May 1942, who urged that civil production should be given higher priority again in the distribution of resources. The winter of 1942/43 with the successes of the Red Army ended these discussions.
Hitler initially continued to shy away from an even clearer subordination of consumer goods production to arms production because he feared for morale on the home front and because he underestimated the volume of war goods production by the Allies. Hitler and Speer hoped to balance the quantitative superiority of the Allied war goods production with qualitative superiority. Unlike the Allies, who sought to achieve the greatest possible output through a high degree of simplification and standardization, the German Reich aimed for flexible mass production that was not able to deliver quite as high an output, but allowed short-term modifications and improvements to the design requirements. The size, strength and diversity of German mechanical engineering made this possible. During the raid on the Soviet Union, the superiority of the Soviet medium T-34 tanks had become apparent . As a result, the 7.5 cm PaK 40 , the heavy Panzerkampfwagen VI Tiger and above all the Panzerkampfwagen V Panther were developed, which with minor modifications remained technically outstanding until the end of the war. Nevertheless, the Citadel Company showed that the technical superiority could not compensate for the clear numerical inferiority, despite the Adolf Hitler tank program to quadruple tank production. In addition, an outstanding technology, with a few exceptions such as the unit 4, was quickly copied by the opponents, so that the qualitative superiority was lost again after a few months.
| Consumer goods production | 1939 | 1940 | 1941 | 1942 | 1943 | 1944 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1939 = 100% | 100 | 94.1 | 95.7 | 86.1 | 90.8 | 85.4 |
At the beginning of the war, the economy of the German Empire grew relatively little. With the start of deep armament in 1942, economic growth increased significantly and achieved similarly high increases as in the USA.
| Comparison of military spending and consumer spending in billion Reichsmarks (at constant prices from 1939) | 1939 | 1940 | 1941 | 1942 | 1943 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross National Income | 129 | 129 | 131 | 136 | 150 |
| Government spending | 45 | 62 | 77 | 93 | 109 |
| Consumer spending | 71 | 66 | 62 | 57 | 57 |
Three phases emerged in the production of war goods: from February to July 1942 production rose by 50%, from October 1942 to May 1943 it rose by a further 50%. From December 1943 to July 1944, production rose another 45% to its peak. Influenced by the stab in the back legend , Hitler was of the erroneous view that the war weariness of the German population had led to an avoidable defeat in the First World War . He was also well aware that the Second World War had not sparked any enthusiasm for war among the German population (unlike the First World War). In the first years of the war he therefore hesitated to consistently increase the production of war goods, because this would inevitably have led to a reduction in the production of consumer goods due to the scarcity of capital and raw materials. Only after the blitzkrieg strategy had clearly failed after the defeat in the Battle of Moscow did Hitler recognize the need for a significant expansion of war production. He appointed Albert Speer Minister of the Reich Ministry for Armaments and Ammunition . Due to simplifications and rationalization measures, armaments production doubled between 1942 and 1943. Speer spoke, charged with propaganda, of an armaments miracle , partly to give the German population a false hope of a final victory , partly to strengthen its own position in the government. The “miracle” of the increase in productivity and production was based in part on the relatively low starting level, because before 1942 the government had paid little attention to high productivity in the war economy.
- The drafting of armaments workers into the Wehrmacht had led to a labor shortage that had to be filled again by women and forced laborers who had to be trained.
- There was a pronounced learning curve in production efficiency, especially with complex weapon production. The production of a Junkers Ju 88 required 100,000 hours in October 1939, only 15,000 in August 1941 and only 7,000 hours in September 1943. In addition to the individual learning curve of the workers, the increased use of machines and the acquisition of more specialized machines also played a role. The vertical range of manufacture was reduced by outsourcing the production of standardized components to highly efficient assembly lines.
- Before 1942, the technical requirements for weapons production were commissioned by the military, so that production changes were frequent as a result. Speer succeeded in pulling the regulatory authority over to the Ministry of Armaments so that the aspects of military functionality could be more closely weighed against aspects of economic efficiency in production.
- Manufacturing steps such as polishing and painting, which did not increase the combat power of a weapon, were abolished.
- The most important change was made to the terms of the contract. Up until mid-1941, weapons were bought on cost contracts. The companies received the total production costs plus a percentage profit mark-up as the purchase price. This gave companies no incentive to produce cheaper, as this would automatically have reduced the profit markup. Fritz Todt (who became Reich Minister for Armaments and Ammunition in March 1940 ) had converted all supply contracts to fixed price contracts between mid and late 1941. In the case of fixed-price contracts, a fixed price was paid for the weapons based on the expected costs. If the arms manufacturers succeeded in falling below the expected production costs, they could keep the cost savings as an additional profit. Companies that demanded a lower fixed price were allowed to request preferential allocation of resources and labor and were given a longer-term contract. Companies that demanded relatively high fixed prices did not receive preferential awards and only short-term contracts. They had to expect not to get a follow-up contract.
- At the instigation of Walter Warlimont and Fritz Todt, the French aviation industry was involved in air force production after the defeat in the Battle of Britain . But it was not until 1943 that Albert Speer succeeded against opposition in integrating the industry of the occupied (western) territories into war production on a large scale. Associated with this was a temporary end to plans to largely eliminate foreign industrial competition.
The more recent research sees no wonder in the expansion of arms production. The main reason for the "armaments miracle" is primarily to be seen in a planned continuous increase in labor productivity. The reduction of the working hours in the production of the Junkers JU88 from 100,000 to 7,000 hours per piece was calculated in advance by the Reich Aviation Ministry. The jump in production in 1943 is therefore not an expression of a sudden increase in production efficiency, but an effect of the heavy investments made in previous years. Furthermore, Speer's statistics are misleading insofar as industrial services in the occupied territories, in particular France, were not shown separately as foreign services.
From the summer of 1943, the Allies began to bomb the German armaments and aircraft industry. This forced the armaments production to decentralize with greater effort or to move it underground. Only when the material superiority of the Red Army became overwhelming, Hitler gave Speer the power of attorney on December 6, 1943, to allocate raw materials and capital preferentially to the war industry and war supply industry, but at this point the war was de facto already lost.
The air strikes on industrial plants did not bring the Allies much strategic advantage. Although there was impressive damage to buildings, it was easy to repair. However, the machines were so well protected against the effects of bombs that only a direct hit could damage them. Raw materials and components were mainly stored outside the factory premises. For example, a lot of effort was made to hit the ball bearing factories in Schweinfurt, but production could not be stopped because less sensitive machines were used for production, which were also difficult to hit from the air. It was different with the factories that produced synthetic oil, which could be more easily damaged by air raids. But also during the air raids on the Leunawerke it turned out that the plant could be made ready for production again within 6-8 weeks despite massive destruction, so that only repeated air raids showed a lasting effect. The Allied aerial warfare strategy tended towards area bombing , which could cause greater damage overall than attacks on individual objects. However, the area bombing caused damage to residential buildings and less to industrial plants. Overall, neither the bombing of England nor the bombing of the German Reich "broke the morale of the population". The economic historian Alan Milward comes to the conclusion that the bombings were essentially the result of the idea of retaliation, but were more of a mistake in a strictly economic cost-benefit analysis . The economist Keith Hartley estimates the costs of the British air strikes on the German Reich (in 2009 prices) at 167 to 440 billion pounds, the benefits in the form of estimated losses for the German Reich in arms production at at least 161 billion pounds and in civilian production 44 billion pounds. From his point of view, the air strikes by the Royal Air Force made economic sense, even if some bombardments were excessive and inefficient at the end of the war. From the end of 1944, the Allied air sovereignty led to major damage to the transport infrastructure and power lines, as well as to not inconsiderable damage to individual industrial facilities. According to the United States Strategic Bombing Survey , German economic production was affected to a greater extent by the strategic air raids from this point on, in particular because coal, by far the most important energy source, could no longer be transported from the mines to the industrial plants, resulting in production stoppages in the Industry came. However, the military situation of the German Reich was already hopeless at this point. According to estimates by the United States Strategic Bombing Survey, German industrial production was reduced by 2.5% in the air raids in 1942, 9% in 1943, 17% in 1944 and 6.5% in 1945. However, the historian Stewart Halsey Ross points out that, despite the massive air raids, German war production in 1944 was much higher than in previous years. Overall, the United States Strategic Bombing Survey also comes to the conclusion that the air strikes did not have a decisive influence on war production and the outcome of the war. Although the population lost faith in victory, they continued to work effectively. John Kenneth Galbraith , one of the directors of the Strategic Bombing Survey, even described the strategic bombing as a disastrous failure because the costs were much higher than the benefits. One could only afford that because the US economy was much larger than that of the German Reich.
With the liberation of France, the integration of French economic power into the war industry of the Third Reich ended. Due to the increasing deterioration in the nutritional situation of hard-working miners (the relative malnutrition of the German and, to an even greater extent, of the forced laborers), the output in coal mining fell rapidly.
| Arms production per year | 1939 | 1940 | 1941 | 1942 | 1943 | 1944 | 1945 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Rifles | 451,000 | 1,352,000 | 1,359,000 | 1,370,000 | 2,275,000 | 2,856,000 | 665,000 |
| Submachine guns | 40,000 | 119,000 | 325,000 | 232,000 | 243,000 | 229,000 | 78,000 |
| Machine guns | 20,000 | 59,000 | 96,000 | 117,000 | 263,000 | 509,000 | 111,000 |
| artillery | 2,000 | 6,000 | 22,000 | 41,000 | 74,000 | 148,000 | 27,000 |
| mortar | 1,400 | 4,400 | 4,200 | 9,800 | 23,000 | 33,200 | 2,800 |
| Tanks and self-propelled guns | 700 | 2,200 | 3,800 | 6,200 | 10,700 | 18,300 | 4,400 |
| Warplanes | 2,300 | 6,600 | 8,400 | 11,600 | 19,300 | 34,100 | 7,200 |
Italy
In Italy there have been little effective efforts towards a war economy. For example, there were wage and price controls, but inflationary monetary policy reduced them to absurdity. General Carlo Favagrossa , State Secretary for War Economics, wrote in retrospect that Italy's foreign policy was in complete contrast to its possibilities. With a recklessness that defies description, she slipped into a catastrophe.
Soviet Union
Stalin viewed the Second World War as a "battle of the machines", which the Soviet Union ultimately won with a significantly larger arms production compared to the German Reich.
The aim of the first five-year plan (valid for 1928 to 1933), with the industrialization of the Soviet Union, was also to increase military strength and develop the war economy. The third five-year plan was changed again under the impact of the western campaign and provided for a forced expansion of mechanical engineering capacities and armament against the kind of blitzkrieg that the German Empire had carried out in France. The expansion of consumer goods production, on the other hand, had a lower priority from the start and was further reduced due to an emerging labor shortage. In 1934, direct arms production had a volume of 6% of the gross domestic product, this rose to 13% by 1937 and in 1941 amounted to approx. 25 - 30% of the gross domestic product. The greatest weakness of the Soviet war economy was of a political and administrative nature, here the forced collectivization , deculakization and the great terror , which reached into the army and economic planning staff, should be mentioned.
| Gross National Product in billion international dollars (at 1990 prices) | 1940 | 1941 | 1942 | 1943 | 1944 | 1945 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Soviet Union | 417 | 359 | 318 | 464 | 495 | 396 |
| German Empire | 387 | 412 | 417 | 426 | 437 | 310 |
Due to the large territorial gains of the German Reich at the beginning ( course of the war in 1941 ), the factories west of Moscow had to be dismantled immediately and the machines in the Ural region, western Siberia and the Volga region re-installed in improvised halls. The Soviet territories conquered by the German Reich by November 1941 accounted for 63% of the coal production of the Soviet Union, 58% of the steel production, 60% of the aluminum production and 41% of the railroad tracks. This initially led to a significant decline in Soviet economic output in 1941 and 1942. From 1943, however, it was possible to exceed the economic output of the German Reich. While in 1920 only 15% of the national product was spent on war material, the quota rose to 55% by 1943. Employment of women in industry rose by 60% during this period.
| Comparison of military spending and consumer spending (1940 = 100%) | 1940 | 1941 | 1942 | 1943 | 1944 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross National Income | 100 | 92 | 66 | 74 | 88 |
| Industrial production | 100 | 98 | 77 | 90 | 104 |
| Arms production | 100 | 140 | 186 | 224 | 251 |
| Agricultural production | 100 | 62 | 38 | 37 | 54 |
The dramatic decline in food production could in no way be compensated for by deliveries under the Lending and Lease Act and led to a famine in which some old people and young children died of starvation. Consumer goods production, which was already very low before the war, fell to 54% and did not return to pre-war levels until 1949. The taxes were increased sharply. In addition, citizens were forced to give the state part of their income as a loan. In 1945 real wages were only 40% of the 1940 level. The large increase in arms production while all other economic sectors, including agriculture, were almost in free fall, testifies to the extremely radical nature of the war economic administration in the Soviet Union.
| Arms production per year | 1941 | 1942 | 1943 | 1944 | 1945 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Rifles | 1,567,000 | 4,049,000 | 3,436,000 | 2,450,000 | 637,000 |
| Submachine guns | 90,000 | 1,506,000 | 2,024,000 | 1,971,000 | 583,000 |
| Machine guns | 106,000 | 356,000 | 459,000 | 439,000 | 156,000 |
| artillery | 30,000 | 127,000 | 130,000 | 122,000 | 72,000 |
| mortar | 42,300 | 230,000 | 69,400 | 7,100 | 3,000 |
| Tanks and self-propelled guns | 4,800 | 24,400 | 24,100 | 29,000 | 20,500 |
| Warplanes | 8,200 | 21,700 | 29,900 | 33,200 | 19,100 |
| Warships | 62 | 19th | 13 | 23 | 11 |
The American and British arms deliveries to the Soviet Union increased the combat strength of the Red Army considerably. It is estimated that 10.5% of all Soviet tanks in World War II and 11% of all aircraft were American or British made.
