Deculakization

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Deployment as part of the deculakization . The banners read: “We will liquidate the kulaks as a class” and “Everything for the fight against the saboteurs of agriculture”.

The dekulakization ( Russian раскулачивание raskul a tschiwanije ), occasionally dekulakization or Kulakendeportation was a political campaign of repression in the Soviet Union who, during the dictatorship of Joseph Stalin from 1929 to 1933 against so-called kulaks taught. Arrests, expropriations , executions and mass deportations characterized this policy.

In particular, peasant families considered to be wealthy , but also so-called middle peasants and their relatives, as well as those rural residents who actually or supposedly rejected the policies of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) were the target of violent repression. Around 30,000 people were shot. Around 2.1 million people were deported to distant, inhospitable regions - 1.8 million of them from 1930 to 1931. Another 2 to 2.5 million people were forcibly relocated to poorer soils in their home region . Experts estimate that deculacization through hunger, disease and executions cost 530,000 to 600,000 lives. In 1930 in particular, the peasants reacted with considerable resistance to the state's campaign of violence. At times, party and state officials feared that the peasant resistance could develop into a nationwide uprising.

The deculakization threatened the peasantry through physical annihilation, deportation and expropriation. In this way it should help the forced collectivization to break through. As a result, deculacization and collectivization subjected the entire peasantry to state control and made a major contribution to radically changing the traditional rural social system. At the same time, the deculakization laid the foundation for the expansion of the Gulag system.

The combination of deculakization, forced collectivization and other repressive measures led to the breakdown of agriculture in many regions of the Soviet Union, especially in traditional agricultural surplus regions. This collapse was one of the causes of the Holodomor , an epoch-making famine with around five to seven million deaths in Ukraine, and a famine in other parts of the Soviet Union.

Background and history

Peasants and Bolsheviks

The October Revolution in 1917 legitimized the decree on land the distinction made by the farmers on their own expropriation of Country Estate, church and monastery lands, as well as by the village community Mir ( Russian мир made division) in this country after the Subsistenzprinzip . Until the end of the civil war (1921), however, this did not mean the liberation from war and coercion, since the peasants were recruited for associations of the Red Army , the White Troops or for peasant insurrectionary armies (see, for example, the Tambov peasant revolt ). At the same time they suffered from the extensive forced requisitions of agricultural products, which the Bolsheviks carried out to secure their power. As far back as the oldest farmers could remember, a persistent drought such as the spring of 1921 had always brought with it hunger and massive, slow death. Although the catastrophe that occurred under Lenin could not be called terror, it was by no means simply a natural occurrence. Civil war, red and white terror , uprisings, requisitions and the neglect of agricultural tasks led to a famine in town and country that affected around 30 million people in 1921/22 and cost five million lives.

The New Economic Policy (NEP) - “a political delaying action for a future economic revolution” - ushered in “a 'golden time' for the village and agriculture” and calmed tensions between the Bolsheviks and peasants without, however, being able to completely eliminate them. The political rulers replaced the practice of requisitions with taxes in kind and later with taxes on money . They also allowed the re-establishment of market mechanisms for the allocation of agricultural products; They also slowed down their initiatives to socialize the farm goods of the farmers, who at that time made up 85 percent of the total population . Despite their different ideological ideas, the Bolsheviks were forced to make the economy of these years semi-state and semi-capitalist.

With the withdrawal of the Bolshevik requisitioning commands and the terrorist units of the Cheka from the villages, it became clear that the communists were without any base outside the cities. The Soviet regime remained a foreign and foreign power for the majority of the peasants. For the party officials, the country became a dangerous terra incognita with a milieu to which they had no access. They regarded the “village” as a cipher of backwardness, as a symbol of old Russia of “icons and cockroaches” ( Trotsky ). A number of leading officials had a marked hatred of farmers. They included Josef Stalin , Lasar Kaganowitsch , Grigory Ordzhonikidze , Anastas Mikoyan , Kliment Voroshilov and Vyacheslav Molotov .

The village itself, often cut off from all means and channels of communication to “civilization”, was shaped by rumors , illiteracy , belief and superstition , alcohol and violence. The village community managed itself with the help of the village assembly (сход / s'chod) . The institution of the village soviet , promoted by the communists, remained practically insignificant. The revitalization of the rural economy by the NEP also preserved the power relations associated with this agricultural economy. None of this had anything to do with what the Bolsheviks considered " progress ". Mentally , politically, culturally and economically, the majority of the peasants refused to accept the new state power and urban lifestyles. The Bolsheviks therefore distrusted the peasants and considered them potential restorers of capitalism . Kulaks in particular were considered to be enemies .

Structure of the peasantry

In the years of the NEP, the proportion of rural residents in the total population decreased. In 1924 83.7% of all Soviet citizens lived in the village, in 1930 it was 80.7%. However, the absolute number of villagers increased; even after the rural exodus has been subtracted , there was an increase of 4.2 million people. At the same time, the village population was young. A 1926 census showed that over 50% of the villagers were under 20 years of age.

The Marxist idea of ​​clearly distinguishable classes found no basis in the material conditions in the country. The tradition of the regular redistribution of village fields by the Russian village communities to the peasant households according to their changing needs prevented a continuation of the ownership structure. Individual farmsteads outside of the village communities, which only existed since the Stolypin agrarian reforms and increased at the time of the NEP, were of little importance, and their residents were not always wealthy. Villagers took on several economic and social roles over the course of the year : they were farmers in summer, migrant workers in winter or in the home industry, migrant traders or day laborers during the harvest , depending on the season . The social differentiation had not solidified into “classes”. Nevertheless, the Marxist economists and statisticians of the Soviet Union with their extensive monopoly of interpretation divided the villagers into large social groups:

  • On the one hand there was therefore the group of landless agricultural workers (batraki) . This included shepherds , day laborers or servants . Many members of this group of people were young and left this group after entering a new phase of life - often after marriage.
  • The poor were those who did not have enough land to support a family. As a rule, they did not have any draft animals . They were forced to offer their labor outside of their own economy - as servants, day laborers or seasonal workers . Taken together, the landless and poor made up around 35 to 40% of the rural population after the civil war.
  • The middle peasants were identified as a further group . They made up the bulk of the rural population; after the end of the civil war, their share was estimated at 55 to 60%. The middle farmer owned an inn that he farmed himself. The income was not abundant, but was enough to support his family and sell the small surpluses. Occasionally, he had to supplement his apparatus of equipment by borrowing further inventory, and he also lent equipment himself. He often had a small number of livestock. In the winter, the members of this large group also worked at home. For example, they made bast shoes, textiles and toys. Middle farmers were the main producers of grain , largely responsible for supplying the cities and therefore the main addressees of the NEP.
  • From the perspective of contemporary Soviet Marxists who dealt with the conditions in the countryside, the kulak was considered to be the holder of the greatest economic power. The term had a derogatory meaning and was intended to mark the " exploiter " in the village. Which criterion made a farmer a kulak , however, was always unclear, the definition of the term kulak was "so vague that it fit almost everyone". For example, it was conceivable that equipment and draft horses could be rented or that day laborers were employed - phenomena that in real village life by no means only applied to the kulaks . Half a million farms at most belonged to this category; this corresponded to a number of about three million people or two percent of all households.

