Panzerkampfwagen VI Tiger
|Panzerkampfwagen VI "Tiger" Ausf. E (Sd.Kfz 181)|
A tiger in northern France, 1944
|crew||5 (commander, gunner, loader, driver, radio operator)|
|Armor and armament|
|Main armament||8.8 cm KwK 36 L / 56|
|Secondary armament||2 x 7.92mm MG 34|
|drive||Maybach HL-210 / HL-230
gasoline engine 650 PS (478 kW) / 700 PS (515 kW)
|Top speed||Road 45 km / h,
terrain 20 km / h
|Power / weight||12.3 hp / t|
|Range||Road 100 km,
terrain 60 km
The Panzerkampfwagen VI "Tiger" was a heavy German tank that was manufactured by the sole manufacturer Henschel in Kassel from 1942 to 1944 and used by the Wehrmacht from late summer 1942. Due to its strong main weapon and the high level of armor protection, the Tiger was one of the most powerful tanks of the Second World War .
In addition to the conventional shape - without inclined armor - the complex production, its under-motorization, the short driving range and a failure-prone technology in connection with a high need for repairs were considered as serious disadvantages , which considerably restricted the mobility of the tank. As a result, more vehicles were lost to mechanical defects and self-destruction than to direct enemy action. Although the strategic importance of the tiger was small due to the low production number of only 1350 copies, it is one of the most famous tanks of the war.
Although the actual construction contract for the Tiger was not awarded until the spring of 1941, the history of development can be traced back to 1937. At that time the company from Henschel got the Army Ordnance Office commissioned in the 30-class t as successor to an infantry support tank Panzer IV to develop. The prototype, known as the "DW 1" breakthrough car, was supposed to have the 7.5 cm KwK 40 gun as its main weapon, which was also used in the Panzer IV . After the construction of a chassis, the tests were discontinued in 1938 because a new order for the only minimally changed successor "DW 2" was available, of which Henschel also only produced one chassis.
In the meantime, Henschel was also working on a 65 t successor to the new vehicle in the form of the "VK 6501", which - like the later Tiger - had front armor of 100 mm and side armor of 80 mm and whose armament also came from the short 7th , 5 cm cannon existed.
After the Heereswaffenamt had set new basic requirements, Henschel submitted - in addition to MAN , Daimler-Benz and Porsche - a revised proposal from DW 2 under the designation "VK 3001 (H)" (VK for full-track motor vehicle). One of the three chassis built was subjected to in-house tests until the end of the war, while the other two served as the chassis for the Sturer Emil self-propelled gun . At the same time, Henschel created the " VK 36.01 (H) ", which was developed based on Hitler's demand for higher armor and armament and is considered to be the direct forerunner of the tiger. A noticeable difference was the armored box upper part that did not hang over the drive. With front armor of 100 mm and side armor of 60 mm, the weight was just under 40 tons. The main weapon should consist of a 7.5 cm cannon with a conical barrel. The four chassis produced later served as towing vehicles.
After the shortage of tungsten ruled out the use of the conical weapon and the short cannon of the Panzer IV showed only unsatisfactory penetration performance in the first few battles, the Army Weapons Office (HWA) issued the final development order to Henschel and the "VK 4501" on May 26, 1941 Porsche for the later Tiger. The combat vehicle in the 45 t class should be armored more heavily than before and have the anti-aircraft gun known as the eight-eight as its main weapon. Since the demonstration of the prototype was to take place on Hitler's birthday on April 20, 1942, both companies relied on components from their previous developments in view of the shortage of time. As a result of the increased need for such combat vehicles shortly after the start of the Russian campaign , the Wehrmacht ordered the vehicles from the drawing board as early as the summer of 1941 and placed construction contracts for 90 tanks from Porsche and 60 from Henschel.
The VK 4501 (P), designed by Professor Ferdinand Porsche and also known as the Porsche Tiger, was an unconventional design with its gasoline-electric drive, in which two 320 hp ten-cylinder engines each drove two generators , with their power supplying the two electric motors flanged to the rear drive wheels were fed. Big disadvantages were the high ground pressure of the vehicle, the short range in the field of only 50 km and technical difficulties with the air-cooled engines.
Since the VK 36.01 from Henschel, after the elimination of the conical cannon, the turret ring was too small for the Krupp turret with its 8.8 cm cannon that was now to be used - and originally designed for the Porsche Tiger, the chassis had to be enlarged. Since the armor was also reinforced, the total weight of the combat vehicle exceeded the specified weight limit by 12 tons.
In addition, Henschel planned another version with a turret from Rheinmetall-Borsig , which was almost identical to the turret of the Panther and should also have its extra-long 7.5 cm cannon. After a wooden model had been built, this plan was filed.
- Prototype demonstration
The Henschel prototype and the Porsche prototype produced in the Nibelungen factory could only be completed on the specified date with great effort . Without any tests, both vehicles had only covered a few meters. Since the Henschel tank protruded beyond the loading gauge of the railroad car, the route from Kassel to the Führer headquarters in Wolfsschanze in East Prussia had to be closed to oncoming traffic. In view of the personal friendship between Porsche and Hitler, the latter paid full attention to the Porsche prototype from the outset, while he paid almost no attention to the Henschel prototype. During the subsequent test drives, the Porsche Tiger already failed on the road, while the Henschel vehicle was able to complete light off-road drives despite small technical defects.
- Production decision
Despite serious concerns about the unusual and not yet fully developed drive system of the Porsche Tiger, Hitler insisted on continuing both projects. In the summer of 1942 extensive test drives were carried out at the test center for motor vehicles , during which the Henschel tiger covered almost 1000 km by the end of July. However, due to numerous teething problems, the vehicle was not yet ready for the front. Due to ongoing engine problems, the arrival of the Porsche Tiger was delayed, which completely failed in the subsequent test drive in difficult terrain. As a result, Porsche was given a further three months for a revision. The role the Porsche Tiger played in Hitler's deliberations was shown not only by his order to accelerate production by all means and to forego the usual testing if possible, but also by his demand from September, in which the not yet available Vehicles should be relocated to the North African theater of war as quickly as possible. In October, Armaments Minister Albert Speer set up a Tiger Commission, which was to determine the final production model and, after a renewed assessment of both versions, at the end of October 1942, decided the Henschel Tiger for series production. The Porsche hulls produced up to then were later converted into the Ferdinand tank destroyer .