Japan
Japan was able to fall back on an armaments industry that was closely interwoven with the state and had been able to supply high-quality material since the beginning of the twentieth century. The army itself tried to create an industrial center for its needs in occupied Manchuria . However, the production volume of industry was not sufficient to achieve the motorization goals demanded by the army . A determined demand of 235,000 motor vehicles was offset by a domestic vehicle production of around 1,000 per year in 1933. Motorization was postponed from 1936 in favor of aircraft construction for the Army Air Force. In 1939, Japan produced 28 tanks a month. In 1936, the state-owned ammunition factories could cover a maximum of a tenth of the calculated war needs. Due to the lack of ammunition, the artillery training within the army also suffered. The share of military spending in gross national product rose from 6.8% in 1932 to 1936 to 13.2% in 1937 and 17.4% in 1939.
At the beginning of the war in 1937, the Japanese parliament had passed several laws authorizing the government and military leadership to set up a centralized planned economy for the purpose of the war by allocating capital, goods and controlling exports and imports. This was followed in the same year by the establishment of a central, state planning commission. In the course of the war there was a shift in the relationship between heavy and light industry. The proportion of heavy industry rose from 38% in 1930 to 73% in 1942 as part of armament and the war. The Japanese government introduced petrol rationing in March 1938 , which led to the appearance of wood-gas powered vehicles . General price controls were passed by parliament in September 1939.
The Shōkōshō (Ministry of Commerce and Industry) was transferred to the newly founded Gunjushō (Ministry of War Material) in 1943 in a fruitless attempt to gain more control over the Zaibatsu . This was intended to create a Japanese equivalent to the Reich Ministry for Armaments and Ammunition , created in the German Reich in 1940 , which centralized the parallel organizations that had arisen during the period of broad armament.
The Japanese arms industry managed to increase the output of fighter aircraft up to and including 1944, which were regarded by the military as the most important instrument in the Pacific War. Production fell sharply due to the Allied military operations in 1945. Even in its prime, Japanese industrial output in this division was only a third of US output.
The number of employees in industry and construction increased by 5 million workers by the end of the war. Of these, 2 million came from low-productivity activities such as B. Domestic workers. Another 3 million came from agriculture. It is believed that the number of agricultural workers did not decrease because the wives and daughters continued to work in the agricultural sector.
Imports for civil production were given a very low priority. So z. For example, cotton for textile production can only be imported by companies that have generated enough foreign currency through their own exports. Another difficulty was that Japan was still in the process of industrialization at the end of the 1930s. 50% of the population still worked in agriculture. The need for machines and machine parts remained the main limiting factor for arms production.
| Comparison of military and consumer spending in billion yen (at constant prices from 1940) | 1940 | 1941 | 1942 | 1943 | 1944 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross National Income | 39.8 | 40.3 | 40.6 | 45.1 | 49.3 |
| Government spending | 4.7 | 6.6 | 9.9 | 14.5 | 20.2 |
| Private capital investments in the defense industry | 4.5 | 4.3 | 3.4 | 5.1 | 5.3 |
| Consumer spending | 26.7 | 26.0 | 23.8 | 22.4 | 18.8 |
| War expenses abroad | 1.0 | 2.2 | 2.5 | 3.4 | 7.1 |
The share of arms production in gross national income rose from 17% in 1940 to more than 30% in 1942 and finally 50% in 1944.
| Arms production per year | 1939 | 1940 | 1941 | 1942 | 1943 | 1944 | 1945 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Rifles | 83,000 | 449,000 | 729,000 | 440,000 | 634,000 | 885,000 | 349,000 |
| Submachine guns | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 5 |
| Machine guns | 6,000 | 21,000 | 43,000 | 71,000 | 114,000 | 156,000 | 40,000 |
| artillery | 1,000 | 3,000 | 7,000 | 13,000 | 28,000 | 84,000 | 23,000 |
| mortar | 500 | 1,600 | 1,100 | 1,500 | 1,700 | 1,100 | 300 |
| Tanks and self-propelled guns | 200 | 1,000 | 1,000 | 1,200 | 800 | 400 | 200 |
| Warplanes | 700 | 2,200 | 3,200 | 6,300 | 13,400 | 21,000 | 8,300 |
| Warships | 21st | 30th | 49 | 68 | 122 | 248 | 51 |
China
The Republic of China was dependent on foreign armaments due to its economic development lag. Before the start of the war in 1937, there were local factories producing infantry weapons and ammunition. Before the war, these were able to deliver around three million rounds of ammunition a day. China received military aid from Germany, the Soviet Union and the Western Allies from 1937 to 1945. Up until April 1938, Germany delivered armaments worth 147 million Reichsmarks. By 1941, the Soviet Union supplied 82 tanks, 1,526 motor vehicles, 1,190 artillery pieces, 9,720 machine guns, 50,000 rifles, around 187 million rounds of infantry ammunition and 1.87 million rounds of artillery ammunition. From 1941 onwards, China received US $ 846 million in military aid under the US lend lease program. Defense equipment accounted for around $ 517 million of this. In addition to armaments, fuel deliveries made up the bulk of the military aid, which was mostly shipped by air. The blockade of the Chinese coast and the Burma Road by Japan prevented large-volume transport of armaments for a long time. Accordingly, until 1944, China received only a minimal part of total US foreign aid during the war, with a maximum of 1.4 percent of the volume of the lend lease program. In 1945 this share of the program rose to 8% when Burma Road became free again. US military aid exceeded Soviet military aid, with 1,394 of 2,351 aircraft the Chinese Air Force received from abroad coming from the United States. Because of the Chinese Civil War, the lend lease program was continued until 1947 and expanded significantly after the end of the Pacific War.
Great Britain
In 1939/40 Great Britain found itself in the situation of not having been prepared for war. The USA initially refused to deliver arms, as it was expected that Britain would soon exit the war or even conquer it. Churchill, in turn, feared that without US arms deliveries he would have to negotiate with Hitler sooner rather than later. It was not until the Battle of Britain was won that the way was clear for arms deliveries under the Loan and Lease Act passed in February 1941 .
The level of German arms production was initially greatly overestimated in Great Britain. Until the end of 1941, the German Reich had placed the main focus on the breadth of final armaments production, the expansion of the production facilities and the modernization of the machine park had not been pursued with the utmost consistency. This enabled Great Britain, which immediately after the outbreak of war used all resources for war production, to catch up with the monthly production of the German Reich as early as 1940. In order to promote the war economy as much as possible, the available workforce was redistributed according to wartime economic priorities and the army's manpower was limited to 2 million. Prices, investments, the supply of food, and war and civilian production were placed under state supervision.
In the armaments effort, Britain was able to draw on imports not only from the colonies (which made up 42% of British trade), but also from the US and many other countries. However, a payment problem quickly arose. As every free resource was invested in the war economy, the production of exportable goods fell to near zero. Total consumer goods production fell 21% below the pre-war level.
According to the economic historian Alan Milward, the labor factor was the limiting factor for the British war economy. In contrast to the German Empire, Great Britain had not recruited guest workers.
| Arms production per year | 1939 | 1940 | 1941 | 1942 | 1943 | 1944 | 1945 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Rifles | 18,000 | 81,000 | 79,000 | 595,000 | 910,000 | 547,000 | 227,000 |
| Submachine guns | 0 | 0 | 6,000 | 1,438,000 | 1,572,000 | 672,000 | 231,000 |
| Machine guns | 19,000 | 102,000 | 193,000 | 284,000 | 201,000 | 125,000 | 15,000 |
| artillery | 1,000 | 10,000 | 33,000 | 106,000 | 118,000 | 93,000 | 28,000 |
| mortar | 1,300 | 7,600 | 21,700 | 29,200 | 17,100 | 19,000 | 5,000 |
| Tanks and self-propelled guns | 300 | 1,400 | 4,800 | 8,600 | 7,500 | 4,600 | 2,100 |
| Warplanes | 1,300 | 8,600 | 13,200 | 17,700 | 21,200 | 22,700 | 9,900 |
| Warships | 57 | 148 | 236 | 239 | 224 | 188 | 64 |
United States
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By 1941, many American arms companies had their order books filled with French and British orders for years to come. After the conquest of France, the British government also entered into the original French orders. In February 1941, the Loan and Lease Act was passed. This enabled Great Britain, the Soviet Union and China in particular to apply for war material in the USA and only had to pay for them after the war. The total volume of land lease shipments from 1941 to 1945 was $ 32.515 billion. Of this, goods worth $ 13.842 billion went to Great Britain and goods worth $ 9.478 billion to the Soviet Union. The volume of total exports to the UK, including land-lease supplies, was $ 15.956 billion. There were practically no exports to the Soviet Union outside of the lending and leasing law.
The United States had a strong navy until it entered World War II, but only an insignificant army. A small part of their fleet, as well as outdated battleships, had been destroyed in the attack on Pearl Harbor . After the USA entered the war, its armed forces were initially only involved in a major defensive battle in the Battle of the Philippines . In January 1942, President Franklin D. Roosevelt believed that the overriding goal was that as few US soldiers as possible should lose their lives. For the USA to participate in the war, above all through high production of war material, it is much easier to win support from the skeptical population than by bearing a heavy burden of war victims. The further logic of a large-scale war production was that the US Army would only go into battle when a clear material superiority had been established.
The government soon found that the large US economy could not support such an armament program without bottlenecks occurring. Due to the significant sums of orders for the war economy, there soon came bottlenecks in the production of raw materials, especially copper, aluminum and steel, as well as a shortage of labor. The companies suffered from scarce resources, so that initially many products could only be manufactured incompletely. As a result, the War Production Board was commissioned in 1942 to distribute the rights to purchase scarce resources such as material, personnel and means of production to the industry according to armaments management criteria.
The armament program ensured full employment as early as early 1942. The last able- bodied people who had become unemployed due to the global economic crisis found work in arms production, as did the former farmers affected by the Dust Bowl . In addition, the industry began to increasingly employ housewives, black people and impoverished farmers. The companies began to poach workers from each other with ever higher wage promises. Inflation rose sharply. In April 1942, the unpopular General Maximum Price Regulation ("General Max") was enacted. With this a ban on price increases was enacted. Wages were only allowed to rise as strongly as the cost of living (“Little Steel Formula”). The trade unions had to promise not to go on strikes until the end of the war. Wages had increased by 65%, mainly due to the wage compensation for extended working hours. Although the unions refrained from demanding higher real wages, for the first time they managed to get financially strong companies to provide their workers with health insurance . With the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, the Office of Price Administration was created to keep inflation caused by high levels of government debt under control through price controls . By the end of the war, prices had increased by 28% (compared to 100% in World War I).