Forced industrialization

With the decision to accelerate the industrialization of the Soviet Union , Stalin had set a decisive milestone in the “ great turning point ”. Since Lenin's death in January 1924, not only had the left opposition in the CPSU been defeated, the “party rights” around Nikolai Bukharin , who had pleaded for a moderate pace of the modernization process, had also been eliminated. In the first five-year plan (1928–1932) approved in 1929 , the ideas of rapid industrialization were expressed, which should ensure the connection to the economic and technological level of the industrialized countries within just a decade. As he emphasized in February 1931, Stalin considered such a major development spurt to be imperative because, in his opinion, the neighboring countries were working towards the destruction of the Soviet Union. Consequently, the focus was on building up heavy industry and less on developing the consumer goods industry .

Because this industrialization could neither be financed by exploiting colonies nor by taking out loans abroad, the peasantry had to pay a “ tribute ”, according to Stalin. Grain exports were supposed to finance the equipment and goods necessary to build up the industry. The farmers themselves should not receive full equivalents for the agricultural products they acquire . Stalin made the peasantry more or less an internal colony from which the necessary capital for economic development was to be extracted.

Collectivization of agriculture

The decision to accelerate the industrialization of the country corresponded with increased efforts to collectivize agriculture. Despite considerable propaganda efforts and various administrative pressures, collectivization had made little progress until the end of the 1920s. In 1926 there were only 18,000 such cooperative groups in the USSR . In particular those peasants who had nothing to lose fled to these kolkhozes . The state sovkhozes were even less important. In 1929 the proportion of peasants who had given up their individual property was 7.6%.

The party leadership around Stalin hoped that collectivization would lead to significant increases in agricultural yields. At the same time, it considered the traditional forms of agricultural economy to be out of date, rejected them for ideological reasons and also provided for state planning and control in this area. The party conference of April 1929, which approved the first five-year plan, still assumed that by the end of 1932 around 23% of all farms would be collectivized. A few months later, on the occasion of the twelfth anniversary of the October Revolution, Stalin published an article entitled "The Year of the Great Turnaround". He claimed that the middle peasants were entering the collective farms in large numbers. The target figures for collectivization were then increased significantly: the goal of fully collectivized agriculture would not only be attainable in a few years, but in a few months. On January 5, 1930, the Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union therefore decided on full collectivization in the core agricultural regions by autumn 1930, but no later than autumn 1931. This decision was followed by agitation and coercion in the countryside. The reports of success seemed to confirm all efforts: As early as February 1930, statisticians estimated the Soviet Union-wide share of collectivized peasant farms at 31.7%; on March 1, this value was 57.2%. For the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic 60.8% were reported on March 1, for the area of ​​the middle and lower Volga it was 60–70%, for the Central Black Earth region 83.3% were reported.

Supply crisis

Obtaining sufficient quantities of grain remained a permanent problem for the Bolsheviks even in the years of the NEP. In the autumn of 1925, the party leadership raised the purchase prices when not enough grain could be found, thus easing the supply situation. In the winter of 1927/28 she decided on the opposite strategy - she relied on coercion and "extraordinary measures". Stalin accused the kulaks , they were hoarding grain to force in this way, higher prices. The Bolsheviks then tried to incite the poor peasants against the kulaks . In the propaganda, the kulaks were accused of forbidden “ speculation ”, their denunciation was encouraged and severe punishments - three to five years imprisonment - were threatened. The state organs confiscated grain stocks and paid high "finder's wages" of a quarter of the assumed value to the respective informant. These coercive measures were specifically linked to those of the civil war.

Nevertheless, the overall successes remained modest. In mid-1928 the party leadership moved away from the repressive course and relied again on market mechanisms. This ambivalent policy of the Bolsheviks, which wavered between coercion and incentive, reinforced the peasants' suspicion. The party leadership decided to buy the missing grain abroad - the traditional grain exporter appeared as an importer for the first time in years . In autumn 1928 bread had to be rationed - a first since the end of the civil war.

In 1929, however, the party leadership again resorted to means of repression to obtain grain. This was all the easier because the internal influence of the “party right”, who pleaded for a moderate pace of development, was now finally reduced to a minimum. Stalin was now in a position to exert his influence without significant resistance.

The range of coercive measures was supplemented by a seemingly popular one: the “Ural-Siberian method”, named after the regions in which it was first used. An essential feature of this method was to let village assemblies made up of poor and middle peasants decide what part the kulaks should contribute to fulfilling the village grain delivery obligation. This was intended to suggest support for the anti-kulak policy of the Bolsheviks and at the same time create an occasion to punish kulaks who failed to meet their high delivery obligations. The penalties ranged from drastically increased tax obligations for defaulting kulaks to their expropriation and deportations.

The harvest remained just below the level of 1928, although the image of a significantly improved supply situation had already been propagated . To avoid the impending loss of face, increased procurement quotas have now been set. A monthly fee was set for each village. Requisition activists from the cities drove in these crowds.

The passive and active resistance of the peasants was inevitable. Many slaughtered their cattle and buried or burned their grain. Farmers attacked those who wanted to squeeze their grain or started fires. However, this resistance was unsuccessful. Leading Bolsheviks announced in December 1929 that the procurement targets for the winter of 1929/30 had almost been achieved. It remained, however, a Pyrrhic victory : the farmers' strengths had been overestimated, and there were hardly any reserves for the coming financial year. In many cases, farmers gave up their economy in order to look for industrial employment in the expanding cities. The world market prices for grain also fell sharply as a result of the global economic crisis , so that the Bolsheviks could not acquire the equipment and machines urgently needed for the development of industry to the desired extent.

course

Announcement and decision

At a conference in front of agricultural experts on December 27, 1929, Stalin sharply criticized all ideas about integrating kulaks into the new kolkhozes. Instead, he announced the "liquidation of the kulaks as a class". He called for an “offensive against the capitalist elements of the village” and thus sparked a real war against the peasants and the village.

At first it was unclear how this "liquidation" should take place - it remained the task of the local authorities to interpret and implement Stalin's announcement. Despite the lack of clear instructions from Moscow, mass deculacization began in January 1930 in many areas , for example in the Urals , Transcaucasia , the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and in the Ryazan Oblast near Moscow. The campaign quickly gained momentum and caused considerable turmoil across the country.

Under the chairmanship of Vyacheslav Molotov , one of Stalin's closest trust, a commission began its work on January 15, 1930, which was supposed to regulate the main features of the deculakization campaign. The Politburo of the CPSU had already entrusted the Molotov Commission with this task in November 1929. The committee included all party secretaries from the important wheat-growing regions as well as their colleagues from those territories that had been chosen as targets for the upcoming kulak deportations. The members also included Genrich Jagoda (Deputy Head of the OGPU ), Sergei Syrzow (Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars ), Jakow Jakowlew , Nikolai Muralow , Moissei Kalmanowitsch (People's Commissariat for the Sovkhoz ), Tikhon Jurkin (Head of the Zentralny organ uprawlenami kollektiwnami , des “Central organ for the management of collective farms”), Grigori Kaminski and Karl Bauman , First Party Secretary in Moscow Oblast .