Production at Henschel in Kassel-Mittelfeld started in August 1942, after Plant III there had been extensively expanded. 8,000 people worked in 12-hour shifts in tank production, with the night shift having a significantly lower workload than the day shift. Due to an instruction from 1943, the employment of foreign workers without a permit was expressly prohibited in the Tiger production. The production line consisted of nine cycles, each with a processing time of six hours. The production time of a vehicle was about 14 days. Most of the components were delivered fully assembled, with the following companies being the most important main suppliers:
- Tub: Krupp (Essen), Dortmund-Hörder Hüttenverein (Dortmund) and Škoda (Königgrätz)
- Tower: Wegmann (Kassel; tower development came from Krupp)
- Engine: Maybach (Friedrichshafen) and license production by Auto Union (Chemnitz)
- Transmission: Maybach
- Electrics: Bosch (Stuttgart)
- Main weapon: Buckau-Wolf (Magdeburg) and Dortmund-Hörder Hüttenverein (developed by Krupp)
Like most German tanks, the Tiger was manufactured in high quality work so that, in combination with its complicated construction, rational mass production was not possible. In addition, the proportion of machining in the tub and tower production was very high and placed high demands on the production technology. In order to create a stable weapon platform, the armor plates were kept as large as possible so that, among other things, the floor pan and the turret - with the exception of the front - consisted of a single piece. In order to prevent cracks or cracks in the event of fire, the armor plates were only subjected to a subtle surface hardening, so that, for example, the front plates had a hardness of 265 Brinell , half as much as the Panzer IV . Nevertheless, it was a very hard armor that showed no signs of brittleness .
After assembly, the tanks were run in around 100 km on a test track without a turret, using bottled gas as fuel to save gasoline. Then the tower was put in place, the vehicle was fully equipped and officially handed over. The cost of a tiger - without weapons, optics and radio - was 250,800 Reichsmarks ; fully equipped, the price charged was RM 300,000.
All of the vehicles initially delivered suffered from massive problems with the semi-automatic gearbox, so that the Tiger was not considered to be operationally safe at the time. In addition to permanent defects such as engine fires, leaks in the cooling water circuit and short circuits, there were also oil losses on the engine of up to 15 l per 100 km, which was accepted as just bearable. It was not until the end of 1942 that the worst difficulties could be resolved, whereas there was an increase in assembly errors due to the increased workload on the factory workers.
In total, Henschel produced 1350 copies, which were distributed over the following production dates:
|Production figures for the VI Tiger armored car|
By September 1943 at the latest, the Allies had information about the production of the Tiger tank. The resistance group around Chaplain Heinrich Maier sent relevant documents to the American Office of Strategic Services . The allied bombers were able to make precise air strikes with the sketches of the production facilities. The factory was hit during the air raids on Kassel in October 1943 , which led to a decline in production.
In August 1944, the production of the tiger was finally stopped. At the same time, the production of the successor Tiger II, also known as the “King Tiger ”, started in early 1944, and the Panther was built under license for a few months in 1943 .
The name of the tank was "Panzerkampfwagen VI Tiger Version E." In contrast to the previous German tanks, there was only this one version of the Tiger, even if some changes were made in the course of production. From February 1944 the vehicle was only called "Panzerkampfwagen Tiger Version E" due to a driver's instruction. In order to avoid confusion with the successor named Tiger II, the name Tiger I can also be found.
Turret and armament
The armored car Tiger consisted of a hull and a freely rotating turret on top. Apart from the front, this consisted of a single piece of armored steel that was bent into a horseshoe. At the front was the panel with the main and secondary armament that ran across the entire width. A luggage box for the crew's utensils was mounted at the stern, and to the right of it was a round emergency exit hatch in the tower wall.
On the tower roof were the hatch cover for the loader and the commander's cupola, which initially had five viewing slits protected with armored glass blocks. Later, based on experiences on the Eastern Front, where Soviet anti-tank defense had repeatedly broken through the dome, the dome known from the Panther with six corner mirrors was adopted. This was supposed to ensure the safety of the tank commander, who was now deeper in the tower shaft.
The tower floor was suspended from the tower ring with three support arms so that the tower crew was swiveled with it. The loader had his place to the right of the cannon, which protruded almost through the entire interior, while the gunner and the commander sat behind one another on the left on the other side. The tower was swiveled by means of a hydraulic gearbox that was connected to a power take-off of the main drive shaft running under the fighting compartment. A rotation through 360 ° took one minute. The lateral fine adjustment and the height adjustment was done with a handwheel. With the engine switched off, the turret had to be turned manually, whereby the commander could provide assistance with another handwheel. The binocular turret riflescope TZF 9b, which had a 2.5x magnification, was available as target optics . From April 1944, the monocular TZF 9c with an additional selectable five-fold magnification was installed. In addition to the primary weapon, the gunner also operated the machine gun MG 34 , which was arranged parallel to the axis with a pedal .
The main weapon, the Kampfwagenkanone 8.8 cm KwK 36 , was a modified version of the well-known 8.8 cm anti-tank gun , which was switched from impact ignition to electric ignition and with a Muzzle brake was provided. In addition to a good penetration performance, it had a high level of shooting accuracy, so that, together with the high-precision target optics, the accuracy of the practical shooting with the first shot at 1000 m was 93 percent. There were 92 rounds of ammunition for the gun, 64 of which were stowed in the side boxes of the overhanging hull and the rest on the sides of the fighting compartment. Usually half of the combat load consisted of armor-piercing shells and half of high-explosive projectiles.
|Ammunition and penetration performance of the 8.8 cm KwK 36 L / 56|
|Ammunition nomenclature||Tank shell 39||Tank shell 40||Grenade 39HL|
|Bullet weight||10.2 kg||7.3 kg||7.65 kg|
|Muzzle velocity||773 m / s||930 m / s||600 m / s|
|Penetration performance of the KwK with armor inclined at 60 ° (= 30 ° angle of impact)|
|500 meters||110 mm||155 mm||90 mm|
|1000 meters||100 mm||138 mm||90 mm|
|2000 meters||84 mm||110 mm||90 mm|
|The tank grenade 40 was a hard core projectile made of tungsten carbide , which, due to the lack of tungsten, was only available in small quantities or often not at all. The penetration rate of the normal Panzerranate 39 was lower than that of the Pzgr. 40, but the destructive effect was higher because a small explosive charge detonated after penetration . The 39 HL grenade was a hollow charge projectile that was rarely carried because it was relatively imprecise and the regular tank shell was more than sufficient.|
Driver and radio station
In the front of the tub sat the driver on the left and the radio operator on the right, with the gearbox between them. Both crew members had their own access hatch. To see ahead, the driver had a viewing slit with a protective armored glass block, which could be covered with a vertically movable armored bolt. In this case, he looked through a corner mirror in the hatch cover . On the right side of the gearbox was his dashboard, to his left a course top . In addition to the radio, the radio operator also operated the bow machine gun, which was located behind a spherical screen and which he adjusted using a headrest. The radio equipment was to the left of him on the transmission.
