Company Hubertus

German infantry group on a house wall in Stalingrad.

Operation Hubertus was an operation by engineer troops of the German 6th Army during the Battle of Stalingrad in World War II . It was carried out from November 9 to 12, 1942, with the aim of breaking the last resistance of the Soviet 62nd Army . It was unsuccessful.

Outline of the storm pioneers

Use of the storm pioneers in Stalingrad

unit	Parent unit	Installation site	commander	Team strength	Arrival in Stalingrad
Engineer Battalion 45	6th Army	Ulm	Captain Drewitz	9 officers , 30 NCOs , 246 men	November 4, 1942
Panzer Pioneer Battalion 50	22nd Panzer Division	Hamburg-Harburg	Captain guest	10 officers, 44 NCOs, 405 men	November 6, 1942
Engineer Battalion 162	62nd Infantry Division	Wroclaw	Major Kruger	7 officers, 31 NCOs, 281 men	November 6, 1942
Engineer Battalion 179	79th Infantry Division	Idar-Oberstein	Captain Welz		October 17, 1942
Engineer Battalion 294	294th Infantry Division	Weissenfels	Captain Weimann	4 officers, 29 NCOs, 275 men	November 6, 1942
Pioneer Battalion 305	305th Infantry Division	Ravensburg	Captain Traub
Engineer Battalion 336	336th Infantry Division	Bielefeld	Captain Lund	8 officers, 38 NCOs, 336 men	November 6, 1942
Engineer Battalion 389	389th Infantry Division	Milowitz near Prague	Captain Pfitzner

The weapon sub-genus of the Sturmpioniere developed mainly in the war against the Soviet Union from 1941 to 1945 from the field of infantry . Initially only used against bunker positions of the Red Army , the storm pioneers experienced an increasing specialization as grenadiers or tank close combatants. Lieutenant Josef Trausnitz from Heeres-Gebirgspionier-Bataillon 85 was one of the first storm pioneers to conquer bunkers with explosive charges and mines and thus contributed to the reputation of the storm pioneers as specialists in infantry combat. In the course of the war, pioneers were given a wide range of tasks: deploying against enemy fortifications, erecting bridgeheads, forming shock troops in counter-attacks and anti-tank defense . The armament usually consisted of flamethrowers , machine guns and explosive charges. In the Battle of Stalingrad, convicted soldiers and prisoners often formed storm pioneer units to deal with particularly dangerous tasks.

initial situation

Starting position for the Hubertus company on November 1, 1942

→ Main article : Attack on Stalingrad

After the Wehrmacht had not succeeded in capturing the remaining positions of the Red Army in Stalingrad in late autumn 1942, which had withdrawn to around 10% of the city area, Hitler ordered the storm pioneer units to be assembled as specialists in house-to-house warfare and deployed in Stalingrad according to raiding forces .

“I wanted to come to the Volga, at a certain point, in a certain city, because there is a very important point there. ... I wanted to take it, and ... we have it! There are only a few very small spots left. Now the others say: why don't they fight faster then? Because I don't want a second Verdun there! I am now doing it with very small raiding parties. Time does not matter, no ship can come up the Volga anymore, that is the decisive factor! "

- Adolf Hitler : on November 8, 1942 in the Munich Löwenbräukeller

Even before remarked Major General Arthur Schmidt, Chief of Staff of the 6th Army, opposite Infantry General Georg von Sodenstern , the Chief of Staff of Army Group South, major concerns that the released fought by the pioneers in close combat terrain sections, given the large number and material superiority in the Soviet Army could not possibly be sustained by the weak infantry forces.

The storm pioneers were the commander of the LI. Army corps , subordinated to Walther von Seydlitz-Kurzbach . The PiBtl. In 672, Major Josef Linden was assigned to finally destroy the Soviet bridgeheads west of the Volga in the Stalingrad inner city area and in the northern industrial complexes. Linden was subordinate to the Army Pioneer Leader Colonel Herbert Selle , who in turn received operational orders directly from Lieutenant General Erwin Jaenecke , the commander of the 389th Infantry Division .

November 1, 1942

Seydlitz-Kurzbach and Paulus observing the battlefield

On November 1, 1942, the last major attack by the 79th Infantry Division in the “Red October” steelworks was repulsed by strong Soviet artillery fire east of the Volga and the combat strength of the division operating there was weakened. The LI. Based on this experience, the army corps decided not to use any larger combat units.

On the night of November 1st to November 2nd, 1942, the 95th Rifle Division was brought to the western part of the Volga to reinforce the defenders of the industrial complex and to prevent the enemy from gaining a foothold on the steep bank.

As targets for the offensive of the newly arriving Sturmpionier battalions , the gun factory "Barricades" (Russian Красные Баррикады - Krasnyje Barricady) and the railway loop "Tennis Racket" with the chemical factory "Lazur" east of the Mamajew Hill were issued. Paulus had already formulated the capture of the “Lazur” factory at the end of September as the main goal in order to split the 62nd Army at a tactically important point. The heavily fortified work was defended by the 284th SD, as Tschuikow also regarded “Lazur” as one of his most important fortresses. Other main objectives were the “Red October” steelworks (Russian Красный Октябрь - Krasny Oktjabr) and the commissioner's house (a massive U-shaped building expanded into a fortress) and the pharmacy east of the gun factory. The engineer battalions 50, 162, 294 and 336 were withdrawn from their front section, combined in Millerowo and Rossosh near Voronezh on Don and flown in on November 6, 1942 with transport machines to Stalingrad . All five battalions already had combat experience on the Eastern Front and, in the opinion of the Wehrmacht High Command, were well suited for their upcoming deployment and combat in confined spaces.