The attainment of air sovereignty and the defeat of the Wehrmacht in the Battle of Stalingrad changed the US war plans. Until then, it was assumed that the Soviet Union would collapse. It was therefore planned to first set up an army with the strength of 215 divisions before the USA would intervene in the European part of the Second World War. After it became clear that the Soviet Union would withstand, armament planning was scaled down to 90 US divisions with maximum support from tanks, warplanes and artillery, so that the US could enter the European war that same year.
In 1939 arms production accounted for 2% of total production, in 1941 10% and in 1943 40%. Despite this, the volume of consumer goods production and services to consumers also increased by a total of 12% from 1939 to 1944. An average factory was used 40 hours a week in 1939. In 1944, 18.7 million more people were employed and an average factory was used 90 hours a week. The War Production Board estimates that the labor productivity of the average worker increased by 25 percent from 1939 to 1944. This went z. T. back to an increase in weekly working hours, z. But partly also through economies of scale , capital investments in more machines and new systems and a better exchange of information. In 1944, the United States accounted for 40% of the world's armaments production. This was due not least to the fact that labor productivity per worker in the USA was twice as high as in the German Reich and five times as high as in Japan.
Due to the technological leadership in aircraft construction, the American Curtiss P-40 turned out to be very suitable for military use. This technological leadership was enhanced during the war, particularly with the development of long-range bombers. In the tank production, however, there was a lack of experience. Initially, weakly armored M4 Sherman were built here with normal vehicle engines, which were fast and agile, but clearly inferior in tank battles. When the armor was reinforced it turned out that the engine was too weak. It was not until 1944 that the USA and Great Britain produced tanks with armor equivalent to that of heavy German or Russian tanks.
| Arms production per year | 1941 | 1942 | 1943 | 1944 | 1945 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Rifles | 38,000 | 1,542,000 | 5,683,000 | 3,489,000 | 1,578,000 |
| Submachine guns | 42,000 | 651,000 | 686,000 | 348,000 | 207,000 |
| Machine guns | 20,000 | 662,000 | 830,000 | 799,000 | 303,000 |
| artillery | 3,000 | 188,000 | 221,000 | 103,000 | 34,000 |
| mortar | 400 | 11,000 | 25,800 | 24,800 | 40,100 |
| Tanks and self-propelled guns | 900 | 27,000 | 38,500 | 20,500 | 12,600 |
| Warplanes | 1,400 | 24,900 | 54,100 | 74,100 | 37,500 |
| Warships | 544 | 1,854 | 2,654 | 2,247 | 1,513 |
Canada and Australia
The Canadian divisions were largely supplied with material from Great Britain. Canada itself did not produce any more technically sophisticated armaments. Aircraft production rose from 40 (1939) to 4,000 (1944), largely copies of British aircraft. Canada and Australia mainly produced ships, ammunition and handguns to British or American requirements.
Raw materials and food
Overview of food
As in the First World War, it was not foreseen in the Second World War that the need for food would increase due to the war. Full employment increased the number of workers and employees, in the German Reich the number of workers also increased by 7 million foreign workers, longer working hours and the deployment of soldiers increased energy consumption and the need for food. Higher incomes also increased the demand for food. At the same time world trade was disrupted, e.g. T. by enemy action, z. Sometimes also simply due to the scarcity of ship capacities. So there was drastic rationing of meat products in Great Britain, even though Australia and Argentina produced meat products for export. Argentina could no longer export its maize because it required too much shipping volume. Instead, pigs were fattened with the corn and then exported to the United States as canned meat. In the United States, grain production had to be increased, although in Argentina excess grain could only be used as fuel. To make matters worse, food production was only adapted to a population marked by the privations of the global economic crisis even before the war.
A big problem was that it takes 18 months until a planned and started expansion of agricultural production is followed by the harvest. A common strategy to prevent starvation has been food rationing e.g. B. About food stamps .
One strategy to better serve the population's calorie needs in the short term was to reduce meat production (especially pigs) and to sell the wheat and maize required for meat production directly to the population. On the other hand, dairy cows and sheep can be fed on pastures that are not suitable for growing crops. Another strategy was to increase potato cultivation at the expense of wheat cultivation, as potatoes have a significantly higher area yield . Sugar beet cultivation results in an even higher area yield, but also requires five times as much fertilizer. The situation has been complicated by the shortage of labor. In British high-tech agriculture, growing potatoes was two and a half times more labor intensive than growing wheat. Raising dairy cows was five times more labor intensive than keeping pigs. Industrialized countries with sufficient flexibility and capital could cope better with these problems than developing countries with a high proportion of subsistence economies . The reduced import opportunities for fertilizers in India and Egypt led to proportionally lower food production. In Great Britain, on the other hand, the calorie output of agriculture increased from 14.7 billion before the war to 28.1 billion in 1943/44. Cultivated arable land increased by 66%, meat production decreased by 69%, wheat production increased by 200%.
An important raw material for explosives and fertilizers is ammonia, which during World War II was mainly industrially produced worldwide using the Haber-Bosch process . To the extent that ammonia was given priority in the arms industry, fertilizer production had to take a back seat, with corresponding consequences for food production. In addition, phosphate had been imported from North Africa before the war, which made the continental blockade largely impossible during the war.
Although Switzerland was not involved in the war and was neutral, the Wahlen plan had to bring about a drastic increase in domestic food production and food rationing, as the opportunities for food imports deteriorated drastically.
German Empire
According to the four-year plan , the German Reich should be ready for war by the beginning of 1940. In addition to armaments production, raw material production was also greatly expanded. The iron ore production was sixfold, but at the same time the iron requirement also increased sixfold, so that the domestic production could constantly cover only 40% of the requirement. The Reichswerke Hermann Göring were founded in order to smelt the Lower Cretaceous iron ores of the Salzgitter region, which under today's conditions cannot be valued as being mined. In 1940, German troops occupied the Norwegian port of Narvik in order to be able to supply the German blast furnaces with high-quality iron ore all year round . High iron ore concentrates from the Swedish deposit in Kiruna are transported via this ice-free port by ore railway , as the Swedish port of Luleå is blocked for months by ice on the Baltic Sea in winter .
The empire had only limited foreign exchange reserves. In addition, the Reich government expected that the Reich would be largely cut off from world trade and capital flows from the start of the war. Therefore, production facilities were built or expanded in order to synthetically manufacture raw materials that were important for the war economy ( self-sufficiency economy ). Ammonia, an important raw material for explosives and fertilizers, has been inexpensively produced using the Haber-Bosch process since 1914 , and production capacities have been multiplied. The production capacity for the production of synthetic gasoline by coal liquefaction (z. B. in the Leuna works in the Bergius-Pier process or plant BASF Schwarzheide by Fischer-Tropsch synthesis ) were eight-fold, while the coverage of the total demand increased by local production of only 30 % to 43%. The production of synthetic rubber began after the completion of the Buna works in 1936. The Buna works covered 20% of the total rubber requirement. Synthetic gasoline and rubber were many times more expensive than the corresponding imported raw materials. The whaling has been intensified to cover the needs fat and glycerin to win for the manufacture of explosives. The clothing industry produced more and more uniforms, while the raw materials for other products became scarce.
Agricultural production was also increased, so that in 1939 83% of the demand for food could be covered by domestic production.
Overall, the goal of self-sufficiency could not be achieved despite great efforts. Shortly before the war, stocks of essential raw materials and food were created, which could cover the total needs for six months. The Reich leadership was aware that a longer war would lead to critical shortages, which is why a successful “ blitzkrieg ” was seen as the only realistic strategy.
The short campaign in the west had already shown the limits of self-sufficiency efforts. At the turn of the year 1939/40 there were various shortages that limited the war economy, especially for iron and rubber. The scarcity of transport capacities was even more critical. Because of the lack of iron, the construction of new locomotives and freight wagons had been banned, although the sharp increase in economic activity would have required an expansion of transport capacity by 10-15%. As a result of the transport delays there were repeated production stoppages.
Hitler declared on June 20, 1941: “The course of the war shows that we have gone too far in our autarkic endeavors. It is impossible to try to manufacture everything that we lack by synthetic processes or other measures. For example, it is impossible for us to develop our fuel economy in such a way that we can rely entirely on it. All of these self-sufficient endeavors take up a huge human demand that simply cannot be met. You have to go another way and have to conquer what you need and don't have. The human effort that is required once for this will not be as great as the human effort that is continuously required for the operation of the synthetic works concerned. The goal must therefore be to secure by conquest all the areas that are of particular military interest to us ”. The German-Soviet non-aggression pact made it possible to conclude a trade agreement with the Soviet Union, which enabled the import of food, animal feed and raw materials. In 1940 the German Reich obtained 74% of the phosphate requirement, 67% of the asbestos requirement, 65% of the chrome requirement, 55% of the manganese requirement, 40% of the nickel requirement and 34% of the crude oil imports from the Soviet Union. To the displeasure of Hitler, the Soviet Union demanded high-quality machines and apparatus, vehicles and weapons in return. This not only tied up capacities that were no longer available to German armaments production, but also helped the “hereditary enemy” with industrialization. With the Barbarossa company , the Soviet mineral resources and food were to come under German control for the purpose of exploitation. With the invasion of the Soviet Union, peaceful trade ended. The Axis powers were thus almost completely cut off from world trade.
The German Reich was unable to mine some raw materials either in its own country or in occupied territories. B. Manganese , nickel and chromium are required as well as for tools for cutting high-strength materials tungsten and industrial diamonds . However, because these were only needed in smaller quantities and larger supplies had been stored before the war, the Allied trade blockade did not result in any decisive strategic advantage here. In addition, when an irreplaceable good becomes scarce, the price rises, which makes smuggling more attractive.
| Production in thousands of metric tons. | 1939 | 1940 | 1941 | 1942 | 1943 | 1944 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| steel | 23,733 | 21,540 | 28,233 | 28,744 | 30,603 | 25,853 |
| petrol | - | 3,963 | 4,849 | 5,620 | 6,563 | 4,684 |
| Synthetic rubber | 22nd | 39 | 71 | 101 | 119 | 93 |
| coal | 240,300 | 267,700 | 315,500 | 317,500 | 340,400 | 347,600 |
Great Britain
One problem was the high dependency on food and raw material imports, which could only be carried out across the Atlantic. During the battle of the Atlantic , the German Reich tried to stop imports, and the submarine war in particular forced the Allies to secure trade in the convoy system. This made the trade more expensive, but the Navy did not succeed in stopping it.
In 1939, Britain had to import 50% of the food it needed. To counter the risk of famine, sweets, meat, butter, jam, cheese, fats, bacon, tea, eggs as well as powdered milk and powdered eggs were rationed from January 1940. Every citizen had to register with a butcher and a grocer and was allowed to buy a certain amount of this food by redeeming the coupons allocated to him. Among other things, this led to the consumption of unrationed healthy foods such as potatoes, vegetables and milk increasing by between 30 and 40%. Furthermore, 1.4 million allotment gardens were created to be able to grow as much food as possible.
United States
In order to have enough ship capacity for transports despite the submarine war , the Emergency Shipbuilding Program, which began in 1940, built a large number of cargo ships in a short time.
| Sunken ship space compared to the newly built ship space in the USA | 1939 | 1940 | 1941 | 1942 | 1943 | 1944 | 1945 | 1939-1945 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ship space sunk by submarines (BRT) | 509.321 | 2,462,867 | 2,298,714 | 6,149,473 | 2,510,304 | 663.317 | 284.476 | 14,593,987 |
| Newbuildings in the Emergency Shipbuilding Program (BRT) | 0 | 0 | 2,059,000 | 4,613,000 | 13,000,000 | 12,260,000 | 4,300,000 | 36,315,000 |
The US was a major food exporter even before the war. The Great Depression and the Great Depression had led to a reduction in food production, but with the loan-lease agreement and the Food for Freedom program, the USA began, without direct consideration, large quantities of food mainly to Great Britain, but also to the Soviet Union and China to export. Food production in the US increased 16% from 1940 to 1944. Food shortages in the United States were mainly in the case of fats, which had traditionally been imported from areas occupied by Japan, and in the case of sugar because the limited shipping capacity was reserved for other imports. In order to save ship capacity, fruit, vegetables and eggs were preferably dried and, if possible, also transported in powdered form.