Drive and drive
The by Maybach engine designed water-cooled twelve-cylinder - V-type engine with a power of 700 hp and 23 liters capacity was installed in the stern centrally in the longitudinal direction. This 1.3-ton petrol engine , which was also used in the Panther, cost 13,000 Reichsmarks and replaced the 650 hp engine with a capacity of 21 liters installed in the first 250 vehicles. At low temperatures it was possible to preheat the cooling water with a blowtorch through a small opening . An automatic Halon fire extinguishing system was installed in the engine compartment . There were tanks on either side of the engine, behind them the radiators with the fans. The latter were driven by a complicated system of 19 gear wheels. The power flow went from the engine via a cardan shaft that was covered in the tub underneath the combat area via the branch gear of the mechanical tower drive to the oil bath disc clutch on the flanged gearbox and steering gear. From there we went on flanged to the pan sides countershaft to the front lying chain drive wheels.
To remove the flanged gearbox and steering gear, the tower had to be lifted , usually with a crane . The Maybach-Olvar (Öl-Variorex) gearbox was a semi-automatic preselector gearbox with eight forward and four reverse gears, which automatically performed the clutch and shifting process hydraulically after the gear was selected. If the automatic system failed, manual emergency switching was possible.
For the first time in a German tank, it was controlled by a steering wheel. In contrast to the previous tanks I to IV with their clutch steering gears controlled by steering levers, an oil pressure-operated two-wheel superimposed steering gear from Henschel was installed, which decelerated the chains depending on the steering wheel angle, so that cornering in two specific radii was possible in each gear. Turning on the spot was also possible. In the event of a steering gear defect, the driver could control the vehicle with two auxiliary steering levers that acted on the normal brake. This service brake was - with - a world first for a standard manufactured automotive disc brakes of Argus provided, whose operation was done mechanically via pedal.
The high combat weight of 57 t made many bridges impassable for the Tiger, which is why the vehicle was initially capable of diving up to 4½ m. For this reason, all hatches and other openings could be closed watertight with rubber seals. A 3 m long snorkel tower for the supply of combustion air was installed above the engine; the exhaust gases were led into the water. In tests an operating time of up to 2½ hours under water could be achieved. After 495 vehicles were produced, this complicated system was no longer installed.
Since the Tiger had a higher weight than initially planned, the chains had to be widened and additional rollers had to be attached to the outside of the drive. Since the rollers bandaged with Buna rubber only had a short service life, after around 800 vehicles had been built, new steel rollers with internal rubber rings were used in February 1944, which were more noisy but more durable and required less rubber to manufacture . At the same time, with this system, the outer row of rollers was no longer necessary, meaning that it was no longer necessary to change the rollers for rail transport. All three rollers of an axle were suspended on a swing arm with a torsion bar spring . The box drive , which was used for the first time in an armored vehicle , provided good suspension comfort, but in winter had the negative characteristic that mud stuck between the rollers could freeze overnight and render the tank immobile. The first prototype had a complicated system with hydraulically lowerable side skirts to protect the drive , which was discarded immediately after the first demonstration. Since the original chain had to be widened from 52 cm to 72 cm, the tank protruded beyond the loading gauge of the railroad cars. As a solution, Henschel suggested installing two chains next to each other, but the Heereswaffenamt rejected this suggestion, so that narrower loading chains had to be pulled up and the outer rollers removed for each rail transport. Changing a chain weighing around 3 t took just under 30 minutes.
The Panzerkampfwagen Tiger did not come into the stock of a regular tank division , but were assigned to the specially set up heavy tank departments, of which a total of eleven existed in the army and three in the Waffen SS . The target number of these independent units used to form the focus was 45 Tiger tanks. The vehicles were usually relocated by rail with SSyms flat wagons . Longer marches should be avoided due to the heavy load on the vehicle, especially since the average marching speed was hardly higher than 50 percent above the foot troops of a regular infantry division . In addition, marches should not take place together with other motorized units, as a technical stop was necessary after the first five kilometers and then every 15 km, which, in combination with the susceptibility to failure, could lead to the rest of the troops being restricted in their movements. As such, the vehicles had good mobility on normal ground, but had problems in heavy or muddy terrain due to the high ground pressure, so that even short, boggy sections were hardly possible. For this reason, it was very important to clarify the terrain before an operation. The training of the crew and the repair units for this valuable vehicle was given high priority. The unusual tiger primer with humorous verses also served as teaching material .
According to an official instruction, the tiger should not be used for reconnaissance and security tasks or - because of its laterally protruding cannon - for forest and city fights. The main task of the tiger was to fight enemy tanks. These were set up directly in combat up to a distance of 1200 meters, at distances above that one forked . The regular combat distance was 2000 m, with optimal conditions a standing target could also be fought up to 3000 m. Shelling moving targets over a distance of 2000 m should be avoided. In order to increase armor protection, it was advantageous to position the chassis at an angle to the enemy during combat so that its projectiles did not hit the vertical and thus ballistically unfavorable Tiger armor at a right angle.
The first use of the tiger took place on August 29, 1942 in the section of Army Group North near Mga near Leningrad, in which not only four tanks but also technicians from Henschel took part. The premature use of the still immature construction due to Hitler's impatience ended in failure, as three of the four vehicles failed due to technical defects in the terrain unsuitable for heavy tanks and each with three heavy Sd.Kfz. 9 had to be recovered. The damaged tanks could only be made ready for use again by extensive repairs with spare parts specially flown in from Germany, but all four of them failed again during the next mission in mid-September, one of which had to be blown up. In addition to this failure, the unsuccessful operation led to the loss of secrecy and the element of surprise.
The next fighting took place at the beginning of 1943, including the Second Ladoga Battle . Although only a few Tigers were in action at the same time, they dominated the battlefield and shot down 160 enemy tanks by March, whereas only three of the six lost vehicles were due to enemy action. It turned out that the Red Army did not have an adequate tank against the Tiger. The standard T-34 tank was completely inferior to the Tiger, as it could not penetrate its front armor and could only make effective hits on the side at a distance of about 100 m, while the Tiger could destroy a T-34 at 2000 m. The SU-122 was also as good as ineffective against the Tiger. The well-trained Tiger crews usually hit enemy tanks like the T-34 with the first shot at a distance of 1000 m, with the hits almost always leading to the destruction of the targeted vehicle. During the fighting several tigers, including an intact vehicle, were captured, which is why the Soviet Ministry of Defense recognized the potential of the vehicle and issued special regulations to combat this tank.