November 6, 1942

On November 6, 1942, Hitler gave the 6th Army the order to first break the Soviet resistance east of the “Barricades” gun factory and the “Red October” steelworks and to clean up the entire northern part of the Volga before targeting the “Lazur” chemical factory again should be included. The main focus of the major offensive was to be the 305th Infantry Division, whose infantry regiments were each reinforced with an assault pioneer battalion at the head. A combined arms and artillery support attack was planned in a narrow section of the front.

November 8, 1942

Stalingrad, urban warfare

As early as November 8, 1942, the engineer battalion 336 suffered the loss of 18 men when the battalion gathered and organized itself in the staging area, a mined hall of the “Barricades” gun factory. The PiBtl. 336 was supposed to fill up the four companies (37 survivors of 400 men) of Major Eugen Rettenmaier with 600 soldiers and throw the Soviets out of their shelters and corridors on the Volga steep bank. Instruction in the special fighting techniques of the Stalingrad Battle by Rettenmaier was refused by the experienced pioneers, as they were of the opinion that it was just another routine task similar to the operation at Voronezh ( Voronezh-Voroshilovgrad operation : translation of the pioneers across the Don and combat operations under Major DR Gerhard Konopka) in front of you. This misjudgment of the situation was partly one of the reasons for the company's failure. Rettenmaier, commander of the IR 578/305. ID, received the rows of houses, some of which were still under construction, between the gun factory “Barricades” and the Volga as an operational area.

The LI. Army Corps was to take the Volgaufer east of the gun factory, including the oil tanks, and the southwest corner of the brickworks on November 8, 1942. For this purpose, 305 ID and the south wing of 389 ID had to carry out a surprise attack with reinforced grenadier regiments on the Volga at daybreak. By deploying deeply staggered and providing strong reserve forces, it was to be ensured on the front line that on the one hand the combat strength would be maintained and on the other hand enough forces would be available to fight the surrounding nests of resistance and to clean the cellars of the conquered buildings. The Sturmpionier battalions were not to operate as a regiment, but to reinforce the ordinary infantry to cooperate with their heavy weapons in close combat. The 71st ID, 295th ID, 100th JD including the Schwerin group (79th ID) had to carry out well-prepared raid troop operations in order to deceive the enemy in expanding the front line. The Schwerin group was also given the task of repelling flanking infantry and artillery attacks after the attack began.

It was assumed that the Red Army had primarily positioned elite troops in the bridgeheads and that officers and political commissars with severe discipline would immediately prevent desertion or possible attempts to surrender. A large-scale tank deployment was not possible in the rubble landscape. The 62nd Army maintained a network of trenches and tunnels that made it possible for them to launch fire attacks at various locations and then withdraw again without being noticed.

Attack Outlines and Attack Targets

German targets on November 10, 1942 in the "Barricades" gun factory sector

• PiBtl. 305: attack on pharmacy
• PiBtl. 50: Attack on the commissioner's house and capture of the building (Commander Hauptmann Gast expressly renounced infantry support)
• Infantry group with parts PiBtl. 305: Advance through a Balka to the Volga, on the sandbank upstream
• Reinforced department: ready to attack House 78

Course of the Hubertus company

Enterprise Hubertus: German attack on 11./12. November 1942, dashed: front shift

Company Hubertus: Fight for pharmacy and commissioner's house

Enterprise Hubertus: Second attack on 14./15. November 1942, shortening of the front in the area of ​​the "Barricades" gun factory

November 9, 1942

On November 9, 1942, when temperatures fell sharply by −18 ° C, the "Hubertus Operation", planned as the first phase of the final offensive against the last Soviet defensive positions west of the Volga, began. In the early hours of the morning, the concentrated artillery fire preparation began, at the same time the first raid troops of the storm pioneers advanced to the planned targets. The regular infantry advanced against the targets as the second wave, but did not have sufficient combat strength to secure the intermediate area between the individual sections. The PiBtl. As planned, 294 reached its sector at the fuel plants on the western Volga. The PiBtl. 50 was able to capture two factory buildings, but was held down in his attack in front of the heavily fortified pharmacy and the "Red House" (party building). The PiBtl. 336 was able to take some residential buildings and advance to the division boundary on a street parallel to the Volga. However, the conquered area had to be partially abandoned because the 305th Infantry Division could not secure the surrounding area due to signs of wear and tear.

The PiBtl offensive. 162 and 389 came to a standstill in front of the “White House”, as the resistance of the Soviet guardsmen in the rubble fields could not be broken.

“These people not only knew the price of every meter, but also of every foot of earth. And almost everyone could operate a rifle and machine gun, anti-tank rifle and grenade launcher, and be a sniper . With fire from all weapons we tried to prevent any regrouping of his order of battle, any concentration of his soldiers in any house or any corner of the house, we stopped any advance. "

- Political officer Belugin

On the very first day, 20% team losses were recorded. The situation at the “Barricades” gun factory was fatal, as Soviet snipers had positioned themselves in the rubble, ruins and bomb craters and interrupted the chain of command by deliberately killing the German officers. Reserves of the 62nd Army were brought from the Volgaufer through the sewer in the middle of the positions of the Wehrmacht, where they caused chaos and confusion in short and surprising firefights. Where the manhole covers could be located, the Wehrmacht closed them with iron girders from the factory ruins or poured gasoline into the underground system and set it on fire.