On January 30, 1930, the Politburo approved the Commission's proposals with the directive “On Measures to Eliminate Kulak Households in Areas of Complete Collectivization”. In the areas that were intended for rapid total collectivization in the North Caucasus as well as on the Middle and Lower Volga, all kulak farms were to be liquidated. The kulaks' economic goods were expropriated - this affected all work and equipment , the stocks of fodder and seeds, livestock, farm buildings and residential buildings as well as processing plants. The decision of the Politburo divided the affected farmers , who were stigmatized as kulaks, into three categories:

  • The first category was made up of members of the so-called “ counter-revolutionary kulak activists”. This meant peasants who opposed collectivization. The resolution named here the number of 60,000 people. They were to be sent to concentration camps for an indefinite period . If members of this group of people had participated in riots , the “highest repressive measures” were provided: shooting without trial . Responsibility for members of this category lay with the OGPU , the successor organization to the Cheka .
  • The Bolsheviks labeled category two all those they considered the richest kulaks and “semi-landowners”. These were to be deported together with their relatives - 150,000 families in total - to inhospitable and deserted areas of the far north (70,000 families), Siberia (50,000 families), the Urals and Kazakhstan (20,000-25,000 families each). Carrying some means of production and modest supplies was permitted. Who belonged to these deportees was determined by the District Soviet on the basis of resolutions of the Committee of Village Poverty and Collective Farms .
  • The third category comprised those people who wanted to resettle in their home region - they were pushed into areas with poor soils by the collective farms. The property of these farmers has been partially confiscated. The number of those affected is unclear - it varies between 396,000 and 852,000 households. The local soviets and party organs were to exercise control over the people of this third category, who were assigned to reclamation , forestry, road building and similar activities.

The resolution of January 30, 1930 set a tight time frame. By April 15, 1930, at least half of those expropriated and imprisoned according to category one or those expropriated and deported according to category two had to have arrived at their destination by the end of May 1930.

Personnel and cost issues were also settled. Instructions were issued to increase the number of OGPU units in the Oblasts of Moscow , Leningrad , Ivanovo , Nizhny Novgorod , Kharkov and in the Donbass by 1,100 men. In addition, 2500 party members are to be mobilized for the deculakization. The Council of People's Commissars was supposed to submit a budget for the construction of new camps in the far north and in Siberia within three days. The OGPU had to set up a timetable for the deportation trains that were to take the displaced to their destinations within five days.

At the end of February 1930, at a secret conference of high party functionaries of all Soviet republics and party committees, which was specially convened for the implementation of the deculakization campaign, Molotov encouraged those present to perform at their best by underlining that Stalin, Lazar Kaganovich and himself were responsible for the campaign. He made it clear to the listeners, who are bound to secrecy, that ruthless and lethal violence is necessary:

“I must confidently say that when individual comrades asked me at the November plenary [1929] what was to be done with the kulaks, I said that if there was a suitable river, they would drown. There is not a flow everywhere, which means that the answer was inadequate [...] It seems to me that there is no doubt that it will not work without repressive measures. We are forced to shoot them. (Shouting: resettle!). Number one: shoot, number two: resettle [...] It is obvious that we are forced to use proper repressive measures. It will not work without relocating a good number of people from different ends. Where do we send them to? (Shouting: To oak !). In concentration camps, if they are available at Oak, then at Oak. "

Immediately on the spot, the leaders of the deculakization squads also called for no consideration. Such a person in charge impressed on his subordinates:

“When you attack, there is no mercy. Do not think of the hungry kulak children; the class struggle is philanthropy out of place. "

In 1930 Stalin also described the conflict with the kulaks as a "deadly fight".

Vulgar propaganda accompanied the attack by the state on a group of people charged with imagined crimes. A poster titled “We'll destroy the kulaks as a class!” Showed a kulak under the wheels of a tractor, a second monkey hoarding grain, and a third sucking milk directly from a cow's teats with his mouth. The message was clear: kulaks were not humans, they were animals. This was not only expressed in the imagery, but also in words. The peasant opponents were no longer people, but "insects", "bacteria", "weeds" and "waste".

Role of the OGPU

With the deculakization, the OGPU , which has been the secret police of the Soviet Union since 1922, again sharpened its profile as the revolutionary and repressive arm of the party and state - like the Cheka during the revolutionary and civil war. At the same time, deculakization was its most important task since 1921. The OGPU as the political police of the Soviet Union faced challenges that went well beyond those of previous years: large-scale raids , military campaigns against rural resistance, the transport of deportees and the expansion of OGPU activities the villages. The preparatory work for this took place at the same time as the deliberations of the Molotov Commission. Yefim Evdokimov , a highly decorated rival of Yagoda in the secret service and a close confidante of Stalin, played a leading role .

On February 2, 1930, three days after the Politburo decision to deculakize, OGPU order No. 44/21 “On the liquidation of kulaks as a class” was available. He ordered the immediate formation of troikas among the regional OGPU representatives. Such a tripartite body - "Terrorist instance par excellence in the history of Soviet mass repression, from the civil war to the Katyn murders " - was composed of the local representative of the secret service, the first secretary of the party committee and the chairman of the Soviet Executive Committee. It sentenced the kulaks of category one in court-like short trials to prison terms, detention in a camp or to be shot - without reference to ordinary courts or legal procedures. The treatment of kulaks of "category one" was to be carried out without delay in accordance with the OGPU order. In addition, assembly points had to be set up for the smooth transport of the deportees. The order also instructed the OGPU services to check all letters sent to soldiers in the Red Army and abroad.

First phase

The local party bodies implemented the decision of the Politburo consistently and quickly. The local OGPU members acted in the same way with the instructions of the Moscow OGPU headquarters. The first report to Jagoda on February 6, 1930 reported 15,985 arrests, three days later there were 25,245. On February 15, 1930, the total reported number of arrests was 64,389, the target number of 60,000 had already been exceeded.

Other groups of people were also victims of the repression. The wave of arrests also affected former police officers of the tsarist era , former white officers , farmers with craft businesses, representatives of the village intelligentsia , former traders and others. Again and again the activists of collectivization and deculakization took action against representatives of the clergy : in the villages priests , pastors , rabbis and mullahs were arrested, expropriated and exiled. In addition, sacred buildings were often closed. The activists removed many church bells and organized the public burning of icons of the Russian Orthodox Church . In a report dated February 15, 1930, Jagoda demanded clear corrections that the blows should be aimed specifically at the kulaks .

The OGPU reports reflected the extent of the violence: members of the poor in the village and the landless farmers

"Driven the unculakized into the street naked, beat them, organized binge drinking in their houses, shot over their heads, forced them to dig their own graves, stripped and searched women, stole valuables, money, etc."