The first major operation took place in the last major German offensive in the east during the battle of the Kursk Arc , in which 152 Tigers participated together with 19 vehicles that were later added, of which 113 were ready for action. The operation was actually supposed to take place in the spring, but contrary to military reason, the date of the attack was postponed until the new tigers and panthers were available until the summer, so that the Red Army could build a deeply staggered line of defense. As the tiger units, contrary to their doctrine as a focus weapon, were sometimes even split up by company and, in addition, had exceptionally high failures in the first two days of the offensive due to - in some cases their own - anti-tank mines , a concentrated deployment of these units was not possible. Even so, the tigers shot down high numbers during the battle; The 505 heavy tank division destroyed 111 enemy tanks in the first two days. Under the Soviet tank formations, the Tigers caused panic-like disintegration phenomena in some cases, whereupon the Red Army turned to military courts. Due to the superiority of the Tigers, the Soviet tank crews were instructed by their command to approach a Tiger at top speed, contrary to all basic tactical knowledge, in order to at least shoot it at close range from the side or at least unable to fight. In view of the devastating losses and the awareness of the inferiority of their T-34 to the Tiger - but not to the upgraded and also superior Panzer IV - the Soviet military suspected Tiger tanks everywhere. With a share of only around five percent of all German armored vehicles deployed, the Tiger had little influence on the course of the battle, especially since the operational readiness of all vehicles was on average below 50%. Until the operation was canceled, the tiger units deployed had only lost 13 vehicles in total despite the heavy fighting.
Tiger units were also involved during the subsequent Soviet counter-offensives. In view of the lack of guns that could penetrate the armor of the tiger, the Red Army switched to concentrating fire from all available weapons on the tigers, which were often only used sporadically, so that these were often put out of action by secondary damage. An example of such tactics were the fights of the sPzAbt 506, which was fully filled with 45 tigers, in autumn 1943, after a week of deployment, in addition to six total losses, there were no more operational tigers due to combat damage - mostly to optics, armament and drive.
After the heavy losses at Kursk, from 1944 the Soviet Union gradually introduced stronger tank models in addition to more powerful hard core projectiles. The new T-34/85 with its 85 mm cannon could penetrate the front of a Tiger up to 500 m, but was still inferior to it due to its only slightly reinforced armor, whereas the heavy IS-2 was a competitive enemy. The penetration power of the 122 mm cannon was identical to that of the Tiger. The advantage was its bevelled armor, which, however, was easy to break through in the front area of the hull in the first series due to the unfavorable stepped bow. Only the improved model with the continuous hull front armor could hardly be penetrated in this area, although the poor quality of the Russian cast steel often severely restricted the ballistic protection. The remaining armor as well as the turret front could be penetrated by the Tiger at 1000 m, while the Tiger could also be put out of action by the IS-2 at this distance. Disadvantages for the IS-2 were the long reload time due to the two-part ammunition, the low ammunition capacity, a significantly poorer target optics and the Soviet tank soldiers who were usually poorly trained in contrast to the experienced Tiger crews. The fact that training and experience were often more decisive than individual technical parameters was shown, for example, in a battle of five tigers near Dünaburg in July 1944 when , according to the combat report of the sPzAbt 502, they destroyed 16 IS-2s within ten minutes without their own losses. In addition, new types of tank destroyers such as the SU-100 or ISU-152 were introduced into the Red Army, which could also fight the tiger effectively.
The total of all Tiger I relocated to the Eastern Front amounted to the following numbers:
- 1942: 9 pieces
- 1943: 434 pieces
- 1944: 507 pieces
- 1945: 11 pieces
The highest number of operations on the Eastern Front was reached in May 1944 with almost 300 tigers, whereby it should be noted that during the entire campaign, the number of tigers in need of repair often exceeded the number of tigers ready for action. During the 1944 Russian summer offensive, known as Operation Bagration , which ended with the worst defeat in German military history, the tigers deployed were able to stop a few advances, but the often confusing retreat fights and the inadequate recovery capacity as well as the quantitatively completely superior and also qualitatively Improved Soviet weapons technology wiped out all three heavy tank detachments used, so that in July 1944, with 125 total losses, the highest monthly losses ever suffered on the Eastern Front were recorded.
In the further course of the war, most of the vehicles acted as alarm units, where they could not stop the Soviet advance due to the numerical superiority of the Soviet tank units, despite the fact that the numbers of guns killed were still considerable. Due to the high losses of the German units, tigers - contrary to their operational doctrine - were often used as a support of the main battle line in the stationary defense, whereby however the often individually deployed and 3 m high vehicles attracted the entire opposing defense capacity, which inevitably led to losses.
After the success of the British at the Battle of El Alamein , troops were reinforced and the first Tigers were ordered to Africa in November 1942. After the Allied landing in North West Africa , the units were diverted to Tunisia, so that from the end of November two heavy tank detachments with a total of 31 tigers were relocated to Tunisia, mostly with lighters , of which not a single one was lost in the otherwise loss-making transport. Since these were the first production vehicles and these were still afflicted with a large number of technical defects, there were many breakdowns in connection with the still missing workshop units and the inadequate supply of spare parts, so that only a few vehicles were in combat at the same time. The Tigers were used in the battle for Tunisia , where they were far superior to all allied tanks. The M3 tank could not penetrate the Tiger armor even from the closest range . Even the increasingly frequent M4 Sherman could not penetrate the armor of the Tiger from all sides under normal circumstances, while the Tigers could easily take out the Allied tanks even at greater distances. The British six-pounder pak was also powerless against the tiger with normal anti-tank bullets, but the tiger managed to incapacitate two tigers with special hard-core bullets during a battle, one tiger burned out after its ammunition was ignited and was later blown up while in the other, despite five rounds through the side, the interior remained intact in a total of 24 hits and the vehicle was recovered. The two heavy tank detachments used destroyed a little more than 300 tanks by the surrender of the Axis Powers in May 1943, whereas only seven Tigers were lost to enemy fire. The rest of the tigers failed due to technical defects or drive damage from fire, artillery or mines and were almost all blown up themselves.