Italy
Since the Abyssinian War, Italy had expanded its agriculture to such an extent that wheat imports were no longer necessary. However, the situation with raw materials was very difficult. Italy mainly produced high-quality high-strength steel, but a total of just two million tons, which was 1/3 of Japanese production. No coal or oil was produced at all. The supplies of strategic raw materials and oil were too small to last even for a very short war.
During the Second World War, Italy imported coal, hardware and machinery from the German Empire. The Italian war economy was completely dependent on German coal imports.
Japan
Even before Japan entered the war, the Japanese economy was slowed down by US trade embargoes. In particular, the need for scrap iron, steel, machine parts, ferro-alloys and aluminum had to be covered by imports that traditionally came from the USA and, to a lesser extent, from the German Empire. An oil embargo was only decided in July 1941. At this point, however, Japan had bought a huge supply of more than 1 million barrels of oil. In the previous year, 1939, imports had only been 40,000 barrels. With constant consumption, the oil supply would have been sufficient for one and a half years. The oil embargo changed the attitude of the Cabinet Planning Office, led by Suzuki Teiichi . While this warned until the beginning of 1941 that a war against the Allies would lead to an economic disaster, in July 1941 it recommended entering the war and conquering the resource-rich Southeast Asia as the only way to avoid economic decline despite the embargo.
In the course of the Pacific War , Japan's oil consumption increased from 15.4 million barrels in 1941 to 35.1 million barrels in 1943. This demand could initially be met from the territories conquered by the Western Allies. From 1944 the oil import dropped to 32 million barrels. Mainly responsible was the submarine war of the US Navy for the disruption of the Japanese supply routes. In the course of 1943, the oil transport from the conquered Dutch colonies collapsed to an eighth of its previous volume. From 1945 even transports from Korea to the main Japanese islands were not very practical due to the superiority of the allies at sea. From January 1945 ship traffic along the coast collapsed almost completely as a result of air operations by the US Navy. Overall, the supply of raw materials declined as the war went on, despite the conquests. This was mainly due to a lack of transport capacities and other war-related restrictions.
| Importing strategic raw materials to Japan in thousands of metric tons. | 1941 | 1942 | 1943 | 1944 | 1945 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| coal | 6,459 | 6,388 | 5,181 | 2,635 | 548 |
| Iron ore | 6,309 | 4,700 | 4,298 | 2.153 | 341 |
| bauxite | 150 | 305 | 909 | 376 | 15th |
| iron and Steel | 921 | 993 | 997 | 1,097 | 170 |
| rubber | 68 | 31 | 42 | 31 | 18th |
88% of Japanese merchant ship capacity was lost to sinking during the war. Due to the losses, much less rice could be imported from 1942/43, the main food in Japan at that time. At the same time, the arable land in Japan had already been expanded to the greatest possible extent before the war, so there was no longer any room for expansion. The only way to respond to the food shortage was to grow less rice and more potatoes, which produce a greater area yield and require less fertilizer.
Real wages in Japan fell to 79.1% of the pre-war level in 1941 and reached their lowest point in 1945 at 41% as the war continued. Despite state price control measures, inflation of 300% occurred between 1935 and 1945. The daily food consumption per capita of the Japanese population fell from 2,195 kcal in 1941 to 1,793 kcal in the last year of the war.
China
China suffered increasing inflation in the Second Sino-Japanese War . This was accompanied by a capital flight from the country. From mid-1941 to the end of 1944, the cost of living rose an average of 10% per month. The loss of purchasing power caused by the currency resulted in serious restrictions on military effectiveness and great hardship and impoverishment among the civilian population. In 1944, a soldier's pay only covered one eleventh of his living expenses. China was economically weakened by the loss of resource-rich Manchuria in 1931. The Kuomintangstaat had in peacetime problems to equip his army and supply. In 1936, Chinese Army soldiers had five per thousand mortality a year from illness, poor equipment or nutrition. The military budget was the ROC's largest expenditure item at 65% in the same year.
In the early years of the war, Japan occupied the most productive and developed parts of the country. In 1939 Japan had occupied a third of the area of China and thus controlled 40% of agriculture, 92% of modern industry and 66% of the salt deposits, which represented an important source of income through a state monopoly. The KMT government lost 80% of its tax revenues as a result. The Chinese national government was thrown back on thirteen provinces in the hinterland. There, also due to the war, the arable land decreased by around 17%. From 1942 the Chiang Kai-shek government introduced a tax in kind on grain. With this measure she hoped to secure supplies for the army without further increasing inflation. As a result of Japan's large territorial gains, there were large internal refugee movements in China, in which up to 15–20% of the country's population left their hometowns. The grain acquisition by both sides and the fighting led to a famine from 1942, which particularly affected the Henan province .
job
The war economy led to full employment and labor shortages in all countries involved in World War II . In Great Britain and Japan, workers were conscripted to work in war-essential factories, similar to the drafting of conscription. In Great Britain the Ministry of Labor and National Service was responsible for the distribution of workers among the civil economy, the war economy and the armed forces. In many countries it was forbidden for workers to give up or change work in war-essential factories during the war. In the USA, the weekly working time has been increased from 38 to 45 hours. This was also common in other countries, since even longer weekly working hours no longer increased productivity. Weekly working hours of up to 70 hours were only common for shorter periods. Shift work was only common in armaments factories. This was mainly because shift work was not necessary during the Great Depression and labor was a scarcer commodity than capital during World War II, making it difficult to attract labor for night shifts. Strikes were banned in Great Britain, but in the USA they tried to prevent them through agreements with the trade unions. Strikes nevertheless broke out in both countries. In the US, between 8.7 million and 13.5 million person-days were lost as a result. In the German Reich workers and unions were brought into line in the German Labor Front , in Japan in the Greater Japanese Patriotic Industrial Union . There were no labor disputes or wage increases in either country.
Women's work
In Great Britain the employment rate for women rose from 27% in 1939 to 37% in 1943. Unmarried women were called up to work in industry, in a similar way to conscription for men. After the war, the quota quickly fell again. Similar practice only existed in Japan, where women were banned from quitting their jobs or changing employers between 1943 and 1945 if they were working in certain war industries. In the United States, advertising was used to encourage women to volunteer in industry. The employment rate rose from 26% in 1939 to 32% in 1944. This increase was more permanent than in Great Britain. In the Soviet Union, women's work was already common before the war. The rate rose from 38% in 1940 to 53% in 1942.
The employment rate of women in the German economy was already quite high (also in an international comparison) before the Second World War. The Third Reich shied away from promoting more women’s work in industry. Hitler feared displeasure among the population and the work of women in any case did not correspond to the National Socialist image of women . Ultimately, the number of German women employed in industry only rose from 14.6 million in 1939 to 14.9 million in 1944. In the German Reich - unlike in Great Britain or the USA - the aid for soldiers' wives was so high that you could live off it and not have to look for additional work.
The Japanese image of women in the 1930s and 1940s was similar to that of the Third Reich. Women were seen primarily as mothers. Prime Minister Tōjō Hideki said that employing women would weaken the family system and, by extension, the nation. In fact, the female employment rate rose only marginally in the 1940s. Beyond the official statistics, however, women and children took over the work in agriculture when the men were called up for military service.
Foreign workers in the German Reich
Following the idea of large-scale economy, the German Reich had recruited guest workers since 1939. By 1944 the number rose to 7.5 million foreign foreign workers and Eastern workers . That was 20% of the entire workforce in the German economy.
The recruitment was initially on a voluntary basis. Responsible for this was the general representative for work, Fritz Sauckel . Recruitment began in occupied Poland in 1939 ; because of high unemployment in Poland it was initially easy to recruit workers for agriculture in the German Reich. In 1940 a large number of workers came from the occupied western territories ; here too, high unemployment in the western regions and very low unemployment in the German Reich favored recruitment. The influx from the occupied western territories decreased over time, among other things because the local economy was fully integrated into the German war economy. In 1941, in view of the great shortage of labor, Hitler allowed to recruit Russians who were not considered "Asian" or "Mongolian". From mid-1943 onwards, voluntary recruitment became increasingly unsuccessful; if the recruitment quotas were not exhausted, workers were simply forcibly kidnapped and brought into the German Reich. From 1944 onwards, the German economy was increasingly exposed to air raids , so that foreign workers could no longer be recruited on a voluntary basis. As the Reich Ministry for Armaments and Ammunition , Albert Speer succeeded in having some of the forced laborers transferred from SS labor camps to normal armaments factories, whereby the SS had to pay fees for the "temporary work".
| year | German men | German women | Foreign civil workers | Prisoners of war | Concentration camps and other prisoners | Total workforce |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| May 1939 | 24.5 million | 14.6 million | 0.3 million | - | - | 39.4 million |
| May 1940 | 19.7 million | 13.7 million | 2.6 million | - | - | 36.0 million |
| May 1941 | 18.3 million | 13.4 million | 2.9 million | 1.4 million | - | 36.0 million |
| May 1942 | 16.2 million | 13.7 million | 4.0 million | 1.5 million | - | 35.4 million |
| May 1943 | 14.8 million | 14.1 million | 6.1 million | 1.6 million | - | 36.6 million |
| May 1944 | 13.5 million | 14.1 million | 7.0 million | 1.9 million | - | 36.5 million |
| September 1944 | 12.8 million | 14.2 million | 7.4 million | 1.5 million | 0.5 million | 36.4 million |
Forced labor in the German Reich
| Workforce group | Mortality (per year) |
|---|---|
| German workers | 4 ‰ |
| Danish workers | 4 ‰ |
| Italian workers (1938-42) | 3 ‰ |
| Dutch workers | 10 ‰ |
| Belgian prisoners of war | 6 ‰ |
| British prisoners of war | 8th ‰ |
| French prisoners of war | 8th ‰ |
| Italian prisoners of war (1943–45) | 40 ‰ |
| Soviet prisoners of war | ≈1000 ‰ |
| Concentration camp inmates | ≈1000 ‰ |
In addition to raw materials and food, the labor force in particular was a limiting factor in the war economy. From the end of 1942 in particular, the course of the war led to high losses. The men, initially classified as indispensable skilled workers, were gradually drafted into the Wehrmacht . This created a labor gap that could only be closed by increasing employment of German women and / or by forced labor by prisoners of war and civilians from the occupied territories. The labor shortage was closed by foreign forced laborers.
In his guidelines of November 7, 1941 , Hermann Göring stipulated lower and inferior food rations for Soviet slave laborers than for slave laborers from other countries. The arrangement was not only planned mass murder , it was also highly inefficient. A flood of complaints came from arms inspectors, employment offices and companies. In addition to the imperial estate of German industry , the high command of the Wehrmacht also ultimately failed in its attempt to implement a change in food policy. On March 25, 1942, the OKW wrote to Fritz Sauckel, the General Plenipotentiary for Labor Deployment : “The terms 'work', 'hard work' and 'hard work' must be viewed objectively, detached from ethnic affiliation, as the conversion of calories into muscle power. It is a fallacy that one can do the same work with 200 insufficiently fed people as with 100 fully fed people. On the contrary: the 100 fully-nourished achieve far more, and their use is much more rational. On the other hand, the minimum rations spent for the mere preservation of life, since there is no equivalent value in terms of work performance, are to be booked economically and war-economically as pure loss, which is increased by the means of transport and administration used. '"The wages of the forced laborers were extremely low . Nevertheless, this does not necessarily mean a high profit margin for the company, because it is not wages that are decisive for profit, but unit labor costs . The rental fees for concentration camp inmates or Soviet prisoners of war were roughly half the comparable wages of a German worker. The labor productivity of concentration camp inmates and Soviet prisoners of war reached a maximum of 50 percent of the comparative value of a healthy and well-nourished German worker due to a lack of motivation, the catastrophic state of health and chronic malnutrition. From the companies' point of view, employing a concentration camp prisoner did not increase profits, but was often associated with cost disadvantages. For workers from Western European countries, both the costs and the work performed were higher than for concentration camp prisoners, but here too the unit labor costs were often relatively higher than for German workers. Civilian workers from Eastern Europe, on the other hand, provided a cost advantage. It should be noted, however, that the war economy worked on account of the government, so the costs were reimbursed anyway. During the Second World War, the companies gradually lost their German workers to the Wehrmacht. In addition, the war economy was increasingly exposed to air raids from 1944, so that no more voluntary foreign workers could be recruited. In this situation, the entrepreneurs either had to employ forced labor or largely stop production.