“The deculakers took away the rich farmers' winter clothes and warm underwear, and first of all their shoes. They left the kulak in his underpants and took everything, including the old rubber shoes, women's clothes, tea for 50 kopeks , poker, jugs […] The brigades confiscated everything, including the small pillows on which the children put their heads had lying. They took the kascha from the stove and poured it over the broken icons. "

Household items and entire buildings were often given to new owners for a fraction of their value instead of being transferred to the collective farm's inalienable fund in accordance with regulations. The expropriations thus turned into looting and a settlement with old opponents. In many cases women were raped in unculakization campaigns .

The party leadership in Moscow was informed of the excessive violence through reports from the provinces, but they did not intervene; on the contrary: Lasar Kaganowitsch, Grigory Ordzhonikidze, Anastas Mikoyan and Vyacheslav Molotov made themselves a picture of the situation on site and forced the violence against the kulaks .

resistance

The farmers not only passively resist by selling their property in advance or by hand-destroying it and slaughtering their cattle on a large scale. In the course of 1930 the authorities were literally inundated with complaints and petitions in which the senders complained of disenfranchisement, expropriation and banishment and demanded that these measures be withdrawn. Those affected wrote to their husbands, sons and brothers serving in the Red Army about the violence in the villages; occasionally the villagers would go straight to the barracks and request protection.

Many soldiers and army officers resolutely opposed collectivization and Dekulakization, and in this respect the army was not the hoped-for pillar of the party. In a number of regions, members of the local party organs and the local militia also refused to take part in deculacization measures. The OGPU headquarters claimed that many local officials and power holders had close or family relationships with "hostile elements".

Many farmers also resorted to open violence against the activists of collectivization and deculakization. OGPU employees reported an increasing number of open peasant resistance actions. According to the secret service, 402 revolts and mass rallies were counted for January 1930 . In February there were 1048, in the following month 6528. For the years 1929 and 1930, the OGPU named a total of 22,887 “terrorist acts” in which around 1,100 representatives of the state and the party were killed. Villagers who fled from the deculakization squads often formed gangs which in the following period repeatedly threatened and attacked collective farms. In some regions, for example in today's Azerbaijan , the state order collapsed outside the provincial capitals; Farmers' associations there managed to bring entire cities such as Quba , Ordubad and Naxçıvan under their control. The worsening conflict between the regime and the peasantry led top officials like Trade Commissioner Anastas Mikoyan to speak of an “extremely dangerous situation”. News of massive resistance from farmers in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, the central Black Earth region and Siberia also fueled the fears of other high party officials.

Tactical break

On March 2, 1930, Pravda published Stalin's article, "Infected with dizziness before successes". With this, the party leader reacted ostensibly to the nationwide peasant unrest. In order to avert the danger of a regime crisis through the spreading peasant uprisings, Stalin criticized "violations and distortions". The pace of collectivization is too high and the administrative pressure on the farmers is a failure. To scapegoats Stalin made exclusively local rulers. At the same time he emphasized the alleged voluntary nature of collectivization. In this way, he seemed to signal understanding and courtesy to the farmers.

Millions of farmers refuted Stalin's reports of success. They interpreted Stalin's article as a license for a mass exodus from the kolkhozes. The number of collectivized households fell significantly. On March 1, 1930, 57% of all households across the country were considered collectivized. Two months later it was only 28%. In the central Black Earth region the corresponding value fell from 83 to 18%, in Moscow Oblast from 73.6% (February 1930) to 12.3% (April 1930).

The unrest in the countryside did not decrease, because the peasants demanded the surrender of their former possessions, the withdrawal of collectivization and deculakization and the end of the anti-religious campaign. Around 20% of the expropriated families actually got their property back after legal complaints. The dispossessed also tried to a considerable extent to enforce their claims by force. The OGPU counted 6,500 "mass rallies" in those months, 800 of which were suppressed at gunpoint and 1,500 officials were beaten, injured or killed.

The number of participants in local riots increased significantly: in January 1930 they were over 109,000 people, in February 1930 the number rose to more than 214,000; In March 1930, the political coercive apparatus finally numbered more than 1.4 million participants.

Second phase

However, Stalin's Pravda article of March 2, 1930, the mass exodus from the kolkhozes and the expansion of peasant resistance turned out to be short-lived successes for the peasants. After the harvest in the late summer of 1930, the second wave of deculakization began. In the eyes of the leading Bolsheviks, the kulaks, the main enemies, had already been defeated. The attack is now to be carried out against the "new kulaks": the "half" or "lower Kulaks". Since December 1930, coercive measures were used again in this campaign.

In March 1931, the Politburo set up the Andreev Commission , named after Andrei Andreev , then head of the Workers 'and Peasants' Inspectorate, to coordinate the second phase of the deculakization . This body was dominated by high-ranking OGPU functionaries, including Jagoda. As early as February 20, 1931, the Politburo had instructed the OGPU to prepare for the exile of another 200,000 to 300,000 farming families, a number that the Politburo reduced to 120,000 on April 5, 1931. According to OGPU statistics, 265,795 families or 1,243,860 people were actually deported in 1931; 95,544 families were sent to the Urals, 54,360 to Western Siberia, 49,455 to Kazakhstan, 14,508 to Eastern Siberia, 11,648 to the northern territories and 5,778 to the Far East of the Soviet Union. On April 10, 1932, the Andreev Commission recommended resettling another 30,000 to 35,000 kulak families by the end of the year; the Politburo increased this number to 38,000 families on April 16, 1932. In 1933 more than half a million people were supposed to be deported. The corresponding decision of the Politburo of July 5, 1933 read:

“In an amendment to the order of the Central Committee of June 17 of this year, in accordance with the instructions of the Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of May 8, in the course of 1933 there were 124,000 who were already resettled or who were already on the way to send an additional 426,000 people to the work settlements (trudposelki) in Western Siberia and Kazakhstan. "

The Andreev Commission was dissolved at the end of 1932. On May 8, 1933, Stalin and Molotov finally stopped the campaign against the kulaks by issuing instructions to the OGPU, the judicial authorities and the party committees . The power of the “ class enemy ” in the village was broken, and a continuation of the deculakization could finally undermine the influence of the Bolsheviks in the countryside.

The peasant resistance to the second wave of deculakization and collectivization was significantly weaker than that against the first wave, because the peasants were decisively weakened by the continued massive state repression and, above all, by hunger and the fear of a major national famine.

Deportations

Kulak deportations 1930–1931

The peasants singled out for deportation were first taken to assembly points and then to train stations. There they had to get into unheated goods wagons that were put together to form deportation trains. From mid-February 1930 they began the journey to the kulak exile, some of which lasted more than two weeks. The OGPU's plan provided for 240 trains with 53 wagons each for the first phase of deculakation, 44 of these wagons were intended for the separated people (according to the plan, 40 people per wagon). The abduction was often delayed, which led to longer stays in shunting yards . The local population thus witnessed the deportations and denounced the inhumane conditions of the transports, sometimes in community letters to Moscow.

Often all valuables were taken from people before they started their journey, so that the allowed 30 poods of luggage and provisions as well as 500 rubles in cash per family remained theoretical. OGPU reports indicate that the expropriations, looting and thefts continued while the trip was in progress. Very often the deportees arrived at the destination stations without sufficient clothing, tools and household items.