British shelling tests on two captured tigers after the end of the fighting showed that the armor provided good protection against the Allied standard weapons. The 40 mm two- pounder cannon of a Churchill tank could not penetrate any part of the armor even with high-speed projectiles. The 57-mm pounder -Standard- Pak left with normal AP -Panzergranaten either only notches, or the shells were broken at the surface-hardened armor. The American 75 mm cannon of an M4 Sherman could not penetrate the front, but it did manage to penetrate the side of the hull from a distance of 90 m with an almost vertical angle of impact. When the angle of impact was increased to over 15 °, the bullet only left notches here as well.
After the capitulation of the Axis powers in North Africa, the Allied invasion of Sicily followed . Of 17 tigers stationed on the island at this time and subordinated to the "Hermann Göring" tank division, only one could be transported back to the Italian mainland due to insufficient recovery and repair capacities, while the others could be transported back to the Italian mainland after technical defects or getting stuck in poorly explored terrain by their own troops had to be blown up.
As part of the defense against the Allied invasion of Italy, two smaller units with a total of 35 tigers were on the battlefield on the Italian mainland from late summer 1943, each of which was joined by a full heavy tank division in February and June 1944. After the breakthrough of the Allies after the Battle of Monte Cassino , many vehicle breakdowns occurred in the difficult terrain during the German retreat from mid-May 1944, so that a total of 64 tigers had to be written off as a total loss until the front at the Goths position was stabilized in July. Of which only five were due to enemy weapons exposure.
After the Allied invasion of Normandy , three heavy tank detachments with a total of 126 tigers were relocated to the combat area in the following weeks. Because of the gradual arrival of units and the marching-related failures, the tigers were only used in small numbers at the same time, so that they had no operational influence on the course of the battle, although this was often ascribed to them in the Western Allied post-war literature. As before in North Africa, the Tiger was far superior to all Allied tanks, only the " Sherman Firefly ", a British special version of the M4 Sherman with a 17 pounder cannon, which was only used in small numbers , was at least equal to the Tiger in terms of firepower. Until mid-August, the Tigers, which were only used in small groups, were responsible for around 500 destroyed tanks, which the Allies were able to replace within a very short time due to their industrial superiority. By the end of the operation at the end of August, which included the loss-making pocket of Falaise , all the tigers were lost, so that at that time not a single tiger was on the western front. An analysis of the losses of 105 lost tigers found that only 38 were due to direct enemy action, while the rest were abandoned or blown up. In addition, during the entire fighting in Normandy, contrary to the high Allied success reports, only thirteen losses were due to air attacks.
In the following period, due to the inferiority of their tanks, the Allies switched to large-scale bypassing localized Tiger units, which forced the underpowered and defect-prone Tigers to retreat in order to avoid encirclement . In the further course, the vehicles could often only be used individually. 35 Tiger I took part in the Battle of the Bulge and did not suffer total losses in the battle. In March 1945, the inventory of Tiger I on the Western Front was only 13 copies. With the expansion of sub-caliber APCR hard core bullets, more and more regular anti-tank weapons were now able to fight a tiger. The Allies did not have a comparable tank until the end of the war, the M26 Pershing , of which, however, due to various delays, only 20 were able to intervene in the fighting on the European theater of war.
The Panzerkampfwagen Tiger was one of the most powerful tanks of the Second World War. Due to the high penetration performance of its main weapon, the fast reloading capability, the precise target optics and the precisely firing cannon, the Tiger was superior to all enemy standard tanks in terms of firepower. Although the armor was ballistically unfavorable, it developed a high level of protection due to its thickness, so that the Tiger was as good as invulnerable to the enemy standard anti-tank weapons at normal combat distances.
However, the vehicle also had serious disadvantages: In addition to the far too short range, the conventional shape of the armor with the vertical and thus non-bullet-repellent surfaces was considered to be backward. Technical innovations such as the steering gear operated by a steering wheel, the semi-automatic gearbox and the disc brakes enabled good controllability, but this complicated and maintenance-intensive technology proved to be extremely susceptible to failure, which in retrospect meant that hardly justifiable logistics and repair capacities had to be used.
In combination with the under-motorization, there were a large number of vehicle failures, whereby it was a particular disadvantage that the towing problem for these heavy vehicles could not be solved satisfactorily by the end of the war. As a rule, only half of a fully equipped Tiger division was ready for action after two to three days of combat. Furthermore, the higher management levels tried to achieve as much as possible with the Tiger units, which were only temporarily subordinate to them, without in return having an understanding of the tactical peculiarities and the high need for repairs of the Tiger. Together, this led to the fact, which was unusual for a tank mass-produced during World War II, that most of the losses were not due to enemy action, but to technical defects, as well as getting stuck or getting stuck in the field in combination with a lack of recovery opportunities and subsequent self-destruction. In addition, enormous personnel and material costs were incurred in the production of the vehicles, at a time when the economic situation in the empire was becoming increasingly precarious.
Despite contemporary criticism of the high development and production costs of the "clumsy and clumsy tank" amounting to half a billion RM, its subsequent manufacture is not necessarily considered a wrong decision. But it is also a fact that the Panther or a more reliable, easier to produce and correspondingly larger number of available tanks in the 35-ton class would have been more advantageous for the army. Even the Henschel engineers felt that the Panther was better suited for mass production and had more tactical advantages.
During his service, the tiger was a preferred object of propaganda, in which naturally the tendency to exaggerated representation became clear. In National Socialist propaganda , the tiger was stylized as an “invulnerable battering ram” and referred to as the “life insurance of the occupation”. Unpredictably, the tiger thus became partly the victim of its own propaganda, since higher-level staff sometimes assigned unrealistic tasks to the tiger departments, which were only subordinate to them for a short time, and which they could not always cope with. In addition, due to the actually good armor protection, some Tiger crews tended to be overconfident and took high risks, so that the inspector general of the armored forces pointed out after unnecessary losses that the status of invulnerability was unrealistic and that basic tactical rules had to be observed. There were hardly any differences in terms of exaggeration compared to opposing propaganda . After the battle in the Kursk Bogen , the Soviet Army stated that they had shot down over 700 tigers, although at that time only just under half of this number had even been produced. The Western Allies also reported seeing Tiger tanks almost everywhere in front of their front and destroying a not inconsiderable number. During the Battle of the Bulge, they were of the opinion that more than half of the German tanks were Tigers, although Panzer IV and Panther made up the actual bulk.
