Papen's meeting with Hitler in the house of the banker Schröder

from Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Villa of the banker Schröder at Stadtwaldgürtel 35, Cologne (2011)

The meeting between Papen and Hitler in the house of the banker Schröder on January 4, 1933 in Cologne is considered to be the "hour of birth of the Third Reich " ( Karl Dietrich Bracher ). With the mediation of the banker Kurt Freiherr von Schröder , Franz von Papen and Adolf Hitler came to an agreement here on Hitler's chancellorship.

The meeting

Floor slab in the sidewalk in front of the villa (2008)

After a lecture by Papens in the Berlin gentleman's club in December 1932, Papen and Schröder spoke about a possible meeting with Hitler. Schröder established the contact through Hitler's economic advisor Wilhelm Keppler and made his house at Stadtwaldgürtel 35 in Cologne available for this purpose. Hitler, who was officially on his way from Munich to a campaign appearance in Detmold, came with Keppler, Rudolf Heß and Heinrich Himmler , who were in the next room. This was followed by a meeting between Papen and Hitler lasting several hours, at which Schröder was only a listener. In doing so, Papen and Hitler reached an agreement in principle on a Hitler-Papen- Hugenberg government .

In Schröder's famous affidavit in the Nuremberg IG Farben trial of 1947, it says about this meeting:

“Before I took this step, I discussed with a number of gentlemen in business and found out in general how the business world felt about cooperation between the two. The general aspiration of the men of business was to see a strong leader come to power in Germany who would form a government that would remain in power for a long time. When the NSDAP suffered its first setback on November 6, 1932 and thus passed its climax, support from German business was particularly urgent. A common interest of business was the fear of Bolshevism and the hope that the National Socialists - once in power - would establish a stable political and economic basis in Germany. "

Hjalmar Schacht wrote to Schröder on January 6, 1933:

"I would like to [...] also congratulate you on the courageous initiative in initiating an understanding between two men whom we both highly appreciate and whose cooperation can perhaps bring about a positive solution as quickly as possible. I hope that the discussion in your house will one day gain historical significance. "

One year after the meeting, on January 4, 1934, Papen sent a telegram to Schröder stating:

"I remember today in gratitude you and your hospitable house, in which the basis for the revolutionary events of last year was laid."

Schröder remained in close contact with Hitler after the meeting; As his SS assessment of August 10, 1937 shows, he had a special "relationship of trust with the Führer" and was "often asked and called by the Führer to confidential meetings and missions".

Becoming aware of the meeting

The plan for the secret meeting between Hitler and Papen had become known before the actual meeting took place: The Berlin dentist and journalist Hellmuth Elbrechter , an advisor to the incumbent Chancellor Kurt von Schleicher , had learned about the upcoming meeting from one of his patients. In order to prove the meeting of Hitler and Papen, he sent the retired Captain Hans Johannesson (1898–1941), a man from Gregor Strasser's entourage , with a camera to Cologne, who took up a post on Schröder's doorstep. Johannesson managed to photograph Papen and Hitler and his three companions entering and leaving Schröder's villa. Elbrecht Schleicher presented the photos the following day with the comment "Fränzchen [Papen] betrayed you".

How exactly Elbrecht found out about the planned meeting is still unclear. The journalist Giselher Wirsing , a colleague of Elbrechter's, later claimed that Elbrecht had received the information from around Schröder. Berndorff, on the other hand, claimed that Elbrechter's boss Hans Zehrer had bribed a man from Hitler's SD .

After the participants had been photographed, Papen had to assume that the meeting would not be kept secret from Schleicher. Therefore, after the meeting, he went to the Hotel Excelsior in Düsseldorf, where he wrote a lengthy letter to Schleicher in which he gave Schleicher a description of the meeting and the reasons for which he met Hitler - probably colored according to Volker Hentschel's judgment met. According to Papen, the letter must have been with Schleicher on January 5th.

The next morning, the Daily Rundschau , a daily newspaper close to Schleicher and whose employees included Elbrecht, published a detailed report on the Cologne meeting. A day later, other daily newspapers also reported on the event.

On January 6, Hitler and Papen published a joint announcement stating that their meeting had only served the purpose of “exploring the possibility of a great political national united front”.

In January 1933 press reports appeared, according to which Paul Silverberg should have been involved in bringing about the meeting. Silverberg vigorously denied these reports. In fact, Silverberg's private apartment was only a few steps away from Schröder's house, and Papen went to see him there immediately after the meeting.

