Desire

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Desire ( desiderium [lat.], Desire [engl.], Désir [frz.]) Is a state of arousal that directs the human psyche towards certain target states. According to the so-called incentive theories, this directionality takes the form of the expectation of something that represents an incentive value for the individual. Incentive is the anticipated emotion with regard to the target state, the incentive value is the degree of positive emotion associated with the targeted target state.

Striving, desire , wishing , longing , wanting, etc. express nuances of desire.

In principle, desire is an intentional act composed of two sub-acts: an act of representation (perception, imagination , thinking , emotion ) and a conative act (desire, will ).

Acts of desire are always aimed at something that promises to trigger a positive stimulus . In Aristotle's words: All striving is directed towards a good. The desire aims across various acts of desire at those objects or target states that represent the greatest possible good. One can understand human desire as ultimately oriented towards a highest good ( Augustine of Hippo : summum bonum ).

Incentive Theory (Psychology)

Empirical psychology speaks of motivation instead of desire . According to the incentive theory (going back to the field theory of Kurt Lewin ), the desire or motivation consists in the alignment of the psyche to certain target states in the sense of a stimulus to strive for them. The target state, in order to be striven for, must be anticipated by the individual. The being directed towards the goal state then has the form of expectation. What is expected is a state of affairs that promises something positive, that represents a value for the striving individual, i.e. H. According to the incentive theory, motivation is "a function of expectation and value".

Mimetic theory (cultural studies, philosophy)

René Girard's mimetic theory reflects on the social interweaving of human desire. When it comes to goals that go beyond the satisfaction of the elementary needs , desire is fundamentally undecided as to what it should be directed at, and therefore likes to orient itself towards what others desire in order to give its own desire an object. Girard addresses the triangular constellation of desiring subject, imitated role model and desired object. An individual desires an object because another also desires it. This mimesis leads to an ambivalent relationship between the two. The imitator makes those who first ask for something a role model. This creates sympathy: They understand each other in that they like the same thing. By asking for it, however, they also become rivals.

Theory of the Supreme Good (Philosophy)

There is a long tradition in philosophy that understands the desire for the highest good . Already in Plato's symposium , the so-called Platonic Eros is described above all objects of a sensual nature and also beyond all objects of science as ultimately oriented towards the idea of ​​the beautiful. The experience of the idea of ​​the beautiful, however, is the highest good: "And at this point in life (...), if anywhere, it is worth living for man when he sees the beautiful for himself ..." According to Augustine , man is on earth as in a desert where he is plagued with burning thirst. None of the many earthly goods on which his desire is directed, however, are really able to satisfy it, because the human soul basically thirsts for God : "inquietum est cor nostrum, donec requiescat in te" (our heart is restless until that it rests in you). For Thomas Aquinas , too , the human appetite is ultimately oriented towards the highest goal, happiness ("naturaliter homo appetit ultimum finem, scilicet beatitudinem"). But happiness consists in knowing God.

See also

literature

  • Aurelius Augustinus: De beata vita / About happiness / Ingeborg Schwarz-Kirchenbauer; Willi Schwarz (transl., Note, follow-up). Reclam, Stuttgart, 1982.
  • Jörg Disse: Desiderium. A philosophy of desire . Stuttgart, 2016, ISBN 978-3-17-031473-3 .
  • René Girard: Figures of Desire. The self and the other in fictional reality. 2nd Edition. LIT, Münster, 2012, ISBN 978-3-643-50378-7 (French: Mensonge romantique et vérité romanesque. 1961, ISBN 2-01-278977-3 ).
  • René Girard: The sacred and the violence. Fischer, Frankfurt a. M. 1994, most recently Ostfildern, Patmos 2011, ISBN 3-8436-0075-9 (French: La Violence et le sacré. 1972, ISBN 3-491-69430-2 ).
  • Jutta Heckhausen; Heinz Heckhausen: Motivation and Action . 4th edition Berlin, 2010.
  • Jean-Luc Marion: The Erotic. A phenomenon. Translated from the French by Alwin Letzkus. Karl Alber, Freiburg i. Br. / Munich 2011. ISBN 978-3-495-48366-4 (French: Le phénomène érotique. Six méditations . Grasset, Paris 2003, ISBN 2-246-55091-2 ).
  • Abraham Maslow: A Theory of Human Motivation. In: Psychological Revue 50 (1943), 370-396.
  • Plato: symposium . In: Works in eight volumes (gr./German) / Gunther Eigler (ed.); Friedrich Schleiermacher (translator). Vol. III. WBG, Darmstadt, 1977.
  • Paul Ricoeur: The willful and the unwilling . Translated and given an introduction by Daniel Creutz. Fink, Paderborn 2016, ISBN 978-3-7705-5513-0 (French: Le volontaire et l'involontaire. Aubier, Paris 1950).

Web links

Wiktionary: Desire  - explanations of meanings, word origins, synonyms, translations

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ See Jutta Heckhausen; Heinz Heckhausen: Motivation and Action. 4th edition Berlin 2010, 105-143.
  2. ↑ See Jörg Disse: Desiderium. A philosophy of desire. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2016, 98f.
  3. ↑ See ibid., 74-105
  4. ↑ Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics, I, 1.
  5. ↑ See Jörg Disse: Desiderium. A philosophy of desire. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2016, 105-110.
  6. ↑ Jürgen Beckmann; Heinz Heckhausen: Motivation through expectation and incentive. In: Jutta Heckhausen; Heinz Heckhausen: Motivation and Action. 4th edition Berlin 2010, 105-143, here 106.
  7. ↑ René Girard: La violence et le sacré. Paris 1972, chap. 6th
  8. ^ Plato: Symposion, 210 de.
  9. ↑ Ibid., 211d.
  10. ↑ Augustinus: en. Ps. 62,3.
  11. ↑ Augustine: conf. I, 1.1.
  12. ↑ Thomas Aquinas: Summa theologica, I-II, 1,7.
  13. ↑ Thomas Aquinas: Summa contra gentiles, III, 25.