In the hectic arrival, luggage was often lost. The deported families were usually separated, able-bodied men were brought into the interior of the country, and the family members who were not able to work - mothers and children under 16 and older people - were sent to transit camps and shelters near the destination stations. If there was no temporary accommodation there, the families were also immediately transported further inland. Many OGPU reports made it clear that in the target regions there was often no organizational preparation for the influx of these farmers who had been driven from their homeland. Inspectors from the People's Commissariat for Home Affairs and the People's Commissariat for Health criticized the conditions in the transit dwellings; these are dirty, dark, cold and "colossally" overcrowded.

The supply of food to the deportees remained inadequate, so that hunger quickly spread. The combination of malnutrition and malnutrition , extreme temperatures and unsanitary conditions led to the outbreak of diseases such as scarlet fever , measles , typhoid , meningitis , diphtheria or pneumonia , in particular, met children. The disease rate of the special settlers exceeded that of the normal population by five times. These living conditions caused the high mortality rates , especially among children.

The way from the transit camps to the final settlement locations in the interior - these had to be off the road - could be several hundred kilometers long. This final stage of the deportation of category two kulaks was similar to the deportation of category three kulaks resettled within their region of origin. Such settlement points were scattered over hundreds of thousands of square kilometers in Siberia or the Urals. In winter the route was covered on sledges, in summer by carts and on foot.

Special settlers

Construction of the Baltic-White Sea Canal. Special settlers were also used as forced labor on this major construction site. (1932)

Provided that the persons concerned were not shot, had kulaks category one try in prison or in labor camps of the Gulag to survive. Their families were among the deportees.

Kulaks in categories two and three were supposed to be given “productive work” at the destinations of the deportation routes: clearing forests, reclaiming soil, building roads and canals. At the same time, they were used on large construction sites of Stalinism, such as the construction of the White Sea-Baltic Canal or the city of Magnitogorsk .

The productivity of the special settlers - also called labor settlers or labor colonists - remained far below expectations. For example, in April 1931, of the 300,000 or so deported to the Urals, only 8% were engaged in “sawing wood or other productive work”. The rest of the men built themselves homes or were in some other way preoccupied with survival. Because places for the settlements were often chosen completely arbitrarily and were not suitable for living and doing business, the hope of a self-sustaining settlement system remained a dream. Instead of self-sufficiency , these settlements, the number of which is estimated at over 2,000, were dependent on outside support: delivery of building materials, tools and machines as well as food. The priority of building industries and kolkhozes, disinterest, inattention, bureaucratic chaos, rivalries between the institutions involved and theft meant that such deliveries did not materialize. Under these circumstances, the construction of the special settlements progressed only very slowly. In the eyes of the local rulers, the deportees themselves were to blame for this, as they were “lazy”, “hostile” or “anti-Soviet”. The special settlements should all be established by September 30, 1930. In fact, only a fraction of the planned buildings had been completed by this time.

Due to the living conditions in the settlements, many deportees fled; as early as February 1931, the OGPU reported 72,000 refugee special settlers. The number of people living in special settlements decreased continuously in the course of the 1930s: in 1931 the OGPU counted 1,803,392 special settlers, at the beginning of 1933 there were 1,317,000 people; immediately before the start of the Second World War the number was 930,000.

Impact and reception

Casualty numbers

The deculakization claimed more than four million victims: around 30,000 people were shot, around 2.1 million were deported as kulaks of category one and two to remote, inhospitable regions. 2 to 2.5 million other people were affected by forced relocation to poorer soil as category three kulaks in their home region . The death toll ranges from 530,000 to 600,000 people. They died of disease and hunger during the transports, in the transit dwellings or in the special settlements. In addition, more than a million farmers evaded the collectivization and deculakization commands through "self-deculakization" - they fled to the cities beforehand and tried to build a new existence there.

consequences

Collectivization and deculakization forced the peasants to submit to the power claims of the state and the party. From then on, the entire peasantry had to pay the “tribute” demanded by Stalin for the development of the state and industry. Agricultural products were to be delivered as export goods and for supplying the cities and the Red Army. Submission and control of the peasantry should also ensure the smoothest possible exploitation of resources: grain, labor , raw materials , recruits for the army.

As the first and largest deportation measure in the Stalinist Soviet Union, the kulak deportations ensured the establishment of a forced labor colony in the interior and thus the rise of the gulag system through the establishment of special settlements in areas hostile to life. Over time, other persecuted groups were to follow in these settlements: "socially alien elements" - that is, marginalized groups of people from the cities - as well as those ethnic groups that Stalin had forcibly resettled in the interior during the Second World War.

Starving people in Kharkiv (1933).

The attempted destruction of the traditional structures of work and life in the village drove the agriculture of the Soviet Union to ruin. When the Bolsheviks covered the country with another rigid and ruthless grain procurement campaign in the winter of 1932/33, the Holodomor immediately followed - a famine with at least 25 to 30 million starving people and around five to seven million dead. The people in the traditional grain surplus regions were particularly affected by starvation.

The escalation of violence in the course of the deculakization as well as the widespread peasant resistance against the Bolshevik policy and its actors let the climate of civil war rise again. It also fueled the fear of an omnipresent conspiracy among the political rulers , which is responsible for all problems of everyday life and the economy.

Even after the end of the deculakization, the peasants vilified as kulaks were not spared from oppression and deadly violence. In early 1933, domestic passports were introduced. One of the thrusts of this measure was to prevent the influx of peasants and refugee special settlers in regime cities.

The second major attack on the kulaks took place in 1937 : In the course of the Great Terror, the top leadership of the Soviet Union legitimized the so-called kulak operation with NKVD order no. 00447 . From August 1937 to November 1938, 800,000 to 820,000 people were arrested, of whom at least 350,000 - possibly up to 445,000 - were shot, the rest were sent to the Gulag prison camps.

Almost 40% of all people in the kulak exile were under 16 years of age. Unless they survived their exile, they fought for life with the stigma , kulaks or to be descended from them. Those affected often concealed their origins and experiences later on, even in close family circles.

research

It was not until the Russian “archive revolution” at the beginning of the 1990s that researchers had access to important sources from which the background and details of collectivization and deculakization emerged. From 1999 to 2003, a five-volume collection of documents was published in Russian on this topic, covering the period from 1927 to 1939. An excerpt from these sources has been translated into English with introductory explanations.

The research made it clear that deculacization was an important driving force behind collectivization: it functioned as a real threat to the village in order to force the majority of the peasants into collective farms. The property of the deported kulaks was also used to provide material resources for the kolkhozes. The kulaks , branded as “enemies” , were also spatially isolated by the mass deportations. The kulak deportations can thus be understood as a first radical experiment in social engineering under Stalinism .

In the history of the Soviet Union, the deculakization is an essential milestone of the Stalinist terror. At the same time, it points beyond the history of the USSR. With regard to the kulak deportations, the historian and Stalinism expert Jörg Baberowski describes state-organized deportations and the mass killing of stigmatized groups of people as a phenomenon of the 20th century. It was first practiced by the Bolsheviks in the Soviet Union.