The pioneers made much slower progress than originally planned, as their bulky and heavy ordnance and weapons proved to be very obstructive in the extremely impassable rubble terrain. Overcoming the obstacles required great attention so that the Red Army could conduct very successful fire raids. Without advancing infantry support, the pioneers were often cut off from their own units and had to withdraw prematurely.

The numerous Soviet counter-attacks increased the ammunition consumption of the Germans to such an extent that buildings that had already been conquered had to be abandoned. The order of the day on November 9, 1942 could not be fulfilled, because the combat strength of the infantry troops after the long and exhausting fighting in September and October 1942 was too weak to keep the ground gain of the storm pioneers.

Assault guns could only be used very inadequately during the rapid infantry advances and only act as flanking fire protection. The free-standing pharmacy, 300 to 400 meters from the Volga, and House 78, located directly on the steep slope, could not be occupied. The Red Army soldiers were also able to stay in the fortress-like commissioner's house.

The IR 578, reinforced by the PiBtl. 50 and the PiBtl. 305, was to attack again the heavily fortified positions of the 62nd Army on the Volga on November 10, 1942. All available artillery batteries in this battle zone should prepare the attack. The focus of the attack was the pharmacy and the detached commissioner's house. Between the pharmacy and the commissioner's house lay a completely destroyed lunar landscape that made an unnoticed approach impossible. It was not possible to get into the commissioner's house because the windows and doors on the first floor were barricaded with rubble and debris. There were loopholes in the outer walls of the building, from which the Red Army soldiers initially fended off all attack efforts with automatic weapons.

At the same time, IR 576 was supposed to take action against the fuel depot and IR 578 against House 78.

In the “Red October” steelworks sector, too, the 79th Infantry Division came into contact with the enemy with the 180th Guardsman Regiment (37th GSD) in Halls No. 2 and No. 10, which developed into bitter hand-to-hand combat. Assault Gun Division 244 was supposed to support the troubled 79th Infantry Division. The 79th ID has suffered more than its neighboring units from permanent Soviet artillery fire since securing the right flank of the 24th PD. Since the German attack formations threatened the chemical factory "Lazur", the counterattacks of the 62nd Army concentrated on this zone.

November 10, 1942

On November 10, 1942, Major Linden was appointed commander of the LI. Army corps, Walther von Seydlitz-Kurzbach , ordered to report to the command post “Schnellhefter” west of the “Barrikady” cannon. Linden asked for another infantry regiment to support the "bled out" 305th Infantry Division and the advanced storm pioneer battalions in order to achieve quick success. He was denied this because the intelligence service had already reported large Soviet units that were gathering on the northern and southern flanks of the 6th Army . No further infantry regiment could be withdrawn from there. Thereupon Linden asked to be allowed to spare his already badly battered storm pioneers as specialists for the planned spring offensive of 1943, which was also refused by Seydlitz-Kurzbach.

On the same day another major attack took place after own forces had been regrouped and the enemy had strengthened his defensive positions.

The PiBtl. 294 remained on the right wing of 305th Infantry Division to repel disruptive attacks from the south. The PiBtl. 162 was withdrawn from 389 ID to aid the distressed center of 305 ID.

After attaching explosive charges, the break-in into the hotly contested police station was successful. After the upper floors and corridors had been cleared, the Red Army soldiers withdrew to the basement. Pioneers tore up the floor, poured gasoline into the basement, and threw backpack loads into it. Outside, German soldiers detonated smoke hand grenades to blind those who had fled the house. Everyone in the house perished in the explosion of the commissioner's house.

“ There is no city in this whole war that saw what the German soldiers had to endure for weeks. The Germans fought for this bastion from the south and the center. And every new day eats more and more deadly on this urban body, which is bleeding over and over. The Volga, along which the daily desolate, decaying rubble stretches along, has long been under German control. But the Soviets still haven't given up. "

- Our army, November 1942

November 11, 1942

On November 11, 1942 at 6:50 a.m., the Hubertus company was concentrated with strong artillery fire on a front width of only 5 km between Volkhovstrojewskaya Street in the north and the Bannyi Gorge in the south and six of the divisions fighting in Stalingrad (79th Infantry Division, JD 100, ID 295, ID 305, ID 389, and PD 14) advanced. The intense hand-to-hand fighting and firefights at very short distances lasted only 5 hours, with the use of flamethrowers often deciding the battle.

Martinsofenhalle attack on November 11, 1942

In the southern section the PiBtl. 179 involved in heavy fighting over the “impregnable” Martinsofenhalle / Hall 4 (Russian Martenovskii Мартеновски заводской цех) in the “Red October” steelworks. The entire factory premises had been in the possession of the Wehrmacht since October 1942, only the Martinsofenhalle, which had been converted into a fortress, could not be taken by the Croatian 369 Infantry Regiment, despite the most intensive efforts, as the Red Army soldiers were able to compensate for their losses through a winding tunnel and pipe system. The Martinsofenhalle (Hall 4) in the northern area of ​​the steelworks contained eight Martinsöfen sunk into the floor. In the basement, 40–50 m below the hall, there were storage rooms and canteens. Hall 4 protected the area behind the slag heaps and the finger canyon including the “White House” and “Red House”, also cornerstones of the Soviet defense on the banks of the Volga. The conquest of the steel works by the 79th Infantry Division and 100th Jäger Division could not be completed without taking possession of the Martinsofenhalle; an attack from the north on the bridgehead on the Volga was unthinkable.