Development in the following weeks up to January 30, 1933

On January 7, 1933, Papen traveled to Dortmund. At the Dortmund train station, he narrowly escaped an attack by supporters of the NSDAP. Then he drove to the house of the industrialist Fritz Springorum , where he arrived at noon. At around 5 a.m. the industrialists Paul Reusch , Gustav Krupp von Bohlen and Halbach and Albert Vögler also met there. This was followed by a discussion “in small groups about the latest events and what has to happen in the future,” as Papen had previously described the purpose of the meeting in December 1932 in a letter to Springorum. In some cases, the literature also states that, in addition to the five people mentioned, Erich Fickler , who lived in Dortmund like Springorum , and the general manager of Harpener Bergbau AG, the then largest independent coal mining company in the Ruhr, took part in the meeting in Springorum's house. Gustav Luntowski evaluates this information, which is based on a letter from Springorum to Papen dated December 27, 1932, in which he advises Papen that he would also like to bring Fickler to the meeting, but as “questionable” because Fickler “in this Context is never mentioned again ”, d. H. because it no longer appears in the other letters that those involved wrote about this before and after the meeting, as well as in the other sources. The Papen biographer Joachim Petzold also assumes that Fickler “did not” “take part” in the meeting because he “is no longer mentioned”. After the meeting in the Springorum house, Papen went to Lüdinghausen, where he met his eldest daughter and his son-in-law Max von Stockhausen , who was the district administrator there , due to the failed attack in the morning, accompanied by the Dortmund police .

Papen's meeting with the industrialists on January 7, 1933, had already been arranged before Papen's meeting with Hitler on January 4, 1933. Joachim Petzold argues that Papen accepted January 4, 1933 as the date for his meeting with Hitler “simply because three days later he had arranged a meeting 'in a small circle' about the political situation in Springorum's house [.. .] Papen could easily calculate that his interlocutors [in Dortmund] would be eager to get to know Hitler's latest point of view. "

On January 9, 1933, Papen visited Schleicher in Berlin for a conversation in which he tried to appease him about the Cologne conversation and the newspaper reports about it. Heinrich August Winkler wrote that Schleicher was forced to "make a good face for a bad game". After the meeting, an official communiqué was forwarded to the Wolffs Telegraphisches Bureau, which was published the next day. In this, the two announced that reports of contradiction between them were baseless and without any basis. In the wording it said:

“The Chancellor received Mr. von Papen for a consultation about his meeting with Mr. Hitler on January 4th and the misleading press comments that were attached to it. The discussion resulted in the complete baselessness of the allegations in the press from this meeting about contradictions between the Chancellor and Herr von Papen. "

Also on January 9, 1933, Papen von Hindenburg was received, to whom he described his version of his meeting with Hitler and obtained his consent to further confidential contacts with Hitler. Papen stated that he had the impression that Hitler no longer wanted the transfer of all government power and was ready to enter a coalition government. Hindenburg then instructed him to keep in touch with Hitler in strict confidence on this basis. Hindenburg, who at that time no longer believed in the possibility of Hitler's support or tolerance of the Schleicher government or in a split in the NSDAP, now envisaged the formation of the Papen cabinet with Hitler as a junior partner. On January 7th, three days after the Cologne meeting and two days before his meeting with Papen, Schleicher himself had convinced the Berlin correspondent of the Dutch newspaper Nieuwe Rottardamsche Courant that Papen was loyal to him and the Cologne meeting rated as a harmless process: "You know my friend Fränzchen he is a good person, but he has no sense." Schleicher also had the change in mood that Hindenburg had about him, Schleicher, and in favor of playing off the Hitler option Time not yet realized. Instead, he was still convinced that Hindenburg strictly rejects Hitler's acceptance into the government and will continue to support him, Schleicher, so that he scoffed at the NSDAP leader: “The great Adolf has a board in front of his head, he understands not that the old gentleman doesn't want him! "

In the weeks that followed, up to January 28, 1933 (when the Schleicher cabinet was dissolved), the two men held a series of further meetings for confidential discussions. At least three meetings in the villa of the wine merchant Joachim von Ribbentrop - a former comrade of Papen's war on the Arab theater of the First World War , who by now belonged to Hitler's followers - in Berlin-Dahlem on January 10, 18 and 22, 1933, a meeting of Hitler and Papen with Hjalmar Schacht at the Hotel Kaiserhof on January 25th and at least one visit by Hitler to Papen's apartment at Wilhelmstrasse 74 in the second half of the month.

consequences

The events of December 1932 and January 1933 led to a serious rift between Papen and Schleicher: Both men subsequently accused each other of treason towards third parties and also made numerous derogatory remarks about the other. Specifically, Papen accused Schleicher of having overthrown him as Reich Chancellor in December 1932, while Schleicher, for his part, held responsible for the failure of his short-lived government and his replacement as Reich Chancellor by Adolf Hitler. In a conversation with Papen's adjutant Hans von Kageneck , Schleicher summarized his interpretation of the events of January 1933 as follows: He, Schleicher, and Papen rode into the political arena together in 1932. But after they had not immediately had success with their endeavors, Papen suddenly turned against him and "quickly pulled the hanger away" so that he went "upside down". Then - in January 1933 - Papen would have taken his, Schleichers, horse and helped Hitler to climb into the saddle. Papen had "betrayed a principle" that he, Schleicher, could not forgive him.

