Turkish Airlines Flight 6491
| Turkish Airlines Flight 6491 | |
|---|---|
.jpg) The accident machine in August 2016 |
|
| Accident summary | |
| Accident type | controlled flight into terrain |
| place | Manas Airport , Bishkek , Kyrgyzstan |
| date | January 16, 2017 |
| Fatalities | 4th |
| Fatalities on the ground | 35 |
| Injured on the ground | 37 |
| Aircraft | |
| Aircraft type | Boeing 747-412F |
| operator | Turkish Airlines |
| Mark | TC-MCL |
| Departure airport | Hong Kong |
| Stopover | Bishkek |
| Destination airport | Istanbul Ataturk |
| Passengers | 0 |
| crew | 4th |
| Lists of aviation accidents | |
On January 16, 2017, a Boeing 747-400F freighter on Turkish Airlines flight 6491 ( flight number : TK6491 or THY6491) crashed into the village of Datscha-Suu (Kyrgyzstan: Дача-Суу; Chüi region , Kyrgyzstan ) the Manas airport , where a scheduled stopover was to take place. The ACT Airlines aircraft was rented by Turkish Airlines on a wet lease . The four crew members and 35 residents of the village were killed in the accident; 37 residents were also injured.
plane
The Boeing 747 ( registration number : TC-MCL, c / n : 32897, s / n : 1322) was delivered brand new to Singapore Airlines Cargo on February 27, 2003 . The Turkish cargo airline ACT Airlines took over the aircraft on December 5, 2015 and then operated it for Qatar Airways and Turkish Airlines, among others .
the accident
Airports along the route from TK6491 |
The machine was to perform a cargo flight from Hong Kong International Airport to Istanbul Ataturk Airport . A stopover was planned at Manas Airport near Bishkek ( Kyrgyzstan ). At the time of the incident, fog prevailed at a temperature of −9 ° C. The visibility on the ground was about 100 meters, the vertical visibility on the final approach was about 50 meters.
The crew had received clearance to descend to 1040 meters (3400 feet) as well as permission for an ILS approach according to CAT II on runway 26. The approach angle for a CAT-II landing is 3 degrees. The ILS approach should begin around six kilometers (3.2 NM ) before the landing threshold at the approved altitude of 3400 feet. Because the pilots had not previously reduced altitude quickly enough, the aircraft controlled by the autopilot was at this position just under 200 meters (650 feet) above the ILS glide jet.
The “Glideslope Deviation Indicator”, which shows the pilots a position deviating from the ILS glide beam, deflected downwards as much as possible. From this and at this point in time, the crew should have recognized that they had flown over the glide jet. However, the pilots did not increase the rate of descent in order to hit the glide jet from above. Instead, the autopilot continued the descent to the previously set altitude of 3400 feet in the direction of the landing course transmitter (LOC CAP / ALT HOLD mode). When this height was reached, the machine went into level flight.
Almost 1.5 kilometers (0.8 NM) from the runway, the aircraft flew through the so-called “false ILS glide slope” (“false glideslope”), which the glideslope transmitter also emits at a 9-degree angle. This glide jet was received by the instruments on board for about one second and caused the autopilot to automatically change its working mode (from LOC CAP to G / S CAP or keep gliding course). The machine then began to descend parallel to the correct ILS glide stream at a 3-degree angle. The distance between the ILS glide beam and the actual position of the aircraft was now around four and a half kilometers, which was more than the total length of the runway. The “Glideslope Deviation Indicator” made the large deviation from the glide stream visible to the pilots through its full deflection. The crew reacted neither to the display nor to the increasing loss of altitude. In addition, she did not recognize that because of her position and the short remaining distance to the runway, landing was no longer possible.
At 07:18 pm local time, the aircraft flew over the landing threshold rail 26 at a high altitude. However, the pilots initially did not abort the approach, presumably due to ignorance of their actual position. At a height of 30 meters (100 feet), the master initiated a go- around maneuver due to the lack of ground visibility . At this point the machine had already flown over the entire runway. The power of the engines was increased to a maximum of 16 meters (52 feet) ( TO / GA ), but the aircraft touched down about 900 meters behind the end of the runway and shifted 60 meters to the right to the center line. It collided with the concrete wall that surrounds the airport.
After the collision, the damaged machine crashed into the adjacent village, breaking apart. The fuel flowing from the damaged wing tanks ignited. A total of 38 houses on the southern outskirts were destroyed and other buildings were damaged, with 35 villagers killed and 37 others injured. Three of the four crew members were found dead; one pilot died on the way to hospital. The cockpit voice recorder was recovered on January 17th, the flight data recorder a day later.
Web links
- Route and data of flight TK6491 at Flightradar24 (English).
- Flight accident data and report Boeing 747 TC-MCL on the Aviation Safety Network , accessed on January 16, 2017.
Individual evidence
- ↑ Boeing 747-412, TC-MCL. rzjets.com, January 16, 2017, accessed January 16, 2017 .
- ↑ MyCargo Airlines TC-MCL (Boeing 747 - MSN 32897). Airfleets Aviation, January 16, 2017, accessed January 16, 2017 .
- ↑ Turkish Cargo Plane Boeing 747 Crashes in Kyrgyzstan Killing Dozens. Aviation Voice, January 16, 2017, accessed February 5, 2017 .
- ↑ a b c d e f g Crash: MyCargo B744 at Bishkek on Jan 16th 2017, impacted terrain on go around. The Aviation Herald, January 16, 2017, accessed August 1, 2017 .
- ^ Interstate Aviation Committee, Preliminary Report , accessed November 7, 2018
- ↑ Крушение грузового Boeing в Киргизии (ru) . In: РБК , January 16, 2017.
Coordinates: 43 ° 3 ′ 24 ″ N , 74 ° 26 ′ 17 ″ E