Even Manfred Hildermeier sees the deportation campaigns harbingers of coming events: The accounts affected by the Kulakendeportationen Volga Germans

“Cast the deep shadow of those murderous horrors of night and foggy operations, which the secret police resorted to in various regimes of the thirties and which, especially during World War II , were sadly known in connection with the crazy demographic 'land consolidations' and the 'final solution' of the Jewish question achieved. "

The American historian Norman M. Naimark regards deculacization as genocidal politics. He proposes an expansion of the conventional genocide concept, which would be suitable to characterize several of the great violence campaigns in Soviet history - in addition to the deculacization, the Holodomor, the ethnically motivated deportations during the Second World War and the Great Terror - as genocide. However, this expansion of the term genocide has met with clear criticism.

References

literature

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  • Manfred Hildermeier: The Soviet Union 1917–1991. (Oldenbourg floor plan of history, vol. 31), Oldenbourg, 2nd edition, Munich 2007, ISBN 978-3-486-58327-4 .
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  • Lynne Viola, VP Danilov, NA Ivnitskii, and Denis Kozlov (Eds.): The War Against the Peasantry. The Tragedy of the Soviet Contryside. Yale University Press, New Haven & London 2005, ISBN 0-300-10612-2 .
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Web links

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Numbers from Hildermeier, Stalinismus und Terror , p. 595 and Werth, Ein Staat gegen seine Volk , p. 165.
  2. ↑ a b Hildermeier, Stalinismus und Terror , p. 595.
  3. ↑ See Hildermeier, Die Sowjetunion , p. 38 f.
  4. ↑ Wolfgang Zank: Stille Vernichtung , Zeit Online , December 3, 2008.
  5. ^ Benjamin Murry Weissman: Herbert Hoover and Famine Relief to Soviet Russia. 1921-1923 , Hoover Institution Press, Stanford 1974, p. 1, ISBN 0-8179-1341-6
  6. ^ Bertrand M. Patenaude : The Big Show in Bololand. The American Relief Expedition to Soviet Russia in the Famine of 1921 , Stanford University Press, Stanford 2002, p. 26, ISBN 0-8047-4493-9
  7. ↑ The death toll according to Luks, History of Russia and the Soviet Union , p. 160 and Werth, Ein Staat gegen seine Volk , p. 140; Number of those affected by hunger in Werth, Ein Staat gegen seine Volk , p. 140. On the requisition policy of the Bolsheviks, see Hildermeier, Geschichte der Sowjetunion 1917–1991 , p. 146 f.
  8. ↑ Timothy Snyder : Bloodlands. Europe between Hitler and Stalin , CH Beck, Munich 2011, ISBN 978-3-406-62184-0 , p. 33.
  9. ↑ Hildermeier, Geschichte der Sovietunion 1917–1991 , p. 253. For the situation of agriculture in the years of the NEP see ibid, p. 253–262, Davies, The socialist offensive , p. 4–38 as well as Viola, best sons , p 19-23.
  10. ↑ Werth, Ein Staat gegen seine Volk , p. 149.
  11. ↑ Heinert, Feindbild 'Kulak' , p. 364.
  12. ↑ Baberowski, Der Rote Terror , p. 61.
  13. ^ Davies, The socialist offensive , p. 54.
  14. ^ Werth, A State Against His People , p. 150.
  15. ↑ Baberowski, Der Rote Terror , p. 123.
  16. ↑ Baberowski, The enemy is everywhere , p. 669. See also Baberowski, Der Rote Terror , p. 125.
  17. ↑ Baberowski, Der Rote Terror , pp. 62–66.
  18. ↑ For their significance, see Hildermeier, Geschichte der Sovietunion 1917–1991 , pp. 287 f.
  19. ↑ Baberowski, Der Rote Terror , p. 67 f.
  20. ↑ Baberowski, Der Rote Terror , p. 69.
  21. ↑ Heinert, Feindbild 'Kulak' , p. 364 f.
  22. ^ Fitzpatrick, Stalin's Peasants, p. 29.
  23. ↑ Absolute and relative numbers according to Hildermeier, Geschichte der Sowjetunion 1917–1991 , p. 284.
  24. ↑ See Hildermeier, History of the Soviet Union 1917–1991 , pp. 287–292.
  25. ↑ a b Hildermeier, History of the Soviet Union 1917–1991 , p. 290.
  26. ↑ The alternative observation model of the “neopopulist school of agricultural economics” around Alexander Tschajanow is briefly explained in Hildermeier, Geschichte der Sovietunion 1917–1991 , p. 293 and in Fitzpatrick, Stalin's Peasants , p. 29. More detailed Gerd Spittler : Tschajanow und die theory der Family Economy (accessed October 31, 2014). In: Alexander Tschajanow: The doctrine of the peasant economy. Attempt of a theory of family economy in agriculture. With an introduction by Gerd Spittler. Reprint of the Berlin, Parey edition, 1923. Campus-Verlag, Frankfurt / M. [u. a.] 1987, ISBN 3-593-33846-7 .
  27. ↑ Hildermeier, History of the Soviet Union 1917–1991 , pp. 290 f.
  28. ↑ a b Fitzpatrick, Stalin's Peasants , p. 30.
  29. ↑ Hildermeier, History of the Soviet Union 1917–1991 , p. 291.
  30. ^ Anne Applebaum : The Gulag . Translated from the English by Frank Wolf. Siedler, Munich 2003, p. 87, ISBN 3-88680-642-1 .
  31. ↑ Hildermeier, History of the Soviet Union 1917–1991 , p. 292; Heinert, Feindbild 'Kulak' , pp. 367–371.
  32. ↑ Hildermeier, History of the Soviet Union 1917–1991 , p. 393.
  33. ↑ Josef Stalin: About the tasks of the economists, speech at the first union conference of the functionaries of the socialist industry (February 4, 1931), in: Stalin, Werke, vol. 13. ( online ( Memento des original from September 24, 2017 on the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this note. ), Accessed on February 4, 2011. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / stalinwerke.de
  34. ^ Luks, History of Russia and the Soviet Union , p. 264 f.
  35. ^ Luks, History of Russia and the Soviet Union , p. 266 f.
  36. ↑ Luks, Geschichte Russlands und der Sovietunion , p. 265. On Stalin's speech about the “tribute” of the peasants, see Viola, The unknown Gulag , p. 15 f.
  37. ↑ Viola et al. (Eds.), The War Against the Peasantry , p. 64.
  38. ↑ Hildermeier, Stalinismus und Terror , p. 381.
  39. ^ Luks, History of Russia and the Soviet Union , p. 254.
  40. ↑ Josef Stalin: The year of the great change. On the 12th anniversary of October , in: Stalin, Werke Vol. 12. ( online ( Memento of the original from 23 September 2017 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link has been inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link accordingly Instructions and then remove this note. ), Accessed on February 3, 2011. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / stalinwerke.de