Previous attempts by the Wehrmacht to conquer Hall 4 have all failed. Air attacks and mortar fire had no effect because of the massive construction of the Martinsöfen, as did the use of heavy weapons against the strongly fortified position. Attacks of the IR 226 on the hall were made by the approx. 400 defenders of the 3rd Btl./120. GSR (39th GSD) and 2nd bag / 253 SR repulsed several times. The reasons for the failure were the greatly reduced combat strength due to the attrition battles in the northern industrial complexes, the overexertion due to almost non-stop fighting and a lack of crew, so that won areas could not be held. In return, the Red Army was able to use tunnels and corridors under the Martinsofenhalle to bring reserves from the Volga directly into the battles. Most of the German troops were tied up in the fighting for Hall 4.

Captain Helmut Welz from PiBtl. 179 received the order to finally demolish the Martinsofenhalle on November 10, 1942. Welz initially resisted this order because, in his estimation, the battalion had already suffered too great losses in the previous battles. A successful attack on the hall therefore seemed impractical to him.

“ I do not need your advice and refuse to give myself these teachings. If you understand it better otherwise: Divisional order, you will attack Hall Four on November 10th and push through to the Volga, understand? "

- Lieutenant General Richard Graf von Schwerin

Chuikov noted that from a position 10 km away, the division commander could not have judged the feasibility of such an undertaking. In contrast to the Wehrmacht officers, the commanders of the 62nd Army were mostly in the immediate vicinity of the fighting and were able to make quick decisions on the spot, which turned out to be a great advantage in the battle for Stalingrad.

The commander-in-chief of the Croatian Legion (Serbo-Croatian: Hrvatska Legija), Colonel Viktor Pavičić, deployed the only remaining battalion under Major Breivikow (300 men) to offer Welz combat support. At the beginning of the fighting in the “Red October” steelworks, the 369th IR numbered 5,000 soldiers.

In the course of the preparations, the attack could be postponed at least one day to November 11th.

Attack planning

Attack order for the PiBtl. 179:

• 1. Enemy holds parts of the “Red October” factory premises with strong forces. The Martinsofenhalle (Hall 4) is the focal point of his defense. With the removal of this hall, Stalingrad falls.
• 2. reinforced PiBtl. 179 takes Hall 4 on November 11, 1942 and pushes through to the Volga. First target: south-east side of Hall 4.
• 3. The following are used:
  • Right: PiBtl. sprinkler
  • Middle: 1st and 3rd company
  • Left: 2nd Company
  • Dividing line between Pi. Sprenger and 1st company: south-west. Hall wall
  • Dividing line between 3rd and 2nd company: northeast. Hall wall
  • Structure and equipment according to verbal instructions
• 4th artillery regiment and IG group with 8 guns support the attack by fire on the northwest part of Hall 4 from x - 5 to x o'clock, then by fighting down targets in the course of the attack. VB go with shock troop leaders, artillery regiment with Pi. Sprenger and 2nd company. IG groups with 2nd and 3rd company.
• 5. 2-cm anti-aircraft battery supported the attack by fighting down snipers in the roof bars of the hall from positions in the area of ​​the ladder house .
• 6th Croatian Infantry Regiment 369 occupied and secured the ground immediately behind the shock groups. A company at my disposal at Leiterhaus.
• 7. Provision must be made by 3:00 am, report under "Martin".
• 8. Illuminated signs:
  • knows: here we are (every 5 minutes)
  • red: counterattack
  • green: reinforcement requested
• 9. Troop formation area: House 50 meters northwest. Hall 4.
• 10. Combat group command post: initially the house between Hall 2 and the Leiterhaus, after reaching the first attack, Hall 4.
• 11th news relay: lays wire to 1st and 3rd company, artillery regiment and IG group are responsible for wire connections to their fireplaces.

The storm pioneers were equipped with submachine guns, flamethrowers, hand grenades, concentrated charges, explosive devices, smoke candles and mines. 4 shock troops of 30-40 men each were formed, which were to be followed by security troops at a distance of 30 meters. The land gained was then to be permanently secured by the Croatian 369th Infantry Regiment. The break-in in Hall 4 should not happen through gates or windows, but through a breach made with an explosive charge. Snipers from the ladder house should be held down and fought by anti-aircraft guns.

course

Storm pioneers pioneered alleys through the minefields in the rubble field of the shot-up freight cars in front of the Martinsofenhalle. German artillery preparation was countered by much stronger Russian shell fire from guns on the eastern Volga, so that sensitive failures had to be recorded before the attack could begin. The thick smoke caused by the shell impacts and the resulting limited visibility made coordinating the attack very difficult.

The explosive charge was successfully installed. Almost immediately after the detonation, the first raid troops managed to penetrate the breach in Hall 4. The noise of the battle was already coming from the Martinsofenhalle when the Croatian infantry regiment came under heavy machine-gun fire. Russian MPI riflemen fired from roof bars and earth bunkers and inflicted heavy losses on the advancing storm pioneers from the start.

Moving forward in the rubble strewn building was almost impossible. A barrier made of carts, rails, iron bars and cross members ran across the hall. The attackers got caught in the tangled wires on the ground or were systematically eliminated at bottlenecks. In many places the pioneers had to balance in a row over individual steel girders; these positions were under constant fire from Russian machine guns. Soviet snipers fired from their alternating positions in large conduits until they were fought with flamethrowers. After three hours of bitter struggle, only 70 meters could be conquered by the Germans at short notice. The own losses exceeded all expectations of the German division management.

