Attack on Stalingrad

Attack on Stalingrad

Part of: Battle of Stalingrad ( World War II )

German infantry in Stalingrad (October 1942)

date	September 13 to November 18, 1942
place	Stalingrad , Soviet Union
output	German failure as complete intake is not achieved

Parties to the conflict
German Empire	Soviet Union
Commander
Friedrich Paulus Hermann Hoth	Vasily Ivanovich Chuikov
Troop strength
6th Army 4th Panzer Army	62nd Army parts of 64th Army NKVD units workers militias
losses
more than 100,000 dead, wounded, captured or missing (6th Army); approx. 30,000 dead, wounded, captured or missing (4th Panzer Army)	not exactly known

The attack on Stalingrad was the climax of the Battle of Stalingrad during the German-Soviet War , in which some army corps of the Wehrmacht and subordinate divisions, combined to form the 6th Army , tried unsuccessfully in an initial phase to fight the city in a large-scale material battle capture the defending 62nd Army of the Red Army . The second stage after the failure of this plan was only to hold the conquered positions - until total defeat.

The German offensive phase began on September 13, 1942 and ended with the start of the major Soviet offensive Operation Uranus on November 19, 1942.

From the German point of view, the struggles for the conquest of Stalingrad can be divided into four phases:

1. Attack on the City Center, South City and Mamayev Hill (September 13-26, 1942)
2. Attack on the workers' settlements and the Orlovka promontory (September 27 to October 7, 1942)
3. Attack on the industrial complexes (October 14-31, 1942)
4. Attack on the last beachheads in the factories (November 9-18, 1942)

Although large parts of the city were occupied, the complete capture of Stalingrad ultimately failed due to the dogged resistance of the Soviet defenders, who stayed on the western Volga until the end. The Soviet offensive " Operation Uranus " led to the encirclement of the 6th Army on November 22nd, 1942 . After the failure of the rescue operation "Wintergewitter" in mid-December 1942 and the ban on attempts to escape by Hitler himself, the last trapped units in the northern basin ceased fighting on February 2, 1943 and were taken prisoner by the Soviets .

In Soviet military literature, the Battle of Stalingrad was seen as a crucial turning point in World War II. In the contemporary perception, the battles in Stalingrad were considered to be the bitterest battles of World War II ( Piekalkiewicz ), the most dogged skirmishes in recorded history (US war correspondent Walter Kerr), the greatest battle of all time ( Völkischer Beobachter ) and the greatest heroic struggle in our history ( Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring ) designated.

Starting position

Fall Blau and the advance to the Volga

The German advance from May 7 to November 18, 1942.

until July 7th

until July 22nd

until August 1st

until November 18th

German offensive on Stalingrad in September 1942

In the summer of 1942, the long-planned German summer offensive Fall Blau began in the southern section of the Eastern Front with the aim of proceeding in two different directions after the destruction of a large unit of the Red Army near Voronezh :

• on the one hand to overcome the land bridge between Don and Volga and to conquer the important traffic junction and industrial location Stalingrad on the Volga and
• on the other hand , to advance from the lower Don into the Caucasus in order to take the important oil sources from Baku and make them usable for the German war economy .

The heaviest fighting took place in the Stalingrad area, with the city itself not being a strategic , but rather a tactical target. Hitler's primary goal was to prevent inland waterway transports on the Volga; in his opinion, the Stalingrad factory complexes could have been eliminated with artillery fire . From the perspective of the Soviet Union , however, the industrial city of Stalingrad was of the greatest strategic importance, as it represented the connection to the Caucasus and the raw material sources on the Black Sea. In view of the increasing shortage of supplies and growing logistical difficulties of the Wehrmacht units, access to the oil fields (fuel for tanks) was of decisive importance for the success of the entire Russian campaign.

Defense preparations

In the opinion of Stalin and the Stawka (Supreme Command of the Soviet Army), due to the great loss of land, the phase of elastic defense was considered to be over and the 62nd Army was ordered to defend the city unconditionally. Mining of the city was prohibited, 200,000 residents of the city were divided into work columns and had to build defensive walls against the expected attack. Stalin previously issued Order No. 227 , known as “ Do n't step back!” (“ Ни шагу назад! ”) , Which threatened the death penalty for any further retreat of soldiers or civilians from the German attackers. Alone in the city of Stalingrad 13,500 soldiers for desertion of specially parked for NKVD executed -Sondereinheiten.

On July 12, 1942, the defense of Stalingrad was organized. From the end of August the 62nd and 64th Armies had to give up the outer defensive belt of Stalingrad and the house-to-house fighting began with the start of the German attack on 13/14. Initiated September 1942.

It was the declared aim of the Stawka to bind the German offensive forces in the city permanently in costly wars of wear and tear and, in the background , to prepare for Operation Uranus , a large-scale counter-offensive in the entire southern arc of the Don with the aim of enclosing the 6th Army. The 62nd Army had the main task of defending the city at all costs; further reinforcement of additional reserve troops could not be guaranteed for this army group.

In the Soviet defense line, strategically important buildings and complexes formed defensive line bases, which were connected with trenches. Buildings that had already been bombed could hardly be further destroyed and were defended by trains, companies or battalions with all-round security. Every soldier was equipped with anti-tank hand weapons as far as possible, mostly tank shells or incendiary bottles . The infantry platoons were mixed with other branches of arms: u. a. Snipers , pioneers and paramedics . Several bases formed a defense node. Factory halls turned out to be ideal points of defense, e.g. B. the Martinsofenhalle , and massive complexes made of steel and concrete with an extensive basement. It was only in the course of the battle that the Stalingrad sewer system was discovered as a preferred deployment area for rapid advances into the depths of the enemy lines. In large streets and squares, the fire points were arranged in a chessboard shape in order to fight the German infantrymen with different fire areas.

Later, damaged tracked vehicles were used in the rubble of the road as immobile artillery, so-called " breakwaters ", only the swiveling tower protruded over the rubble and rubble and was able to fight enemy targets. General VI Chuikov ordered his armed forces to remain in the immediate physical vicinity of the foremost German front line in order to neutralize air strikes by the enemy and involve him in close-quarters combat with heavy losses .

Initiation of battle and troops involved

The 6th Army was considered an elite unit of Army Group South and had successfully passed defensive battles such as the Battle of Kharkov in May 1942. After participating in the Voronezh offensive in June / July, she had advanced in a south-easterly direction along the Don and, after a minor success in the Kesselschlacht near Kalach , had crossed it in the area of ​​the land bridge to the Volga in early August. Since she had been in constant use for weeks, she had had little opportunity to make up for her losses. On August 23, 1942, 600 bombers from Luftflotte 4 completely destroyed Stalingrad in a heavy bombardment, the city was turned into a field of rubble in 1,600 missions with high explosive devices and incendiary bombs, and around 40,000 civilians fell victim to the air attack. On the same day, units of the German XIV Panzer Corps reached the Volga north of Stalingrad from their Don bridgehead Wertjatschi. On September 2, 1942, the 6th Army and the 4th Panzer Army united on a ridge in front of Stalingrad and began planning the offensive on the city center. Due to the unexpectedly high intensity of the house-to-house fighting, the entire summer offensive of 1942 near Stalingrad came to a standstill.

Balance of power (according to Soviet data) on September 13, 1942 in the urban area of ​​Stalingrad

category	62nd Army	6th Army	relation
Team strength	45,000	80,000	1: 1.8
artillery	85	630	1: 7.5
Anti-tank guns	260	490	1: 1.9
Grenade launcher	150	760	1: 5
tank	108	390	1: 3.6

On September 3, 1942, the 6th Army succeeded in sealing off Stalingrad and one day later German tank units penetrated the southern part of the city through the outer defensive belt. On September 10, the 62nd Army had to withdraw into the inner defense ring due to increasing pressure from the enemy. On the same day, Lieutenant General Vasily Tschuikow , who had commanded the 64th Army until August, replaced the unsuccessful General Anton Lopatin (1897–1965) in defense of the city. The weak forces of the Red Army left the high command of the 6th Army in the expectation of being able to take Stalingrad in one quick coup.

On September 3, 1942, the entire Army Group B consisted of an estimated 980,000 men (including 580,000 German soldiers and 400,000 allies of other nationalities). At that time the 6th Army still consisted of around 200,000 men. For the attack on the large area stood the LI. Army Corps 30,000 combat troops available, in addition 50,000 men from XXXXVIII. Panzer Corps of the 4th Panzer Army. This attack unit was increased during the fighting by the 100th Jäger Division, 305th Infantry Division and 79th Infantry Division. The strength of the troops involved on both sides continued to fluctuate, as permanent reserves had to be used in the costly local combat. Initially, nine and later twelve German divisions were deployed to attack the city.

Even before the fighting in the city area began, the 6th Army was exposed to greater military stress in its sector and was already considered worn out.

The Soviet defense of Stalingrad consisted mainly of the 62nd Army, NKVD units and smaller parts of the 64th Army and armed workers' militiamen. The armies were incomplete as much of their artillery had to be left behind on the western Volga. Stalingrad was defended by 20,000 Soviet soldiers on September 12, 1942, and another 25,000 men were on the eastern bank of the Volga. The combat strength consisted of three intact rifle divisions and two tank brigades, which only had 40 operational tanks.

Individual aspects of the battle

Terrain description

Overview map (Stalingrad 1942)

Stalingrad was an industrial city stretching over 50 kilometers and in places up to 5 kilometers wide, which consisted of workers' settlements in the north and the adjoining factory district, a business district in the city center and a southern town. While the suburbs and workers' settlements were mainly built from simple wooden huts, the rest of the town was considered an architecturally exemplary planned Stalinist model city with a number of modern apartment houses, state institutions, gardens and parks.

To the west of the city lies a chain of hills, the heights of which are named on tactical maps with height information. The east is bounded by the up to two kilometers wide river of the Volga with its river islands. The entire Soviet supplies were transported across the Volga by water and stored on the steeply sloping west bank of the river. Because of its sheltered location, the command posts of the 62nd Army were set up there. Numerous erosion gorges (balkas) shape the western fore of the city, they also run through the city area to flow into the Volga.

On the higher ground in the northwest of the city are the villages of Orlowka and Gorodishche and about ten kilometers northwest of the city ​​airport Gumrak . To the extreme north of Stalingrad bordered the industrial city of Rynok , the course of the Mokraia Metschetkaia and the deep gorge of the Vishnevaia Balka , which were used by the Red Army as natural barriers against attacks from the west.

The adjoining industrial district consisted of the tractor factory, the “Barricades” gun factory, the “Red October” steelworks and the “Lazur” chemical factory, all of which were developed into fortresses. Between the large facilities were smaller factories such as the brickworks between the tractor factory and the “Barrikaden” gun factory and the bread factory between the gun factory and the “Red October” steelworks. To the west of the “Barricades” gun factory stretched the Skulpturny Park and further west the Silicate Factory. The chemical factory "Lazur" was located in the middle of the railway loop "Tennis Racket" between Mamayev Hill and the Volga.

The Tatar tomb Mamayev Kurgan as the highest observation point separated the northern industrial district from the city center. In the northwest area of ​​Mamayev Hill was a small airfield with a flying school. The deeply cut gorges Bannyi, Krutoi and Dolgii acted as natural barriers to prevent the enemy from moving north-south and to protect the defenders from enemy reconnaissance and direct artillery fire.

South of Razgulaewka Station and the hospital on the hills in front of the city, the railway line led to Stalingrad Central Station, the tactical significance of which was that it was in the immediate vicinity of Red Square and the central Volga ferry pier.

The deeply hollowed Tsaritzaschlucht cut off the inner city from the southern city and served as a barrier against west-east movements of the 6th Army. The southern city stretched to the banks of the Elschanka River and had the southern train station and the towering grain silo visible from afar as prominent points. (The silo is preserved: 48 ° 41 ′ 14 ″  N , 44 ° 29 ′ 1.9 ″  E ). The railway line from Voroponovo via Sadovaya ended at the South Station, between the railway line and the grain silo there were a number of factories, such as the canning factory and numerous warehouses. On the higher ground were the cemetery and a larger barrack complex, and on the hills kolkhozes, orchards, the leather factory and the motor tractor station. To the south of the Elschanka were the suburbs of Minina and Kuporosnoje, as well as the “Elektroles 25 October” power station and sawmill No. 2 on the south bank.

Enclosing was impossible due to the special topographical location of the city. This was one of the main reasons why the 6th Army had to carry out costly and costly frontal attacks against tactically important buildings and landmarks. The city was systematically divided into grid squares by the Army High Command (AOK) , to which different tactical meanings were assigned. The plan consisted of breaking out of the Soviet defensive barriers, which were defended to varying degrees, and isolating them and fighting them separately. Defined buildings and landmarks were declared military targets. The guns of the German artillery could not seriously endanger the positions of the Red Army on the banks of the Volga even with steep fire .

The special topography of Stalingrad only allowed the enemy to advance on three routes:

• along the river Mokraia Metschetka via Spartanowka to Rynok or into the industrial complexes (XIV. Panzer Corps)
• or along the Tatar Wall in a south-easterly direction via Gorodishte and Gumrak to the Mamayev Hill (LI. Army Corps)
• or a direction of march along the Elschanka River via the Voroponowo station to the southern city with the destination southern station (XXXXVIII. Panzer Corps).

Combat technique and rat war

Since the German advance into the city center, the battle for Stalingrad has developed into a bitter house-to-house fight , which was characterized by sniper fire and bloody hand-to-hand fighting. The phase of the asymmetrical battle began, which was later referred to as the so-called " rat war " (Russian: Krysinaja wojna , Крысиная война). The term "rat war" came from the fact that fights were often held to take possession of insignificant foxholes and basements. Neither the 6th nor the 62nd Army were trained in three-dimensional warfare over houses, blocks of flats and streets and had to learn this fighting technique in practice with great losses. The loss rate was particularly high among young inexperienced soldiers who had not yet learned any experience and survival strategies in urban warfare.

About 30% of the 13th Guardsmen fell within the first 24 hours and all 15 tanks were destroyed. During this phase of the battle, 3 to 4 tanks were assigned to each German infantry company. However, this tactic was quickly doomed to failure, as the tracked vehicles were ambushed and there were fought with armor-piercing weapons; nor could the tanks fight riflemen from the higher floors of a building. During the defensive measures in the industrial district in particular, the Red Army created so-called " death zones ", heavily mined streets and squares, around which soldiers with armor-piercing weapons and snipers were posted to destroy German attackers in an ambush.

On the tactical maps, the units of both sides appeared as contiguous divisions, brigades and regiments. In reality, small units fought. With the exception of the major attacks on the Mamayev Kurgan and the tractor factory, raid troops and groups of a maximum of 50 soldiers were operated in downtown Stalingrad. Above all, the Red Army assembled its small mobile combat units from different nationalities and branches of service. If a building was captured by the Wehrmacht and some defenders were able to escape, they could easily join a neighboring unit.

Both parties to the conflict experienced an “almost nightmarish environment” in the battle for Stalingrad. When night fell, which was typical for the southern Russian region, the German air and artillery attacks were largely stopped, unusual nocturnal noises and the permanent threat from Soviet snipers made it impossible for the German soldiers to sleep. Due to the dust and soot of the collapsed and burning buildings, the soldiers could hardly be distinguished from one another from the outside, so that fatal confusion between friend and foe arose, especially in close combat. Chuikov studied the tactical decisions of the German attackers and quickly found effective countermeasures to delay the capture of Stalingrad as long as possible. He encouraged his soldiers to use guerrilla tactics in the city war and even use the sewers for marches.

Soldiers and officers described the urban warfare in Stalingrad:

“To take a block, you can't use 10 men to take the entrance. But you need so many people to provide fire protection, 2 to 3 people who have the courage to jump towards the entrance. And then they jump in. One has a hand grenade and the other has submachine guns. I don't need any more people. The others must provide fire protection from outside. And that's the tricky part. And we had to learn that first, on site. "

- Gerhard Münch

“Death lurks in every corner of the building. It is a situation that couldn't be more terrible and disgusting. "

- Knight's Cross bearer Major i. G. Winrich Behr (orderly officer in the 6th Army staff)

“If the Russians suddenly jumped in, then there's only one thing left. Pull the spade and then catch the artery below the head. "

- Günter Schröder

Weather

The climate in today's Volgograd is characterized by a continental steppe climate. Dry summers are replaced by rainy periods in a relatively short transition phase in autumn and spring, before a continental winter with moderate snowfall and sometimes heavy frosts sets in. Since the Battle of Stalingrad began in the late summer and then dragged on into late winter, people and material were exposed to the full range of climatic stress.

During the attack phase, the weather was mostly dry and mild until around mid-October, so that the roads and paths were easy to drive on for both sides and there was also good visibility for flights. Until the encirclement of the cauldron, the weather did not play such a crucial role in the fighting as it did in the Battle of Moscow .

Supply situation

Ships across the Volga supplied the 62nd Army fighting in the city with supplies. Due to the strong German air activity, the supply trips mostly took place at night.

For the German attackers, supply problems could hardly be overcome by the end of September 1942. The personnel situation worsened in the course of the autumn and on November 18, 1942 Colonel General Friedrich Fromm reported that the forces were no longer sufficient to hold occupied spaces, let alone carry out further offensive attack operations.

While the combat strength of the 6th Army continuously decreased, the reserves transported into battle increased in the Red Army despite difficult conditions. Shortly before the major attack on the tractor factory on October 14, 1942, units of the 6th Army reported a critical inventory of hand grenades and mortar ammunition .