  41. ^ Luks, History of Russia and the Soviet Union , pp. 254 f; Hildermeier, History of the Soviet Union 1917–1991 , pp. 389–391.
  42. ↑ Printed in English translation by Viola et al. (Eds.), The War Against the Peasantry , pp. 201-204.
  43. ↑ Numbers based on Hildermeier, History of the Soviet Union 1917–1991 , p. 391.
  44. ↑ Hildermeier, History of the Soviet Union 1917–1991 , p. 379 f. See also Heinert, Feindbild 'Kulak' , pp. 372–378.
  45. ↑ Hildermeier, History of the Soviet Union 1917–1991 pp. 380–383.
  46. ↑ Fitzpatrick, Stalin's Peasants , p. 38 f.
  47. ↑ On the “ural-Siberian method” see Conquest, harvest of death , p. 118 f and Viola et al. (Eds.), The War Against the Peasantry , pp. 119-122.
  48. ↑ Hildermeier, History of the Soviet Union 1917–1991 pp. 384–386.
  49. ↑ See Fitzpatrick, Stalin's Peasants , p. 42 f; Viola et al. (Eds.), The War Against the Peasantry , p. 121. On the fundamental importance of arson in the peasant protest culture, see Viola, Peasant rebels under Stalin , pp. 121–124.
  50. ↑ Hildermeier, History of the Soviet Union 1917–1991 P. 386 f.
  51. ^ Josef Stalin: On questions of agricultural policy in the USSR, speech at the conference of Marxist agricultural scientists (December 27, 1929) In: Stalin: Works. Vol. 12, ( online ( memento of the original from September 23, 2017 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was automatically inserted and not yet checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this note . February 2011. For the “war against the peasants” see u. a. Luks, History of Russia and the Soviet Union. P. 255; Werth: A state against its people p. 165; Baberowski: The red terror. P. 122; Baberowski: The enemy is everywhere. P. 674; fundamental: Viola et al. (Eds.): The War Against the Peasantry. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / stalinwerke.de
  52. ↑ Viola, The unknown Gulag , p. 23 and p. 204, note 41.
  53. ^ Viola, The unknown Gulag , p. 22.
  54. ↑ Biographical information from Sidney I. Ploss: The roots of perestroika. The Soviet breakdown in historical context , McFarland & Co Inc., Jefferson 2009, p. 56 f , ISBN 978-0-7864-4486-1 .
  55. ↑ Information on Bauman's position during deculakization according to Viola et al. (Eds.), The War Against the Peasantry , p. 265.
  56. ↑ Information on the members according to Davies, The socialist offensive , p. 232. See also Baberowski, Der Feind ist everywhere , p. 679, note 31.
  57. ↑ Printed in English translation by Viola et al. (Eds.), The War Against the Peasantry , pp. 228-234.
  58. ↑ Baberowski, Stalinism “from above”. Kulak deportation in the Soviet Union 1929–1932 , p. 577.
  59. ↑ For example Davies, The socialist offensive , pp. 233-237; Baberowski, Stalinism “from above”. Kulak deportation in the Soviet Union 1929–1932 , p. 577 f; Creuzberger, Stalin , p. 118; Viola, The unknown Gulag , p. 22 f .; Hildermeier, History of the Soviet Union 1917–1991 , p. 392 f; Polian, Against their will , p. 71.
  60. ↑ Baberowski, Stalinism “from above”. Kulak deportation in the Soviet Union 1929–1932 , p. 578.
  61. ↑ Quoted from Creuzberger, Stalin , p. 119. For the first time in Baberowski, either for socialism or after Archangel'sk !. P. 618 f.
  62. ↑ Quoted from Heinert, Feindbild 'Kulak' , p. 379.
  63. ↑ Quoted from Davies, The socialist offensive , p. 228.
  64. ↑ Description after Timothy Snyder: Bloodlands. Europe between Hitler and Stalin , CH Beck, Munich 2011, ISBN 978-3-406-62184-0 , p. 47. The poster is online here .
  65. ↑ Jörg Baberowski: Civilization of violence. The cultural origins of Stalinism . In: Historische Zeitschrift , Volume 281, Issue 1 (August 2005), pp. 59–102, here p. 78.
  66. ^ A b Shearer, Policing Stalin's socialism , p. 130.
  67. ↑ Hagenloh, Stalin's Police, p. 55.
  68. ↑ On Evdokimov's career and importance, see Stephen G. Wheatcroft: Agency and Terror: Evdokimov and Mass Killing in Stalin's Great Terror , in: Australian Journal of Politics and History. Vol. 53, 2007, pp. 20–43 ( PDF; 1.2 MB , accessed on February 10, 2011).
  69. ↑ Printed in English translation by Viola et al. (Eds.), The War Against the Peasantry , pp. 238-245.
  70. ↑ Rolf Binner, Marc Junge: How terror became “big”. In: Cahiers du monde russe. Vol. 42, 2001, H. 2–4, S. 557–613 (PDF) ( Memento of the original dated February 6, 2015) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. (Accessed April 12, 2010), p. 568. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / monderusse.revues.org
  71. ↑ Werth, A State Against His People , p. 166.
  72. ^ Shearer, Policing Stalin's socialism , p. 9.
  73. ↑ Paul R. Gregory , Philipp JH Schröder, Konstantin Sonin : Dictators, Repression and the Median Citizen: An 'Eliminations Model' of Stalin's Terror (Data from the NKVD Archives) , p. 6 ( PDF; 303 kB ( Memento of the original from December 27, 2014 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and not yet checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this note. ), Accessed on February 10, 2011. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.hha.dk
  74. ^ Gregory, Terror by quota , p. 175.
  75. ↑ All numbers according to Werth, Ein Staat gegen seine Volk , p. 169.
  76. ↑ Werth, Ein Staat gegen seine Volk , pp. 169 f; Baberowski, The Enemy Is Everywhere , p. 677.
  77. ↑ Compare Fitzpatrick, Stalin's Peasants , pp. 59–62.
  78. ↑ Werth, Ein Staat gegen seine Volk , p. 169 f.
  79. ↑ Quoted from Naimark, Stalin und der Genozid , p. 63.
  80. ↑ Quoted from Werth, Ein Staat gegen seine Volk , p. 167.
  81. ↑ Werth, A state against its people , p. 166 f. See also Fitzpatrick, Stalin's Peasants , pp. 56 f.
  82. ↑ Examples from Azerbaijan in Baberowski, The enemy is everywhere , p. 700 f.
  83. ↑ Baberowski, The enemy is everywhere , p. 680 f.
  84. ↑ On this subject, Fitzpatrick, Stalin's Peasants , p. 67. For details on forms of peasant rebellion and passive resistance: Viola, Peasant rebels under Stalin , p. 68–99.
  85. ↑ Viola et al. (Eds.), The War Against the Peasantry , p. 268; Reese, Red Army Opposition , p. 33 f.
  86. ↑ On this, comprehensive Reese, Red Army Opposition .