Both raiding parties Limbach and Fetzer failed because of the strength of the Russian resistance. Red and green flares were shot down more and more often, which meant a counterattack and the urgent need for reinforcements. The storm pioneers had to take cover in the numerous bomb craters and were unable to gain any further ground because of the precise defensive fire.

The hand-to-hand combat-tested Croats under Major Breivikovic ran straight into Russian machine gun fire that claimed numerous lives. The few survivors made makeshift burrows. A backward movement or even a counterattack were made impossible by the Soviet defenders. They only managed to withdraw from the hall at dusk. Another Croatian unit under Lieutenant Rudolf Baricevic could not make out the Russian positions in the confusing rubble field and ended up in the field of fire of snipers, who almost completely eliminated the Croats.

The Red Army partially imitated the German signal ammunition in order to direct artillery strikes on their positions.

Result

The storm pioneer offensive on the Martinsofenhalle ended in a debacle; despite disproportionately large losses, no land gain was achieved. On November 11, 1942 alone, the LI lost. Corps 3000 soldiers and 10 tanks. The strength of the small raiding parties was no longer sufficient to take Hall 4. Larger units like the 305th Infantry Division would not have been able to develop their strength in the confined space, but only offered a better target and would have been eliminated in groups.

Major Josef Linden realized that the Martinsofenhalle could not be taken in a direct frontal attack based on the Ludendorff principle from the First World War . In a final report it was noted that the German attack was unfortunately carried into the middle of the readiness for a major enemy attack.

In the division history of the 79th Infantry Division, the daily report of November 11, 1942 said:

“The raiding party of the 79th I. D, against the western part of the Martinofenwerk, encountered an enemy attack and did not have its full effect. The break-in point of the previous day in the plant west of Hall 8 has been cleaned up. In the course of the morning the enemy attacked again in several successive advances in this plant and penetrated here. At 2 p.m. the hall was again firmly in [the enemy's] hands . "

- from a German field post letter

November 12, 1942

Use of the flamethrower in Stalingrad

Helmut Welz describes an attack by the storm pioneers on November 12, 1942 against the "tennis racket" railway loop:

“ Every moment we see the storming troops being thinned out, the submachine gun and rifle falling to the ground and their bearers reaching into the void to fall two steps further. The cracks in the earth have swallowed the fighters. I am waiting for units to move up, reinforce and take the meters that have been won firmly in hand. But it stays empty back there. Wounded hobble back, paramedics haul stretchers. The emptiness of the battlefield worries me. The dreaded counter-attack is about to take place. The noise of the battle is already growing. Nothing is moving on our side. No company, no battalion, no reinforcements can be seen. A soldier jumps over the edge of the Balka. A German. He runs back, surely a reporter. But no, one more, three, four. Individual pioneers also emerge from the exits of the gorges. Where are the remnants of the five battalions? The Russians are now approaching the starting position and a barrage starts like this morning. Then the lines freeze. Everything is as before. Like before the attack, like yesterday, like a week ago. Did I dream, was the whole thing just a spook? Five fresh battalions took up the attack, five battalions fought like at home on the training area. And the result? The masses are dead, some are wounded, the rest are beaten and devastated. It's bewitched, here you bite on granite. If entire divisions are not thrown to the front, we will never achieve our goal. "

The 100th Jäger Division destroyed 19 bunkers of the enemy and the 71st and 295th Infantry Division took some workers' dormitories near the "tennis racket". Within 48 hours, the major attack broke up into a series of isolated firefights. Smaller German infantry units reached the Volga, but were separated from their unit by advancing Red Army soldiers. In the “Red October” steelworks, 244 Red Army soldiers from the 118th GSR fell within 5 hours and only 100 men from the 112th GSR survived. 440 pioneers fell that day and the 389th Infantry Division had 190 dead and 189 missing.

In return, Chuikov ordered on November 12, 1942:

“ The enemy is trying to break through the front in the south-eastern part of the 'Red October' plant and to reach the Volga. In order to strengthen the left wing of the 39th Guards Rifle Division and to clear the entire factory area from the enemy, I order the commanders of the 39th Guards Rifle Division to maintain the order of operations in the center and on the left wing of his division through a battalion of the 112th Guards Rifle Regiment amplify. Task: to restore the situation completely and to clear the factory premises from the enemy. "

-

For the German General Staff, a Soviet counterattack was emerging, but its possibilities were underestimated:

“ The overall picture of the build-up of forces is still unclear in terms of place, time and scope, and there are no imminent attack possibilities. The forces available are likely to be too weak for more extensive operations. "

- Colonel R. Gehlen, Foreign Armies East Department, November 12, 1942

November 13, 1942

By strengthening the PiBtl. 162 the pharmacy and the "Red House" were taken on November 13, 1942. This was not achieved in a loss-making frontal attack, but rather through concentrated charges and shaped charges, which the PiBtl. 50 were used. The daily report of the 138th SD reported extremely hard fighting over these buildings. In the course of the eleven-hour firefight, Wehrmacht units penetrated deep into the formation of the enclosed rifle division, and around 70 MPI riflemen reached the divisional command post of the 138th SD. Hand grenade fights developed around the staircases and the individual floors, and the German attack was finally repelled after heavy losses on both sides. Allegedly 1000 deaths were counted in the division section afterwards. The PiBtl. 162 suffered 40% crew losses in the split of a Soviet bridgehead on the Volga. It was possible to push a wedge between two rifle regiments and to conquer the petrol tanks. A complete Soviet rifle battalion was reduced to 15 men, who were nevertheless able to hold a 70 m wide strip of banks on the Volga.