Course of the fighting

Battle for the center of Stalingrad

Stalingrad-Mitte combat sections IR 518, IR 194 and IR 191

Stalingrad - mid-September 1942 (map not north)

The fighting for Stalingrad-Mitte began with the German major offensive on the inner city on September 13, 1942 and largely subsided towards the end of September 1942. The fights for Pavlov's house continued until November 1942 and for Mamayev Hill until February 1943.

Attack on the city center (September 13-14, 1942)

Infantry in Stalingrad

On September 13, 1942 at 4:45 a.m. (6:30 a.m. Russian time), the major German attack began with bombing by dive bombers and massive fire from field artillery and mortars on the inner defensive belt of Stalingrad. At 8 o'clock the large-scale ground offensive was launched, with the 295th Infantry Division (ID) advancing against Mamayev Hill and the 71st Infantry Division against Stalingrad Central Station and the central ferry terminal in the city center. The immediate goal was a ridge near the brickworks as a starting point for the storm on the city center. Chuikov moved his headquarters as a result of heavy German artillery fire on September 14, 1942 from Mamayev Hill to the Zaritsa Gorge near the Pushkinskaya road bridge. The 10th NKVD rifle division under General Sarajev initially held the entrances, including the tactically important buildings in the city center.

Heavy firefights broke out between the 71st Infantry Division and the defending Red Army soldiers at the main station. In the army report the capture of the main station by the Soviet troops was reported at 8:30 a.m., at 8:40 a.m. it was recaptured by the Wehrmacht, 9:30 a.m. by the Soviet troops and 1:20 p.m. it was back in German hands. In total, the Stalingrad Central Station was captured and lost 13 times on the same day. At night, the main station was repossessed by an NKVD battalion.

Air raid on the main train station

Bombing a building

On the afternoon of September 14, 1942, 71 ID managed to break through the Soviet front at the hospital and penetrate the northern inner city. The aim was to isolate the 62nd Army and break through to the main ferry pier. Chuikov's new headquarters on the Zaritsa was under fire by German raiding parties, while units of the 71st Infantry Division were able to work their way up to 100 meters on the Volga and the ferry pier. The “house of specialists” was taken and the ferry dock came within range of the heavy machine guns. The Red Army also lost the state bank and the brewery on Sovetskaya Street (“ Soviet Street”) to the I. Btl./Infanterie-Regiment (IR) in 194 under Captain Hindenlang.

Tschuikow mobilized his last reserves to save Stalingrad from a quick conquest by the Wehrmacht. Military units were formed from his staff, police officers, fire fighters, factory workers and NKVD units to block the streets from the main train station to the ferry terminal. A second unit was supposed to throw the German infantrymen out of the “house of specialists” so that the ferry dock was no longer under machine gun fire, which made the landing of the Soviet relief troops very difficult. 50 to 100 soldiers and militiamen were assigned to hold the tactically important buildings of Stalingrad, which were converted into "house fortresses" (or so-called "one-man fortresses") at all costs. At that time, only about 1,500 men were defending Stalingrad-Mitte.

On the evening of September 14 at around 9 p.m., the first relief forces of the 13th Guards Rifle Division (GSD) under Major General Alexander Ilyich Rodimzew arrived to stop the German advance into the city center. She was assigned the central section of the battle between Zaritza and Mamayev Hill. During the crossing on the Volga, the guardsmen suffered heavy losses from German air and artillery attacks. The 42nd Guards Rifle Regiment (GSR) under Colonel Jelin intervened as the first unit in the skirmishes around the city center, was able to further expand the bridgehead on the Volga and stabilize the situation at the ferry terminal. The 39th GSR was deployed to recapture Mamayev Hill, the 42nd and 34th GSR received orders to seal off the accesses to the Volga River.

In many places the Wehrmacht had advanced up to 100 meters to the Volga, but had not had the time to dig in or to create expanded positions for the heavy machine guns to the advantage of the guardsmen. South of January 9th Square (also called Lenin Square), the 39th GSR managed to free the Grudinin Mill (Russian: Mel'nica Grudinina , Мельница Грудинина) in close combat . The red brick mill later served the 42nd GSR as a command post and an important base of the central defense line, the divisional command post of the 13th Guardsman Division was built 100 meters further south on the steep bank of the Volga. The fights that day were most bitter in the area of ​​Mamayev Hill, on the banks of the Tsaritsa, at the grain silo and on the western edge of the suburb of Minina. The main station changed hands four times on this day alone. The two attacking armies, the 4th Panzer Army from the south and the 6th Army from the northwest, established the connection on the Tsarizar channel, which separates the old city from the new business district.

Central station and nail factory (September 15-17, 1942)

Grudinine Mill

Front line Stalingrad-middle September 16, 1942

Front course Stalingrad-Mitte 17. – 19. September 1942

In the early morning hours of September 15, the German attack resumed and began with massive air strikes. The 295th and 71st Infantry Division again attacked the Central Station and Mamayev Hill. The main station changed hands several times during the day and could be held by the Soviet troops at night. The 71st ID was able to successfully repel the attack of the 34th GSR together with heavy tanks on the "House of Specialists". German machine gunmen penetrated the Zaritsa Gorge, re-fired Chuikov's headquarters and could only be pushed back with difficulty by the army guard battalion. On the evening of September 15, 1942, Lt. Anton Kuzmich Dragan from I. Btl./42. GSR tasked with recapturing the main train station on Chuikov's personal orders. His unit managed to infiltrate the main station and fend off several German counter-attacks until nightfall. At dawn on September 16, air and artillery strikes continued on the main train station. The Soviet soldiers drove 20 tanks from the 24th Panzer Division from the station, which was recaptured in a counterattack. In the evening the main station was again checked by Dragan's guardsmen.

On September 16, 1942, IR 194 was embroiled in a confusing house-to-house battle against the 34th and 39th GSR in a 3.5 kilometer wide zone that stretched south from the Dolgii Gorge to the main train station. The heaviest fighting occurred near the “Place of January 9” in the buildings of the “Street of the Communists”, which were persistently held by parts of the 34th and 42nd GSR.

Heavy rains on September 17, 1942, caused the temperatures in Stalingrad to drop dramatically and turned the battlefield into a mud desert, which severely hampered forward movement on both sides. The fighting over the main train station continued, with the focus shifting to the nail factory. The nail factory was located one block south of the main train station and was used as a refuge for Lieutenant Dragans infantry platoon, as the main train station was surrounded by German soldiers and had to be abandoned for the time being. Battles also developed on Red Square, around the Barmaley Fountain, the “Uniwermag” department store and on the train tracks. The 71st Infantry Division narrowed the blocks around the main station and captured the nail factory in heavy hand-to-hand combat. During the night, Chuikov's headquarters had to be relocated again from the Zaritsa Gorge to the steep bank of the Volga, approx. 800 meters north of the Red October steelworks, as the positions on the Zaritsa could no longer be held. In the course of the fighting, the units on both sides melted down drastically due to the unexpectedly high losses, and many regiments sometimes only consisted of 100 soldiers. Only the 10th NKVD Rifle Division (SD) under Colonel Sarajev was still largely intact.

A confidential communiqué from the NKVD to Lavrenti Beria on September 16, 1942 described the chaotic and barbaric conditions in Stalingrad in the initial phase of the street fighting, where the city center would have had to be abandoned without the intervention of the 13th Guards Rifle Division. In each of the most critical stages of the battle for the Red Army, “fresh blood was sent to the meat grinder of Stalingrad”, so the 62nd Army was reinforced by more than 100,000 new soldiers from September to October 1942, most of whom fell victim to the slaughter. Tschuikow was able to maintain a target strength of 50,000 soldiers despite the continuous loss of terrain and the shrinking perimeter of the area to be defended. In contrast, the 6th Army was unable to compensate for its losses in any way.

Central Station, Railway House and Sedelnikow House (September 18-19, 1942)

Although almost the entire area of ​​the main station was in German possession, Red Army soldiers now fought in small units from small hidden shelters, basements or behind overturned or destroyed railway wagons. The tactic required being rolled over by waves of German attacks and then attacking from an ambush. 20 volunteers under Lieutenant Dragan, equipped with a 5-day ration, penetrated the main station again and targeted German machine-gun positions and armored vehicles between the tracks. In the 71st Infantry Division, the main station was a "death trap", as many officers were killed by snipers whose position could not be determined.

Soviet storm and burglary

More units arrived to relieve the defense of Stalingrad center. The 39th GSR again took action against the tracks in the station district and thus prevented the Wehrmacht from completely breaking into the city center.

An assault detachment of the 42nd GSR was able to take the railroader's house on September 19, 1942 under the personal assistance of Colonel Jelin. The Wehrmacht had assigned two infantry companies and a group of mortars to defend the house. The guardsmen were prepared for this operation in the protection of the Volga and attacked in three waves of attack, 6 to 8 men each with about 80 soldiers in reserve. Around 10 a.m., after a strong artillery barrage, the break-in into the building was reported, which was camouflaged by smoke candles . Within half an hour the house was free of the enemy. A similar attack was made by Lt. Sedelnikov carried out to the L-shaped house in the northeast of Lenin Square. The L-shaped house was a six-story, heavily fortified building, from which an entire block of streets in the immediate vicinity of the Volga River could be dominated by mortar and machine guns being able to work on a wide section of the bank. Soviet storm troops crawled up to the building in the twilight. The break-in occurred like a raid in the early morning hours of September 19, 1942 in blind spots that were beyond the reach of German machine guns and could not be seen. Before the Germans could use their firearms, the ground floor was already fully owned by the guardsmen. A third of the building was cleaned in just 20 minutes. After 26 hours of siege, the Germans trapped in the basement refused an ultimatum from the Soviet soldiers and were ultimately buried alive under the rubble by the explosion of explosive charges.

Lieutenant Dragan's Retreat Battles (September 20-22, 1942)

Front line Stalingrad-middle September 21, 1942

Front line Stalingrad-middle September 22, 1942

During September 20 and 21, 1942, the nail factory was attacked by strong German armored and infantry forces. In the evening the last Soviet battalion was smashed in half. Some of them were able to entrench themselves again in the destroyed battalion command post in the Uniwermag department store and offer the German attackers fierce resistance for a while. Four attempts were made to send relief across the Red Square to the units locked in the Uniwermag department store, which was bloodily refused each time. Fedoseev and all the officers were killed in this attempt. Even in the Uniwermag department store, no Soviet defender survived the German shelling.

Lieutenant Dragan could no longer stay in the completely devastated nail factory and slowly withdrew with his severely decimated group from the station district. On the corner of Krasnopiterskaya and Komsomolskaya, the 40-strong group moved into a three-story building, barricaded windows and doors there and prepared for the anticipated battle. For five days, resistance to increased German attacks could be put up, 28 Soviet soldiers were seriously wounded and brought to the cellar. In the end only 12 men were able to fight, and two guardsmen deserted. The tough resistance came to an end when the heavy machine guns ran out of ammunition and German tanks shot the house ready to attack. Only six guardsmen were able to flee to the other side of the Volga.

The 71st Infantry Division cleared the Zaritza and Krutoi gorges behind the main train station of broken Soviet riflemen. The southern town of Stalingrad has meanwhile completely fallen into the hands of the Germans, only in the south of the Zaritza Gorge enclosed Soviet marines could assert themselves.

The ruins of the Uniwermag department store

On September 21, 1942, the 10,000 men (including 3,000 sailors) strong 284th Rifle Division from Siberia reached the western part of the Volga. Your commander, Colonel Batjuk, received the order to secure the area between the “Red October” steelworks and Mamayev Hill and to relieve the 13th GSD. A combined attack of fighter jets, tanks and artillery was supposed to separate the 13th Guards Rifle Division from the main body of the 62nd Army. The 13th GSD had to fight off twelve enemy offensives on September 22, 1942, in the evening the guardsmen were pushed back to a position north of the main ferry pier. Soldiers of the Wehrmacht of Infantry Regiment 194 reached Moskowskaja-Strasse ("Moskauer Strasse") near the Volga River and split the 62nd Army in two.

Final phase of the fighting in Stalingrad-Mitte (September 23-28, 1942)

A Soviet counterattack by the 284th SD and 95th SD on the main ferry pier, the main train station and the track systems was repulsed on September 23, 1942. The 6th Army succeeded in permanently securing the corridor to the Volga River. A troop inspection by the OKH showed that the number of companies in the German 295th and 71st Infantry Divisions had dropped to 10 to 15 men due to the high losses during the fighting. In particular, the high losses of officers were extremely worrying. Attacks could only be carried out under the direction of an officer and fire protection from at least one machine gun. The infantrymen were trained to fight with assault guns ; if these were switched off and the command structure by officers was lacking, the effectiveness of the attack declined sharply. The supply situation for the fighting troops became noticeably tighter due to the difficult connection routes.

The fighting in the center of Stalingrad subsided and the 62nd Army used the reduced fighting activity to sound out the situation and search for dispersed units. The Gorky Theater and the party buildings around Red Square were about to be conquered. A Soviet infantry platoon of the 42nd GSR captured a detached four-story building at the southern end of January 9th Square on Penzenskaya Street, about 300 meters from the Volga. During the fighting, the platoon leader fell and was replaced by Sergeant Pavlov. The group set up for defense in what would later become known as Pavlov's House . During tank attacks, the guardsmen withdrew to the basement or the attic, where they could not be reached by tank shells. They were able to withstand the German superiority for 58 days.

The 272nd NKVD Regiment (10th NKVD Division) was trapped and destroyed in a park near the main train station.

On September 27, the LI. Army Corps the party building of the Communist Party on Red Square and hoisted the imperial war flag. This event was featured in the newsreel and hailed as an imminent victory. Hitler was already planning a public speech in Berlin about the conquest of Stalingrad. From now on the battle gradually shifted to the workers' settlements of the Stalingrad industrial complexes.

Balance sheet

Destroyed downtown

According to Tschuikov, the Wehrmacht lost 2,000 soldiers on September 15, 1942 and 8,000 to 10,000 in the period between September 13-15, 1942, and 54 German tanks were destroyed. The Soviet losses are not exactly known, but exceeded the Germans many times over. The 6th Army used over 23 million rifle cartridges and 750,000 mortar shells in the September fighting - ammunition that was missing in later operations. The extremely high losses of the 71st Infantry Division as a result of the house-to-house fighting in the inner city were documented in statistics from the High Command of the Army (OKH) on September 19, 1942: IR 191: 377, IR 194: 304 and IR 211: 392 dead. According to the OKH, 50% of the losses were caused by artillery fire.

The later Brigadier General of the Bundeswehr and Commander of the Panzer Grenadier Brigade 31 Gerhard Münch remembered the house-to-house fighting in Stalingrad-Mitte:

“As a captain, I led the battalion that broke through to the Volga near the main station when attacking the outskirts - but at what price! I haven't overcome all that psychologically until today, the unbelievable brutality of the street fight, you can't shake it off. "

Münch was the only survivor of the III. Battalion in the Battle of Stalingrad.

The four-storey flour mill with its numerous bullet holes, which testify to the intensity of the fighting around Stalingrad center, was left in its original state at the request of the Stalingrad veterans and is now a memorial and museum of the Battle of Stalingrad next to the Mamayev Hill.

Mamayev Kurgan

Mamayev Hill September 16-17, 1942

Mamayev Hill September 20 to October 5, 1942

Soviet positions on Mamayev Hill

Stuka over Stalingrad, Mamayev Hill on the right

The Mamayev Hill (Russian Mamajew Kurgan Мамаев курган , also called Mamai Hill and on German combat maps as height 102 ) was one of the central points in the defense network of Stalingrad, as the Soviet eastern positions of the Volga could be fired with artillery from there. For both parties to the conflict, taking the hill meant a great tactical gain in access to the inner city, workers' settlements and the Volga.

On September 13, 1942, an NKVD battalion awaited a major attack by the German 295th Infantry Division (IR 516 in the south, IR 517 in the center and Grp. Salzer in the northern sector) in trenches reinforced with barbed wire. Due to heavy artillery bombardment, Chuikov's headquarters of the 62nd Army on Mamayev Hill had to be abandoned and relocated to the so-called Zaritzyn shelter. Although the forward movement was severely hampered by minefields and barbed wire barriers, the 295th Infantry Division reported the capture of Mamayev Hill at 12 noon, but suffered heavy casualties in close combat in the trenches.

Another NKVD rifle battalion was ordered to retake Mamayev Hill, but only partially succeeded. In order to wear down the Soviet defensive positions, heavy air raids were flown against Mamayev Hill and the railway loop at the foot of the hill, known as the "tennis racket". GSR 42 under Colonel Jelin received the order to recapture Mamayev Hill and "tennis rackets" at any price and fought their way from the main train station line to the southern slope of the hill. At dusk were the now almost completely reamed NKVD units on Mamayev Kurgan by two battalions of the 42nd GSR and 416th Rifle Regiment (SR) / 112th Rifle Division under heavy mortar - Barrage be replaced. Shell holes and bomb craters served the guards as foxholes that were connected to a system of positions. According to Soviet representations, Captain Kirin took the Germans' positions on the north slope, while the 416th Regiment worked its way up to the top of the hill on the northeast slope. Lieutenant Vdovichenko and 30 men from his infantry platoon took the hilltop in close combat, with only six soldiers surviving. German air strikes and a combined counterattack by infantry and tanks could no longer throw the Soviet soldiers out of their positions. Two tanks were destroyed in this attack.

