Treaty of Saint Petersburg (1755)

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The Treaty of Saint Petersburg was signed on September 30, 1755 between the Kingdom of Great Britain and the Russian Empire . In the run-up to the approaching Seven Years' War he was directed against the Kingdom of Prussia , although it was not mentioned in the text. Specifically, it was a subsidy and assistance pact to protect the Electorate of Hanover , which the English king ruled in personal union. In the event of a war, there was a risk that Hanover would be occupied by France or by Prussia, which was sympathetic to it at the time, and used as a bargaining chip in subsequent peace negotiations.

The Russian side initialed , but failed to ratify it , so the treaty never became binding. Because in the meantime Great Britain had used the agreement as a means of pressure during its parallel secret negotiations with Prussia and had thus reached the Westminster Convention with him . However, Russia saw Prussia as its opponent and now turned from Great Britain to Austria, which forged an alliance against Prussia in order to regain possession of Silesia .

prehistory

In 1750, two years after the end of the War of the Austrian Succession , in which Prussia and France had fought against Great Britain and Austria, Tsarina Elisabeth had offered the British, against payment of subsidies, 30,000 men for a new war against Prussia. Great Britain initially ignored this, although it assessed Prussia as a possible future aggressor. Nevertheless, Russia remained interested in an agreement. Negotiations, which began in 1753, were unsuccessful, as the amount of subsidies and the conditions under which Russia would have been obliged to intervene militarily remained disputed.

With the outbreak of open hostilities in North America (→ Seven Years War in North America ) the tide turned. Now it was London that - encouraged by Austria's Chancellor, Count Kaunitz - pressed for a swift conclusion of a treaty with the Tsarist Empire. Great Britain wanted to prevent the conflict from spreading to mainland Europe or at least contain it, as it feared an invasion of Hanover by France or its alleged ally Prussia in the event of a conflict.

The House of Hanover was now looking for a " mainland sword" that would protect its German home countries against receiving British subsidies. Russia, whose Tsarina Elisabeth harbored a personal hostility towards the Prussian ruler, Frederick II , seemed to be particularly suitable for this role .

In April 1755, the new British ambassador to Saint Petersburg, Charles Hanbury Williams , received a request from the London Cabinet to bring the negotiations to a speedy conclusion. The contract was finally signed on September 30, 1755. The decisive factor was the interest of both sides in a containment of France and Prussia, but also the high bribes that Hanbury Williams et al. a. to the Grand Chancellor Count Bestushev-Ryumin, who was in charge of Russian foreign policy .

content

In return for receipt of 100,000 pounds sterling annually , Russia undertook to have 55,000 men ready in Livonia for an incursion into East Prussia for four years and to set up a sea power of 40 galleys for use along the Baltic coasts. A further 400,000 pounds were agreed for their use in the event of war. According to the treaty, however, the Russian troops were only allowed to intervene militarily if fighting broke out in Germany. In the event of war, Prussia had to expect not only Austria's invasion of Silesia, but also a Russian advance from the east and the operation of Anglo-Russian naval units against its coastal areas. Encircled in this way and put on the defensive, a Prussian attack on Hanover would be an incalculable risk.

consequences

The treaty ultimately did not come to fruition, as Great Britain had also negotiated secretly with Prussia since the summer of 1755 and concluded the Westminster Convention with them in January 1756. The agreement, which Frederick II learned of in December 1755, increased the pressure on Prussia to come to a peaceful settlement with Great Britain in the face of the Russian threat and thus lured it out of the expected alliance of France.

With the conclusion of the convention, Prussia assumed the role previously intended for Russia as protector of Hanover. The resulting renversement des alliances (overthrowing the alliances) ultimately saw Great Britain and Russia in opposing camps, but without any significant direct confrontation between the two powers during the following war.

For Count Bestushev-Ryumin, who had largely determined Russia's foreign policy since 1741, the failure of the Anglo-Russian pact meant a loss of face, which gave his pro-French opponents at the Tsar's court additional impetus. His intrigues against the Russo-French-Habsburg alliance, which continued even during the war, led to his overthrow in February 1758 .

literature

Individual evidence

  1. ^ Matt Schumann , Karl W. Schweizer : The Seven Years War: A Transatlantic History . 1st edition. Routledge, Abingdon-on-Thames 2008, ISBN 978-0-415-39418-5 , pp. 34 .
  2. ↑ Jeremy Black : America Or Europe ?: British Foreign Policy, 1739-63 . 1st edition. UCL Press, London 1998, ISBN 1-85728-185-3 , pp. 20 .
  3. ^ Matt Schumann , Karl W. Schweizer : The Seven Years War: A Transatlantic History . 1st edition. Routledge, Abingdon-on-Thames 2008, ISBN 978-0-415-39418-5 , pp. 34 ff .
  4. ↑ Jeremy Black : America Or Europe ?: British Foreign Policy, 1739-63 . 1st edition. UCL Press, London 1998, ISBN 1-85728-185-3 , pp. 20th ff .
  5. ^ William R. Nester : The French and Indian War and the Conquest of New France . 1st edition. University of Oklahoma Press, Norman 2014, ISBN 978-0-8061-4435-1 , pp. 75 .
  6. ^ Daniel Marston : The Seven Years' War . 1st edition. Osprey Publishing Limited, Oxford 2001, ISBN 978-1-57958-343-9 , pp. 15 .
  7. ^ Daniel A. Baugh : The Global Seven Years War 1754-1763: Britain and France in a Great Power Contest . Routledge, Abingdon-on-Thames 2014, ISBN 978-0-582-09239-6 , pp. 153 .
  8. ^ William R. Nester : The French and Indian War and the Conquest of New France . 1st edition. University of Oklahoma Press, Norman 2014, ISBN 978-0-8061-4435-1 , pp. 180 .
  9. ^ William R. Nester : The French and Indian War and the Conquest of New France . 1st edition. University of Oklahoma Press, Norman 2014, ISBN 978-0-8061-4435-1 , pp. 179 .
  10. ↑ Jeremy Black : America Or Europe ?: British Foreign Policy, 1739-63 . 1st edition. UCL Press, London 1998, ISBN 1-85728-185-3 , pp. 21 .
  11. ^ William R. Nester : The French and Indian War and the Conquest of New France . 1st edition. University of Oklahoma Press, Norman 2014, ISBN 978-0-8061-4435-1 , pp. 222 .