Subordinate to the purpose of extermination through labor was the use of slave labor in concentration camps run by the SS, such as the Auschwitz III Monowitz concentration camp . As a result of this (as requested by the Nazis), Soviet forced laborers either starved to death after a year on average, or were sorted out for killing, completely exhausted. Plans to use more forced laborers within concentration camps under the leadership of the SS were thwarted by Fritz Todt with the support of the armaments companies. The relocation of workers and machines from the productive armaments factories to the lowest productive concentration camps made no sense for the ammunition ministry because of the expected production losses. The Nazi ideology then had to subordinate itself to this arms industry logic.
Forced labor in the Soviet Union
In the Soviet Union, 20 million people were forced to work in gulag labor camps between the 1920s and the 1950s . Between November 1941 and the spring of 1942, around one million Russian- Germans and German emigrants as well as Karachay , Kalmyks , Chechens , Ingush , Balkar , Crimean Tatars , Meshet and Kurds were forced to work in Gulag labor camps as "members of enemy nations". Prisoners of war were added later. By 1948, 20 to 25 percent of the deportees died from the poor living conditions. The productivity of forced labor was low, often reaching only 50 percent of the productivity in normal companies.
Forced Labor in Japan
Chinese and Korean forced laborers were increasingly used to expand war production.
War finance
The war was financed by all warring parties in the short term by the state assuming all costs. This was only possible to the actual extent because all active warring parties (with the exception of Italy) generated economic growth well above average during World War II. For example, the US gross national income rose from $ 88.6 billion in 1939 to $ 135 billion in 1944 ($ 1939 constant prices). The high economic growth not only increased tax revenues, but also increased the scope for new government debt, which all warring parties generously made use of.
The question of financing the war was also a question of justice. Should the war be financed by tax increases, that is, by the generation that was also burdened by the fighting or by debts to be shifted to the next generation. Due to the very high expenditure, this question could not be answered as either or question. In 1943, taxes funded 26% of total war spending in the US, 53% in the UK and 55% in Canada. In 1944 the tax portion of war financing in the USA increased to 2/3 of the cost.
In total, 45% of total US war spending was funded by tax revenue. The Tax Revenue Act of 1942 doubled federal tax revenues. The number of taxpayers increased from 4 million to 42.6 million US citizens due to the sharp rise in incomes due to the war economy and the reduction in the tax allowance. Fifty-five percent of total US war spending was raised through debt, 1/4 of it through the sale of war bonds to private citizens and 3/4 through the sale of war bonds to banks and financial institutions.
In Great Britain, government bonds were placed on very good terms. For one thing, the certainty of victory in Great Britain was far greater than in the German Empire. On the other hand, there were few other investment opportunities, as only the war economy expanded, so that most government bonds could be issued with a long term and an interest rate of only 3%.
In the German Empire, taxes were not increased as much as in Great Britain, for example. Taxes contributed 48% of government revenue. Cash flows from the occupied territories contributed 19.2% of government revenue. Most of the cost of the war was covered by Silent War Financing. German financial institutions were forced to invest their customers' money in government bonds , which became worthless after the lost war. This measure was not so dependent on public opinion in the German Reich, where there was a certain skepticism about the prospects of war from the beginning and there were also negative experiences with war bonds from the First World War. In 1939, war spending was twice as high as state revenue; in 1943, war spending was already 150% of state revenue. The national debt rose from 37.4 billion Reichsmarks at the beginning of the war to 380 billion Reichsmarks at the end of the war. More than half of these were short-term loans. Towards the end of the war, when the war defeat became clear, far more money was being printed than was needed by the economy. Inflation was initially suppressed by wage and price controls (pent-up inflation), but after the collapse of the German Reich it led to a devaluation of the Reichsmark, which made a currency reform necessary. The financial persecution (expropriations, Reichsfluchtsteuer ) of the tiny and increasingly impoverished Jewish population group had serious consequences for those affected, but did not make a significant contribution to financing the enormous armament costs.
Colonies and Occupied Territories
Territories occupied by the German Reich
The strategy of the German Reich was initially based on the idea of being able to do everything in a Blitzkrieg. As a result, quickly achievable goals were sought, such as the confiscation of supplies and goods and the securing of facilities that were of direct use to the German war economy. When it became clear that the war would not be over soon, the strategy was changed in 1942 to stop short-term looting and expect a substantial and continuous contribution to the war economy. From the end of 1942 onwards, Albert Speer tried to integrate the occupied territories much more closely into the German war economy by placing more orders and stopping the plundering of goods and labor. From March 1943, the French and Belgian economies were planned as part of the German economy. Speer also accepted an increase in consumer goods production on the assumption that more consumer goods production in France and Belgium would free up capacities in Germany. Hans Kehrl , a close colleague of Speer, described the considerations as follows:
“Even with the use of force I cannot get people to go from France to Germany in sufficient numbers, that is obvious from experience, and at the same time I risk that people no longer go to the companies for fear of being abducted where they work. Then I only have the lesser evil of trying to employ these people in France or Belgium and in this way I don't need any German troops to bring them across the border ... In this way, industrial policy changed. "
In both France and Belgium industrial production for German orders increased, in Belgium from 32% to 48%.
Compared to the benefits the German Empire drew from France, Belgium, and the Netherlands, the occupied territories in the east were relatively unimportant. Particularly after the strategy was changed, the industrialized countries in the west, with their greater potential and flexibility of production, were more useful to the war economy. Even in the case of food deliveries, France's contribution was just as great as that of all of the occupied eastern territories.
Austria
The connection of Austria was mainly advantageous because of the underemployment that still prevailed in Austria in 1938, which increased the workforce by 401,000 unemployed (which made an increase in the workforce of the German Reich by 30-40%). The Austrian foreign exchange reserves made arming easier in the short term, but in the medium term the Austrian demand for food and raw material imports had a negative impact on the balance of payments . In addition, the negotiating position of the German Reich with its trading partners in Southeast Europe improved. B. Hungary's export dependence on the German Reich from 26 to 44% and that of Yugoslavia from 32 to 42%.
France
Occupation costs of 20 million Reichsmarks were demanded from France per day. For the payment of the occupation costs as well as for all other trade agreements, the exchange rate of the franc into Reichsmark was set at 20: 1. The Reichsmark was overvalued by about 50%. This also resulted in unnaturally favorable terms of trade for imports. The payments represented 49% of French government spending. 1/3 of the payments were made through taxes, the remainder through inflation of the franc by the central bank and borrowing. Added to this are the confiscation of goods, the purchase of goods at unnaturally low prices and the use of the labor of French prisoners of war and French foreign workers. The German Reich confiscated 3/4 of the French iron ore. In 1943, half of French bauxite production and 15% of coal production was confiscated. In 1943 and 1944 a good 2/3 of all French train movements were carried out for German purposes. From 1942, French companies also increasingly produced for the German war economy. In 1942 France had an export surplus to the German Reich of 858 million Reichsmarks.
Other western countries
Norway actually had to pay occupation costs equivalent to 1/3 of the Norwegian national income per year. These were high costs for Norway, but insignificant income for the German Reich, which was actually offset by high occupation costs, as a relatively large number of troops had to be stationed in Norway. In addition, Norway was cut off from its traditional trading partners by the German occupation. a. developed an import surplus of 130 million Reichsmarks in relation to the German Reich. Under (irrelevant) purely economic aspects, the occupation of Norway was rather unprofitable. The occupation of Norway was mainly to keep the Narvik route free for Swedish iron ore shipments. In contrast to the routes across the Baltic Sea, the Narvik route was ice-free all year round and therefore navigable.
The Belgian industry produced 50% for the German war industry. However, due to a lack of raw materials, production was very low, with iron and steel around 50% below the pre-war level. Belgium also had to deliver coal. In 1942 Belgium had an export surplus with the German Reich of 412 million Reichsmarks.
The situation was very similar in the Netherlands.
Czechoslovakia
Czechoslovakia was fully integrated into the German war economy during the German occupation. Coal production increased 33%, electricity increased 44% and steel increased 11% during World War II. Overall industrial production rose by 18%.
Poland
Goering's original directive for Poland was that a large part of the railroad tracks, the electricity works and the telephone lines should be confiscated. This absurdity was quickly changed to the effect that a certain amount of industrial activity was retained in order to keep the Polish economy operational and to be able to increase mineral extraction and food production. After the looting in Poland was far more ruthless and thorough than in the western countries, it was much more difficult to integrate the Polish economy in an orderly manner into the German war economy. Although coal production rose from 38 million tons to 57 million tons, the combined production of mining and industry fell to 60% of the pre-war level. In addition, there was ruthless looting of food.
Soviet Eastern Territories
Compared to the benefits the German Empire drew from France, Belgium, and the Netherlands, the occupied territories in the east were relatively unimportant. On the one hand, this was due to the fighting in the east, with the front lines changing. Second, Stalin had ordered a scorched earth policy . The Soviet Stawka Order No. 0428 ( Torch Men Order ), which was issued on November 17, 1941, became public :
"1. To completely destroy and burn down all settlement points in the hinterland of the German troops at a depth of 40 to 60 kilometers from the main battle line and 20 to 30 kilometers to the left and right of the roads. To destroy the settlement points in the specified radius, immediately call in the air force, use the artillery and grenade launchers on a large scale, also reconnaissance teams, also skier units and diversion groups of the partisans, who are equipped with bottles with fuel, grenades and explosives. 2. To set up hunter squads of 20 to 30 men each in each regiment to blow up and set fire to the settlement points in which the enemy’s troops settle. "
It is true that there were strategic resources of great value in Ukraine and the Caucasus, such as oil, iron ore and manganese. However, these were thoroughly destroyed when the Red Army withdrew. In addition, railroad tracks had been dismantled and power supplies destroyed. The coal fields conquered by the Reichswehr were initially only able to produce at 10 - 20% of the pre-war level. It was similar with iron ore. Only the manganese exploitation was of greater importance, 90% of this came from the occupied territories of the Soviet Union.
The National Socialist policies and attitudes were also harmful. The example of Hungary shows that a cooperative attitude could be very useful. In response to growing German demand, Hungarian bauxite production doubled and Hungarian oil production multiplied, with 90% of the bauxite and half of the oil being exported to the German Reich. Since the eastern areas were initially viewed as economically inferior food suppliers, the Nazi logic and planning of the economic organization East and the Reich Ministry for the occupied eastern areas proceeded with senseless cruelty.
With Belgium and Norway there were occupied countries that were very dependent on food imports, but the German Reich also needed imports, not least because of the high number of foreign workers and prisoners of war, which had not been foreseen in the self-sufficiency plans. Therefore, according to the plans of the Economic Organization East, 7 million tons of wheat should be imported from Russia and Ukraine. The planning was based more on wishful thinking and the mystical exaggeration of the Ukrainian "black soil areas". In fact, only half a million tons of wheat could be imported. The problems were based e.g. Partly also on a sharp decline in the productivity of Russian agriculture, which had begun with the forced collectivization in the Soviet Union and was aggravated by the effects of war, the politics of the scorched earth, capital and fertilizer shortages. In return, agricultural capital goods and livestock were delivered to Russia. Sometimes food was simply requisitioned for nothing in return. The tax rates were set so high for occupied Russia that the standard of living of the population had to be severely restricted. The "special treatment" of the Soviet Union predictably led to millions of Soviet people starving to death ( Green Portfolio ).
Territories occupied by Japan
Unlike the German Empire, Japan did not control developed economies. The conquests in the southeast only alleviated the raw material situation. For example, large quantities of crude oil and bauxite were imported from the Dutch East Indies . Overall, the supply of raw materials declined as the war went on, despite the conquests. This was mainly due to a lack of transport capacity.