German infantry with assault gun in deployment

From September 15 to 17, 1942, the intensity of the fighting on the hill increased, it was partly impossible to determine who was in control of the tactically important point. In contrast to the skirmish at the grain silo from bottom to top, the fighting on Mamayev Hill was fought downhill from a German point of view in order to take the heavily fortified Soviet positions on the eastern slope. On September 16, 1942, the 42nd Guards Rifle Regiment of the 13th Guards Rifle Division under Colonel Jelin recaptured the northern part of Mamayev Hill from IR 518 in a chaotic and completely confusing battle. The 42nd GSR (Jelin) and the remnants of the 112th Rifle Division (Sologub) gained a terrain gain of 100 to 150 meters and were able to establish themselves on the hilltop of Mamayev Hill. Since the German efforts did not let up, a stalemate arose between the opponents on the hilltop. The 95th Rifle Division reinforced the heavily worn Soviet line of defense on September 19, 1942, and a day later the 284th Rifle Division reached Mamayev Hill.

On September 22, 1942, the Wuthmanns IR 516 and 518 had to repeat their advances with flamethrowers and concentrated charges against the trenches and earth bunkers of the 95th and 112th SD, as Paulus saw this as an uncompromising precondition for the upcoming offensive on the industrial district and thus the right one Flank of the LI. Army Corps would be significantly relieved. For this purpose, IR 517 and combat group Sälzer (24th PD) were mobilized to provide support. Despite concentrated air strikes in clear weather, the trenches of the Red Army could not be destroyed, which in turn responded with mortar, artillery and rocket fire. After the most severe fire fighting, IR 516 and 517 Gorishny's divisions slowly pushed against the southern slope of the hill. Only the newly arrived rifle regiments 1047 and 1045 of the 284th SD prevented the total loss of the Tatar grave. IR 516 could not crack the defensive positions of the 95th SD on the hilltop, while the 26th Panzer Grenadier Regiment was already engaged in defensive combat on the western slope.

On September 26, 1942, the 100th Jäger Division of the Wehrmacht replaced the battered 295th Infantry Division, which was used against the "tennis racket". The 100th Hunter Division also penetrated the "tennis racket" and took two thirds of the meat factory. On September 27, 1942, half of the Mamayev Hill remained in German ownership after initial partial successes in taking the airstrip and the shooting range on the northwest side, only the eastern slope was defended stubbornly by the 284th Rifle Division (Colonel Batjuk). It is believed that up to 30,000 soldiers from both sides died on this ridge in the course of the battle. A single counterattack by the Red Army is said to have lost 10,000 soldiers a day.

Conquering the grain silo

Stalingrad Südstadt Advance on the grain silo on September 15, 1942

Grain silo German advance

Stalingrad grain silo

Artillery fire on the grain silo

Soviet marines land on the Volga

The grain silo (Russian Elewator Stalingrada , Элеватор Сталинградa) was one of the tallest buildings in Stalingrad and was considered a tactically important observation point from which all important entrances in the south of the city could be controlled.

The 14th Panzer Division separated the 35th GSD (Colonel Dubyanski) stationed in the southern part of the city from the rest of the 62nd Army and the 94th Infantry Division attacked the railway line in the southern suburbs in the direction of the Volgaufer. The fighting began on September 15, 1942, when 50 guardsmen of the 35th GSD entrenched themselves in the corrugated iron construction of the side tower. On September 17, 1942, only 30 guardsmen were still alive. They were reinforced at night by an 18-man platoon of marine infantry (92nd Special Infantry Brigade, known as "Seeteufel") under Lieutenant Andrei Chojsjanow. The marines were armed with PM-1910 machine guns and Degtjarjow PTRD armored rifles and were preparing for a lengthy siege.

On September 17, 1942, when the battle in the Südstadt reached its climax, the IR 276 and later also the IR 274 were fighting for the grain silo and the fortified buildings east of the railway line. The commanding general of the XXXXVIII. Panzer Corps Werner Kempf complained that the grain silo was not taken on the first advance of the 24th Panzer Division .

On September 18, 1942, ten attacks by raiders of 94th Infantry Division, 14th Infantry Division and 29th Infantry Division (motorized) were successfully repulsed during the day . During the day, the highest point of the concrete complex was defended and all-round security was laid at night.

From September 18 to 25, 1942, 94 ID and 29 ID (motorized) were assigned the difficult task of fighting down every single resistance nest between the railway line, the canning factory and the Volgaufer, often in close combat, defended by only a few Soviet soldiers. The advance dissolved into a myriad of small, locally limited, intractable firefights. The fighting intensified at the grain silo and the 94th Infantry Division had to call in parts of the 24th PD for fire support.

German artillery prepared the area for the ground attack with a massive shell fire, which set the grain on fire. On September 20, 1942, the tank units of the 14th PD formed in front of the building and the ammunition of the Soviet soldiers was running out, and the two heavy machine guns also failed. The conditions for the defenders became unbearable due to the heavy build-up of smoke inside and the lack of water. Several offers of surrender were turned down. Choisyanov left the wounded behind and attempted to escape to get water supplies, and his group was taken prisoner.

On September 21, 1942, bomb hits tore breakthroughs in the wall in the west of the massive concrete complex and the soldiers of IR 267/94. ID managed to get inside. The staircase and each floor had to be individually in close combat, i. H. with submachine guns, knives and folding spades, to be fought free. Colonel Dubyanski described the fighting:

“The situation has changed. First we were in the upper part of the silo and the Germans in the lower part. Then we threw them out below. That's why they penetrated above. Now there is fighting in the upper part. "

The grain silo was one of the first buildings in the Battle of Stalingrad, in which a multiple occupation took place simultaneously by German and Soviet infantrymen and in which fighting was carried out on different levels. Often only voices of the opponent were fired because the smoke blocked the view.

“We heard the enemy's breathing and every move he made, but couldn't see him in the thick smoke. That's why we shot noises. "

The dramatic hand-to-hand combat experience during the extremely tough fighting in the grain silo traumatized the German infantrymen and made hope for a quick conquest of Stalingrad disappear from the early stages of the battle:

“If all the buildings in Stalingrad are defended in this way, then none of our soldiers will return to Germany. Our soldiers have never experienced such bitter fighting. "

- Wilhelm Hoffmann NCO, Infantry Regiment 267/94. Infantry Division

During this phase, the German attack formations suffered heavy losses and the strengths of the companies were reduced to 60 in some cases. When the grain silo was completely captured on September 23, 1942, the Germans found 40 fallen Red Army soldiers. Carell says that infantrymen and engineers of the IR 71/29. ID (mot.) Blew open the access to the grain silo and discovered dead Soviet soldiers who were killed by explosions, burned or suffocated. The entrances to the granary were walled up to prevent further attempts to escape. The wheat that could be saved from the burning granary later served the 6th Army as an important food reserve.

Similar to the Narvik shield , an emblem was intended to remind the Stalingrad fighters of the conquest of the granary as a combat decoration. General Paulus commissioned the propaganda company 637 and the artist Ernst Eigner with the design. A first draft, which showed the ruins of the city and the face of a dead soldier, was rejected by the OKW as "destroying the military force", thereupon the silhouette of the granary with the words "Stalingrad" and "Volga" was made and should be as Sleeve shield can be sewn onto the uniforms.

Battle for the industrial complexes

Stalingrad industrial complexes divided into grid squares

Stalingrad was one of the most important industrial locations in the south of the Soviet Union and of crucial importance for the arms production of the Red Army. The bombing of Stalingrad severely restricted production in the industrial plants, but 76 mm guns were manufactured in the “Barricades” gun factory and rocket launchers in the “Red October” steelworks during the fighting.

At the end of September 1942, the 6th Army High Command shifted the focus of the attack to the industrial complexes in the north of the city. With the exception of a few Soviet “house fortresses” (including Pavlov's house ), Stalingrad-Mitte was almost completely under German control, only in the north the decision about the area of ​​the tactically important Mamayev Hill had not yet been made. Isolated attempts to take the neighboring "tennis racket" or the chemical factory "Lazur" on September 23, 1942, failed despite great losses on the Soviet side.

The 284th Rifle Division took over from the 13th Guards Rifle Division on Mamayev Hill and held their positions in the trenches on the southern and eastern slopes in spite of continued artillery fire, the top of the hill remained in the possession of the 295th Infantry Division. To the north of it, the 39th Guards Rifle Division, the 194th and 308th Rifle Division set up trenches to defend the western access to the "Red October" and "Barricades" factories. A second front line arose there under camouflage measures, the fighting on Mamayev Hill was intended to divert attention from the fortification in the north. In the area of ​​the tractor factory, the 112th Rifle Division and the 37th Guards Rifle Division under General Viktor Scholudjew reached the western part of the Volga. After the removal of the Volga ferry pier in the center of Stalingrad, General Tschuikow had to improvise new river crossings in the north in order to increase the manpower of his divisions in the factories. Due to the strong German artillery fire, these maneuvers were only possible at night and were associated with high losses as a result of German artillery or dive bomber attacks. By October 1942, around 100,000 soldiers could be shipped across the Volga. In September 1942 alone, the 62nd Army lost around 80,000 soldiers in Stalingrad, and on the western bank of the Volga only 53,000 men were fit to fight.

General Tschuikow received knowledge of German troop movements in the industrial district through his reconnaissance troops. On October 9, his scouts, who were hiding in an empty coal railroad car between Mamayev Hill and the “Red October” steelworks, reported the relocation of field guns, grenade launchers and ammunition to the headquarters of the 62nd Army. The German plans to attack the factories were no longer secret.

Paul asked Army Group B to replace his 40,000 soldiers who had failed. Only the 14th Panzer Division and the 29th Infantry Division (mot) could be withdrawn and made available.

The Soviet Air Force gained from mid-October 1942, the night skies above Stalingrad. The increasing air strikes demoralized the exhausted German soldiers and permanently robbed them of their sleep. Attacks from Soviet Polikarpow-Po-2 double-deckers (Кукурузник, Russian Kukurusnik), which were called “sewing machines” or “coal shippers” because of their noise, and bombed German shelters at night, were particularly feared .

Expansion of the attack operations to the workers' settlements (September 27 to October 7, 1942)

German attacks on the workers' settlements

Red Army soldiers defending the workers' settlements

The 24th Panzer Division , 100th Jäger Division and 389th Infantry Division were relocated north to the industrial districts on September 26, 1942 to counter a counterattack by the Red Army. The Edelsheim group (Colonel Baron Maximilian von Edelsheim , commander of the Panzergrenadier Regiment 26/24. PD) and Winterfeld group (Major Hild-Wilfried von Winterfeld, Commander I / PzRgt. 24/24. PD) went against enemy positions along the railway line in the bush in front of the workers' settlement "Red October" north of Mamayev Kurgan. The 284th SD under Colonel Batjuk was tasked with defending the anti-tank barriers around the Dolgi Gorge. The 112th SD was supposed to prevent the German penetration into the workers' settlements “Red October” and “Barricades” and to hold the fortified buildings in school No. 20 and in the bathhouse at the intersection of Kasachija and Dublinskaja streets. After partial German successes, Red Army soldiers regained the Germans' territorial gains at night and were able to establish themselves in the canteen, bathhouse and school no.5.

The German major attack on September 27, 1942 on the workers' settlement "Red October" and the successes on Mamayev Kurgan, where air raids razed the 95th SD's position system and briefly control of the hill could be taken over, brought the 62nd Army in dire straits. At the same time the minefields in the workers' settlement "Barricades" could be overcome and the pressure on the Soviet line of defense increased. The battle had reached its preliminary climax for both sides.

"Another fight like this and we are in the Volga"

- Vasily Ivanovich Chuikov

On September 28, 1942, the 100th Jäger Division took 75% of the meat combine on the "tennis racket" and the 24th Panzer Division was able to clear its sector 500 meters northwest of the "Barricades" gun factory. Another advance of the Austrian hunters on the tennis racket was prevented by the 284th SD. Between September 25 and 28, 1942, additional rifle brigades were deployed at the front in the workers' settlements to temporarily stabilize the situation there. On September 29, 1942, German associations took a large part of the workers' settlement "Barrikaden" and the silicate factory. The toughest battles so far developed in the Battle of Stalingrad against well-secured factory fortresses on a front width of 8 kilometers from the Lazur chemical factory to the tractor plant in the north, the gain in terrain after six days was only 400 meters to the east. Increased sniper activity is developing from the factory roofs and chimneys.

On September 30, 1942, a counterattack by the Red Army in the “Red October” and “Barricades” settlements had to be repulsed, primarily by the 100th Jäger Division, while the light rail in front of the “Red October” steelworks was occupied in two places. Due to strong pressure from the Soviet Army, the section of terrain that had been gained had to be surrendered again quickly, only the connection to the 24th PD could be maintained. In the section of IR 276, a close battle for Soviet bunker positions on a bridgehead north of the Balka in grid square 74c developed with great severity. The following casualties were recorded that day: 100th JD: 15 killed and 68 wounded, 24th PD: five killed and 30 wounded, 94th ID: two wounded officers. On the same day, the 193rd SD reinforced the western sector of the “Barricades” gun factory and the 95th SD reinforced the “Red October” steelworks.

Between October 3rd and 7th the fighting shifted in the direction of the workers' settlement "Tractor Works", carried by the 389th Infantry Division in the far north, the Winterfeld group and the Edelsheim group from the silicate factory in the direction of the heavily fortified "folder block" north of the silicate factory . Seen from the air, this group of apartment blocks represented the image of an open file folder. On October 2, 1942, the Winterfeld combat group reached the apartment blocks, which the Soviets also called "six-sided building block". The Edelsheim Panzer Grenadiers encountered bitter resistance from the Red Army in the very solidly constructed loose-leaf block, and were able to penetrate from the north on October 3rd, but were unable to take the entire complex. Furious fighting broke out between the tank grenadiers and soldiers of the 308th SD in the entire space between the silicate factory, loose-leaf binder, stadium and sculpture park. The capture of this sector was of great importance in order to gain access to the lower workers' settlement "Tractor Works" and the factory itself.

On October 3, 1942, there was a further combined attack by the Edelsheim and Winterfeld groups against the southeast side of the loose-leaf binders. After the capture, the Panzergrenadiers set up on the southeast side to defend against possible Soviet counter-attacks. It was not until October 4, 1942 that the loose-leaf binder was clear of the enemy, as Winterfeld's tanks were able to destroy numerous T-34 tanks on this side. The fighting continued inside the block as snipers and machine guns had holed up in some of the numerous window caves and had to be fought individually. When the 39th GSD and the Winterfeld group met on the night of October 4th to 5th, 1942, further heavy fighting over the loose-leaf binder developed.

The fighting in Stalingrad on October 6th and 7th, 1942, was concentrated on the workers' settlements upstream of the tractor works. The fighting took place against the 37th Guards Rifle Division in the workers' dormitories, where military successes were measured in terms of the number of rooms already occupied. Only a single block of flats could be captured by the German infantrymen at the end of the day. That day it cost the Germans four battalions and 16 tanks to take a single block of flats.

“We fought for a single house for 15 days, with mortars, grenades, machine guns and bayonets. By the third day there were 54 German corpses in the cellars, on the staircases and in the staircases. The front is a corridor between burned-out rooms, the thin ceiling between two floors. Help comes from neighboring houses via fire escapes and chimneys. It's a never-ending struggle, day and night. Blackened faces, we throw grenades at each other from floor to floor amid explosions, dust and smoke, heaps of rubble, streaks of blood, pieces of furniture and people. Ask a soldier what half an hour of hand-to-hand combat means here. And then imagine Stalingrad: 80 days and 80 nights of hand-to-hand combat. The road is no longer measured in meters, but in corpses…. Stalingrad is no longer a city. By day it is a huge cloud of burning and acrid smoke; a huge stove lit by the reflection of the flames. And when night comes, one of those scorching, howling, bloody nights, the dogs jump into the Volga and swim desperately to the other bank. The nights in Stalingrad are terrible for them. Animals flee from this hell; the hardest stones cannot stand it for long, only humans can endure it. "

- Joachim stamp

The workers' settlements were owned by Germany at the beginning of October 1942, so that only the factories of the tractor factory, the “Barricades” gun factory and the “Red October” steelworks represented noteworthy fortifications of the Soviet line of defense.

Correction of the Orlovka Front Arch (September 29 to October 8, 1942)

German attacks on the Orlovka promontory

Soviet T-34 tank

The Orlovka front ledge separated the XIV Panzer Corps from the LI. Army corps and thus tied up forces that were urgently needed to conquer the factory complexes. In the opening phase of the offensive on the factories, the Orlowka front ledge in the far north of the city was supposed to be pushed in by fast-moving German storm wedges for tactical reasons. For this purpose the 16th Panzer Division , 60th Infantry Division (motorized) , 389th Infantry Division and the 100th Jäger Division were transported to the north and were given the task of handling the relatively weak Soviet positions from Orlowka to Rynok to conquer on a front length of 19 kilometers. The 124th Special Brigade under Colonel Andrjussenko and the remains of the 196th Rifle Division and 2nd Rifle Brigade (mot) defended these positions with around 5000 soldiers. From there they threatened the German flank and were able to launch disruptive attacks against the northern industrial complexes of Stalingrad.

The 60th Motorized Infantry Division was given the task of attacking Orlowka head-on - coming from a north-westerly direction. The division, which consisted primarily of war veterans, had to carry out the operation in the sector assigned to it on open terrain without tank support. The first attack in the early hours of the morning was repulsed by enemy air strikes and machine gun fire. Many German soldiers were also killed by direct artillery fire. However, the operational goals could be achieved later in the day and the Soviet resistance collapsed completely at this point. The attack wedges advanced concentrically from three directions in an easterly direction and were involved in tough encounter skirmishes at heights 135.4 and 147.6 . Losses could initially be filled with reserves. At Gorodishche, the ridge lines 109.4 and 108.9 were fought with tanks and MP riflemen. The order of action of the 2nd Battalion of the 124th Special Brigade was completely overrun.

