Theory of the company

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Among theory of the firm , even theory of the firm or theory of the firm (Engl. Theory of the firm ), comprises various models that the company try to explain the market, its origin and function and its behavior. There is neither a special model behind the term, nor can it be clearly distinguished from company theory . There is a business and an economic approach.

In neoclassical theory , the existence of the company was assumed. It interacts with the market determines prices and demand and allocates its resources in order to profit maximize. The price system has a determining function. However, this cannot explain the internal structure of the company and other factors that influence the decisions. Today, therefore, one no longer simply summarizes the principles of profit maximization under the term theory of the company . Rather, it is understood to mean the totality of heterogeneous theories from different subject areas that theoretically deal with the company and its embedding in markets or individual aspects thereof. These include B. also the works from organizational theory (groundbreaking the publication by Richard M. Cyert and James G. March from 1963), sociology and systems theory (e.g. Niklas Luhmann ) and business psychology . Corporate governance theories on the effect of incentive structures are also becoming increasingly important .

Business oriented company theories

The business approach deals with the specific design of a company or company, i.e. with the specific characteristics and functional units of companies. This perspective, which is no longer an isolated discipline today, must be distinguished from the more action and decision-oriented theory of corporate management and from strategically oriented corporate policy . However, problems arise when one completely separates the psychology of corporate management from a microeconomically founded corporate theory, as Erich Gutenberg attempted, who decisively coined the term corporate theory in German business administration in the 1950s. Gutenberg worked out the division of responsibilities between owners and management, but excluded the psychology of corporate governance from his analysis. Since the 1970s, these approaches have been supplemented by approaches that take into account interactions in multi-person companies and teams, as well as the principal-agent problem , or even place them at the center of corporate theory. In addition, there are resource-theoretical considerations from strategic management to explain sustainable competitive advantages such as E.g. Edith Penrose's imbalance theory approach : Instead of buying resources in markets, companies have the opportunity to generate immaterial values ​​such as knowledge themselves. Such approaches have been discussed more and more frequently since the 1990s, including the concept of Dynamic Capabilities by David J. Teece .

Economically oriented company theories

The economic theory of companies looks at companies primarily in the context of their market relationships and asks fundamental questions of the kind: What is a company? Why are there any activities at all? How are they structured and how do they draw their limits? What is an entrepreneur? It deals with the role of the company for economic equilibrium, for resource allocation and competition and asks whether the premises assumed by microeconomic theory actually apply to all economic subjects (e.g. the assumptions of perfect foresight or a lack of information monopolies). In addition, she deals with the forms of business in economic systems that are not dominated by the market and with the question of the conditions under which market structures or hierarchies are more efficient and which incentives they imply. In doing so, she takes on more and more suggestions from institutional economics .

Influences of institutional economics

As early as the 1930s, Ronald Coase pointed out the importance of transaction costs and their relationship to hierarchy (bureaucracy and internal control) costs for structuring and delimiting companies from one another. Since the 1980s, this approach has been closely linked to the development of more recent business theory, which turns to the analysis of specific forms of cooperation and networking among companies in a globalizing world economy. In doing so, she takes on more and more suggestions from institutional economics . For example, Oliver E. Williamson explains the constraints on corporate growth from the increase in delegation costs (the cost of a lower quality decision made by engaging agents). In this way, aspects such as risk and trust find their way into the corporate theory discussion.

criticism

Klaus Brockhoff , on the other hand, points out that a comprehensive theory of the company today either remains empty or reaches such a high level of complexity that it makes handling impossible. Other authors point to the arbitrariness of institutional economic explanations, in contrast to which microeconomics is at least based on a stable foundation. Just like the principal-agent theory, it does not dispute that actors do not act permanently against their interests; In contrast to this, institutional economics seeks rational reconstructions for behavior too quickly: even behavior against one's own interests (e.g. throwing away money and other forms of waste) can, according to institutional economics, be rational if it involves the transfer of information (e.g. B. to increase reputation). With this the distinction between rational and irrational action is lost.

Web links

literature

  • Erich Gutenberg: The company as an object of business theory , Gabler: Wiesbaden; ND of the Habil. Script from 1929 (1997), ISBN 3409122184
  • Horst Albach: On the theory of the company: writings and speeches by Erich Gutenberg. From the estate , Springer, Berlin; 1989, ISBN 3540504605
  • Helmut Koch: Recent developments in company theory: Erich Gutenberg on his 85th birthday , Springer, Berlin 2013

Individual evidence

  1. ^ Theory of the enterprise - Article of the University of Lüneburg
  2. ↑ Business theory  ( page no longer available , search in web archives )  Info: The link was automatically marked as defective. Please check the link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. - Article from the University of Siegen@1@ 2Template: Toter Link / www2.uni-siegen.de  
  3. ↑ Theory of the company ( Memento of the original from September 21, 2010 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. - Literature review on the subject of "Theory of Enterprise" from the University of Oldenburg @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.laub.uni-oldenburg.de
  4. ↑ RM Cyert, JG March: A Behavioral Theory of the Firm , Wiley-Blackwell 1963.
  5. ^ Michael C. Jensen, William H. Meckling: Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. In: Journal of Financial Economics , Vol. 3, Issue 4, October 1976, pp. 305-360.
  6. ↑ Josef Windsperger: The development of company theory since Gutenberg. In: Horst Albach, Egbert Eymann, Alfred Luhmer, Marion Steven (eds.): The theory of business in research and practice. Springer 2013, p. 147 ff.
  7. ^ E. Penrose: Theory of the Growth of the Firm. Wiley: New York 1959.
  8. ↑ Theory of the enterprise - definition in the Gabler Wirtschaftslexikon
  9. ^ RH Coase: The Nature of the Firm. In: Economica. New Series, Vol. 4, No. 16 (November 1937), pp. 386-405.
  10. ↑ Ulrich Mill, Hans-Jürgen Weißbach: Networking economy. In: Thomas Malsch, Ulrich Mill (eds.): ArBYTE. Modernization of industrial sociology. Sigma: Berlin 1992, pp. 315-342.
  11. ↑ Utz Krüsseberg: Theory of the company and institutional economics: The theory of the company in the field of tension between new institutional economics, order-theoretical institutionalism and market process theory. Physica: Heidelberg 2013.
  12. ↑ Oliver E. Williamson: The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting. Free Press 1985; German: Oliver E. Williamson: The economic institutions of capitalism. Companies, markets, cooperations. Tubingen 1990.
  13. ^ Klaus Brockhoff: Business Administration in Science and History: A sketch , Gabler, 2nd edition, 2006, page 69, ISBN 3834925764
  14. ↑ Sabine Altiparmak: Institutional business theory and incomplete factor markets. Springer 2003, p. 5.