As early as the 1930s, Japan had invested so much in Korea that 82% of Korea's industrial capital was held by Japanese. From 1938, Japanese rice imports from Korea declined. The Korean industry was getting more and more orders from Japan for armaments, so many Korean workers moved from agriculture to better paid jobs in industry.
The Oriental Development Company invested with government aid in Korea, where it promoted industrialization, in cotton production in China, in rubber production in the Dutch East Indies and in many other projects. Under the influence of the Kwantung Army , the Manshū Jūkōgyō Kaihatsu invested in Manchukuo , and the economic model here was a war economy from the beginning. Although the direct Japanese influence ended in 1945, the economic activities in the region led to a change in mentality that was of significant importance for the further economic development of many Asian countries after 1945.
In 1945 the Japanese-occupied colony of French Indochina suffered a severe famine . This was triggered both by the consumption and stockpiling of the Japanese occupation troops as well as the interruption of the transport routes between the southern food surplus area and the north.
British colonies
In 1942, Undersecretary of State at the Colonial Office, Harold Macmillan , stated the importance of the colonies in warfare as follows:
- Through increased exports, they were supposed to generate foreign exchange that would enable Great Britain to purchase goods essential to the war effort.
- Imports should be reduced in order to free up shipping capacity.
- Local repair shops and spare parts production should be established.
The Second World War had conflicting effects on the colonies. On the one hand there was compulsory farming, rationing, price controls and inflation. The African colonies in particular suffered from the confiscation of cattle. Kenya appeared to be of particular military interest. Here in particular, investments in mechanization made agriculture more efficient and profitable; services, trade and industry began to grow rapidly. The unusually strong growth for Africa at the time continued after the war. There was greater copper production in Northern Rhodesia , which was also significant for the British and American war economies. In southern Rhodesia , forced labor for Africans was introduced in 1942 with the Compulsory Native Labor Act in order to increase agricultural yields . The 1947 Defense Committee Memorandum of the British Cabinet mentions that Central and East African production of copper, pyrethrum , sisal, coffee, maize and copra contributed significantly to the war effort.
When the Japanese conquered Burma in the spring of 1942 , the supply of rice in British India fell by 15% and prices rose sharply. Winston Churchill was annoyed by India's aspirations for independence and unwilling to free up ship capacities for aid deliveries. The famine hit Bengal particularly hard. Here 1.5 million people starved to death, another 1.5 million people died from malnutrition from epidemics. It was only when Archibald Wavell, 1st Earl Wavell was appointed Viceroy of India in September 1943, that he organized aid deliveries against Churchill's will.
India was a colony with a large workforce and far enough away from the war to be able to produce undisturbed. On the other hand, there was a lack of trained workers, machines and capital. India was a country where most people had just enough to live on. The arms production was limited to the manufacture of handguns for the Indian soldiers, whereby the optics had to be imported from Great Britain. The attempt to expand the Indian arms industry was given up again in 1944. Plans to complete ships and aircraft based on components supplied from Great Britain were discarded due to the long transport route.
The colonies around the Middle East were of strategic importance in order to militarily secure the oil imports that were necessary for the war.
Consequences after the end of the war
Worldwide famine 1946/47
An important raw material for explosives and fertilizers is ammonia, which during World War II was mainly industrially produced worldwide using the Haber-Bosch process . To the extent that ammonia was given priority in the armaments industry, fertilizer production had to take a back seat, with corresponding consequences for food production. In almost all countries too little fertilizer was produced during the war. This hit developing countries all the harder as they were unable to produce fertilizers themselves. The worldwide famine of 1946/47 was a consequence of depleted soils .
International economic system
According to the economic historian Alan Milward, the experiences in the war economy of the Second World War and also detailed economic statistics introduced during the war helped to regenerate the economy after the war and to establish an international economic system with the Bretton Woods system , the international economic anarchy replaced by the 1930s.
The US gained its superpower status in World War II. Great Britain, on the other hand, had become dependent on loan and lease supplies from the USA. Already during the war this led to Great Britain agreeing to the principle of free trade with the Atlantic Charter and having to give up tariff and non-tariff trade benefits in favor of the Commonwealth of Nations. Associated with the idea of free trade was the abandonment of bilateral trade agreements, trade blocs, import and export controls, and capital controls, which had made world trade difficult between the First and Second World Wars, and the idealistic idea that free trade can prevent wars. The efforts culminated in 1947 with the conclusion of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) , with which the participating nations agreed to gradually dismantle tariffs and other trade barriers .
Production modernization
The armaments production of the Second World War caused increasing mechanization and thus a change of workers from low-productive jobs to high-productive jobs. There were also leaps and bounds in science and technology. The advances were by no means limited to the armaments industry, but in many cases the aim was to eliminate bottlenecks in the supplier industry by improving productivity and the speed of production. Likewise, the need for well-trained workers was particularly high in the first years of the war, during which time much more was invested in training than in the subsequent peacetime. The advances in production efficiency have been enormous. The production of a Junkers Ju 88 required 100,000 hours in October 1939, only 15,000 in August 1941 and only 7,000 hours in September 1943. The production of an Ilyushin Il-4 accelerated from 20,000 working hours (1941) to 12,500 in 1943. The production of a merchant ship in the USA took 245 days before the war, in 1943 only 50 days. In Switzerland, the production time of a 20 mm Oerlikon gun was reduced from 132 to 35 hours. The production of a large-caliber machine gun accelerated from 642 to 329 man-hours. The cost of making a long-range bomber in the United States fell from $ 15.18 per hour worked in 1940 to $ 4.82 in 1944. Economically, almost all states had been very successful during the war. From this point of view, the low levels of production and employment in the period between the wars were seen as a waste of resources and unnecessary human suffering that could be avoided through appropriate economic policies.
The Japanese economy was still in the process of industrialization at the beginning of World War II. The war forced the Japanese economy, which until then had mainly operated relatively simple textile production, to acquire skills in technologically highly sophisticated manufacturing such as B. to acquire aircraft production. In 1939 Japan was still producing aircraft according to American blueprints using machine tools bought in the USA and with the help of workers trained by the USA. Due to the trade embargo, they inevitably had to become independent of American models, but could not keep up with American developments during the war. The destruction of the war did not rob the Japanese economy of the technological expertise it had gained. It was possible to build on this after the war.
During the Second World War, the German and Japanese war economies were unable to cope with highly standardized mass production in the American style. The attempt to achieve American production efficiency without completely giving up the flexibility of production traditionally regarded as important in Germany and Japan, but gradually led to the development of flexible mass production . This brought the German and Japanese economies a production-technological leadership in the post-war period, as it was possible to respond more flexibly to the wishes of consumers than with the more cumbersome, highly standardized mass production, to which the USA, Great Britain and the Soviet Union held on for a long time after the war. In a way, that was how the losers of the war had "won" the peace.
Follows by region
United States
In the USA, the end of the war did not lead to an economic crisis. The end of the war in 1945 brought a drastic reduction in armaments spending, but this gap in demand was compensated for by the high demand for consumer goods. American (and European) industry had expanded and modernized during World War II. The highly efficient war industry was partially converted to the production of consumer goods, so that increasingly cheaper, yet high-quality consumer goods came onto the market.
Continental Europe
Some countries were badly damaged due to war damage and / or occupation. Nonetheless, the situation in continental Europe after the war was that, despite the consequences of the war, there was still a sufficient supply of industrial assets and skilled workers. Immediately after the war, industrial production in France, Belgium and the Netherlands fell to 30–40% of pre-war levels, and in Germany and Italy to 20%. Only a small part of this low industrial production was due to the destruction of industrial plants during the war, and to a much larger extent to the lack of raw materials, the extensive destruction of the transport infrastructure and the destruction of means of transport. The industrial substance of Germany was not so badly damaged by the Second World War and the reparations. According to research by Werner Abelshauser , the gross fixed assets had fallen to the level of 1936 by 1948, although the majority of these were relatively new, less than 10 years old systems. According to economic historian Alan Milward, gross fixed assets have fallen back to their pre-war levels in 1939. In contrast, industrial production in 1948 only reached less than half the value of 1936, mainly because the transport infrastructure was still largely destroyed and the Reichsmark had largely lost its function as a means of payment. For West Germany, the reparations were relatively moderate. The East German economy, on the other hand, was burdened by considerable reparations to the Soviet Union.
In 1947, measures were taken in the American and British zones of occupation to restore the war-torn transport infrastructure, and the dynamic economic upswing began. As a result of the currency reform of 1948 , valuable money was available again, so that the war-intact capacities could be fully activated again. From January 1947 to July 1948 industrial production rose from 34% to 57%, measured against the level of 1936; from the currency reform to the establishment of the Federal Republic, industrial production rose to 86%.
Contributed to the European upturn also has Marshall Plan , the US President Harry S. Truman and Secretary of State George C. Marshall initiated. From 1948 to 1951, many Western European countries received a total of $ 13 billion in economic aid, helping to overcome the shortage of foreign currency shortly after the war.
Soviet Union
After the Second World War, the Soviet Union was initially in a state of exhaustion. High population losses had to be compensated for. In addition to an enormous armaments industry, there were only completely neglected other branches of the economy. Food production only returned to pre-war levels in 1955.
Developing and emerging countries
During the Second World War, most of the industrialized countries focused on the production of war goods, which mostly led to a decline in the production of civil goods. This in turn led to a sharp drop in industrial goods exports. Far-reaching industrialization took place in Australia and Canada. Some other countries such as B. Spain, Mexico ( Mexican miracle ), Chile and Argentina pursued a policy of import-substituting industrialization with some success. For other countries such as B. the French colonies, the interruption of trade with France during the war led to great economic problems.
literature
- Mark Harrison, The Economics of World War II: Six Great Powers in International Comparison. Cambridge University Press, 2000, ISBN 0-521-78503-0 .
- Alan Milward , War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, 1977 ISBN 0-520-03942-4 .
- Alan Milward , The German War Economy 1939–1945. 1966, translated by Elisabeth Maria Petzina, Walter de Gruyter, 2010 ISBN 978-3-486-70370-2 .
- Dietrich Eichholtz , History of the German War Economy 1939–1945. Volume I, KG Saur Verlag, 2013, ISBN 978-3-598-11635-3 .
- Adam Tooze , The Wages of Destruction. The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy, London 2006. German as: Economy of Destruction. The history of the economy under National Socialism. Translation by Yvonne Badal, Pantheon, Munich 2018, ISBN 978-3-570-55407-4 .
- David M. Kennedy , The American People in World War II: Freedom from Fear, Part Two. Oxford University Press, 2003, ISBN 0-19-984005-9 .
Individual evidence
- ^ Mark Harrison: The Economics of World War II: Six Great Powers in International Comparison. Cambridge University Press, 2000, ISBN 0-521-78503-0 , pp. 1-2.
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , p. 9.
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , pp. 5, 6.
- ↑ J. Adam Tooze, Economy of Destruction: The History of the Economy under National Socialism, Pantheon, 2018, ISBN 9783570550564 , pp. 26-27
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , pp. 8-10
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , pp. 87-89, 150-152
- ↑ J. Adam Tooze, Economy of Destruction: The History of the Economy under National Socialism, Pantheon, 2018, ISBN 9783570550564 , pp. 26-27
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , pp. 14, 150-152
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , pp. 8-10
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , p. 13
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , p. 128
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , pp. 14-15
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , pp. 15-16
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , p. 32
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , pp. 16-17
- ↑ J. Adam Tooze, Economy of Destruction: The History of the Economy in National Socialism, Pantheon, 2018, ISBN 9783570550564 , pp. 373-377
- ↑ a b c d e f g h i j William J. Duiker, Jackson Spielvogel: The Essential World History. Cengage Learning, 2006, ISBN 0-495-09729-2 , p. 551.
- ↑ David R. Stone: The First Five-Year Plan and the Geography of Soviet Defense Industry . In: Europe-Asia Studies . 57, No. 7, 2006, ISSN 0966-8136 , pp. 1047-1063. doi : 10.1080 / 09668130500302756 .
- ^ Dietrich Eichholtz: History of the German War Economy 1939–1945. Volume I, KG Saur Verlag, 2013, ISBN 978-3-598-11635-3 , pp. 32-34.
- ^ Alan Milward, The German War Economy 1939–1945. 2010, ISBN 978-3-486-70370-2 , p. 14.