On September 29, the Orlovka front was cut off, and the enclosed Soviet units neither broke out nor surrendered. The fighting on September 30th focused on the capture of Orlovka, which was held in the north and south of the village by two rifle battalions, east of which, however, threatened the break-in of the German attack formations. The corridor over the Orlowskaya Balka to Spartanowka and the actual target of the tractor factory was now accessible to the 6th Army. On October 1, 1942, the German attack forceps joined the III. Rifle Battalion and in the villages of Orlowka and Wodstroj, the stubborn positional and house-to-house fighting between the 60th Motorized Infantry Division and a Soviet tank regiment resumed.

The 124th Special Brigade, with a crew of 500 men, was now enclosed on all sides and continued to fight in the pocket until October 7, 1942. Only when the ammunition was completely used up did it break through in a southerly direction over the Balka Mokraya Metschetkaya and was able to unite with the units stationed there on the northern edge of the tractor plant. The Orlovka operations had inflicted unreasonable losses on the 6th Army and weakened the offensive efforts in North Stalingrad. Allegedly, from October 1 to 7, 1942, the Wehrmacht lost over five infantry battalions, 17 tanks, 21 heavy machine guns, 2 medium field guns, 6 anti-tank cannons and mortar batteries, which were no longer available for the planned major attack on the tractor plant.

Before the major attack on the tractor plant (October 6-13, 1942)

Destruction on the factory site

Already on October 6, 1942, the 14th PD and 60th Motorized Infantry Division carried out a major armed reconnaissance operation against the factory premises of the Stalingrad tractor works and met the 37th Guards Rifle Division. The offensive was canceled, however, as almost an entire battalion of the 60th Motorized Infantry Division was destroyed in the open by fire from Katyusha rocket launchers west of the railway bridge over the Metschetka. The fighting strength of the infantry units was already too worn out for further offensive efforts.

The next day, at 11:30 a.m., another limited attack began with two divisions on the residential area in front of the tractor plant. The 60th Motorized Infantry Division advanced from the west and the 14th PD with battle tanks from the southwest. In the evening after heavy fighting, they were able to push back the 37th GSD. The Germans captured an entire block of flats in the workers' settlement and headed for the Sportak sports stadium ( Stalingrad tractor Трактор Сталинград). The 193rd SD entered into a tough battle with mutual success for the bathhouse in the Red October steelworks; when neither side got the upper hand, the bathhouse became a no man's land.

On October 8, 1942, German attack groups inflicted further heavy losses on the 193rd SD in the bathhouse and forced the 37th GSD into the stadium. It was found that the 6th Army was not in good shape: The 94th Infantry Division had been reduced to 535 soldiers still fit for combat, and the 76th Infantry Division had already been completely exhausted. The companies consisted of an average of only 60 soldiers. The relatively rested 305th Infantry Division was supposed to secure the low German land gains. The LI. Army Corps made little secret of planning a major attack on the tractor plant; German prisoners of war confirmed this plan during interrogation by the Red Army. A German radio operator was captured by a Soviet fighter patrol and was able to provide relatively precise information about the German troop deployment.

Chuikov made the risky decision to withdraw the 3,075 men of the 95th SD from Mamayev Kurgan and to station them in the industrial complexes; Together with 937 sailors of the Volga fleet, they took up positions in the outskirts of the “Red October” steelworks between the 37th GSD and 308th SD. 2300 soldiers of the 112th SD, including the 524th SR on the eastern part of the Volga, marched from the north-west into the workers' settlement "Tractor Works". The factory halls of the tractor works and the brickworks were converted into fortresses.

On October 9, 1942, the STAWKA transferred command from the Political Commissars to the officers at the front. The Soviet troops in the north (124th, 143rd and 115th Special Brigade) were able to hold their lines in Rynok, Spartanowka, Spartanowka Forest and along the workers' settlement "Tractor Works" on the Mechetka River. A regiment of the 10th NKVD-SD was kept in reserve. The 6th Army ordered a break in combat and ordered their troops to hold out in their positions and wait for reinforcements.

The balance of power on October 9th was as follows:

• 6th Army: 90,000 soldiers, 2,000 artillery pieces and mortars, 300 tanks and 1,000 fighters and bombers of Air Fleet 4
• 62nd Army: 55,000 soldiers, 950 artillery pieces, 500 mortars, 80 tanks and 188 aircraft

On October 12, 1942, a major Soviet counterattack took place in the workers' area and stadium southwest of the tractor plant. The 37th GSD and a regiment of the 95th SD undertook local disruptive attacks against the western outskirts of the workers' settlement "Tractor Works". They made 200-300 m of terrain gain until they were stopped by the massive main body of the German armed forces.

Major attack on the "Dzerzhinsky" tractor plant (October 14-17, 1942)

Air raid on the tractor plant

Tractor factory

Entrance to the tractor factory

German soldier with captured Russian submachine gun

Fights in the tractor factory area 5. – 15. October 1942

Attack on the tractor works 14. – 15. October 1942

German attack on the tractor factory on October 14, 1942

Built in 1930, the tractor factory "FE Dzerzhinsky" , even STW - Stalingrad Tractor Factory (. Russian Сталинградский тракторный завод им Ф. Э. Дзержинского) called, was located in the extreme north of the factory site and tractors produced, T-34 -Panzer and military stores. Around 20,000 workers were employed in the STW; before the offensive, factory workers were assigned as militiamen for the defense.

The meticulously planned major attack by the Wehrmacht on the tractor plant began in the early morning hours of October 14, 1942 with a massive Stuka attack. The view was impaired by large clouds of smoke and dust, which resulted from the intensive artillery preparation. General of the Artillery Walther von Seydlitz-Kurzbach ordered the following target for the units in Stalingrad for October:

"In the north of the city we are now faced with the difficult task of taking the three large industrial plants, the 'Dzerzhinsky' tractor factory, the 'Barricades' gun factory and the 'Red October' steelworks and reaching the Volga River everywhere. The plan of attack envisages first attacking the 'Dzerzhinsky' tractor plant, then the other two industrial plants and finally the oil depot and the rest of the city center from north to south. Two divisions were reassigned for this task, the 305th Infantry Division under General Oppenländer and the 14th Panzer Division under General Heim. "

The attack formation of the LI. Army Corps on October 13, 1942 consisted of parts of the 24th Panzer Division on the south wing of the attack group, the Jänecke group of the 305th Infantry Division and tank squadrons of the 14th and 24th Panzer Divisions, parts of the 389th Infantry Division and parts of the 16th Panzer Division. The infantry attack was prepared with a massive air strike from over 300 dive bombers.

Before reaching the tractor factory, the advancing Wehrmacht troops were involved in heavy fighting with Soviet soldiers in the upstream workers' settlement and in the numerous Balka gorges. The 1st Battalion of the 103rd Panzer Grenadier Regiment under Captain Domaschk was one of the first to reach the factory at around 9 a.m. When entering the factory there was fighting on the ground, from factory hall to factory hall and in the canals. The STW was defended by the 37th Guards Rifle Division and 95th Rifle Division against 150 German tanks, which were flanked by dismounted Panzergrenadiers. Tschuikow reported a five-fold superiority of the Germans in soldiers and even 12-fold superiority in tanks, which, however, can be strongly doubted.

The German aerial reconnaissance could no longer see a clear main battle line (HKL) due to the heavy smoke development in the confusing landscape of ruins . Later it turned out that the daily goals of the armored shock formations could not be achieved. By noon the 305th Infantry Division had reached the northwest area of ​​the tractor works and was involved in ongoing firefights in grid square 96 D. The strong resistance in the individual building complexes required a constant regrouping of the offensive forces, which took too much time to make a quick decision. Tanks broke through the Soviet defense line and around 11:30 a.m. the storm troops of the 389th Infantry Division under General Erwin Jaenecke broke into the spacious workshops of the tractor factory. Within a very short time, almost the entire storm spikes of the attacking infantry were worn out or fallen. Contemporary witnesses reported that bitter hand-to-hand fighting developed everywhere, including in the works canteen, where both parties met unprepared. The 37th Guards Rifle Division under General Scholudjew for a long time denied the German grenadiers access to the tractor factory. Of the 8,000 Soviet soldiers, around 5,000 were killed in just 48 hours.

At around 3 p.m. the 24th PD was in the stadium, the 14th PD in the ravines at grid square (PQ) 94B and the 305th ID on the northern edge of the district in PQ 86 D. In the late afternoon, two armored spearheads were able to meet in the destroyed workshops unite. An officer of the 14th PD described his experiences:

"It was an eerie, grueling battle on and under the earth, in the rubble, basements and canals of the industrial plants."

At the onset of dusk, some raiding parties were able to reach the Volga. The short-term gain in terrain on the Volga had to be given up again during the night, as the Red Army soldiers hidden in the Balkas involved the German attackers in fierce firefights.

A tank battle developed primarily in the northern area, when the 124th Rifle Brigade (SB), 115th Rifle Brigade and the 2nd Rifle Brigade (mot) were able to recapture some workshops in a counterattack.

The 62nd Army regrouped its forces, the 37th GSD received the order to hold the southern part of the tractor factory and the 95th SD occupied the area between the tractor factory and the gun factory "Barricades". The overall situation of the 62nd Army was particularly critical on October 14, 1942, because all telephone lines to the individual combat units had completely collapsed due to artillery fire and heavy air strikes. The few reporters who survived the battle gave contradicting reports to headquarters, so that no comprehensive picture of the situation could emerge. The slogan to hold on unconditionally was passed on to all Soviet units fighting in the tractor factory via makeshift radio communications.

Colonel Gurtjew and the 308th Rifle Division were pushed into the machine halls in the north-west of the “Barricades” gun factory and cut off from the rest of the 62nd Army. Major General Smechotvorov received orders to re-establish communications with the 308th SD. This only succeeded when the troops cautiously approached the trapped riflemen in crawl from the Volga River during the heavy artillery battle. The major German offensive split the defenders of the tractor plant into three parts: the northern task force had to move to Rynok, the middle group was trapped in the factory premises and fought in the metal foundry and in the assembly department, and the southern part of the troops withdrew to the basement of the Nischni settlement. Air strikes destroyed General Scholudjew's division command post, which was buried with his staff in the rubble. Only at night did the 62nd Army radio signs of life from the 37th GSD that were trapped inside.

On October 15, 1942, the focus of the offensive was shifted further to the southern part of the tractor factory, the goal was still to penetrate the Volga. The Panzer Regiment 36 (14th PD) pushed deep into the factory premises, the Panzer Grenadier Regiment 103 captured an important bunker on the railway embankment and the Grenadier Regiment 577 (305th ID) threw the enemy back over the railway line into the brickworks . Weakened by the great losses of the main forces, storm pioneers from PiBtl took over in the early hours of the morning. 389 infantry tasks. The pioneers carried out raiding forces primarily in the underground connections and tunnels between the plants. They specialized in silently deactivating Soviet listening posts and used concentrated charges, flamethrowers , folding spades and pioneer hand axes in close combat . In the course of the day a major material battle developed in the tractor factory, which also extended to the neighboring brickworks. At the end of the day, the Wehrmacht was able to gain more ground. Only on October 20, 1942, the tractor factory was completely captured by the Wehrmacht, at the same time successful break-ins into the “Barricades” gun factory and the capture of the western part of the “Red October” steelworks were reported.

The 62nd Army had lost a total of 13,000 men in the battle for the tractor works from October 13 to 17, 1942 (25% of the 53,000 soldiers deployed west of the Volga). On October 14, 1942 alone, 3,500 wounded had to be brought to the military hospitals east of the Volga, but the transport of the wounded across the river was also risky because of the Stuka attacks. The Wehrmacht lost 1,500 soldiers and 40 tanks in the attack, mainly to anti-tank rifles . The fighting in the tractor factory was the hardest and most costly in the Battle of Stalingrad up to that point. The asymmetrical skirmishes and the lack of a main battle line (HKL) made tactical decisions and the precise assessment of the military situation difficult.

"The fighting took on monstrous proportions that could no longer be measured at all."

Attack on the "Barricades" gun factory (October 16-26, 1942)

Gun factory barricades 1942

Industrial plant destroyed by Stuka attacks

Destroyed workshops

Gun factory barricades 16. – 18. October 1942

Barricades Front line 17. – 25. October 1942

The "Barricades" gun factory founded in 1914 (Russian: Производственное объединение, "Баррикады") was located in the middle of the factory and had been expanded into a fortress by the Soviet defenders, as well as the tractor and steel works "Red October".

The offensive on the tractor plant meant that the 112th SD and militia brigades were cut off from the rest of the 62nd Army and the 37th GSD was encircled in the tractor plant. Originally two SRs of the 308th SD had taken up positions in the gun factory and another in the nearby ravine to secure the open flank. The Soviet soldiers survived numerous air raids in the trench system. Shortly before the German preparations for the attack, the defense was taken over by the 138th SD under Colonel Ivan Ilyich Lyudnikov . The heavily decimated units of the 308th SD were replaced.

On October 16, 1942, raids from the 305th Infantry Division from the north and the 14th Panzer Division in the center penetrated the area of ​​the gun factory. One day later, the 100th Jäger Division advanced against the southern part of the factory site. The cross street in the factory premises of the gun factory was occupied by the 577 Infantry Regiment, while the 576 Infantry Regiment reached the Volga in a rapid advance. Artillery support could hardly take place due to a lack of ammunition. Soviet authors, on the other hand, report that the successful break-in of German attack groups into the factory premises was not possible until 23/24 October 1942. From October 16 to 18, 1942, there was still fighting in the “Barrikady” workers' settlement. On October 17, 1942, Chuikov ordered General Lyudnikov to obey the defense of the gun factory:

“You are responsible for closing the breakthrough with the 138th Rifle Division, securing the right flank, and making close contact; Under no circumstances will you allow the enemy to break into the barricade factory or break through at the 138th SD. You are responsible for the line. "

- Vasily Ivanovich Chuikov

October 18, 1942 was a critical moment for the Soviet armed forces, so that for the first time in the Battle of Stalingrad a tactical retreat in the industrial district by 200 meters was ordered.

The battles in the “Barricades” gun factory turned out to be particularly difficult, as it was almost impossible to locate the enemy in the midst of the rubble, freight wagons, slag heaps and destroyed workshops.

Lieutenant General Strecker described the difficult terrain as follows:

"The enemy just keeps coming back and using the newly created ruins to fortify their defensive positions."

The battles reached a particularly high intensity and were extremely lossy for both sides. The German attack formations suffered their greatest casualties in the period from October 16 to 18, 1942, when many combat companies were decimated to a few soldiers in the material battle. A gain in terrain of only 20 meters was already seen as a great success, mostly lost due to Soviet counterattacks at night.

On October 19, 1942, the focus of the fighting shifted to the area of ​​the gorge between the “Barricades” gun factory and the “Red October” steelworks, while the fighting in the factory halls continued unabated. The battle for the command post of the 339th Rifle Regiment in the main office of "Barrikady" was particularly intense; the Soviet resistance continued here until October 26, 1942.

On October 25, 1942, the 100th Jäger Division received the order to completely conquer "Barrikady". When the hunters formed to attack on the embankment, the Stukas missed their target and mistakenly dropped their bombs on the Austrian infantrymen, which caused the attack to fail. The attack turned into a loss-making fiasco on the following day: The dug-in Soviet troops let themselves be rolled over by the storm wedges, encircled and destroyed a larger German unit.

Similar to the steelworks, the gun factory could never be completely taken and in the ongoing battle of attrition and wear and tear, mutual attacks and counter-attacks could not bring about a decision. In contrast to the troops of the Wehrmacht, the Red Army were able to compensate for their human and material losses through constant supplies via the Volga. It was not until October 25, 1942, that the 6th Army completely stopped its attack efforts in the gun factory, as the losses could no longer be compensated.

Attack on the "Red October" steelworks (October 23 to 31, 1942)

The steelworks “Red October” (Russian: Волгоградский металлургический завод “Красный Октябрь”) and its ten factory halls were considered impregnable for a long time because of its favorable topographical location and the defending Soviet elite units. At the end of October, the cold, wet autumn weather was finally over and a severe winter with temperatures between −20 ° C and −30 ° C set in. Air attacks were made more difficult by the onset of winter storms.

Red October steel mill

Red October steelworks, attack 23 to 31 October 1942

Red October steelworks, German attack 23./24. October 1942, the furthest brief advance to the Volga, violet planning of the attack

Red October steelworks, the factory buildings except for Hall Four are taken in October 1942

German storm pioneers in preparation for an attack

Soviet MP riflemen in the ruins of the steel mill

Attack on the Martinsofenhalle on November 3, 1942

On October 22nd, 1942, when the German offensive planning under Seydlitz-Kurzbach was completed on the “Red October” steelworks, all infantry platoons were disbanded and shock troops of approx. 15 men each were formed, which were accompanied by evacuation troops who had the task of breaking down Destroy enemy. For the offensive on the steelworks as the last major Soviet defensive position, the following attack formation was used on October 23, 1942 at 7 a.m.

• The 79th Infantry Division under General von Schwerin was withdrawn from the Don Front and was supposed to take the steel mill out of the opposing bridgehead with the reinforced Jäger Regiment 54 "Kampfgruppe Weber" (100th Jäger Division) and push through to the Volga
• The 14th Panzer Division was to break through the tank barriers at the bread factory and catch up with 79th Infantry Division

The “Red October” steelworks was defended by the 193rd Rifle Division and the 39th Guards Rifle Division. At this point in time, the units had the following strengths: 138th Rifle Division: approx. 1000 men and 193rd Rifle Division: approx. 400 men, replacement forces approx. 3000 men.