The PiBtl. 162 was deployed in the sector of IR 578 for another deployment on November 13, 1942. The aim was to further constrict the enclosed Soviet units behind the “Barricades” gun factory in the “Ludnikov Island” area. The focus was on taking the fortified positions on the steep bank. Explosive charges could be attached, but the Rolik group cut the detonating wires again. Attack efforts were frustrated by precise artillery defensive fire from Soviet batteries from the eastern part of the Volga. A German tank unit was set on fire and a company was destroyed on the sandbank. The German infantrymen mined the sandbank and withdrew to the starting position of the Balka.

On November 13, the Wehrmacht succeeded in taking house 81, which was in the immediate vicinity of the commissioner's house. The break-in took place in the basement floor; the higher floors were gradually conquered in bitter hand-to-hand combat.

The use of assault guns in the difficult built-up area was only possible to a very limited extent, as they could not follow the rapid attacks of the assault pioneers; Their task was mainly to provide retroactive fire protection.

November 14, 1942

The last attack by the storm pioneers took place on November 14, 1942 in the area of ​​the “Barricades” gun factory, but did not lead to any notable success. The PiBtl. 294 defended the fuel store, the PiBtl. 50 (mot.) In an easterly direction and the PiBtl. 162 against Soviet forces in the north. The Soviet positions connected by tunnels could not be effectively combated by artillery attacks, explosions and mines, or by throwing hand grenades.

“ Army Group B: In Stalingrad, raiding troops eastward 'Rote Barrikade' took two blocks and the commissioner's house. An enemy attack by 150 men was repulsed. "

- Situation report of the Army High Command, November 14, 1942

“ The heavy fighting for Stalingrad continues. The fascist siege army, which, as already reported, has been reinforced by 60,000 fresh troops, is making tremendous efforts to overcome the occupation of the city and to force a decision. The main scene of the fighting in this new phase is still the factory district in the northern part of Stalingrad, where the German storm troops have attempted new breakthroughs. They shift the focus of their attacks to a sector only 250 to 300 meters wide, where they achieved small gains in terrain along a single street, which were paid for with extremely heavy losses. "

- Sowinform office , November 15, 1942

November 16-18, 1942

Major Rettenmaier reported that isolated battles still took place on November 16 and 17, 1942, with only two buildings of the "70s" series being captured. On November 18, 1942, house 83 was taken by IR 578.

Despite the complete failure of Operation Hubertus, Hitler assumed that the attacks would continue and that the minimum goals would be adhered to:

“ I therefore expect the leadership to do everything again with all the energy they have repeatedly demonstrated and the troops to do everything they can to at least break through to the Volga at the gun factory and at the metallurgical plant and take these parts of the city. "

- Führer order of November 17, 1942

Balance sheet

As a result of the Hubertus company, the commissioner's house and the pharmacy were taken, but the factory complexes only partially fell into German hands. The major attack by the 305th Infantry Division and the Engineer Battalion 179 in the “Red October” steelworks was repulsed and the Martinsofenhalle / Hall 4 remained in Soviet hands. About 3,000 soldiers were deployed, 1,000 of whom died in the fighting.

After the operation, Colonel Herbert Selle had the severely decimated five engineer battalions combined into one battalion under the command of Major Krüger and deployed infantry in the combat section of the 305th Infantry Division.

The use of the storm pioneers in the house-to-house fighting in Stalingrad is seen as the last attempt by the Wehrmacht to take the remaining bridgeheads of the 62nd Army on the western Volga, regardless of the loss of people and material. With this last mission, the decision in the Battle of Stalingrad should be brought about before the start of winter. In his speech in the Löwenbräukeller on November 8, 1942, Hitler saw this decision as having been made.

The Hubertus company proved to be a military fiasco and decisively weakened the combat troops in the northern industrial complexes. During this phase, the Soviet operation Uranus to encircle the 6th Army was imminent, so that even the achievement of the operational goals in the Hubertus company could no longer have made a significant difference.

Colonel Herbert Selle said of the loss of the "specialists":

“ You will cry many tears in Germany ... probably for those who are not responsible for these unjustifiable victims. "

Tschuikow wrote of the last German attack efforts in November 1942:

“ All information and the course of the battle showed that the forces on both sides were running out. In ten days of fighting, the enemy had again split our army into two parts, took the tractor factory, but was unable to destroy the main forces of our army. It wasn't enough for that. He had to bring reserves into the battle from the depths and, in addition to fresh divisions, also had to deploy regiments and battalions that had been detached from their units and moved to Stalingrad by air. But even that wasn't enough. The enemy was forced to withdraw individual battalions, especially engineer battalions, from various divisions on the long front and to throw them into action while moving. But they melted like wax in the fire of the Battle of Stalingrad. "

“ These supplies, these constantly rolling replacements for the defenders, were the problem of the battle. The secret lay in these loess gorges on the banks of the Volga. In this steep bank, which was inaccessible to the German artillery, sat the staffs of the Soviets, the hospitals and the ammunition depots were housed. Here were the assembly points for the people and material transports brought across the river at night. Here were the default positions for counter-attacks. The sewers of the industrial plants flowed here, now empty long cave paths that led into the rear of the German front. Soviet raiders crawled through. Carefully lifted the manhole covers. Got machine guns in position. Then the bursts of fire rattled in the backs of the advancing German units, slammed into the food carriers and supply columns. Manhole cover closed and back. "

The storm pioneers became known, among other things, through the film Stalingrad by Joseph Vilsmaier from 1993, which tells the story of the Pioneer Battalion 336 in the battles for the “Red October” steelworks.