The interruption of such statements by both men about each other - usually in front of a larger circle of listeners - attracted a considerable amount of attention, so that finally the association of former members of the General Staff (Schlieffen Association), to which both Papen and Schleicher as former General Staff officers belonged turned on. In an effort to settle the quarrel between the two men - or at least to put an end to the constant derogatory statements of both men about each other in front of a larger audience - the major a. D. and former adjutant of the Prussian Crown Prince Louis Müldner von Mülnheim was charged with mediating between Papen and Schleicher because of the "honorary matter" that arose between them. In the months of March to May 1933, Müldner repeatedly visited Papen and Schleicher separately from one another, explained each other's perspective on past events and tried to bring about a reconciliation or at least a compensation formula between them. This ultimately failed because both persisted in their stance and assessed the other's point of view as unacceptable: In his final statement to Müldner on May 28, 1933, Schleicher wrote irreconcilably with regard to Papen's activities in January 1933:

“It may be that my view does not fit into the 'tough decisions of political life', and I have to admit that it was only my belief in loyalty and trust in friendship that led to my peculiar, incomprehensible political end to the uninitiated, but I did I will nevertheless stick to my perhaps somewhat outdated attitude that there is no difference between political and human morality, and that even the leading statesman cannot be granted a special political morality. […] Papen and I are worlds apart in our views on what a politician may and may not do. That is why Herr von Papen will not understand when I have described his conduct as treason and said that he acted on me as Judas. "

Evaluation in research

In research, the meeting is of great importance for the further course of history. The Hitler biographer Joachim C. Fest points out, for example:

"The gathering has been called the 'birth of the Third Reich' with good reason, because it will lead to a direct causal sequence of events up to January 30. "

In GDR historical research, Papen was the spokesman for the interests of monopoly capital in this action, as represented by Kurt Gossweiler , among others . From the fact that Schröder's bank, the JH Stein bank , was represented on the supervisory boards of IG Farben and the United Steel Works , Gossweiler concluded “that it was the top figures of German monopoly capital who operated Hitler's chancellorship to use the fascist dictatorship as a bastion of their own power. ”The American historian Henry Ashby Turner countered this by stating that Schröder was only a“ partner in a medium-sized provincial bank ”who could hardly speak for the economy. He was only a link in a fortuitous chain of personal relationships; a mere extra.

Archival material

  • Federal Archives: NS 20/76 (correspondence in preparation for the meeting of January 4, 1933)
    • Letter from Kurt von Lersner to Kurt von Schröder dated August 2, 1932 (sheet 1f.), Franz von Papen to Kurt von Schröder dated October 1, 1932 (sheet 4f.), Kepplers dated November 28, 1932, Papen to Kurt von Schröder dated October 1, 1932 (sheet 6), letter from Lersner to Schröder dated October 8, 1932 (sheets 7, 11), letter from Wilhelm Keppler to Kurt von Schröder dated October 21, 1932 (sheet 17), Second letter from Wilhelm von Keppler to Kurt von Schröder dated October 21, 1932 (sheet 19), letter from Wilhelm Keppler to Kurt von Schröder dated November 13, 1932 (sheet 24f.) ( digitized on the website of the Federal Archives ), input to the President of the Reich of November 19, 1932 (p. 28f.), Kurt von Lersner to Kurt von Schröder of December 6, 1932 (p. 9), Papen to Kurt von Schröder of December 19, 1932 (p. 80), 26 December 1932, Papen to Kurt von Schröder from December 28, 1932 (sheet 60), Wilhelm Keppler to Kurt von Schröder from December 28, 1932 _ (sheet 44), Wilhelm von Keppler to Kurt von Schröder v om December 29, 1932 (p. 62) and January 2, 1933, telegram from Papen ab Schröder of January 4, 1934 (f. 83), Wilhelm Keppler to Kurt von Schröder of January 6, 1933 (p. 70, 71), letter from Hjalmar Schacht to Kurt von Schröder of January 6, 1933 (p. 66f.), Keppler to Kurt von Schröder of January 12, 1933 (p. 73), Keppler to Kurt von Schröder of January 21, 1933 (p. 75), Otto von Below to Schröder of January 31, 1933 (p. 77), Papen to Schröder of December 19, 1933 (p. 80), telegram from Papen to Schröder of January 4, 1934 (p. 83), Himmler's telegram (p. 83), Wilhelm Brückner on January 13, 1934 to Kurt von Schröder (p. 86).