Particularly strong Soviet sniper activity was observed in the Red October factory site. Vasili Saizew often operated there with the “Academy for Snipers” from the roofs of the factory or in the no man's land between the steelworks and the “Lazur” chemical factory. The training in sniper technology took place in a building of the chemical factory, shortly afterwards the recruits were sent directly to the front.

The actual attack in the “Red October” steelworks took place on a front only 2.5 km wide. Previously, scouting troops carried out investigations, based on whose reports the companies were assigned their attack rooms. The offensive forces were rearranged and regrouped for the upcoming urban warfare. The aim of the attack was the gradual capture of the works railway as well as Halls 1 to 10 and finally the Volga. A quick advance was expressly forbidden by Seydlitz: further advances were only permitted if all Soviet defensive positions in their own area were eliminated. As long as artillery and air force were taking targets under fire, the infantrymen should remain on the ground.

The attack by the German infantry was hindered by a long column of firmly coupled goods wagons on the light rail and could only be continued after pioneers with a concentrated load struck a breach. The first line of defense on the embankment was taken with great losses for the Red Army soldiers. The works train was taken around 9 a.m. and at 11 a.m. the first raiding parties entered the factory halls. At around 1 p.m., the attack stalled because radio communications with the foremost units broke off. The High Command of the 6th Army assumed a fiasco, as heavy weapons could no longer be used for the time being. It was only around 4 p.m. that Paulus received the message that the Volga River east of Hall 7 had been reached. Since other units were tied up in the tough house-to-house warfare in the factory buildings, the battalion on the Volga ran the risk of enclosure and destruction.

The second wave of attacks suffered the greatest losses and "bled out in the factory halls," as an eyewitness reported. (Uffz Willi Heller 4./208) During the night the battalion that had advanced the furthest had to withdraw from the Volga because the gain in terrain could not be maintained.

The eastern sector of the “Red October” steelworks was of great strategic importance, as it was from there that the blind spot of the gently sloping bank of the Volga could be controlled. The Red Army was able to assert itself successfully in Halls 1 to 3, Hall 8 and the school building. The attack by the reinforced 54th Jäger Regiment stopped at the bunkers in front of the Banni (also called bayonet gorge in grid square 62). The infantry companies in the factory halls set up improvised for nighttime defense and had to withstand numerous massive counter-attacks by the Red Army. The losses in the Wehrmacht amounted to 25% of the attack strength, in the case of officers by snipers even 50%.

The center of the 79th ID, consisting of IR 208 and PiBtl. 179, was to take the heavily fortified administration buildings of “Red October” on October 23, 1942, grouped in wedges: “H-Building”, “Ladder House”, “Hook Building” including the most important main factory halls 3–7. Massive Soviet artillery fire brought the attack by IR 208 and Jäger Regiment 54 to a standstill after taking Halls 3 and 6 in the approach to the west side of Hall 4. The long advance from its starting position made the Jäger Regiment vulnerable to counter-attacks by the Red Army. Nevertheless, around 6 p.m. the brief capture of the south side of Hall 4 was reported, where the 120th Guards Rifle Regiment under Major Goriachew had set up for defense. When Panzergrenadiers of the 24th PD tried to storm Hall 4 (Martinsofenhalle, Russian Мартеновский заводской цех , Martenowski zavodskoi zech ), they found a terrible battlefield in the middle of the industrial rubble . Schwerin decided to concentrate on the complete capture of the Martinsofenhalle, since the defenders had partly set up there in the still undamaged chimneys and from there they could take almost the entire section of the 79th Infantry Division under targeted fire. IR 208 and PiBtl. 179 were supposed to drive the guardsmen out of the Martinsofenhalle in a two-phase attack.

Hall 4 with the Martinsöfen formed the center of the Soviet defense. Air attacks were ineffective on the thick-walled Martinsöfen, these could only be taken by a frontal attack by the infantry with reinforced forces and high troop superiority. The hall was over 100 m long and 40–80 m wide and the core building of the “Red October” steelworks. Its chimneys were visible from afar and in the middle there were eight Martin stoves that were set deep in the ground. From there, stairs 40 to 50 m deep led to concrete accommodation rooms and halls, storage rooms and canteens. From here there was also a connection to the Volga and the supply routes.

The hall was defended by Red Army soldiers from the 39th GSD (Guard Rifle Division), whose well-positioned machine-gun positions made any approach impossible. Machine guns and snipers were also positioned on the chimneys of the steelworks, who could see and fire at the entire factory premises, including streets, gorges and trails through the rubble field.

Lieutenant Colonel Wolf (Commander Infantry Regiment 208) reported on the battle in the steelworks of a fight in the rubble of a " gruesome moonscape " with wandering civilians and disoriented soldiers. The fire could often not be localized, nor could it be determined whether it came from the enemy or from one's own units. There was also a fight for the passage of the canal between the urban and industrial railway, as the access to the sewer system was claimed by the Red Army. For a long time, the fighting was concentrated around the massive administration buildings of the factory and around Hall 4, where forward movement was still impossible.

On October 24, 1942, the takeover of the “Red October” steelworks by the 79th ID, except for Hall 4, was announced by OKW. The losses were much greater than assumed, and radio traffic also collapsed very often, so that detectors had to be sent. In the first few days of the fight 20 detectors were killed by snipers. The bread factory was captured by the 103rd Panzer Grenadier Regiment (14th PD) at the same time as the steelworks were conquered on October 24, 1942. The main load of the fighting here was carried by the 14th Panzer Grenadier Brigade under Lieutenant Colonel Hans Freiherr von Falkenstein.

Hall 4 was enclosed from the west and south. The west side of Hall 4 was conquered for a short time. A week after the attack on October 24, 1942, the LI was successful. Army corps, however, completely absorbed. What had previously been given as the minimum daily destination in factory halls 1, 5, 10 and the Martinsofenhalle was equalized again during the night by Chuikov's reinforcements across the Volga. The Red Army's losses by day were compensated for at night. On October 25, 1942, Schwerin gathered the 2,500 soldiers of the division who were still operational under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Richard Wolf (commander of the division mortar units and since 1943 knight's cross bearer) and again ordered the capture of the Martinsofenhalle. The first attack failed after the storm troops penetrated the interior of the hall and guardsmen came to the surface from an underground drain that ran through the hall and took fire from hidden positions with automatic weapons and machine guns. Reinforcements from the IR 212 and 700 pioneers of the PiBtl. 179 should bring the decision.

“The advance from the west, supported by strong artillery defensive fire on the Martinsofenhalle, achieved a good initial success. We were able to penetrate halfway into Hall 4, while Hall 1 and 2 were recaptured. From then on the front border of our troops ran along the eastern side of the factory. Unfortunately, the success in Hall 4 was not permanent. Our troops faced counter attacks by the 120th Guards Rifle Regiment. After that, the front line only ran along the west side of Hall 4 "

- Richard Wolf

On October 25, 1942, phase two of the battle for “Red October” began with the aim of conquering Hall 4. In the opinion of the divisional headquarters of the 79th Infantry Division, rested troops and storm pioneers were necessary to throw Hall 4. For this purpose, the combat groups were reorganized and placed under Lieutenant Colonel Richard Wolf. A new combat group "Buchholz" (Captain Buchholz, IR 212), parts of 79th Infantry Division and storm pioneers were entrusted with this task. Hall 4 was supplied by a large underground drainage ditch that led directly to the Volga. Guardsmen used the trench and the cooled down Martinsöfen as a disposal room. North of the Martinsofenhalle, Halls 1 and 2 were conquered; the main battle line ran here in phase two. German storm pioneers managed to break into the middle of the Martinsofenhalle for a short time, but this was lost again in a night Soviet counterattack. A unit of the 79th Infantry Division suffered heavy losses when a wagon loaded with armor plates was hit in a dive bomber attack and killed the soldiers below.

Often only air strikes and artillery battles took place on both sides during the day and raid troop operations at night, some with battlefield lighting . Food could only be provided at night because of sniper observation. The positions of the Red Army soldiers on the steep bank could not be taken because artillery and mortars did not work here. The command post of the 62nd Army and General Tschuikov's bunker were only 50 meters from the 14th PD. A defensive trench war developed in the main battle line between the gun factory and the steel mill.

In Hall 4, the Croatian Regiment 369 under Colonel Pavicic continued to fight for the decision on the German side . Of the 3865 Croatian soldiers, only 983 were alive on October 21, 1942, of which only 447 were operational.

The IR 226, which had only arrived on October 26, 1942, was sent directly to the ongoing fighting for the Martinsofenhalle in the following three days, but was unable to conquer the hall.

“During the attacks by the 79th Infantry Division on the 'Red October' steelworks, the realization prevailed that the Martinsofenhalle was the cornerstone of the Red Army's defense. Hall 4 with its large Martinsöfen within the massive outer walls is a kind of natural fortress that cannot be destroyed with either Stukas or artillery. The infantry is also unsuitable for capture. Due to its construction and its defenses, it is a preferred destination for the storm pioneers. "

- Richard Wolf

On October 29, 1942, the Luftwaffe and artillery again concentrated on the Martinsofenhalle as a primary target, as a large-scale night attack by the infantry with flamethrowers and the newly arrived Infantry Regiment 226/79. However, the attack failed because of the strong Soviet defensive fire. IR 226 was supposed to take the rubble dump and the "castle" northeast of the Martinsofenhalle, so the HKL shifted back to the eastern edge of Halls 1 and 2.

In November 1942, the Martinsofenhalle was a front wedge from which the Red Army was able to launch lightning offensives and bind the enemy in large numbers. With Hall 4, the rear area could be dominated up to the steep bank of the Volga. The Soviet defense system continued to consist of positions southeast of the slag dump, the "Finger Gorge", the White and the Red House, whose natural barrier was Hall 4. For the Red Army, the elimination of the Martinsofenhalle would have meant the abandonment of the Volga translation points and the fortified bases, for this reason the main efforts of the Soviets were on the defense of this hall. On October 31st, the Martinsofenhalle was completely recaptured by the 39th Guardsman Division.

The fighting continued in hall 7 and 10 and from the water tower Siberian snipers caused heavy losses among officers and advanced units. On November 2, the IR 369 attacked the Martinsofenhalle again and was supposed to relieve the Buchholz Combat Group, which was located in the middle of Hall 4. General Werner Sanne , commander of the 100th Jäger Division, awarded platoon leader Podobnik the Iron Cross Second Class because his unit was able to occupy an important bunker of the Red Army, which prevented an entire German regiment from advancing.

Until October 31, all the factory halls except for Hall 4 were in German hands, but it was found that the air force and artillery could no longer offer the infantry any further support. The newly arrived 45th Soviet Rifle Division was moved across the Volga on the same day and was ordered to retake the Martinsofenhalle, the calibration department and the finished goods store.

In view of the tenacity of the fighting in Stalingrad's industrial district and the possible influx of socialist activists from abroad, Reich Propaganda Minister Goebbels ordered that terms such as “Geschützfabrik Barrikaden” and “Stahlwerk Roter Oktober” may no longer be used in the German press landscape.

Attack against the last Soviet defensive positions (November 9-14, 1942)

Stalingrad industrial plants

Soviet counterattack

Operation Hubertus November 1942

Front line barricades - Red October

→ Main article : Operation Hubertus

On November 1, 1942, the last attack by the 79th Infantry Division in the “Red October” steelworks collapsed in heavy artillery fire. Due to the lack of ammunition, no further land gain could be recorded. Pressure on the Soviet positions was only maintained with selective small attacks ("violent explorations by scouting troops").

These events sometimes led to a fundamental change in strategy in the 6th Army, no offensives with large units, but targeted operations by special units for special military tasks: Hitler's speech on November 9, 1942 in the Bürgerbräukeller in Munich announced the use of smaller combat units: “[...] because I I don't want to have a second Verdun there, but prefer to do it with very small raiding parties. Time doesn't matter at all. There is no longer a ship coming up the Volga and that is the decisive factor. "

This project was promoted in the lead by Colonel General Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen , Commander in Chief of Air Fleet 4, who prevailed over Paulus and obtained the clearance of the Sturmpioniere, an elite troop unit for house-to-house warfare and other special tasks. This was preceded by conflicts between Richthofen and the army command with Friedrich Paulus and Walther von Seydlitz-Kurzbach . Richthofen complained about what he called "army conventionalism":

“The artillery doesn't fire and the infantry doesn't take advantage of bombs. Our planes are already throwing hand grenades within range of the infantry, which is doing nothing. "

305 ID, 389 ID, assault pioneers and assault guns were planned for this operation; Colonel Bernhard Steinmetz , commander of 305 ID and Major Josef Linden, commander of the PiBtl. 672 entrusted. The divisional command post was located in the “folder block”, a block to the west of the “Barricades” gun factory, which caused heavy losses during the fighting for the working-class neighborhoods. PiBtl. 336 and 294 were flown in, PiBtl. 45 (mot), PiBtl. 50 and PiBtl. 162 reached Stalingrad on November 4, 1942 by land. Different approaches were discussed: von Seydlitz intended to win the Volgaufer with the help of the storm pioneers in the combat section of the 295th Infantry Division, while Hitler favored the conquest of the chemical factory "Lazur". Finally, the decision was made for the second variant, in addition the 79th Infantry Division and parts of the 14th and 24th PD formed the "Kampfgruppe Schwerin", while the 14th PD formed the "Kampfgruppe Seydel" and the 24th PD the "Kampfgruppe Scheele" formed On November 6, 1942, Hitler changed his plan and gave the conquest of the Volga strip between "Barricades" and "Red October" the highest priority before taking "Lazur".

The last Soviet defensive positions were in the “Barricades” gun factory, the “Red October” steelworks and the “Tennis Racket” railway loop. The target of the German attack was initially the "pharmacy" (also known as the "White House", two rows of houses in the shell between "Red October" and the Volga) and House 78, the commissioner's house (also known as the "Red House", a red brick building) 200 m to the left of the pharmacy), the bread factory and the Martinsofenhalle, which is considered impregnable, in the “Red October” steelworks.

On November 11, 1942, under the command of General Schwerin (79th Infantry Division), a major attack took place on the Martinsofenhalle and the 400 defenders of the 39th GSD entrenched there. Schwerin quickly realized that the positions there could not be defeated with the conventional weapons of the infantry. Captain Helmut Welz ran the PiBtl. 179 (79th ID) against the sewer system in Hall 4, which was held by the Soviet troops. The advance of the three raid troops, each 30-40 men strong, proceeded very slowly. There was a hard fight for every meter, every corner of the house, landing and cellar hole. The raiding party was followed by a security force to fight red Army soldiers who had broken down. Furthermore, the Croatian Infantry Regiment 369, trained in hand-to-hand combat, was to advance and secure the area. Chuikov noted that the raid tactics copied by the Red Army and very successful in Stalingrad were doomed to failure in the attack on the Martinsofenhalle, as the attackers approached the target in an open area and not in paved trenches like the Soviet soldiers. The 369 Infantry Regiment was led by Lieutenant Rudolf Baricevic and supported the four-sided attack by the pioneers on the Martinsofenhalle. Three of their attacks were repulsed by Red Army soldiers, a fourth managed the break-in, but they lost their bearings in the rubble and were killed by Siberian snipers.

In the early hours of the morning, strong explosive charges were released on the hall walls. Camouflaged by the clouds of smoke from the explosion, the first storm pioneers were able to penetrate Hall 4. After a bitter three-hour fight, only a gain of 70 meters was recorded. Due to the ruins of the factory made of iron parts, wall remnants, destroyed machines, bent steel girders, wire and rubble, the forward movement was extremely laborious or even impossible, in many places only crawling through the continuous fire of the Soviet machine guns. The raiding parties could not develop enough force in their offensive to hold the gained terrain in Hall 4. Stronger associations could not develop in the narrow ruins and so the company failed to take the Martinsofenhalle directly with limited resources in terms of manpower and firepower. The troops that were able to penetrate Hall 4 were stopped by massive enemy fire from several directions. The attack by the Wehrmacht eventually got caught up in a major Soviet counterattack and was repulsed with great losses. 50% of the storm pioneers fell out on the first day, a total of 13 NCOs and 41 crew ranks. The Croatians counted 33 dead.

The onset of winter followed and temperatures dropped to −18 ° C. Assault troop companies of the 71st, 295th Infantry Division and 100th JD were supposed to act as deception to distract the enemy from the actual goals of Operation Hubertus. Soviet scouts, which were deep behind the German positions, provided the 62nd Army with detailed information about the troop deployment. The rifle divisions in the factory district regrouped tactically and were given the task of expanding their bridgeheads by 100 meters to the west every day.

The 71st, 79th, 100th, 295th, 305th and 389th Infantry Divisions with the attached engineer battalions opened the attack on November 11, 1942.

Since the 305th Infantry Division had major failures due to its non-stop operation ("trench strength" of a company only 25-35 men), the attack was started by four battalions of storm pioneers, which the 305th Infantry Division was supposed to follow. The attack was carried out over a width of around two kilometers and was made very difficult by the ruins of the factory and terrain obstacles. The armament and ammunition of the German troops was inadequate. The Soviet defensive positions were defended by elite soldiers of the guardsmen.

A company of the PiBtl. 336 already had losses of 18 men in a mined factory building during deployment. The Red and White Houses had been developed into strong bases by the Red Army and were able to use the PiBtl. 50 (mot) should not be taken. The losses on November 9, 1942 were put at 15%. The gains in terrain of the storm pioneers could not be maintained without the tracking of unused infantry regiments. The storm pioneers were able to take the pharmacy according to plan, but got caught in a fire at the commissioner's house, which caused their first offensive to collapse. The PiBtl didn't succeed until the next morning. 50 (mot) the break-in. The Soviet defenders retreated to the basement, where they were fought with hand grenades and petrol cans that were set on fire. Smoke candles around the commissioner's house were supposed to make the escape of the Red Army soldiers impossible.