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , p. 39
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , p. 44
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , p. 25
- ^ Alan Milward: The German War Economy 1939-1945. 2010, ISBN 978-3-486-70370-2 , pp. 14-15.
- ↑ J. Adam Tooze, Economy of Destruction: The History of the Economy under National Socialism, Pantheon, 2018, ISBN 9783570550564 , p. 369
- ↑ J. Adam Tooze, Economy of Destruction: The History of the Economy under National Socialism, Pantheon, 2018, ISBN 9783570550564 , pp. 381–384
- ^ Alan Milward: The German War Economy 1939-1945. 2010, ISBN 978-3-486-70370-2 , pp. 14-15.
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , p. 26
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , p. 59
- ^ Stewart Halsey Ross, Strategic Bombing by the United States in World War II: The Myths and the Facts , McFarland, 2002. ISBN 9780786414123 , p. 198
- ^ Alan Milward: The German War Economy 1939-1945. 2010, ISBN 978-3-486-70370-2 , pp. 14-15.
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , p. 28
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , p. 48
- ^ A b Mark Harrison: The Economics of World War II: Six Great Powers in International Comparison. Cambridge University Press, 2000, ISBN 0-521-78503-0 , p. 10.
- ^ Mark Harrison: The Economics of World War II: Six Great Powers in International Comparison. Cambridge University Press, 2000, ISBN 0-521-78503-0 , p. 18. See also Der Große Ploetz. Freiburg i. B. 2008, p. 817. There, the ratio for combat aircraft is 2.8: 1 and for tanks 3.4: 1.
- ^ Alan Milward: The German War Economy 1939-1945. 2010, ISBN 978-3-486-70370-2 , pp. 14-15.
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , pp. 67 and 84
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , p. 83
- ^ Mark Harrison: The Economics of World War II: Six Great Powers in International Comparison. Cambridge University Press, 2000, ISBN 0-521-78503-0 , p. 17.
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , pp. 19-21.
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , p. 32
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , pp. 177-179
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , p. 22
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , pp. 99-102
- ↑ J. Adam Tooze, Economy of Destruction: The History of the Economy under National Socialism, Pantheon, 2018, ISBN 9783570550564 , p. 274
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , pp. 110-114
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , pp. 110-114
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , p. 104
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , p. 123
- ^ David M. Kennedy: The American People in World War II: Freedom from Fear, Part Two. Oxford University Press, 2003, ISBN 0-19-984005-9 , pp. 203-204.
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , pp. 110-114
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , pp. 117-119, 122
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , pp. 119-120
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , pp. 120-121
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , p. 119
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , pp. 105-107
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , pp. 187-189
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , p. 67
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , p. 190
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , p. 189
- ^ Dietrich Eichholtz: History of the German War Economy 1939–1945. Volume I, KG Saur Verlag, 2013, ISBN 978-3-598-11635-3 , p. 26.
- ^ Dietrich Eichholtz: History of the German War Economy 1939–1945. Volume I, KG Saur Verlag, 2013, ISBN 978-3-598-11635-3 , pp. 27-28.
- ^ Dietrich Eichholtz: History of the German War Economy 1939–1945. Volume I, KG Saur Verlag, 2013, ISBN 978-3-598-11635-3 , pp. 23-26.
- ^ Alan Milward, The German War Economy 1939–1945. 2010, ISBN 978-3-486-70370-2 , p. 11.
- ^ Alan Milward: The German War Economy 1939-1945. 2010, ISBN 978-3-486-70370-2 , p. 28.
- ^ Alan Milward: The German War Economy 1939-1945. 2010, ISBN 978-3-486-70370-2 , p. 36.
- ^ Dietrich Eichholtz: History of the German War Economy 1939–1945. Volume I, KG Saur Verlag, 2013, ISBN 978-3-598-11635-3 , p. 17.
- ^ Dietrich Eichholtz: History of the German War Economy 1939–1945. Volume III, KG Saur Verlag, 2013, ISBN 978-3-598-11635-3 , p. 88.
- ^ Dietrich Eichholtz: History of the German War Economy 1939–1945. Volume I, KG Saur Verlag, 2013, ISBN 978-3-598-11635-3 , p. 104.
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , pp. 76-77
- ↑ J. Adam Tooze, Economy of Destruction: The History of the Economy in National Socialism, Pantheon, 2018, ISBN 9783570550564 , pp. 399-409
- ↑ See google books “Führererlasse 1939–1945” Compiled and introduced by Martin Moll. Stuttgart 1997.
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , p. 56
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , p. 57
- ^ Alan Milward: The German War Economy 1939-1945. 2010, ISBN 978-3-486-70370-2 , pp. 91-93.
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , pp. 57-58
- ^ Alan Milward: The German War Economy 1939-1945. 2010, ISBN 978-3-486-70370-2 , pp. 91-93.
- ^ Dietrich Eichholtz: History of the German War Economy 1939–1945. Volume II, KG Saur Verlag, 2013, ISBN 978-3-598-11635-3 , p. 384.
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , p. 75
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , p. 76
- ^ Alan Milward: The German War Economy 1939-1945. 2010, ISBN 978-3-486-70370-2 , p. 91.
- ↑ Jonas Scherner, Jochen Streb: Causes of the "armaments miracle" in the air armament, powder and ammunition industry during the Second World War. In: Andreas Heusler, Mark Spoerer, Helmuth Trischler: Armaments, war economy and forced labor in the "Third Reich". Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag, 2011, ISBN 978-3-486-58858-3 , accessed from De Gruyter , (online)
- ^ Dietrich Eichholtz: History of the German War Economy 1939–1945. Volume I, KG Saur Verlag, 2013, ISBN 978-3-598-11635-3 , pp. 183-184.
- ↑ Mark Spoerer, Jochen Streeb: New German economic history of the 20th century. 2013, ISBN 978-3-486-76656-1 , p. 187. (online at De Gruyter)
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , pp. 300-302, 315
- ^ Keith Hartley: The strategic bombing of Germany in the Second World War: an economic perspective . 2011, p. 475-476 .
- ^ Derek L. Braddon, Keith Hartley, Handbook on the Economics of Conflict , Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011, ISBN 9780857930347 , p. 475
- ^ Raymond G. Stokes: Technology and the West German Wirtschaftswunder . In: Technology and Culture . tape 32 , no. 1 , January 1991, pp. 1-22 , JSTOR : 3106006 .
- ^ Alan Milward: The German War Economy 1939-1945. 2010, ISBN 978-3-486-70370-2 , pp. 91-92.
- ↑ Stewart Halsey Ross, Strategic Bombing by the United States in World War II: The Myths and the Facts , McFarland, 2002. ISBN 9780786414123 , pp. 197-199
- ^ Dietrich Eichholtz: History of the German War Economy 1939–1945. Volume III, KG Saur Verlag, 2013, ISBN 978-3-598-11635-3 , p. 122.
- ^ A b Mark Harrison: The Economics of World War II: Six Great Powers in International Comparison. Cambridge University Press, 2000, ISBN 0-521-78503-0 , p. 16.
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , p. 38
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , pp. 45-46
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , p. 83
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , p. 92
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , pp. 92-94
- ^ A b c Mark Harrison: The Economics of World War II: Six Great Powers in International Comparison. Cambridge University Press, 2000, ISBN 0-521-78503-0 , p. 15.
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , p. 73
- ↑ Edward J Drea: Japan's Imperial Army. Its Rise and Fall, 1953-1945. Lawrence, 2009, pp. 187f
- ^ Alan Milward: War, Economy and Society 1939-1945 . University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , p. 30
- ^ SCM Paine: The Wars for Asia, 1911-1949. Cambridge, 2012, pp. 168f
- ^ Edward J Drea: Japan's Imperial Army - Its Rise and Fall, 1953-1945. Lawrence, 2009, p. 215
- ^ SCM Paine: The Japanese Empire - Grand Strategy from the Meiji Restauration to the Pacific War. Cambridge, 2017, p. 174
- ^ Alan Milward: War, Economy and Society 1939-1945 . University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , p. 84
- ^ Alan Milward: War, Economy and Society 1939-1945 . University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , p. 35
- ^ Alan Milward: War, Economy and Society 1939-1945 . University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , p. 85
- ^ Alan Milward: War, Economy and Society 1939-1945 . University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , p. 84
- ↑ Chang Jui-te: The Nationalist Army on the Eve of the War. in Mark Peattie, Edward Drea, Hans van de Ven: The Battle for China - Essays on the Military History of the Sino-Japanese War of 1937 - 1945. Stanford, 2011, p. 90
- ↑ Zhang Baijia: China's Quest for Foreign Military Aid. in Mark Peattie, Edward Drea, Hans van de Ven: The Battle for China - Essays on the Military History of the Sino-Japanese War of 1937 - 1945. Stanford, 2011, p. 286f, p. 290, p. 303
- ^ SCM Paine: The Wars for Asia 1911-1949. Cambridge, 2012, p. 181
- ↑ Zhang Baijia: China's Quest for Foreign Military Aid. in Mark Peattie, Edward Drea, Hans van de Ven: The Battle for China - Essays on the Military History of the Sino-Japanese War of 1937 - 1945. Stanford, 2011, p. 301
- ↑ Loyd E. Lee, Robin DS Higham: World War 2 in Europe, Africa, and the Americas, with General Sources. Greenwood Publishing Group, 1997, ISBN 0-313-29325-2 , p. 339.
- ^ Alan Milward: The German War Economy 1939-1945. 2010, ISBN 978-3-486-70370-2 , pp. 12-13.
- ↑ Loyd E. Lee, Robin DS Higham: World War 2 in Europe, Africa, and the Americas, with General Sources. Greenwood Publishing Group, 1997, ISBN 0-313-29325-2 , p. 339.
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , p. 43
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , p. 90
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , p. 82
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , p. 49
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , p. 50
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , p. 71
- ^ David M. Kennedy: The American People in World War II: Freedom from Fear, Part Two. Oxford University Press, 2003, ISBN 0-19-984005-9 , pp. 193, 194.
- ^ David M. Kennedy: The American People in World War II: Freedom from Fear, Part Two. Oxford University Press, 2003, ISBN 0-19-984005-9 , pp. 203-204.
- ^ David M. Kennedy: The American People in World War II: Freedom from Fear, Part Two. Oxford University Press, 2003, ISBN 0-19-984005-9 , pp. 212-216.
- ↑ Harry A. Sultz, Christina M. Young: Health Care USA - Understanding Its Organization and Delivery. Jones and Bartlett Publishers LLC, 2009, ISBN 978-0-7637-4974-3 , p. 55.
- ^ David M. Kennedy: The American People in World War II: Freedom from Fear, Part Two. Oxford University Press, 2003, ISBN 0-19-984005-9 , pp. 212-216.
- ^ David M. Kennedy: The American People in World War II: Freedom from Fear, Part Two. Oxford University Press, 2003, ISBN 0-19-984005-9 , p. 206.
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , p. 65
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , p. 67
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , p. 182
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , p. 172
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , pp. 247, 278
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , p. 247
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , pp. 247-254
- ^ Dietrich Eichholtz: History of the German War Economy 1939–1945. Volume I, KG Saur Verlag, 2013, ISBN 978-3-598-11635-3 , pp. 23-26.
- ^ Dietrich Eichholtz: History of the German War Economy 1939–1945. Volume I, KG Saur Verlag, 2013, ISBN 978-3-598-11635-3 , p. 269.
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , p. 255
- ↑ Hans Kolbe: Neokom iron ores of the Salzgitterer saddle. - Forsch. Min., 43.2 , pp. 117-120, Stuttgart.
- ^ Dietrich Eichholtz: History of the German War Economy 1939–1945. Volume I, KG Saur Verlag, 2013, ISBN 978-3-598-11635-3 , pp. 23-26.
- ^ Alan Milward, The German War Economy 1939–1945. 2010, ISBN 978-3-486-70370-2 , p. 11.
- ^ Dietrich Eichholtz: History of the German War Economy 1939–1945. Volume I, KG Saur Verlag, 2013, ISBN 978-3-598-11635-3 , pp. 23-26.
- ^ Alan Milward, The German War Economy 1939–1945. 2010, ISBN 978-3-486-70370-2 , p. 11.