literature

  • Axel Kuhn : The conversation between Hitler and Papen in the house of Baron v. Schroeder. A methodical-systematic source analysis . In: History in Science and Education . Vol. 24 (1975), pp. 709-722.
  • Heinrich Muth : The "Cologne Conversation" on January 4, 1933 . In: History in Science and Education . Vol. 37 (1986), pp. 463-480 and 529-541.
  • Rainer Orth : Backstage games . In: Ders .: "The official seat of the opposition"? Politics and state restructuring plans in the office of the Deputy Chancellor 1933/1934 . Cologne 2016, pp. 251–280.
  • Joachim Petzold : Franz von Papen. A German fate . Munich / Berlin 1995.
  • Wolfram Pyta : "Not without alternative: How a Reich Chancellor Hitler could have been prevented". In: Historische Zeitschrift 311 (2020) 1, pp. 47–83.


Source editions :

  • Joachim Petzold: Upper bourgeois initiatives for the appointment of Hitler as Reich Chancellor. For the November petition of 1932 by the Keppler Circle of German bankers, industrialists, overseas merchants and large landowners . In: Journal of History . Vol. 31 (1983), pp. 38-54. (contains impressions of numerous letters from 1932 in connection with the preparation of the meeting)

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Quoted from: Eberhard Czichon : Who helped Hitler to power? . Cologne 1967, p. 78 f .; Document online at ns-archiv.de.
  2. ↑ Eberhard Czichon : Who helped Hitler to power? . Cologne 1967, p. 79.
  3. ↑ Joachim Petzold : Franz von Papen, Ein deutsches Verfassnis . Munich / Berlin 1995, p. 143.
  4. ↑ Joachim Petzold : Upper middle class initiatives for the appointment of Hitler as Reich Chancellor . In: ZfG , 1/1983, p. 52.
  5. ↑ In the older literature, Johannesson erroneously uses "Johansen" (Gottfried Reinhold Treviranus: Das Ende von Weimar. Heinrich Brüning und seine Zeit , 1968, p. 414) or "Johan n sen" (Klaus Fritzsche: Politische Romantik und Gegenrevolution . 1976, P. 390).
  6. ↑ Heinz Höhne: Waiting for Hitler . In: Der Spiegel No. 5/1983, p. 130 f.
  7. ↑ Ebbo Demant (Ed.): From Schleicher to Springer. Hans Zehrer as a political publicist . 1971, p. 105.
  8. ↑ Volker Hentschel: Weimar's last months: Hitler and the fall of the republic , 1978, p. 89.
  9. ^ A b Gustav Luntowski: Hitler and the gentlemen on the Ruhr, economic power and state power in the Third Reich . Frankfurt am Main 2000, p. 84.
  10. ↑ Reinhard Neebe: Big Industry, State and NSDAP 1930-1933. Paul Silverberg and the Reichsverband der Deutschen Industrie in the crisis of the Weimar Republic . Göttingen 1981, p. 171 f. DNB 213227002 full text online
  11. ↑ Luntowski: Hitler und die Herren an der Ruhr, 2000, p. 274; Petzold: Franz von Papen, 1995, p. 144.
  12. ↑ Luntowski: Hitler and the Lords, p. 84.
  13. ^ Petzold: Papen, p. 138.
  14. ^ Wording of the communiqué according to Hans Rein: Franz von Papen in the twilight of history, 1979, p. 46.
  15. ^ Heinrich August Winkler: The long way to the west, p. 538; Irene Strenge: Kurt von Schleicher, 2006, SS 210.
  16. ^ Thomas Trumpp: Franz von Papen: the Prussian-German dualism and the NSDAP in Prussia; a contribution to the prehistory of July 20, 1932 , 1963, p. 159; also: Schleicher on Hitler . In: Pariser Tageblatt of July 19, 1934.
  17. ^ Rainer Orth: The official seat of the opposition, 2016, p. 266.
  18. ^ Rainer Orth: The official seat of the opposition, 2016, p. 831.
  19. ↑ Joachim Fest : Hitler . Frankfurt / Main 1996, 6th edition, p. 497.
  20. ^ Andreas Dorpalen: German History in Marxist Perspective: The East German Approach . Tauris, London 1985, p. 387.
  21. ↑ Kurt Gossweiler : The bank capital sets the course . in: Helmut Bock (Ed.): Fall into the Third Reich . Leipzig 1985, 2nd edition, p. 71.
  22. ↑ Henry Ashby Turner : The Big Entrepreneurs and the Rise of Hitler . Siedler Verlag, Berlin 1985, p. 377 ff.

Coordinates: 50 ° 55 '53.9 "  N , 6 ° 54'26.7"  E