A more Russian view of the battle, with a focus on the snipers around Vasily Saizew , was brought in 2001 by the movie Duel - Enemy at the Gates .

literature

• David M. Glantz: The Struggle for Stalingrad City: Opposing Orders of Battle, Combat Orders and Reports, and Operational and Tactical Maps. Part 2: The Fight for Stalingrad's Factory District-14 October – 18 November 1942. In: The Journal of Slavic Military Studies. 1556-3006, Volume 21 (2008), Issue 2, pp. 377-471.
• David M. Glantz: Armageddon in Stalingrad: September-November 1942. (The Stalingrad Trilogy, Volume 2). University of Kansas Press, Lawrence 2009, ISBN 978-0-7006-1664-0 .
• Jason D. Mark: Island of Fire: The Battle for the Barrikady Gun Factory in Stalingrad . Leaping Horseman Books, Sydney 2006, ISBN 0-9751076-3-1 .
• Jason D. Mark: Death of the Leaping Horseman: 24th Panzer Division in Stalingrad. Leaping Horseman, Pymble, Australia 2003, ISBN 0-9751076-0-7 .

Individual evidence

1. ↑ David M. Glantz: Armageddon in Stalingrad: September-November 1942 (The Stalingrad Trilogy, Volume 2). University of Kansas Press, Lawrence 2009, p. 612.
2. ↑ Manfred Kehrig, Stalingrad. Analysis and documentation of a battle, Stuttgart 1979, p. 41.
3. ↑ home.arcor.de
4. ↑ ^{a b c d e} Archived copy ( Memento from April 1, 2009 in the Internet Archive ) (English)
5. ↑ Helmut Welz: Betrayed Grenadiers . German military publisher. Berlin 1967, p. 52.
6. ↑ ^{a b} Herbert Selle: What for? - Memories of a leading pioneer as far as Stalingrad. Neckargemuend 1977, p. 49.
7. ↑ Hans Wijers: The fight for Stalingrad, the fighting in the industrial area, October 14 to November 19, 1942, Brummen 2001, p. 164.
8. ^ Antony Beevor: Stalingrad , Niedernhausen 2002, p. 249.
9. ^ David Glantz: The Struggle for Stalingrad City: Opposing Orders of Battle, Combat Orders and Reports, and Operational and Tactical Maps. Part 2: The Fight for Stalingrad's Factory District-14 October – 18 November 1942, p. 431.
10. ↑ David M. Glantz: Armageddon in Stalingrad: September-November 1942 (The Stalingrad Trilogy, Volume 2). University of Kansas Press, Lawrence 2009, pp. 270, pp. 611, pp. 614-617, pp. 632.
11. ↑ The German battle density on the 4-5 km wide front was denser than before Verdun in Wassili Iwanowitsch Tschuikow: Die Schlacht des Jahrhundert , Militärverlag der DDR, Berlin 1988, p. 272.
12. ^ David Glantz: The Struggle for Stalingrad City: Opposing Orders of Battle, Combat Orders and Reports, and Operational and Tactical Maps. Part 2: The Fight for Stalingrad's Factory District-14 October – 18 November 1942 , p. 440.
13. ↑ Major Josef Linden: Never before have so many engineer battalions been deployed to a closed attack in such a narrow area during the war. in Hans Wijers: The struggle for Stalingrad; the fighting in the industrial area, October 14 to November 19, 1942 , Brummen 2001, p. 166.
14. ^ William Craig: The Battle of Stalingrad , Munich 1991, pp. 144-145.
15. ^ David Glantz: The Struggle for Stalingrad City: Opposing Orders of Battle, Combat Orders and Reports, and Operational and Tactical Maps. Part 2: The Fight for Stalingrad's Factory District-14 October – 18 November 1942 , p. 442.
16. ↑ Hans Wijers: The fight for Stalingrad, the fighting in the industrial area, October 14 to November 19, 1942 , Brummen 2001, p. 165.
17. ^ David Glantz, The Struggle for Stalingrad City: Opposing Orders of Battle, Combat Orders and Reports, and Operational and Tactical Maps. Part 2: The Fight for Stalingrad's Factory District-14 October – 18 November 1942, p. 437.
18. ^ David Glantz, The Struggle for Stalingrad City: Opposing Orders of Battle, Combat Orders and Reports, and Operational and Tactical Maps. Part 2: The Fight for Stalingrad's Factory District-14 October – 18 November 1942, p. 441.
19. ↑ Hans Wijers: The battle for Stalingrad, the battles in the industrial area, October 14 to November 19, 1942 , Brummen 2001, p. 173.
20. ^ David Glantz: The Struggle for Stalingrad City: Opposing Orders of Battle, Combat Orders and Reports, and Operational and Tactical Maps. Part 2: The Fight for Stalingrad's Factory District-14 October – 18 November 1942 , p. 444.
21. ^ David Glantz: The Struggle for Stalingrad City: Opposing Orders of Battle, Combat Orders and Reports, and Operational and Tactical Maps. Part 2: The Fight for Stalingrad's Factory District-14 October – 18 November 1942 , p. 452.
22. ^ Antony Beevor, Stalingrad, Niedernhausen 2002, p. 251.