Due to the low availability of the tiger due to mechanical unreliability and low production rates, there were not even a handful of examples during the war of concentrated use as a breakthrough weapon in accordance with its actual doctrine. Furthermore, there was not a single strategic breakthrough; all successfully completed attacks were merely tactical in nature. Even so, the Tiger was the German tank that opponents showed the most respect. Usually enemy armored vehicles retreated immediately as soon as they saw Tiger tanks. Especially among the Western Allies, his appearance at the front often led to panic-like conditions. During the landing in Normandy , Tiger units were the only German units below the division level that were recorded on the Allies' strategic situation maps . In a report prepared by General Eisenhower for the War Department , American soldiers describe in detail the superiority of the Tiger over their tanks. Field Marshal Montgomery was also aware that the tiger had a negative impact on the morale of his British troops. According to the author Horst Scheibert , the legendary reputation of the tiger was more due to the Allied reporting and the reception of foreign military literature than it was actually realistically justified.
Armored command vehicle
In contrast to the other German armored vehicles, there were hardly any variants of the Tiger. The most common was the tank command car with 89 pieces, which could only be recognized from the outside through an additional star antenna attached to the tower. As a change, the coaxial turret machine gun was omitted and the ammunition was reduced from 92 to 66 shells. Instead, an additional radio device was installed in the tower, which was operated by the loader as the second radio operator.
The Sturmtiger was a heavily armored assault tank with a sloping box structure placed on the Tiger chassis. The main armament was a 38 cm rocket mortar, the projectiles of which had an enormous effect on the target. Only 18 of the 66-ton vehicle were produced.
Armored recovery vehicles
Only a handful of the mountain tigers, which the front workshops had converted from regular tanks on their own initiative, were used. In the vehicles, the main weapon had been removed and a suspension for a small crane was installed instead, which could only lift light loads.
Five of the available chassis of the Porsche Tiger were converted into armored recovery vehicles. The drive system was converted as with the Jagdpanzer Elefant , but the vehicle did not have additional armor and instead of the large structure only a low structure at the rear, in which an MG 34 was installed for self-defense. The vehicle had a small crane, but not powerful recovery technology.
After the heavy street fighting in Stalingrad , the proposal was made to convert three Porsche chassis into ramming tanks. The vehicle, which was provided with armor that was closed all around and strongly sloped on all sides, was intended to bring down buildings with its tapered front ram. The project was discontinued, as was the plan to use two Tiger chassis as load carriers for an intermediate 24 cm cannon 4 or a version of the Tiger as an assault gun with the 8.8-8 also used in the successor model Tiger II or "King Tiger " cm-KwK 43.
There were also plans to increase combat value for the production model. In the summer of 1942, for example, there were investigations into whether the front armor could be reinforced to 120 mm. In autumn 1943, a vehicle was equipped with the KwK 43 from the "King Tiger" to increase its firepower. Because of the massive problems with the manual gearbox at the beginning, a Tiger was equipped with a 12-speed electric gearbox from ZF in October 1942 , which carried out the gear changes electrically. With regard to improved power transmission, the installation of fluid drives from Voith was also examined. All projects mentioned were not pursued any further.
As part of the increase in specific power , there were several developments with more powerful engines. In tests, the power of the Maybach engine could be increased from 700 to 800 hp by means of direct injection . The next stage of development resulted in a 1000 horsepower supercharged engine , a test model of which was installed in a Tiger but not tested. A version of this unit was installed in a French AMX-50 prototype after the war . Due to the course of the war, these tests remained, as did projects such as a 12-cylinder diesel engine with 800 hp from Argus , an air-cooled 16-cylinder X-engine from Porsche, which achieved an output of 1500 hp on the test bench, a 12-cylinder petrol engine with 900 hp from the auto Union , a 12-cylinder gasoline engine with 1,050 horsepower of eagles and a unique drive concept of Porsche with a 1000 WPS strong gas turbine , unfinished.
|Technical data of the Panzerkampfwagen VI Tiger|
|0 General characteristics|
|Prototype designation / Sd. Vehicle No.||VK 4501 (H) / 181|
|Chief designer||Dr.-Ing. Erwin Aders ( Henschel & Sohn , Kassel)|
|Combat weight||57 tons|
|Length over all with cannon / without cannon||8.45 m / 6.31 m|
|height||3 m (with later Panther dome = 2.88 m)|
|Main armament||8.8 cm KwK 36|
|Secondary armament||2 × MG 34|
|Ammunition supply||KwK: 92 rounds
MG: 5850 rounds (39 belt bags with 150 cartridges each)
|Pipe length (KwK)||4.93 m|
|Weight (KwK)||1.35 t|
|Tube life||6000 shots|
|Price (KwK)||22,000 RM|
|Tub front||100 mm / 81 ° (driver front)|
|Tub side (construction)||80 mm / 90 °|
|Tub side below (drive)||60 mm / 90 °|
|Tub rear||80 mm / 90 °|
|Tub bottom||25 mm|
|Tower front||100 mm / 80 ° (aperture 110 mm)|
|Tower side||80 mm / 90 °|
|Turret stern||80 mm / 90 °|
|Tower ceiling||25 mm|
|0 drive and performance|
water-cooled twelve-cylinder - Otto engine type Maybach HL 230 P 45
V-type engine with a 60 ° bank angle and four downdraft - Register carburetors (four twin carburettors ),
each cylinder bank a Bosch magneto , dry sump lubrication , oil content 28 liters
|Bore × stroke||130 × 145 mm|
|power||700 hp at 3000 min -1 (continuous power: 650 hp at 2800 min -1 )|
|Weight related performance||12.3 hp / t|
|Top speed road / terrain||45/20 km / h|
|Fuel supply||540 l|
|Range road / terrain||100 km / 60 km (other information: 195 km / 110 km)|
|Chain width||72 cm|
|Ground pressure||1.03 kg / cm²|
|Ground clearance||47 cm|
|Climbing ability||up to 35 °|
|Fording depth||1.60 m|
|Trench crossing ability||2.50 m|
- Notes on the "Technical data" table
Different information: Von Senger and Etterlin (Die Deutschen Panzer 1926–1945.) Gives 3920 cartridges.
In Spielberger's reference work (Der Panzerkampfwagen Tiger and its variants.) The technical drawings show only 32 belt bags = 4800 cartridges.
- during the first 250 vehicles: Maybach HL 210 P 45 (21 liters, 650 hp at 3000 min -1 )
There are two very different figures for range and fuel consumption:
• Jentz (Tiger I & II: Combat and Tactics) and Spielberger (The Tiger armored car and its variants) give 195 km / 110 km , the latter giving the following fuel consumption per 100 km : 270 l on the road and 480 l off-road.