  87. ↑ Shearer, Policing Stalin's socialism , pp. 108 and pp. 112-115.
  88. ↑ Numbers according to Werth, Ein Staat gegen seine Volk , p. 167. For information on forms and regional spread of resistance, see Davies, The socialist offensive , pp. 255–261.
  89. ↑ Numbers from Hildermeier, Geschichte der Sovietunion 1917–1991 , p. 395. The OGPU statistics on motives, forms, temporal development and spatial distribution of these “acts of terror” see the corresponding overviews in Viola, Peasant rebels under Stalin , p. 103– 105 and pp. 108-110. (There, p. 105, Table 4–3, the number of those murdered is given as around 1200.)
  90. ↑ On the gang character after the deculakization, see Viola, Peasant rebels under Stalin , pp. 176–179.
  91. ↑ Baberowski, Either for Socialism or According to Archangel'sk! , P. 632; Baberowski, The Enemy Is Everywhere , pp. 706–708.
  92. ↑ Quoted from Hildermeier, Geschichte der Sovietunion 1917–1991 , p. 395.
  93. ^ Fitzpatrick, Stalin's Peasants , p. 63; Viola, Peasant rebels under Stalin , p. 134.
  94. ↑ Josef Stalin: Affected by dizziness before successes. On the questions of the collective farm movement , (accessed on March 1, 2011).
  95. ↑ For the meaning of the Stalin article, see the corresponding introduction on the website www.1000dokumente.de, ( accessed on March 1, 2011).
  96. ↑ All information from Fitzpatrick, Stalin's Peasants , p. 63.
  97. ↑ Viola et al. (Eds.), The War Against the Peasantry , p. 264.
  98. ↑ Number after see Hildermeier, Geschichte der Sovietunion 1917–1991 , p. 396.
  99. ↑ Numbers according to Werth, Ein Staat gegen seine Volk , p. 168.
  100. ↑ Figures from Viola, Peasant rebels under Stalin , p. 140. See also Table 5 there on the number of riots per region and the respective number of participants.
  101. ↑ Hildermeier, History of the Soviet Union 1917–1991 , p. 397; see also Davies, The socialist offensive , p. 379.
  102. ^ Viola, The unknown Gulag , p. 96.
  103. ^ Viola, The unknown Gulag , p. 115.
  104. ↑ See Baberowski, Stalinism “from above”. Kulak deportation in the Soviet Union 1929–1932 , p. 578 and p. 593, table 4.
  105. ↑ Information from Viola, The unknown Gulag , p. 115.
  106. ↑ Baberowski, Stalinism “from above”. Kulak deportation in the Soviet Union 1929–1932 , p. 578.
  107. ↑ Quoted from Baberowski, Stalinism “from above”. Kulak deportation in the Soviet Union 1929–1932 , p. 578. “Arbeitsiedlung” is the later term for “special settlement”.
  108. ↑ Baberowski, Stalinism “from above”. Kulak deportation in the Soviet Union 1929–1932 , p. 578 f.
  109. ↑ Viola: Peasant rebels under Stalin , p. 176.
  110. ↑ On the often chaotic situation there, see Viola, The unknown Gulag , p. 38 f.
  111. ↑ Information from Werth, Ein Staat gegen seine Volk , p. 171 and Viola et al. (Eds.), The War Against the Peasantry , p. 269.
  112. ↑ Viola et al. (Eds.), The War Against the Peasantry , p. 269.
  113. ↑ Viola, The unknown Gulag , p. 43 f.
  114. ↑ Viola, The unknown Gulag , p. 44. An unfiltered description of the conditions in the transit accommodation from the perspective of a deportee who wrote to Mikhail Kalinin can be found in Viola, The Other Archipelago , p. 745.
  115. ↑ See Viola, The unknown Gulag , pp. 48-51; Viola, The Other Archipelago , p. 743.
  116. ↑ Werth, Ein Staat gegen seine Volk , p. 172.
  117. ↑ Naimark, Stalin and the Genocide , p. 66; Baberowski, Stalinism “from above”. Kulak deportation in the Soviet Union 1929–1932 , p. 581 f. On the deployment of special settlers in Magnitogorsk, see briefly Robert W. Davies: Forced Labor under Stalin: the Archive Revelations , in: New Left Review , No. 214 (1995), p. 76 ( online, accessed on August 5, 2015. ) and Werth, Ein Staat gegen seine Volk , p. 177.
  118. ^ Viola, The Other Archipelago , p. 732, note 7; Werth, Ein Staat gegen seine Volk, p. 175; Polian, Against their will , 76.
  119. ^ According to a report by a commission of inquiry, quoted in Werth, Ein Staat gegen seine Volk , p. 175.
  120. ↑ Werth, Ein Staat gegen seine Volk , p. 175.
  121. ^ Polian, Against their will , p. 76.
  122. ↑ In detail on this Viola, The unknown Gulag , pp. 73-88 and Viola, The Other Archipelago .
  123. ↑ Viola et al. (Eds.), The War Against the Peasantry , p. 275.
  124. ↑ Baberowski, The enemy is everywhere , p. 684.
  125. ↑ Hildermeier, Stalinismus und Terror , p. 595 and Werth, Ein Staat gegen seine Volk , p. 165.
  126. ↑ See Hildermeier, Die Sowjetunion , p. 38 f; Baberowski, The Enemy Is Everywhere , p. 684.
  127. ↑ Baberowski, The enemy is everywhere , p. 684.
  128. ↑ Viola et al. (Eds.), The War Against the Peasantry , p. 319.
  129. ↑ Viola, The unknown Gulag , p. 32.
  130. ^ Viola, The Other Archipelago , p. 732.
  131. ↑ Baberowski, The enemy is everywhere , p. 684 f.
  132. ↑ POLIAR, Against Their wants , S. 87th
  133. ↑ Hildermeier, History of the Soviet Union 1917–1991 , p. 399; Wolfgang Zank: Silent Destruction , Zeit Online , December 3, 2008.
  134. ↑ Cf. Viola, Peasant rebels under Stalin , p. 179 f. On the rhetoric of an ubiquitous conspiracy, see Gábor T. Dandelion : The Omnipresent Conspiracy: On Soviet Imagery of Politics and Social Relations in the 1930s . In: Nick Lampert and Gábor T. Rittersporn (Eds.): Stalinism. Its nature and aftermath. Essays in honor of Moshe Lewin . ME Sharpe, Armonk, NY 1992, ISBN 0-87332-876-0 , pp. 101-120.
  135. ↑ Kaznelson, Remembering the Soviet State , p. 1164.
  136. ↑ Kaznelson, Remembering the Soviet State , pp. 1173-1176.
  137. ↑ Tragedija sovetskoj derevni: kollektivizacija i raskulačivanie; documenty i materialy v 5 tomach; 1927–1939, Rosspen, Moscow, 1999–2003.
  138. ↑ Viola et al. (Eds.), The War Against the Peasantry .
  139. ^ Viola, The Other Archipelago , p. 731.
  140. ↑ Baberowski, Either for Socialism or According to Archangel'sk! , P. 617.
  141. ↑ Hildermeier, History of the Soviet Union 1917–1991 , p. 394.
  142. ↑ See Naimark, Stalin und der Genozid , pp. 57–74, especially pp. 64 f. See there also p. 136.
  143. ↑ See Jürgen Zarusky : Review of: Norman M. Naimark: Stalin und der Genozid, Frankfurt / M .: Suhrkamp Verlag 2010 , in: sehepunkte 11 (2011), No. 5 (May 15, 2011).
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