In the evening it was possible to include an association of 2,000 Red Army soldiers in these groups of houses. In the course of the operation, the commissioner's house was lost again. The command post of Colonel Lyudnikov and the center of the bridgehead "Lyudnikows Island" were located in the commissioner's house. Another hard-fought building - House 78 - was renamed Kretzhaus after the death of Lieutenant Kretz. The resistance of the encircled Red Army soldiers could not be broken.

On November 11, 1942, the Wehrmacht report said: "Lively raid troop activity in Stalingrad", Soviet bunkers in the waterworks and chemical factory "Lazur" area were taken. The Luftwaffe was able to bring down the factory chimneys, but could not drive the enemy out of his expanded positions in trenches, bunkers and cellars. At dusk, a major counterattack by the 62nd Army with a focus on the 95th SD in the direction of the "Death Gorge" between "Barricades" and "Red October" was launched to prevent the German troops from securing their flanks. The gorge got this name from the high Soviet failures, as the gorge was within the reach of German snipers. German mortar fire on November 12, 1942 forced the Red Army soldiers to break off their advance and an attack wedge drove two Soviet SRs apart. The oil tanks on the Volga were reached. The first phase of Operation Hubertus ended with only minimal gain in space and disproportionately high losses on both sides. For the second phase, the offensive forces had to be regrouped again.

On November 13, 1942, operations were again undertaken against the fortifications of the 62nd Army. Shock troops managed to take the commissioner's house for a short time. The massive attacks from November 12th to 13th brought the Wehrmacht an unacceptably high number of failures. Mainly it was the Soviet artillery under General Voronov, which collapsed German offensives already in the available area. Notwithstanding the failure of Operation Hubertus, follow-up operations were planned for the second half of November: "Operation Schwerin I" was supposed to bring the area between Red October and the barricades finally under German control and "Operation Schwerin II" had the goal of isolating the Martinsofenhalle. Neither of the two plans was implemented.

Until November 15, the 6th Army tried to take the Martinsofenhalle in isolated smaller commandos, which all failed.

Lyudnikov Island (November 16-18, 1942)

Ludnikov's Island 16.-18. November 1942

The remnants of the 138th SD under General Lyudnikow were pushed back in a narrow space between the Barricades gun factory and the Volga in a triangle of terrain measuring 350 × 200 meters and encircled on three sides. This bridgehead is referred to in Russian literature as "Lyudnikows Island" (Russian: Остров Людникова).

The division shrank from 10,000 to 800 men due to severe failures. Included were the survivors and wounded of the SR 768, 344 and 650, who could hardly be supplied from the air. The food rations had to be drastically reduced and the fighting could sometimes only be continued with captured weapons and ammunition. On November 17, 1942, the 138th SD was on the verge of collapse and radio communications with the 62nd Army on the eastern Volga River broke off. Wehrmacht formations repeatedly penetrated the encircled positions of the 138th SD, but were too weak to achieve success or greater territorial gains.

Only on November 20, 1942, ships succeeded in landing there on the Volga and supplying the isolated unit with food and ammunition. Lyudnikov's troops continued to fight for a total of 40 days in their trapped positions. After the Battle of Stalingrad , the area was declared a national monument.

Also on November 17, Hitler issued the following order to the 6th Army High Command:

“I am familiar with the difficulties of the battle for Stalingrad and the reduced combat strength. The difficulties for the Russians are now even greater with the ice drift on the Volga. If we take advantage of this period of time, we will save a lot of blood later. I therefore expect the leadership to do everything again with all the energy they have repeatedly demonstrated and the troops to do everything they can to break through at least at the gun factory and at the metallurgical plant to the Volga and take these parts of the city. The air force and artillery must do everything in their power to prepare and support this attack. "

The fighting in the industrial district finally ended on November 18, 1942, when there was a sharp drop in strength, as documented in the OKH's management report: “The enemy forces trapped at the leather factory [factory in the Stalingrad suburb of Kuporosnoye] were destroyed except for two officers and a few captured soldiers. No special combat operations on the rest of the front of the Army Group. "

Conclusion

The complete capture of Stalingrad probably failed for the following reasons:

• German air and artillery attacks did not have the desired effect against the Soviet line of defense
• Assault guns as a focus weapon could hardly be used in urban warfare due to their immobility
• The Red Army used the advantage of the terrain of the destroyed city to involve the enemy in house-to-house fights that were unfamiliar to him, to tie up his reserves and to wipe them out in a lengthy material battle
• the tactic, obsolete since the First World War , of trying to take important defensive nodes such as Pavlov's house in Ludendorff's frontal attack, led to numerous unnecessary human losses
• the infantry of the Wehrmacht units was not trained for local combat, so the losses were much higher than assumed in the planning and could no longer be compensated
• The 6th Army was unable to develop its mobility in Stalingrad, its tank units were purposefully eliminated and the German infantry were forced to adopt a previously unknown combat practice: close-range combat, sniper fire and night attacks
• Falkenhayn's principle, which also originated in the First World War, of allowing the enemy to bleed to death in trench warfare (→ Battle of Verdun ), could not be applied in Stalingrad
• Material and personnel superiority of the Red Army due to supplies via the Volga

During the Battle of Stalingrad, the Soviet Army successfully developed attack troop tactics . Wehrmacht units only adopted this combat technique later during the attack on the Red October steelworks. Time was an important factor for the 62nd Army, the longer the fighting could be dragged out despite the disproportionately high human and material casualties, the greater the likelihood of keeping bridgeheads on the western Volga.

The LI was on trench warfare and the resulting hand-to-hand fighting. Army corps insufficiently prepared. In the first days of the fighting, the German troops succeeded, despite their numerical superiority, only in advancing butt wedges through infiltration with MP riflemen in the center, but not in taking it all. In addition to the military peculiarities of urban warfare, the extremely high physical strain and psychological stress played a further role in the failure of the capture. The battles were almost always characterized by proximity to the enemy, permanent threat from snipers, few breaks in combat and the opportunity for regeneration due to the tense personnel situation and a greatly increased noise level due to artillery fire and air attacks. In addition, there were great losses in the confusing terrain through self-fire and through the blurred, asymmetrical front lines to partisan tactics by armed civilians and factory workers. A large part of the Soviet success also accounted for night attacks and hand-to-hand combat, which were forced on the soldiers of the Wehrmacht on unfamiliar territory.

Ultimately, it was the extreme severity of the house-to-house fighting and resilience of the Soviet Army, which severely wore the 6th Army from September to November 1942 and thus determined the outcome of further fighting. Operation "Uranus" met with little resistance from the 6th Army and the inclusion of the army together with parts of the 4th Panzer Army and the 3rd Romanian Army was the logical consequence. Although initially a stable boiler front could be maintained, the Soviet operation "Kolzo" (Eng. Ring ) led to the gradual reduction of the boiler with constant attacks in connection with the completely inadequate supply from the air and the failures due to the increasingly harsh winter which ended with the downfall of the 6th Army. Hitler's view that every war can be won with the remaining battalions, which should be decisive over the supposedly defeated remnants of the Red Army, turned out to be wrong.

See also

• Battle of Stalingrad

literature

swell

• DV Druzhinin: Two hundred days under fire. Moscow 1968.
• Helmuth Groscurth, Helmut Krausnick: Diaries of a defense officer. 1938-1940. With further documents on the military opposition to Hitler. Stuttgart 1970, (Sources and representations on contemporary history. Volume 19).
• SD Gluchowski: Lyudnikov's Island. Moscow 1963.
• Nikolai Krylow: Stalingradskij Rubez Stalingrad - The decisive battle of the Second World War. Pahl-Rugenstein, Cologne 1981, ISBN 3-7609-0624-9 .
• Herbert Selle : What for? Memories of a leading pioneer from the Bug to the Volga. Vowinkel, Neckargemuend 1977, ISBN 3-87879-118-6 .
• Wassili Iwanowitsch Tschuikow : The battle of the century . 3. Edition. Military publishing house of the GDR , Berlin 1988, ISBN 3-327-00637-7 (original title: Сражение века . Translated by Arno Specht, also publishing house Sowjetskaja Rossija, 1975).
• Helmut Welz : Grenadiers betrayed. German Military publishing house, Berlin 1967.
• Hans Wijers (ed.): The fight for Stalingrad, the fighting in the industrial area, October 14 to November 19, 1942, eyewitnesses report . Self-published, Brummen 2001.

Secondary literature

• John Antal: City Fights: Selected Histories of Urban Combat from World War II to Vietnam . Ballantine Books, New York 2003, ISBN 0-89141-781-8 .
• Peter Antill: Stalingrad 1942 (Campaign) . Osprey Publishing, Oxford 2007, ISBN 978-1-84603-028-4 .
• Antony Beevor : Stalingrad . Orbis-Verlag, Niedernhausen 2002, ISBN 3-572-01312-7 .
• Raymond Cartier : The Second World War . tape 2 1942-1944 . Lingen Verlag, Cologne 1967 (French: La Seconde guerre mondiale . Translated by Max Harriès-Kester).
• Alan Clark : Barbarossa: The Russian-German Conflict. 1941-1945. William Morrow, New York 1965, ISBN 0-688-04268-6 .
• William E. Craig: The Battle of Stalingrad. Factual report . 8th edition. Heyne, Munich 1991, ISBN 3-453-00787-5 (American English: Enemy at the gates . Translated by Ursula Gmelin and Heinrich Graf von Einsiedel).
• Will Fowler: Battle for Stalingrad. The capture of the city - October 1942 . tosa, Vienna 2006, ISBN 3-902478-62-4 .
• David M. Glantz: The Struggle for Stalingrad City - Opposing Orders of Battle, Combat Orders and Reports, and Operational Maps. Part 1: The Fight for Stalingrad's Suburbs, Center City, and Factory Villages. September 3 - October 13, 1942. In: The Journal of Slavic Military Studies. Volume 21 (2008), Issue 1, pp. 146-238.
• David M. Glantz: The Struggle for Stalingrad City: Opposing Orders of Battle, Combat Orders and Reports, and Operational and Tactical Maps. Part 2: The Fight for Stalingrad's Factory District – October 14 – November 18, 1942. In: The Journal of Slavic Military Studies. 1556-3006, Volume 21 (2008), Issue 2, pp. 377-471.
• David M. Glantz: Armageddon in Stalingrad: September – November 1942 (The Stalingrad Trilogy, Volume 2) . University of Kansas Press, Lawrence 2009, ISBN 978-0-7006-1664-0 .
• Wilhelm Graf: Principles and experiences of local combat by tanks and tank grenadiers, illustrated using the example of the 24th Panzer Division in Stalingrad in September and October 1942. 1969.
• Haller (Ed.): Lieutenant General Karl Strecker . Westport (Conn.) 1994.
• Lothar von Heinemann: The struggle for the capture of Stalingrad (last phase autumn 1942). 1956 in study group VI 4dd Stalingrad 1942/43 (Lw 170/92).
• Michael Jones: How the Red Army triumphed. Pen and Sword, 2010, ISBN 978-1-84884-201-4 .
• Manfred Kehrig: Stalingrad. Analysis and documentation of a battle . In: Contributions to military and war history . 3. Edition. tape 15 . Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart 1979, ISBN 3-421-01653-4 .
• Walter Kerr: The Russian Army - Its Men, its Leaders and its Battles. Alfred A. Knopf, New York 1944. ( babel.hathitrust.org )
• Guido Knopp : Stalingrad. The drama . Goldmann, Munich 2006, ISBN 3-442-15372-7 .
• Jason D. Mark: Island of Fire: The Battle for the Barrikady Gun Factory in Stalingrad . Leaping Horseman Books, Sydney 2006, ISBN 0-9751076-3-1 .
• William T. McCroden: The Organization of the German Army in World War II, Army Groups, Armies, Corps, Divisions, and Combat Groups. in five volumes, draft manuscript, undated and unpublished.
• Herbert Selle: The tragedy of Stalingrad: A representation from the military side with a map supplement . Verlag Das Andere Deutschland, Hanover 1947.
• Stalingrad Battle Encyclopedia. June 1942 – February 1943. Publishing House “Volgograd”, 2008.
• PN Pospelov, Hans Gossens (ed.): History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union. German military publisher, Berlin 1962.

Web links

• Private website with lots of battle materials
• Multilingual information page about the Stalingrad battle ( Memento from December 18, 2014 in the Internet Archive )
• Dutch website about the Stalingrad battle
• linking researchers, collectors and gamers to the Stalingrad Battle
• Volgograd official website
• russian site world war two
• The Battle for Stalingrad (English)
• Contemporary witness reports and photos of German survivors of the battle
• The letters of the soldier Helmut Horstmann (1922-1943) from the Stalingrad pocket