• Scheibert (Die Deutschen Kampfpanzer 1935–1945) , Queißner (Die Tiger-Familie) and von Senger and Etterlin (Die Deutschen Panzer 1926–1945.) Indicate 100 km / 60 km , whereby the consumption per 100 km is 535 l Street and 935 l in the area. Since Spielberger (The Panzerkampfwagen Tiger and its variants.) In his standard work, strangely enough, also specifies this value for the Henschel prototype in contrast to the series model, the range of 100/60 km seems most likely.
- Walter J. Spielberger: The armored car Tiger and its varieties. Motorbuch Verlag, Stuttgart 1997, ISBN 3-87943-456-5 .
- Thomas L. Jentz : Tiger I & II: Combat and Tactics. Podzun-Pallas Verlag 2000, ISBN 3-7909-0691-3 .
- Wolfgang Fleischer: The Panzerkampfwagen VI "Tiger" with the troops. Podzun-Pallas 1998, ISBN 3-7909-0637-9 .
- Wolfgang Fleischer, Horst Scheibert: Panzer-Kampfwagen Tiger. Edition Dörfler im Nebel Verlag, Utting (2002?), ISBN 3-89555-051-5 .
- Roger Ford: Tiger tanks. Dörfler im Nebel Verlag, Utting 2000, ISBN 3-89555-768-4 .
- Egon Kleine, Volkmar Kühn: Tiger - The story of a legendary weapon 1942–1945. Motorbuch Verlag, Stuttgart, ISBN 3-87943-414-X .
- Horst Scheibert: Tiger I in action. Waffen-Arsenal special volume S-20, Podzun-Pallas, ISBN 3-7909-0410-4 .
- FM von Senger and Etterlin : The German tanks 1926–1945. Bernard & Graefe Verlag, ISBN 3-7637-5988-3 .
- George Forty: The German tank weapon in World War II. Bechtermünz 1998, ISBN 3-8289-5327-1 .
- Christopher W. Wilbeck: Sledgehammers. Aberjona Press, 2004, ISBN 0-9717650-2-2 (English)
- Tiger I Information Center (English; with pictures of the Porsche Tiger and the chief designer Erwin Aders ; next to it kill ratio lists of Tigers I and II)
- Tiger in Allied Intelligence (English; with original texts from descriptions at the time, marking of vulnerable areas and tactical instructions from the Allies)
- Restoration of the tiger exhibited in the Bovington Tank Museum until it is drivable (English)
- General - Technical Data - Development & The Tiger Departments (English)
- Tiger at AchtungPanzer.com and Tiger (P) (English; with pictures of the mountain and ramming tiger)
- Tiger primer as original document (PDF; 4.4 MB)
- PDF image file with vehicles of the Tiger type Panzerkampfwagen still in existence today (English; 4.14 MB)
- Spielberger: The armored car Tiger and its varieties. Pp. 24–26 | VK for full track vehicles.
- Spielberger: The armored car Tiger and its varieties. Pp. 16–18 (other sources speak of four prototypes).
- Forty: The German tank weapon in World War II. P. 118.
- Spielberger: The armored car Tiger and its varieties. P. 28 and 36 (Porsche) and p. 70 (Henschel).
- Spielberger: The armored car Tiger and its varieties. Pp. 28-36.
- Spielberger: The armored car Tiger and its varieties. P. 70.
- Spielberger: The armored car Tiger and its varieties. Pp. 76-77.
- Michael Winninger: The Nibelungenwerk. The tank factory in St. Valentin . Müller History Facts, Andelfingen 2011, ISBN 978-3-905944-04-4 , p. 192 .
- Spielberger: The armored car Tiger and its varieties . 1997, p. 94 .
- Spielberger: The armored car Tiger and its varieties. P. 133.
- Forty: The German tank weapon in World War II . 1998, p. 150 (subsequent estimate).
- Hartmut Knittel: Tank production in the Second World War. Mittler Verlag, 1988, ISBN 3-8132-0291-7 , p. 60.
- Jentz: Tiger I & II: Combat and Tactics . 2000, p. 21 (Brinell value).
- Wolfgang Fleischer: The Panzerkampfwagen VI "Tiger" with the troops. Podzun-Pallas, ISBN 3-7909-0637-9 , p. 37.
- Wolfgang Fleischer: The Panzerkampfwagen VI "Tiger" with the troops . Podzun-Pallas, 1998, ISBN 3-7909-0637-9 , pp. 10 (250,800 RM).
- Spielberger: The armored car Tiger and its varieties . 1997, p. 106 (300,000 RM).
- Spielberger: The armored car Tiger and its varieties. Pp. 92, 96, 99 and 100.
- Spielberger: The armored car Tiger and its varieties. P. 78
- Forty: The German tank weapon in World War II . 1998 (1355, a month's representation is estimated).
- Peter Broucek: Military Resistance: Studies on the Austrian state sentiment and National Socialist defense . Böhlau Verlag , Vienna 2008, ISBN 978-3-205-77728-1 , The Austrian Identity in Resistance 1938–1945, pp. 163 ( limited preview in Google Book search).
- Peter Pirker: Subversion of German Rule: The British War Intelligence Service SOE and Austria . Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht , Göttingen 2012, ISBN 978-3-89971-990-1 , p. 253 ( limited preview in Google Book search).
- Dietrich Eichholtz : History of the German War Economy 1939–1945 . Walter de Gruyter, Berlin 2003, ISBN 978-3-11-096489-9 , pp. 337 ( limited preview in Google Book search).
- Spielberger: The armored car Tiger and its varieties. P. 104.
- Jentz: Tiger I & II: Combat and Tactics. P. 9.
- Jentz: Tiger I & II . Combat and Tactics. 2000, p. 8 (The Tiger I cannon was even more precise than the Tiger II's longer cannon).
- Jentz: Tiger I & II: Combat and Tactics. P. 7.
- Complete technical description according to → Spielberger: The Panzerkampfwagen Tiger and its varieties. and Forty: The German tank weapon in World War II. and F. M. von Senger and Etterlin: The German tanks 1926–1945.
- Wilbeck: sledgehammers. P. 36.
- Maintenance intervals → Lukas Friedli: The tank repair of the Wehrmacht. Schneider Armor Research, ISBN 3-935107-08-0 , p. 105.
- Jentz: Tiger I & II: Combat and Tactics. P. 89 and 90.
- Jentz: Tiger I & II: Combat and Tactics. P. 9.
- See also the so-called "meals" in the Tiger Primer (PDF file; 4.4 MB), p. 80 ff.