23. ↑ Hans Wijers: The battle for Stalingrad, the battles in the industrial area, October 14 to November 19, 1942 , Brummen 2001, p. 168.
24. ↑ Political officer and Red Banner order bearer Belugin on the resistance of the 347th SR in Nikolai Krylow, Stalingrad - The decisive battle of the Second World War, Cologne 1981, p. 313.
25. ^ Militaryhistoryonline.com
26. ↑ Hans Wijers: The fight for Stalingrad, the fighting in the industrial area, October 14 to November 19, 1942 , Brummen 2001, p. 170.
27. ^ Hans Wijers: The fight for Stalingrad, the fighting in the industrial area, October 14 to November 19, 1942 , Brummen 2001, p. 166.
28. ↑ Will Fowler: Battle for Stalingrad. The conquest of the city - October 1942 , Vienna 2006, p. 142.
29. ↑ Will Fowler: Battle for Stalingrad. The conquest of the city - October 1942 , Vienna 2006, p. 147.
30. ↑ ^{a b} Hans Wijers: The fight for Stalingrad, the fighting in the industrial area, October 14 to November 19, 1942 , Brummen 2001, p. 172.
31. ^ ^{A b} Will Fowler: Battle for Stalingrad. The conquest of the city - October 1942 , Vienna 2006, p. 150.
32. ^ Janusz Piekałkiewicz : Stalingrad. Anatomy of a battle. Heyne, Munich 1993, p. 358.
33. ↑ Nikolai Krylow: Stalingrad - The decisive battle of the Second World War , Cologne 1981, p. 321.
34. ↑ Hans Wijers: The fight for Stalingrad, the fighting in the industrial area, October 14 to November 19, 1942 , Brummen 2001, p. 143.
35. ^ Helmut Welz: Betrayed Grenadiers , Berlin, 1967, p. 56.
36. ↑ Wassili Tschuikow, The Battle of the Century, Berlin 1988, p. 281.
37. ↑ Major Tomislav Brajkovic according to Hans Wijers: The fight for Stalingrad, the fighting in the industrial area, October 14 to November 19, 1942 , Brummen 2001, p. 143.
38. ↑ Helmut Welz: Betrayed Grenadiers , Berlin, 1967, p. 57.
39. ↑ ^{a b} Helmut Welz: Betrayed Grenadiers , Berlin 1973, pp. 60–61.
40. ^ Antony Beevor: Stalingrad , Niedernhausen 2002, p. 252.
41. ↑ Nikolai Krylow: Stalingrad - The decisive battle of the Second World War , Cologne 1981, p. 328.
42. ↑ feldpost.mzv.net ( Memento of the original from January 6, 2009 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. 
43. ↑ Helmut Welz: Betrayed Grenadiers , Berlin, 1967, pp. 85–87.
44. ↑ ^{a b c} Will Fowler: Battle for Stalingrad. The conquest of the city - October 1942 , Vienna 2006, p. 151.
45. ↑ theeasternfront.co.uk ( Memento from December 17, 2009 in the Internet Archive )
46. ↑ Wassili Tschuikow: The Battle of the Century , Berlin 1988, p. 276.
47. ^ Janusz Piekałkiewicz: Stalingrad. Anatomy of a battle . Heyne, Munich 1993, p. 364.
48. ^ David Glantz: The Struggle for Stalingrad City: Opposing Orders of Battle, Combat Orders and Reports, and Operational and Tactical Maps. Part 2: The Fight for Stalingrad's Factory District-14 October – 18 November 1942 , p. 457.
49. ^ Antony Beevor: Stalingrad , Niedernhausen 2002, p. 254.
50. ↑ Hans Wijers: The fight for Stalingrad, the fighting in the industrial area, October 14 to November 19, 1942. Brummen 2001, p. 175.
51. ↑ Hans Wijers: The fight for Stalingrad, the fighting in the industrial area, October 14 to November 19, 1942 , Brummen 2001, p. 176.
52. ^ Janusz Piekałkiewicz: Stalingrad. Anatomy of a battle . Heyne, Munich 1993, p. 358.
53. ^ Janusz Piekałkiewicz: Stalingrad. Anatomy of a battle . Heyne, Munich 1993, p. 359.
54. ^ Hans Wijers: The fight for Stalingrad, the fighting in the industrial area, October 14 to November 19, 1942 , Brummen 2001, p. 177.
55. ^ Janusz Piekałkiewicz: Stalingrad. Anatomy of a battle . Heyne, Munich 1993, p. 376.
56. ↑ Hans Wijers: The fight for Stalingrad, the fighting in the industrial area, October 14 to November 19, 1942 , Brummen 2001, p. 178.
57. ^ According to the Red Army, 2000 soldiers and 4 tanks; Wassili Iwanowitsch Tschuikow: The battle of the century , Military Publishing House of the GDR, Berlin 1988, p. 273.
58. ↑ Nikolai Krylow: Stalingrad - The decisive battle of the Second World War , Cologne 1981, p. 322.
59. ^ William Craig: The Battle of Stalingrad , Munich 1991, p. 146.
60. ↑ Wassili Iwanowitsch Tschuikow: The battle of the century , Military Publishing House of the GDR, Berlin 1988, p. 250.

Web links

• Operation Hubertus Part One: First Steps, First Plans
• Operation Hubertus Part Two: Soviet Preparations
• Operation Hubertus Part Three: Day by Day Account, 9. – 12. November 1942
• Operation Hubertus Part Four: Day by Day Account, 13. – 19. November 1942
• Operation Hubertus: Evaluation and Conclusions
• The Struggle for Stalingrad City