Individual evidence

1. ^ David M. Glantz: Armageddon in Stalingrad: September – November 1942 (= The Stalingrad Trilogy. Volume 2). University of Kansas Press, Lawrence 2009, ISBN 978-0-7006-1664-0 , p. 716.
2. ^ Peter Antill: Stalingrad 1942. Osprey Publishing, Oxford 2007.
3. ^ Manfred Kehrig: Stalingrad. Analysis and documentation of a battle. Stuttgart 1979, foreword
4. ↑ Stalingrad: Turning Point of the War . In: Der Spiegel . No. 5 , 1983, pp. 36-57 ( online ).
5. ^ Manfred Kehrig: Stalingrad. Analysis and documentation of a battle. Stuttgart 1979, p. 25.
6. ^ ^{A b c} Raymond Cartier: The Second World War. Vol. 2 1942-1944. Lingen Verlag, Cologne 1967, p. 573.
7. ^ William E. Craig: The Battle of Stalingrad. Factual report. Heyne, Munich 1991, p. 16.
8. ^ William E. Craig: The Battle of Stalingrad. Factual report. Heyne, Munich 1991, p. 32.
9. ^ Raymond Cartier: The Second World War. Vol. 2 1942-1944. Lingen Verlag, Cologne 1967, p. 576.
10. ^ ^{A b} Raymond Cartier: The Second World War. Vol. 2 1942-1944. Lingen Verlag, Cologne 1967, p. 575.
11. ^ Antony Beevor: Stalingrad. Niedernhausen 2002, p. 125.
12. ^ Antony Beevor: Stalingrad. Niedernhausen 2002, p. 110.
13. ^ Antony Beevor: Stalingrad. Niedernhausen 2002, p. 12.
14. ^ Manfred Kehrig: Stalingrad. Analysis and documentation of a battle. Stuttgart 1979, p. 32.
15. ^ Manfred Kehrig: Stalingrad. Analysis and documentation of a battle. Stuttgart 1979, p. 33.
16. ^ ^{A b} Wassili Iwanowitsch Tschuikow: The battle of the century. Military Publishing House of the GDR, Berlin 1988, p. 302 ff.
17. ^ ^{A b} William E. Craig: The battle for Stalingrad. Factual report. Heyne, Munich 1991, p. 88.
18. ↑ Wassili Iwanowitsch Tschuikow: The battle of the century. Military Publishing House of the GDR, Berlin 1988, pp. 80, 101.
19. ^ David M. Glantz: Armageddon in Stalingrad. Lawrence, 2009, pp. 29, 32.
20. ↑ The divisions marked in bold were deployed in the Stalingrad city area.
21. ↑ in September 1942 to the XI. Army Corps subordinated.
22. ↑ Subordinated to the VIII Army Corps in September 1942.
23. ^ David M. Glantz: Armageddon in Stalingrad. Lawrence, 2009, pp. 856-857.
24. ^ David M. Glantz: Armageddon in Stalingrad. Lawrence, 2009, pp. 34-35.
25. ^ Replaced by Lieutenant General Tschuikow on September 12, 1942.
26. ↑ 20th Destroyer Brigade ??
27. ↑ stalingrad.net: Order of Battle of 62nd Army. (No longer available online.) Archived from the original on February 5, 2012 ; accessed on September 8, 2012 . 
28. ^ David M. Glantz: Armageddon in Stalingrad. Lawrence, 2009, p. 85.
29. ^ William E. Craig: The Battle of Stalingrad. Factual report. Heyne, Munich 1991, p. 11.
30. ↑ Guido Knopp: Stalingrad - The Drama. Munich 2006, p. 114 f.
31. ^ Manfred Kehrig: Stalingrad. Analysis and documentation of a battle. Stuttgart 1979, p. 36.
32. ↑ Cf. Tschuikow: The battle of the century. Berlin (East) 1975, p. 95.
33. ↑ Involved in the attack on the city itself.
34. ↑ Guido Knopp : Stalingrad - The Drama. Munich 2006, p. 132.
35. ^ David M. Glantz: Armageddon in Stalingrad: September – November 1942 (The Stalingrad Trilogy, Volume 2). University of Kansas Press, Lawrence 2009, foreword.
36. ^ David M. Glantz: Armageddon in Stalingrad: September – November 1942 (The Stalingrad Trilogy, Volume 2). University of Kansas Press, Lawrence 2009, pp. 28-31.
37. ^ Antony Beevor: Stalingrad. Niedernhausen 2002, p. 157.
38. ↑ Team strength of 62nd Army: 54,000, 64th Army: 36,000 and 6th Army: 170,000; in David M. Glantz: The Struggle for Stalingrad City - Opposing Orders of Battle, Combat Orders and Reports, and Operational Maps, Part 1: The Fight for Stalingrad's Suburbs, Center City, and Factory Villages, September 3 - October 13, 1942. 2008 , P. 175.
39. ^ David M. Glantz: Armageddon in Stalingrad: September – November 1942 (The Stalingrad Trilogy, Volume 2). University of Kansas Press, Lawrence 2009, pp. 26-28.
40. ^ ^{A b} Combat Studies Institute: Urban Operations: An Historical Casebook. Command & General Staff College: Fort Leavenworth / Kansas 2002.
41. ^ ^{A b} Antony Beevor: Stalingrad. Niedernhausen 2002, p. 164.
42. ↑ ^{a b c} Will Fowler: Battle for Stalingrad. The conquest of the city - October 1942. Vienna 2006, p. 55.
43. ↑ Air attacks mostly only took place in clear weather and with good visibility and fell sharply in autumn 1942 with the onset of winter.
44. ^ David M. Glantz: Armageddon in Stalingrad: September – November 1942 (The Stalingrad Trilogy, Volume 2). University of Kansas Press, Lawrence 2009, pp. 166-167.
45. ^ ^{A b c} ZDF documentary "Stalingrad" by Christian Klemke, 2002.
46. ↑ Excerpts from the war diary of the 6th Army [1]
47. ↑ ^{a b} Manfred Kehrig: Stalingrad. Analysis and documentation of a battle. Stuttgart 1979, p. 34.
48. ^ Kehrig: Stalingrad. Analysis and documentation of a battle. Stuttgart 1979, p. 35.
49. ^ Kehrig: Stalingrad. Analysis and documentation of a battle. Stuttgart 1979, p. 37.
50. ↑ Wassili Iwanowitsch Tschuikow: The battle of the century. Military Publishing House of the GDR, Berlin 1988, p. 24.
51. ↑ Guido Knopp: Stalingrad - The Drama. Munich 2006, p. 158.
52. ^ Arbeitsgemeinschaft Das Kleeblatt: The 71st Infantry Division, 1939–1945. Hildesheim 1973, p. 237.
53. ↑ Wassili Iwanowitsch Tschuikow: The battle of the century. Military Publishing House of the GDR, Berlin 1988, p. 121.
54. ^ Antony Beevor: Stalingrad. Niedernhausen 2002, p. 161.
55. ^ Arbeitsgemeinschaft Das Kleeblatt: The 71st Infantry Division, 1939–1945. Hildesheim 1973, p. 240 f.
56. ↑ Guido Knopp: Stalingrad - The Drama. Munich 2006, p. 136.
57. ↑ ^{a b} Peter Antill: Stalingrad 1942. Osprey Publishing, Oxford 2007, p. 55.
58. ↑ ^{a b c} Wassili Iwanowitsch Tschuikow: The battle of the century. Military Publishing House of the GDR, Berlin 1988, p. 127.
59. ↑ Wassili Iwanowitsch Tschuikow: The battle of the century. Military Publishing House of the GDR, Berlin 1988, p. 123.
60. ^ William E. Craig: The Battle of Stalingrad. Factual report. Heyne, Munich 1991, p. 87.
61. ^ William E. Craig: The Battle of Stalingrad. Factual report. Heyne, Munich 1991, p. 89.
62. ↑ The soldiers of the 13th GSD were largely inexperienced in combat, tired after a long march, poorly equipped and had no exact maps of the location of the strategically important buildings in Stalingrad. The heavy equipment was left in the disposal area on the eastern bank of the Volga, so that Chuikov had to equip it with rifles, machine guns, anti-tank rifles , mortars and grenades. They had little ammunition and only 1,000 soldiers were even equipped with rifles. Every battalion that was shipped across the Volga was thrown into the battle immediately and with little preparation, which was increasing in severity from day to day. From Chuikov: The Battle of the Century. 1975, p. 123 f.
63. ^ ^{A b} William E. Craig: The battle for Stalingrad. Factual report. Heyne, Munich 1991, p. 90.
64. ↑ Wassili Iwanowitsch Tschuikow: The battle of the century. Military Publishing House of the GDR, Berlin 1988, pp. 131–136.
65. ↑ volfoto.ru: Волгоград: Музей-панорама “Сталинградская битва” - Руины мельницы , accessed on May 12, 2010.
66. ↑ ^{a b c d} Wassili Iwanowitsch Tschuikow: The battle of the century. Military Publishing House of the GDR, Berlin 1988, p. 128.
67. ↑ stalingrad-feldpost.de: Data "Operation Blau" - Summer Offensive 1942 , accessed on September 8, 2012.
68. ^ William E. Craig: The Battle of Stalingrad. Factual report. Heyne, Munich 1991, p. 92.
69. ^ William E. Craig: The Battle of Stalingrad. Factual report. Heyne, Munich 1991, p. 95 f.
70. ^ David M. Glantz: Armageddon in Stalingrad: September – November 1942 (The Stalingrad Trilogy, Volume 2). University of Kansas Press, Lawrence 2009, p. 140.
71. ↑ Guido Knopp: Stalingrad - The Drama. Munich 2006, p. 155.
72. ↑ Wassili Iwanowitsch Tschuikow: The battle of the century. Military Publishing House of the GDR, Berlin 1988, p. 155 ff.
73. ^ William E. Craig: The Battle of Stalingrad. Factual report. Heyne, Munich 1991, p. 97 f.
74. ↑ Wassili Iwanowitsch Tschuikow: The battle of the century. Military Publishing House of the GDR, Berlin 1988, p. 136.
75. ↑ Wassili Iwanowitsch Tschuikow: The battle of the century. Military Publishing House of the GDR, Berlin 1988, p. 113.
76. ^ David M. Glantz: Armageddon in Stalingrad: September – November 1942 (The Stalingrad Trilogy, Volume 2). University of Kansas Press, Lawrence 2009, pp. 131-134.
77. ^ David M. Glantz: Armageddon in Stalingrad: September – November 1942 (The Stalingrad Trilogy, Volume 2). University of Kansas Press, Lawrence 2009, p. 135.
78. ↑ Wassili Iwanowitsch Tschuikow: The battle of the century. Military Publishing House of the GDR, Berlin 1988, p. 142.
79. ^ Arbeitsgemeinschaft Das Kleeblatt: The 71st Infantry Division, 1939–1945. Hildesheim 1973, p. 246.
80. ↑ Wassili Iwanowitsch Tschuikow: The battle of the century. Military Publishing House of the GDR, Berlin 1988, p. 310.
81. ↑ Wassili Iwanowitsch Tschuikow: The battle of the century. Military Publishing House of the GDR, Berlin 1988, p. 313.
82. ↑ Wassili Iwanowitsch Tschuikow: The battle of the century. Military Publishing House of the GDR, Berlin 1988, p. 335.
83. ↑ Wassili Iwanowitsch Tschuikow: The battle of the century. Military Publishing House of the GDR, Berlin 1988, p. 159.
84. ^ William E. Craig: The Battle of Stalingrad. Factual report. Heyne, Munich 1991, p. 102 f.
85. ↑ Wassili Iwanowitsch Tschuikow: The battle of the century. Military Publishing House of the GDR, Berlin 1988, p. 321.
86. ↑ Nikolai Krylow: Stalingrad - The decisive battle of the Second World War. Cologne 1981, p. 183.
87. ↑ Wassili Iwanowitsch Tschuikow: The battle of the century. Military Publishing House of the GDR, Berlin 1988, p. 166.
88. ↑ Wassili Iwanowitsch Tschuikow: The battle of the century. Military Publishing House of the GDR, Berlin 1988, p. 165.
89. ↑ Wassili Iwanowitsch Tschuikow: The battle of the century. Military Publishing House of the GDR, Berlin 1988, p. 154.
90. ^ William E. Craig: The Battle of Stalingrad. Factual report. Heyne, Munich 1991, p. 105.
91. ↑ Will Fowler: Battle for Stalingrad. The conquest of the city - October 1942. Vienna 2006, p. 58.
92. ^ William E. Craig: The Battle of Stalingrad. Factual report. Heyne, Munich 1991, p. 112.
93. ↑ Wassili Iwanowitsch Tschuikow: The battle of the century. Military Publishing House of the GDR, Berlin 1988, p. 197.
94. ↑ ^{a b c} Will Fowler: Battle for Stalingrad. The conquest of the city - October 1942. Vienna 2006, p. 62.
95. ↑ Wassili Iwanowitsch Tschuikow: The battle of the century. Military Publishing House of the GDR, Berlin 1988, p. 129.
96. ^ Earl F. Ziemke: Stalingrad to Berlin: The German Defeat in the East. Washington 1987, pp. 79-80.
97. ↑ VO / OKH b. AOK 6: Report on a trip to Stalingrad. AH Wu. 9/25/42 in Urban Operations: An Historical Casebook.
98. ↑ Kölner Stadtanzeiger from January 29, 2003.
99. ↑ http://stadt-badlauterberg.de/pics/medien/1_1228227334/rund-um-12-2008.pdf (link not available)
100. ↑ Wassili Iwanowitsch Tschuikow: The battle of the century. Military Publishing House of the GDR, Berlin 1988, p. 131.
101. ^ ^{A b} Wassili Iwanowitsch Tschuikow: The battle of the century. Military Publishing House of the GDR, Berlin 1988, p. 130.
102. ^ David M. Glantz: The Struggle for Stalingrad City - Opposing Orders of Battle, Combat Orders and Reports, and Operational Maps, Part 1: The Fight for Stalingrad's Suburbs, Center City, and Factory Villages. September 3 - October 13, 1942. p. 190.
103. ↑ Wassili Iwanowitsch Tschuikow: The battle of the century. Military Publishing House of the GDR, Berlin 1988, p. 108.
104. ↑ Wassili Iwanowitsch Tschuikow: The battle of the century. Military Publishing House of the GDR, Berlin 1988, p. 119.
105. ^ Antony Beevor: Stalingrad. Niedernhausen 2002, p. 160.
106. ↑ According to Tschukov, it was the 39th GSR, cf. Wassili Iwanowitsch Tschuikow: The battle of the century. Military Publishing House of the GDR, Berlin 1988, p. 130.
107. ^ David M. Glantz: Armageddon in Stalingrad: September – November 1942 (The Stalingrad Trilogy, Volume 2). University of Kansas Press, Lawrence 2009, p. 139.
108. ↑ Different dates of the authors.
109. ↑ Wassili Iwanowitsch Tschuikow: The battle of the century. Military Publishing House of the GDR, Berlin 1988, p. 139.
110. ^ David M. Glantz: Armageddon in Stalingrad: September – November 1942 (The Stalingrad Trilogy, Volume 2). University of Kansas Press, Lawrence 2009, pp. 199-200.
111. ^ David M. Glantz: Armageddon in Stalingrad: September – November 1942 (The Stalingrad Trilogy, Volume 2). University of Kansas Press, Lawrence 2009, p. 235.
112. ^ David M. Glantz: Armageddon in Stalingrad: September – November 1942 (The Stalingrad Trilogy, Volume 2). University of Kansas Press, Lawrence 2009, pp. 255, pp. 259.
113. ↑ The Mamayev Hill. 60 Years ago ( english ) In: The Voice of Russia . Archived from the original on January 11, 2003. Retrieved May 11, 2010.
114. ↑ Battle of Stalingrad ( English ) In: ww2db.com . World War II Database. Retrieved May 11, 2010: "At Mamayev Kurgan hill, a Russian counterattack took control of the hill after suffering 10,000 casualties in one day"
115. ↑ It was the height of a 22-story house according to ВОРОШИЛОВСКИЙ РАЙОН . Archived from the original on July 2, 2007. Retrieved May 11, 2010.
116. ↑ vectorsite.net: Germans Resurgent , accessed May 12, 2010.
117. ↑ stalingrad-info.com: Stalingrad 1942–43 ( Memento from March 31, 2010 in the Internet Archive ) , accessed on May 12, 2010.
118. ^ David M. Glantz: The Struggle for Stalingrad City - Opposing Orders of Battle, Combat Orders and Reports, and Operational Maps, Part 1: The Fight for Stalingrad's Suburbs, Center City, and Factory Villages. September 3 - October 13, 1942. p. 177.
119. ^ William E. Craig: The Battle of Stalingrad. Factual report. Heyne, Munich 1991, p. 96 f.
120. ↑ columbia.edu: Battle of Stalingrad , accessed May 12, 2010.
121. ^ David M. Glantz: Armageddon in Stalingrad: September – November 1942 (The Stalingrad Trilogy, Volume 2). University of Kansas Press, Lawrence 2009, p. 145.
122. ^ David M. Glantz: Armageddon in Stalingrad: September – November 1942 (The Stalingrad Trilogy, Volume 2). University of Kansas Press, Lawrence 2009, p. 151.
123. ^ Janusz Piekałkiewicz: Stalingrad. Anatomy of a battle. Heyne, Munich 1993, p. 234.
124. ^ ^{A b} Wassili Iwanowitsch Tschuikow: The battle of the century. Military Publishing House of the GDR, Berlin 1988, p. 134.
125. ^ David M. Glantz: Armageddon in Stalingrad: September – November 1942 (The Stalingrad Trilogy, Volume 2). University of Kansas Press, Lawrence 2009, pp. 163-165.
126. ^ ^{A b} William E. Craig: The battle for Stalingrad. Factual report. Heyne, Munich 1991, p. 97.
127. ↑ Wassili Iwanowitsch Tschuikow: The battle of the century. Military Publishing House of the GDR, Berlin 1988, p. 132.
128. ↑ Nikolai Krylow: Stalingrad - The decisive battle of the Second World War. Cologne 1981, p. 162.
129. ^ ^{A b} Wassili Iwanowitsch Tschuikow: The battle of the century. Military Publishing House of the GDR, Berlin 1988, p. 135.
130. ↑ Based on the war diaries by Wilhelm Hoffmann / IR 267 → usswashington.com: World War 2 Plus 55 ( Memento from September 28, 2011 in the Internet Archive ) , accessed on May 12, 2010.
131. ^ Stalingrad: Decisive Battle of Eastern Front, 8/11/42 - 3/2/43 ( en , Flash) Archived from the original on December 16, 2010. Retrieved September 8, 2012.
132. ^ Paul Carell : Operation Barbarossa, The March to Russia, Ullstein Verlag, Frankfurt, Berlin, Vienna, 1963, pp. 498, 501.
133. ↑ Will Fowler: Battle for Stalingrad. The conquest of the city - October 1942. Vienna 2006, p. 74.
134. ↑ The Battle of Stalingrad 1942 . In: maraba.de . Archived from the original on June 21, 2008. Retrieved May 11, 2010.
135. ↑ historisches-tonarchiv.de: The scene of death in the east. Retrieved September 8, 2012 . 
136. ↑ Nikolai Krylow: Stalingrad - The decisive battle of the Second World War. Cologne 1981, p. 50 u. 84.
137. ^ William E. Craig: The Battle of Stalingrad. Factual report. Heyne, Munich 1991, p. 113.
138. ^ William E. Craig: The Battle of Stalingrad. Factual report. Heyne, Munich 1991, p. 116.
139. ^ William E. Craig: The Battle of Stalingrad. Factual report. Heyne, Munich 1991, p. 118.
140. ^ ^{A b} William E. Craig: The battle for Stalingrad. Factual report. Heyne, Munich 1991, p. 124.
141. ^ William E. Craig: The Battle of Stalingrad. Factual report. Heyne, Munich 1991, p. 130.
142. ^ ^{A b} David M. Glantz: The Struggle for Stalingrad City - Opposing Orders of Battle, Combat Orders and Reports, and Operational Maps, Part 1: The Fight for Stalingrad's Suburbs, Center City, and Factory Villages. September 3 - October 13, 1942. p. 223.
143. ^ John Erickson: The Road to Stalingrad: Stalin's war with Germany. London 1993, p.
144. ^ David M. Glantz: Armageddon in Stalingrad: September – November 1942 (The Stalingrad Trilogy, Volume 2). University of Kansas Press, Lawrence 2009, p. 316.