- ^ Dietrich Eichholtz: History of the German War Economy 1939–1945. Volume I, KG Saur Verlag, 2013, ISBN 978-3-598-11635-3 , p. 107.
- ^ Dietrich Eichholtz: History of the German War Economy 1939–1945. Volume I, KG Saur Verlag, 2013, ISBN 978-3-598-11635-3 , pp. 208-209.
- ↑ J. Adam Tooze, Economy of Destruction: The History of the Economy under National Socialism, Pantheon, 2018, ISBN 9783570550564 , pp. 374, 375
- ^ Dietrich Eichholtz: History of the German War Economy 1939–1945. Volume I, KG Saur Verlag, 2013, ISBN 978-3-598-11635-3 , p. 230.
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , pp. 300, 313
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , p. 79
- ↑ Loyd E. Lee, Robin DS Higham: World War 2 in Europe, Africa, and the Americas, with General Sources. Greenwood Publishing Group, 1997, ISBN 0-313-29325-2 , p. 339.
- ↑ Malcolm Chandler, Britain in the Age of Total War, 1939-45 , Heinemann, 2002, pp. 7, 8
- ↑ Clay Blair, The Submarine War. Die Jäger .: 1939--1942 , Heyne, 1998, ISBN 9783453123458 , p. 884
- ^ Clay Blair, Der U-Boot-Krieg, Volume 2, Heyne, 1999, ISBN 9783453160590 , pp. 823, 944
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , pp. 274-276
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , p. 37
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , p. 88
- ↑ Michael A. Barnhart, Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 1919-1941 , Cornell University Press, 2013, pp. 215, 216
- ^ SCM Paine: The Wars for Asia, 1911-1949. Cambridge, 2012 p. 182
- ↑ Michael A. Barnhart, Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 1919-1941 , Cornell University Press, 2013, p. 240
- ^ SCM Paine: The Japanese Empire - Grand Strategy from the Meiji Restauration to the Pacific War. Cambridge, 2017, pp. 173f
- ^ Stein Tønnesson: The Vietnamese Revolution of 1945 - Roosevelt, Ho Chi Minh and de Gaulle in a World at War. London, 1991, 1993, pp. 294-296
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , pp. 165-168
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , p. 167
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , pp. 256-258
- ^ SCM Paine: The Wars for Asia, 1911-1949. Cambridge, 2012, p. 169
- ^ Rana Mitter: China's War with Japan 1937-1945 - The Struggle for Survival. London, 2013, pp. 275-277
- ↑ Chang Jui-te: The Nationalist Army on the Eve of the War. in Mark Peattie, Edward Drea, Hans van de Ven: The Battle for China - Essays on the Military History of the Sino-Japanese War of 1937 - 1945. Stanford, 2011, p. 91
- ↑ a b Rana Mitter: China's War with Japan 1937-1945 - The Struggle for Survival. London, 2013, pp. 267-275
- ^ SCM Paine: The Wars for Asia 1911-1949. Cambridge, 2012, pp. 167f
- ^ Rana Mitter: China's War with Japan 1937-1945 - The Struggle for Survival. London, 2013, pp. 117f, pp. 267–269
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , pp. 228-230
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945 , University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , pp. 241-244
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945 , University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , pp. 219-220
- ↑ Mark Spoerer, Jochen Streeb: New German economic history of the 20th century. 2013, ISBN 978-3-486-76656-1 , p. 197. (online at De Gruyter)
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945 , University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , p. 220
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945 , University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , p. 220
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945 , University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , pp. 76-77
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945 , University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , p. 226
- ↑ Mark Spoerer, Jochen Streeb: New German economic history of the 20th century. 2013, ISBN 978-3-486-76656-1 , p. 200. (online at De Gruyter)
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945 , University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , p. 229
- ↑ Mark Spoerer, Jochen Streeb: New German economic history of the 20th century. 2013, ISBN 978-3-486-76656-1 , p. 197. (online at De Gruyter)
- ↑ Mark Spoerer, Jochen Streeb: New German economic history of the 20th century. 2013, ISBN 978-3-486-76656-1 , p. 199. (online at De Gruyter)
- ↑ a b The source for the table is von Spoerer in the work supporting it, New German Economic History of the 20th Century. P. 199, his earlier study stated - Mark Spoerer: Forced Labor Under the Swastika. Foreign civilian workers, prisoners of war and prisoners in the German Reich and in occupied Europe 1939–1945 . Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart / Munich 2001, ISBN 3-421-05464-9 , p. 228 f. In the table there, p. 228, the Soviet prisoners of war and concentration camp inmates are not directly included, but Spoerer gives a differentiated explanation of these, p. 229: “The mortality of Soviet prisoners of war and prisoners in labor can be derived from the not calculate the available information, but it is certainly in the three to four-digit per mille range. The latter means a mortality rate of over 100% per year, ie the remaining life expectancy of a concentration camp prisoner on duty was less than twelve months. It is known that the IG Farbenindustrie plant in Auschwitz only lasted three to four months. "
- ↑ Mark Spoerer, Jochen Streeb: New German Economic History of the 20th Century 2013, ISBN 978-3-486-76656-1 , p. 197. (online at De Gruyter)
- ^ Dietrich Eichholtz: History of the German War Economy 1939–1945. Volume II, KG Saur Verlag, 2013, ISBN 978-3-598-11635-3 , p. 216.
- ↑ Mark Spoerer, Jochen Streeb: New German economic history of the 20th century. 2013, ISBN 978-3-486-76656-1 , p. 200. (online at De Gruyter)
- ^ Dietrich Eichholtz: History of the German War Economy 1939–1945. Volume II, KG Saur Verlag, 2013, ISBN 978-3-598-11635-3 , p. 222.
- ^ Dietrich Eichholtz: History of the German War Economy 1939–1945. Volume II, KG Saur Verlag, 2013, ISBN 978-3-598-11635-3 , p. 224.
- ↑ Federal Foundation for Work- Up , Soviet Criminal and Labor Camps: "Gulag"
- ↑ Bernd Bonwetsch: Gulag. Arbitrariness and mass crime in the Soviet Union 1917–1953. Introduction and documents. In: Julia Landau, Irina Scherbakowa (Ed.): Gulag. Texts and documents, 1929–1956, Wallstein, Göttingen 2014, ISBN 978-3-8353-1437-5 , p. 34.
- ↑ Felix Schnell: The Gulag as a systematic place of Soviet rule. In: Bettina Greiner, Alan Kramer (ed.): The world of camps. On the “success story” of an institution , Hamburger Edition, Hamburg 2013, p. 150; Steven A. Barnes: Death and redemption. The Gulag and the shaping of Soviet society , Princeton University Press, Princeton et al. 2011, ISBN 978-0-691-15112-0 , p. 38.
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , pp. 60-63
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , p. 32
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , p. 107
- ^ David M. Kennedy: The American People in World War II: Freedom from Fear, Part Two. Oxford University Press, 2003, ISBN 0-19-984005-9 , pp. 199-202.
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , p. 109
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , pp. 107-108, 138
- ↑ J. Adam Tooze, Economy of Destruction: The History of the Economy in National Socialism, Pantheon, 2018, ISBN 9783570550564 , pp. 328–329
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , p. 135
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , pp. 150-151
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , p. 152
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , p. 148
- ^ J. Adam Tooze, Economy of Destruction: The History of the Economy in National Socialism, Pantheon, 2018, ISBN 9783570550564 , p. 291
- ↑ J. Adam Tooze, Economy of Destruction: The History of the Economy under National Socialism, Pantheon, 2018, ISBN 9783570550564 , p. 292
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , pp. 137-144
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , pp. 146-147
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , pp. 308-309
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , pp. 147-148
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , p. 148
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , p. 89
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , pp. 150-152
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , p. 148
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , p. 148
- ↑ Christian Hartmann, Jürgen Zarusky: Stalin's "Torch Men Order" from November 1941. A falsified document . In: Christian Hartmann u. a. (Ed.): The German War in the East 1941–1944. Facets of crossing borders . Oldenbourg, Munich 2009, pp. 393-402, citation p. 399; the command is printed there in full on p. 398 ff.
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , pp. 148-149
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , pp. 150-152
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , pp. 260-263
- ^ Dietrich Eichholtz: History of the German War Economy 1939–1945. Volume I, KG Saur Verlag, 2013, ISBN 978-3-598-11635-3 , p. 244.
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , pp. 165-168
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , p. 165
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , p. 47
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , pp. 165-168
- ^ Stein Tønnesson: The Vietnamese Revolution of 1945 - Roosevelt, Ho Chi Minh and de Gaulle in a World at War. London, 1991, 1993, pp. 294-296
- ↑ Thomas Kiefer, The British Colonies of Kenya, Northern and Southern Rhodesia in Decolonization 1945-1965: Political Structures of Settler Societies in Crisis, LIT Verlag Münster, 2012, ISBN 9783643119834 , p. 72
- ↑ Thomas Kiefer, The British Colonies of Kenya, Northern and Southern Rhodesia in Decolonization 1945-1965: Political Structures of Settler Societies in the Crisis, LIT Verlag Münster, 2012, ISBN 9783643119834 , pp. 70–73
- ^ Antony Beevor, The Second World War, C. Bertelsmann Verlag, 2014, ISBN 9783641107901 , Chapter 20
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , p. 200.201
- ^ Ashley Jackson, The British Empire and the Second World War, A&C Black, 2006, ISBN 9781852854171 , p. 27
- ^ Dietrich Eichholtz: History of the German War Economy 1939–1945. Volume I, KG Saur Verlag, 2013, ISBN 978-3-598-11635-3 , pp. 23-26.
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , p. 357
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , p. 131
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , pp. 330-331
- ^ Manfred B. Steger: Globalization. Sterling Publishing Company, 2010, ISBN 978-1-4027-6878-1 , p. 51.
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , pp. 60-61, 173
- ↑ Jonas Scherner, Jochen Streb: Causes of the "armaments miracle" in the air armament, powder and ammunition industry during the Second World War. In: Andreas Heusler, Mark Spoerer, Helmuth Trischler: Armaments, war economy and forced labor in the "Third Reich". Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag, 2011, ISBN 978-3-486-58858-3 , accessed from De Gruyter , (online)
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , pp. 86, 185-186
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , p. 339
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , pp. 86, 172
- ^ Mark Harrison, The Economics of World War II: Six Great Powers in International Comparison , Cambridge University Press, 2000, ISBN 978-0-521-78503-7 , p. 40
- ^ Randall Bennett Woods : Quest for Identity: America since 1945. Cambridge University Press, 2005, ISBN 1-139-44426-3 , p. 121.
- ^ Nicholas Crafts, Gianni Toniolo, Economic Growth in Europe Since 1945 , Cambridge University Press, 1996, ISBN 978-0-521-49964-4 , p. 4
- ^ Barry Eichengreen: The Marshall Plan: Economic Effects and Implications for Eastern Europe and the Former USSR . In: Economic Policy . 7, No. 14, April 1992, pp. 13-75. Retrieved September 19, 2014.
- ↑ Werner Abelshauser, German Economic History. From 1945 to the present. Munich 2011, p. 70 f.
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , p. 78
- ↑ Werner Abelshauser, German Economic History. From 1945 to the present. Munich 2011, p. 107.
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , p. 336
- ↑ Werner Abelshauser, German Economic History. From 1945 to the present. Munich 2011, p. 115 ff.
- ↑ Werner Abelshauser, German Economic History. From 1945 to the present. Munich 2011, p. 126.
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , p. 78
- ↑ Werner Abelshauser, German Economic History. From 1945 to the present. Munich 2011, p. 107.
- ^ Barry Eichengreen: The Marshall Plan: Economic Effects and Implications for Eastern Europe and the Former USSR . In: Economic Policy . 7, No. 14, April 1992, pp. 13-75. Retrieved September 19, 2014.
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , pp. 95, 270
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , pp. 350-353
- Jump up ↑ Simon Collier, William Sater: A History of Chile, 1808-2002. Cambridge University Press, 2004, ISBN 0-521-53484-4 , p. 230.
- ^ Nicholas Crafts, Gianni Toniolo, Economic Growth in Europe Since 1945, Cambridge University Press, 1996, ISBN 978-0-521-49964-4 , p. 123
- ^ Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-03942-4 , p. 356