- Forty: The German tank weapon in World War II. Pp. 125-126.
- Wilbeck: sledgehammers. P. 39.
- The Soviet standard 76.2 mm tank shell BR-350A had a penetration rate of about 80 mm at 100 m at 90 ° → М. Н. Свирин: Артиллерийское вооружение советских танков 1940–1945. Экспринт 1999.
- In the case of the T-34, the engine was often destroyed after the hull front was penetrated. → Jentz: Tiger I & II: Combat and Tactics. P. 81.
- David M. Glantz: Colossus Reborn. University of Kansas Press, ISBN 978-0-7006-1353-3 , p. 201.
- Jentz: Tiger I & II: Combat and Tactics. P. 95 | Other sources speak of 146 vehicles.
- Wolfgang Fleischer: The Panzerkampfwagen VI "Tiger" with the troops. Podzun-Pallas, ISBN 3-7909-0637-9 , p. 12.
- The sPzAbt 503 had to surrender its three companies to three different divisions and the sPzAbt 505 was subordinate to an infantry division → Wilbeck: Sledgehammers. P. 187.
- The sPzAbt 503 had hardly any Tiger of 38 tanks left, while the sPzAbt 505 had six of 26 tanks. → Wilbeck: Sledgehammers. P. 67 and 73.
- David Glantz : The Battle of Kursk 2004. University of Kansas Press, ISBN 978-0-7006-1335-9 , p. 17.
- MGFA: The German Empire and the Second World War . Volume 8, ISBN 978-3-421-06235-2 , p. 159 (also the number of kills before it)
- Austrian military magazine : 60 years ago: Prochorowka. Edition 6/2003 → Article online ( Memento from May 25, 2012 in the web archive archive.today )
- Wilbeck: sledgehammers. Pp. 72-74.
- Losses up to July 20th → Jentz: Tiger I & II: Combat and Tactics. P. 95.
- Wilbeck: sledgehammers. Pp. 76-77.
- the standard BR-471 bullet at a 30 ° angle of impact: 105 mm at 1000 m and 80 mm at 2000 m → А. Б. Широкорад : Энциклопедия отечественной артиллерии. Харвест 2000, ISBN 985-433-703-0 (Russian).
- И. Желтов, И. Павлов, М. Павлов, А. Сергеев: Танки ИС в боях. Восточный горизонт 2002 (Russian).
- Wilbeck: sledgehammers. P. 110.
- Jentz: Tiger I & II: Combat and Tactics. Pp. 132, 157.
- For example, the Soviet offensive could be delayed by a week in the south wing → Wilbeck: Sledgehammers. P. 104.
- Jentz: Tiger I & II: Combat and Tactics. Pp. 138, 150.
- Jentz: Tiger I & II: Combat and Tactics. P. 42.
- Willy Queißner: The Tiger Family. Flugzeug-Publ.-GmbH 1996, p. 12.
- Jentz: Tiger I & II: Combat and Tactics. Pp. 55-56, 59.
- Wilbeck: sledgehammers. Pp. 56-57 | Almost all of the kills were due to the tigers. The Panzer III Ausf. N, also present in the sPzAbtl, could only destroy a few tanks with their short cannons.
- Jentz: Tiger I & II: Combat and Tactics. Pp. 12-15.
- Jentz: Tiger I & II: Combat and Tactics. Pp. 96-97.
- On June 30, 1944 alone, the sPzAbt 504 lost 22 tigers through self-destruction while retreating. → Wilbeck: Sledgehammers. Pp. 96-97.
- Wilbeck: sledgehammers. P. 181.
- Jentz: Tiger I & II: Combat and Tactics. Pp. 126-129.
- George Forty: United States tanks of World War II. Blandford Press 1983, ISBN 0-7137-1214-7 , p. 136 (English).
- Jentz: Tiger I & II: Combat and Tactics. P. 10.
- Willy Queißner: The Tiger Family. Flugzeug-Publ.-GmbH, 1996, p. 14.
- Williy Queißner: The Tiger Family. Flugzeug-Publ.-GmbH, 1996, p. 14.
- Wolfgang Fleischer: The Panzerkampfwagen VI "Tiger" with the troops. Podzun-Pallas, ISBN 3-7909-0637-9 , p. 37.
- Jentz: Tiger I & II: Combat and Tactics. Pp. 150, 166, 168.
- Wolfgang Fleischer: The Panzerkampfwagen VI "Tiger" with the troops. Podzun-Pallas, ISBN 3-7909-0637-9 , p. 96.
- Spielberger: The armored car Tiger and its varieties. P. 7.
- Hartmut Knittel: Tank production in the Second World War. Mittler Verlag, 1988, ISBN 3-8132-0291-7 , p. 101.
- Spielberger: The armored car Tiger and its varieties. P. 189.
- Jentz: Tiger I & II: Combat and Tactics. Pp. 143-145.
- Forty: The German tank weapon in World War II. P. 132 as well as Jentz: Tiger I & II: Kampf und Taktik. P. 163.
- Wilbeck: sledgehammers. P. 8.
- Wilbeck: sledgehammers. Pp. 7-8.
- Wilbeck: sledgehammers. P. 182 ff.
- Jentz: Tiger I & II: Combat and Tactics. Pp. 163, 166.
- Charles Whiting: Kasserine: first blood. Stein and Day Verlag 1984, ISBN 0-8128-2954-9 , p. 174 (English) as well as Forty: The German tank weapon in the Second World War. P. 119.
- Wilbeck: Sledgehammers. P. 185.
- The panther is also shown as superior → Jentz: Tiger I & II: Combat and Tactics. Pp. 169-171.
- Horst Scheibert: The German battle tanks 1935-1945. Waffen-Arsenal, Special Volume 7, ISBN 3-7909-0483-X , p. 40.
- Stephen A. Hart: Sherman Firefly vs. Tiger: Normandy 1944. Osprey-Verlag, ISBN 978-1-84603-150-2 , p. 21 (English).
- Forty: The German tank weapon in World War II. P. 136 | Number of five mountain tigers (P) in Spielberger, p. 148.
- Spielberger: The armored car Tiger and its varieties. Pp. 152, 176.
- Spielberger: The armored car Tiger and its varieties. Pp. 77, 98, 101, 186.
- Spielberger: The armored car Tiger and its varieties . 1997, p. 180–185 (Some of the projects were designed for the successor "King Tiger", but would have probably also been used for the Tiger I if successful).
- Spielberger: The armored car Tiger and its varieties. Pp. 190-191.