145. ^ David M. Glantz: Armageddon in Stalingrad: September – November 1942 (The Stalingrad Trilogy, Volume 2). University of Kansas Press, Lawrence 2009, p. 319.
146. ^ David M. Glantz: Armageddon in Stalingrad: September – November 1942 (The Stalingrad Trilogy, Volume 2). University of Kansas Press, Lawrence 2009, pp. 321-322.
147. ^ David M. Glantz: Armageddon in Stalingrad: September – November 1942 (The Stalingrad Trilogy, Volume 2). University of Kansas Press, Lawrence 2009, pp. 325-329.
148. ^ ^{A b} Will Fowler: Battle for Stalingrad. The conquest of the city - October 1942. Vienna 2006, p. 83.
149. ^ David M. Glantz: The Struggle for Stalingrad City - Opposing Orders of Battle, Combat Orders and Reports, and Operational Maps, Part 1: The Fight for Stalingrad's Suburbs, Center City, and Factory Villages. September 3 - October 13, 1942. pp. 197-225.
150. ^ David M. Glantz: Armageddon in Stalingrad: September – November 1942 (The Stalingrad Trilogy, Volume 2). University of Kansas Press, Lawrence 2009, p. 289.
151. ↑ Nikolai Krylow: Stalingrad - The decisive battle of the Second World War. Cologne 1981, p. 213.
152. ^ William E. Craig: The Battle of Stalingrad. Factual report. Heyne, Munich 1991, p. 122.
153. ↑ Wassili Iwanowitsch Tschuikow: The battle of the century. Military Publishing House of the GDR, Berlin 1988, p. 199 ff.
154. ^ J. Bowyer Bell: Besieged - Seven Cities under Siege. Transaction Publishers, New Jersey, 2006, p. 134.
155. ↑ Wassili Iwanowitsch Tschuikow: The battle of the century. Military Publishing House of the GDR, Berlin 1988, p. 200.
156. ↑ Wassili Iwanowitsch Tschuikow: The battle of the century. Military Publishing House of the GDR, Berlin 1988, p. 202.
157. ↑ http://www.62vgd.com/RK_Mannschaften.htm Genealogie {Dead Link | date = 2018-03 | archivebot = 2018-03-25 10:53:17 InternetArchiveBot | url = http: //www.62vgd.com /RK_Mannschaften.htm}} (link no longer available).
158. ↑ Wassili Iwanowitsch Tschuikow: The battle of the century. Military Publishing House of the GDR, Berlin 1988, pp. 203–205.
159. ^ ^{A b} Will Fowler: Battle for Stalingrad. The conquest of the city - October 1942. Vienna 2006, p. 82.
160. ^ Antony Beevor: Stalingrad. Niedernhausen 2002, p. 225.
161. ^ Manfred Kehrig: Stalingrad. Analysis and documentation of a battle. Stuttgart 1979, p. 37.
162. ^ Stalingrad football club, founded by members of the Stalingrad tractor works.
163. ^ ^{A b} Will Fowler: Battle for Stalingrad. The conquest of the city - October 1942. Vienna 2006, p. 87.
164. ↑ ^{a b c} Will Fowler: Battle for Stalingrad. The conquest of the city - October 1942. Vienna 2006, p. 89.
165. ↑ Will Fowler: Battle for Stalingrad. The conquest of the city - October 1942. Vienna 2006, p. 88.
166. ↑ Wassili Iwanowitsch Tschuikow: The battle of the century. Military Publishing House of the GDR, Berlin 1988, p. 219.
167. ^ David M. Glantz: The Struggle for Stalingrad City: Opposing Orders of Battle, Combat Orders and Reports, and Operational and Tactical Maps. Part 2: The Fight for Stalingrad's Factory District – 14 October – 18 November 1942. p. 380.
168. ↑ realeconomy.ru: Волгоградский тракторный завод ( memento of September 8, 2012 in the web archive archive.today ) , accessed on May 12, 2010.
169. ↑ Wassili Iwanowitsch Tschuikow: The battle of the century. Military Publishing House of the GDR, Berlin 1988, p. 226.
170. ↑ Hans Wijers: The battle for Stalingrad, the battles in the industrial area, October 14 to November 19, 1942. Brummen 2001, p. 11.
171. ^ Attack structure LI AK in Hans Wijers: The battle for Stalingrad, the battles in the industrial area, October 14 to November 19, 1942. Brummen 2001, p. 9.
172. ^ ^{A b} Hans Wijers: The battle for Stalingrad, the battles in the industrial area, October 14 to November 19, 1942. Brummen 2001, p. 12.
173. ↑ Wassili Iwanowitsch Tschuikow: The battle of the century. Military Publishing House of the GDR, Berlin 1988, p. 222.
174. ↑ Hans Wijers: The battle for Stalingrad, the battles in the industrial area, October 14 to November 19, 1942. Brummen 2001, p. 18 f.
175. ^ ^{A b} William E. Craig: The battle for Stalingrad. Factual report. Heyne, Munich 1991, p. 126.
176. ^ Rolf Grams: The 14th Panzer Division 1940–1945. P. 54.
177. ↑ Hans Doerr: The campaign to Stalingrad. P. 54.
178. ↑ ^{a b} KTB war diary of the 62nd Army in Hans Wijers: The battle for Stalingrad, the battles in the industrial area, October 14 to November 19, 1942. Brummen 2001, p. 26.
179. ↑ Wassili Iwanowitsch Tschuikow: The battle of the century. Military Publishing House of the GDR, Berlin 1988, p. 235.
180. ^ Antony Beevor: Stalingrad. Niedernhausen 2002, p. 228 f.
181. ↑ Wassili Iwanowitsch Tschuikow: The battle of the century. Military Publishing House of the GDR, Berlin 1988, p. 228.
182. ↑ Wassili Iwanowitsch Tschuikow: The battle of the century. Military Publishing House of the GDR, Berlin 1988, p. 224.
183. ↑ KTB General Tschuikow, 62nd Army "October 15, 1942" in Hans Wijers: The battle for Stalingrad, the fighting in the industrial area, October 14 to November 19, 1942. Brummen 2001, p. 30.
184. ↑ ^{a b} Manfred Kehrig: Stalingrad. Analysis and documentation of a battle. Stuttgart 1979, p. 38.
185. ^ Lieutenant Alfred von Habsburg zu Hohenberg, PiBtl. 389 in Hans Wijers: The fight for Stalingrad, the fighting in the industrial area, October 14 to November 19, 1942. Brummen 2001, p. 28.
186. ↑ Wassili Iwanowitsch Tschuikow: The battle of the century. Military Publishing House of the GDR, Berlin 1988, p. 234.
187. ↑ Maj. V. Velitschko: The 62nd Army, in USSR, Stalingrad. P. 149.
188. ^ David M. Glantz: The Struggle for Stalingrad City: Opposing Orders of Battle, Combat Orders and Reports, and Operational and Tactical Maps. Part 2: The Fight for Stalingrad's Factory District – October 14 – November 18, 1942. pp. 388–389.
189. ^ David M. Glantz: The Struggle for Stalingrad City: Opposing Orders of Battle, Combat Orders and Reports, and Operational and Tactical Maps. Part 2: The Fight for Stalingrad's Factory District – October 14 – November 18, 1942. pp. 379–380.
190. ↑ volfoto.ru: Волгоград , accessed on May 12, 2010.
191. ^ Antony Beevor: Stalingrad. Niedernhausen 2002, p. 231.
192. ↑ Guido Knopp: Stalingrad - The Drama. Munich 2006, p. 164 f.
193. ^ Antony Beevor: Stalingrad. Niedernhausen 2002, p. 232.
194. ↑ Pospelow: History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union. Berlin 1962, p. 527.
195. ↑ ^{a b c} Will Fowler: Battle for Stalingrad. The conquest of the city - October 1942. Vienna 2006, p. 113.
196. ^ Haller: Lieutenant General Karl Strecker. Westport 1994, p. 90.
197. ↑ Hans Wijers: The fight for Stalingrad, the fighting in the industrial area, October 14 to November 19, 1942. Brummen 2001, p. 67.
198. ↑ Hans Wijers: The battle for Stalingrad, the battles in the industrial area, October 14 to November 19, 1942. Brummen 2001, p. 66.
199. ^ William E. Craig: The Battle of Stalingrad. Factual report. Heyne, Munich 1991, p. 132.
200. ↑ ^{a b} Guido Knopp: Stalingrad - The Drama. Munich 2006, p. 173.
201. ^ David M. Glantz: The Struggle for Stalingrad City: Opposing Orders of Battle, Combat Orders and Reports, and Operational and Tactical Maps. Part 2: The Fight for Stalingrad's Factory District – 14 October – 18 November 1942. p. 408.
202. ^ ^{A b c} David M. Glantz: The Struggle for Stalingrad City: Opposing Orders of Battle, Combat Orders and Reports, and Operational and Tactical Maps. Part 2: The Fight for Stalingrad's Factory District – 14 October – 18 November 1942. p. 468.
203. ^ David M. Glantz: The Struggle for Stalingrad City: Opposing Orders of Battle, Combat Orders and Reports, and Operational and Tactical Maps. Part 2: The Fight for Stalingrad's Factory District – October 14 – November 18, 1942. pp. 408–409.
204. ↑ Hans Wijers: The fight for Stalingrad, the fighting in the industrial area, October 14 to November 19, 1942. Brummen 2001, p. 89.
205. ^ Command LI. Corps in Hans Wijers: The fight for Stalingrad, the fighting in the industrial area, October 14 to November 19, 1942. Brummen 2001, p. 72 f.
206. ↑ ^{a b} Manfred Kehrig: Stalingrad. Analysis and documentation of a battle. Stuttgart 1979, p. 39.
207. ^ William E. Craig: The Battle of Stalingrad. Factual report. Heyne, Munich 1991, p. 114.
208. ↑ Hans Wijers: The battle for Stalingrad, the fighting in the industrial area, October 14 to November 19, 1942. Brummen 2001, p. 81 f.
209. ↑ Hans Wijers: The battle for Stalingrad, the battles in the industrial area, October 14 to November 19, 1942. Brummen 2001, p. 84.
210. ↑ Hans Wijers: The battle for Stalingrad, the fighting in the industrial area, October 14 to November 19, 1942. Brummen 2001, p. 90 f.
211. ↑ ^{a b} Hans Wijers: The battle for Stalingrad, the battles in the industrial area, October 14 to November 19, 1942. Brummen 2001, p. 95.
212. ^ David M. Glantz: Armageddon in Stalingrad: September – November 1942 (The Stalingrad Trilogy, Volume 2). University of Kansas Press, Lawrence 2009, pp. 472-473.
213. ^ David M. Glantz: Armageddon in Stalingrad: September – November 1942 (The Stalingrad Trilogy, Volume 2). University of Kansas Press, Lawrence 2009, pp. 481-483.
214. ^ David M. Glantz: Armageddon in Stalingrad: September – November 1942 (The Stalingrad Trilogy, Volume 2). University of Kansas Press, Lawrence 2009, p. 698.
215. ↑ ^{a b} Hans Wijers: The fight for Stalingrad, the fighting in the industrial area, October 14 to November 19, 1942. Brummen 2001, p. 110 f.
216. ↑ ^{a b} Glantz: Armageddon in Stalingrad , University of Kansas Press, 2009, pp 488-490.
217. ↑ Hans Wijers: The battle for Stalingrad, the fighting in the industrial area, October 14 to November 19, 1942. Brummen 2001, p. 117.
218. ^ David M. Glantz: Armageddon in Stalingrad: September – November 1942 (The Stalingrad Trilogy, Volume 2). University of Kansas Press, Lawrence 2009, pp. 495-496.
219. ↑ ^{a b} David M. Glantz: Armageddon in Stalingrad: September – November 1942 (The Stalingrad Trilogy, Volume 2). University of Kansas Press, Lawrence 2009, p. 498.
220. ↑ KTB 62nd Army in Hans Wijers: The fight for Stalingrad, the fighting in the industrial area, October 14 to November 19, 1942. Brummen 2001, p. 137.
221. ↑ ^{a b} David M. Glantz: Armageddon in Stalingrad: September – November 1942 (The Stalingrad Trilogy, Volume 2). University of Kansas Press, Lawrence 2009, p. 518.
222. ^ ^{A b} Hans Wijers: The battle for Stalingrad, the battles in the industrial area, October 14 to November 19, 1942. Brummen 2001, p. 141.
223. ^ ^{A b} Wassili Iwanowitsch Tschuikow: The battle of the century. Military Publishing House of the GDR, Berlin 1988, p. 277.
224. ^ David M. Glantz: Armageddon in Stalingrad: September – November 1942 (The Stalingrad Trilogy, Volume 2). University of Kansas Press, Lawrence 2009, pp. 520-521.
225. ↑ ^{a b} Manfred Kehrig: Stalingrad. Analysis and documentation of a battle. Stuttgart 1979, p. 40.
226. ↑ Wassili Iwanowitsch Tschuikow: The battle of the century. Military Publishing House of the GDR, Berlin 1988, p. 267.
227. ^ Antony Beevor: Stalingrad. Niedernhausen 2002, p. 234 from WA Boelcke: “Do you want total war?”, The Secret Goebbels Conferences. Stuttgart, 1967, p. 384.
228. ↑ "The effect of the enemy artillery massing east of the Volga has decisively weakened the attack power of the division." KTB AOK 6, BA-MA, RH20-6 / 221, in Antony Beevor: Stalingrad. 2002, p. 248 f.
229. ↑ Quotation from M. Domarus: Hitler - Reden und Proklamationen, 1932–1945. Vol. 2, Würzburg 1962, p. 1937 f.
230. ^ William E. Craig: The Battle of Stalingrad. Factual report. Heyne, Munich 1991, p. 143.
231. ↑ ^{a b c} Manfred Kehrig: Stalingrad. Analysis and documentation of a battle. Stuttgart 1979, p. 41.
232. ^ ^{A b} Antony Beevor: Stalingrad. Niedernhausen 2002, p. 253.
233. ↑ ^{a b} Hans Wijers: The battle for Stalingrad, the battles in the industrial area, October 14 to November 19, 1942. Brummen 2001, p. 164.
234. ↑ ^{a b c} Manfred Kehrig: Stalingrad. Analysis and documentation of a battle. Stuttgart 1979, p. 42.
235. ↑ Hans Wijers: The battle for Stalingrad, the battles in the industrial area, October 14 to November 19, 1942. Brummen 2001, p. 143.
236. ↑ Helmut Welz: Betrayed Grenadiers. Berlin 1973, pp. 49-79.
237. ↑ Lt. Baricevic in Hans Wijers: The battle for Stalingrad, the battles in the industrial area, October 14 to November 19, 1942. Brummen 2001, p. 133.
238. ↑ Wassili Iwanowitsch Tschuikow: The battle of the century. Military Publishing House of the GDR, Berlin 1988, p. 278.
239. ↑ Hans Wijers: The battle for Stalingrad, the fighting in the industrial area, October 14 to November 19, 1942. Brummen 2001, p. 144.
240. ↑ estate Grossmann, RGALI 618/2/108 in Antony Beevor: Stalingrad. 2002, p. 251.
241. ↑ ^{a b c} Manfred Kehrig: Stalingrad. Analysis and documentation of a battle. Stuttgart 1979, p. 43.
242. ↑ Wassili Iwanowitsch Tschuikow: The battle of the century. Military publishing house of the GDR, Berlin 1988, p. 258 u. 260.
243. ↑ Wassili Iwanowitsch Tschuikow: The battle of the century. Military Publishing House of the GDR, Berlin 1988, p. 261.
244. ↑ Hans Wijers: The battle for Stalingrad, the fighting in the industrial area, October 14 to November 19, 1942. Brummen 2001, p. 195.
245. ^ ^{A b} William E. Craig: The battle for Stalingrad. Factual report. Heyne, Munich 1991, p. 145.
246. ↑ Hans Wijers: The fight for Stalingrad, the fighting in the industrial area, October 14 to November 19, 1942. Brummen 2001, p. 170.
247. ↑ Hans Wijers: The battle for Stalingrad, the battles in the industrial area, October 14 to November 19, 1942. Brummen 2001, p. 173.
248. ↑ Wassili Iwanowitsch Tschuikow: The battle of the century. Military Publishing House of the GDR, Berlin 1988, p. 271.
249. ↑ Wassili Iwanowitsch Tschuikow: The battle of the century. Military Publishing House of the GDR, Berlin 1988, p. 152.
250. ^ Antony Beevor: Stalingrad. Niedernhausen 2002, p. 254.
251. ↑ ^{a b c} Manfred Kehrig: Stalingrad. Analysis and documentation of a battle. Stuttgart 1979, p. 44.
252. ↑ Guido Knopp: Stalingrad - The Drama. Munich 2006, p. 171.
253. ↑ volfoto.ru: Волгоград: Баррикады - Остров Людникова , accessed on May 12, 2010.
254. ^ David M. Glantz: The Struggle for Stalingrad City: Opposing Orders of Battle, Combat Orders and Reports, and Operational and Tactical Maps. Part 2: The Fight for Stalingrad's Factory District – 14 October – 18 November 1942. 2008, p. 460 ff.
255. ↑ STALINGRAD CHRONICLES: DECEMBER 1942 . In: The Voice of Russia . Archived from the original on March 18, 2005. Retrieved May 11, 2010.
256. ^ David M. Glantz: The Struggle for Stalingrad City: Opposing Orders of Battle, Combat Orders and Reports, and Operational and Tactical Maps. Part 2: The Fight for Stalingrad's Factory District – 14 October – 18 November 1942. 2008, p. 465 f.
257. ↑ US defense supplies to the USSR since 1941 in Raymond Cartier: The Second World War. Vol. 2 1942-1944. Lingen Verlag, Cologne 1967, p. 585.
258. ↑ “ The degeneration of urban warfare into a series of small-group — or even of individual battles was evident in operations as different as Stalingrad, Hue and Beirut. The nature of cities themselves is responsible for this fragmentation process. As battles wear on, the streets and building blocks of the urban physical morphology fragment urban warfare into conflict between units usually of squad or platoon size, with generally insufficient space for the deployment and maneuvering of larger units. The battle rapidly disintegrates into a series of more or less separate and isolated conflicts around such 'fortresses'. ”Section“ Small-Unit Operations ”in: US Army FM 3-06.11 - Combined Arms Operations in Urban Terrain, Appendix H: Lessons Learned from Modern Urban Cobmbat
259. ↑ The life expectancy of the Red Army soldiers was often less than 24 hours: "... masses of Russian soldiers (whose life expectancy was less than 24 hours) ...", in: Military History Podcast: Urban Warfare at Stalingrad
260. ^ "During urban operations time is a critical factor, and a problem with the campaign for the Germans was how the Soviets perceived time. The Germans wanted to quickly accomplish their objectives, but the Soviet defenders were more interested in dragging the conflict out as long as they could to whittle the Germans down both physically and psychologically. ”In Eric Mailman: Urban operations: learning from past battles ( Memento from July 19, 2012 in the web archive archive.today ), Infantry Magazine, March / April 2008.
261. ↑ Nikolai Krylow: Stalingrad - The decisive battle of the Second World War. Cologne 1981, p. 141.
262. ↑ Nikolai Krylow: Stalingrad - The decisive battle of the Second World War. Cologne 1981, pp. 142, 150 f.
263. ↑ Section “Urban Warfare” in: US Army FM 3-06.11 - COMBINED ARMS OPERATIONS IN URBAN TERRAIN, APPENDIX H: LESSONS LEARNED FROM MODERN URBAN COMBAT
264. ^ Raymond Cartier: The Second World War. Vol. 2 1942-1944. Lingen Verlag, Cologne 1967, p. 659.

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