Treaty of Versailles (1756)

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French silver medal on the Treaty of Versailles 1756. Obverse: Allegories of France and Austria. Text: "FOEDUS VERSALIIS SANCITUM / PRIMA DIE MAII MDCCLVI" (The Treaty of Versailles concluded / First day of May 1756)
King Louis XV of France . Titulature in the text of the contract: "SM Très-Chrétienne" (His Majesty, the most Christian king )
Empress-Queen Maria Theresa of Austria . Titulature in the text of the contract: "SM l'Impératrice Reine d'Hongrie & de Bohème" (Her Majesty the Empress, Queen of Hungary and Bohemia )

The (first) Treaty of Versailles (more rarely the Treaty of Jouy-en-Josas ) was concluded on May 1, 1756 as a neutrality convention and defensive alliance between France and Austria . He was near Versailles , in the Jouy-en-Josas Palace , by the diplomats Georg Adam Graf von Starhemberg (1724-1807), François-Joachim de Pierre, Abbé de Bernis (1715-1794) and the French Foreign Minister Antoine Louis Signed Rouillé, Comte de Jouy (1689–1761). The conclusion of the treaty led to the dissolution of the alliances that had determined the political power play in Europe since the late 1680s and thus brought about one of the decisive power-political system changes of the early modern period . He remained until the declaration of war of revolutionary France to Emperor Francis II. On April 20, 1792 in force.

Initial situation and negotiations

Treaty of Versailles (1756) (Île-de-France)
Jouy Castle
Jouy Castle
Palace of Versailles
Palace of Versailles
PARIS
PARIS
Location in the Île-de-France

The conclusion of the contract was part of the reversal of the alliances and finally ended the Habsburg-French opposition that had existed since 1516 . The first Treaty of Versailles represented the Franco-Austrian reaction to the Westminster Convention concluded in January 1756 between their respective allies Prussia and Great Britain . The basis was thus two long-term historical processes, the Second Hundred Years War (1689-1815) and the Prussian- Austrian dualism (1740–1866). In view of the simmering conflict over Silesia , which had fallen to Prussia, and the danger of a future war between the two states, the Habsburg court in Vienna sought France as a powerful ally and entered into secret negotiations.

The immediate start of the negotiations was initiated on August 30, 1755 by the arrival of an instruction from Vienna from State Chancellor Wenzel Anton von Kaunitz (1711–1794) for the Austrian ambassador Starhemberg. On the same day, the envoy handed Madame de Pompadour a letter from Maria Theresa addressed to the king and an accompanying letter from Kaunitz addressed to the mistress herself. The Habsburg diplomacy proceeded with caution in strict secrecy: In the accompanying letter, Kaunitz only stated that Starhemberg had to inform the king about things of the greatest importance. Madame de Pompadour forwarded the letter to the addressee in accordance with the Austrians' intention. Louis XV subsequently appointed Abbé de Bernis as his negotiator.

On September 3, 1755, the first secret meeting took place on the grounds of the Château de Bellevue between Starhemberg and Bernis. The Austrian ambassador read out a letter from the Empress containing the alliance proposal. The offer was made to Louis XV. forwarded, after which the negotiations hesitantly got underway. Until the end of the year the circle of confidants in Vienna was limited to Maria Theresa, her husband and Kaunitz, in Versailles to the king, Madame de Pompadour and Abbé de Bernis. The following meetings of the negotiators continued to be of a conspiratorial nature and therefore took place outside Versailles. In November 1755 there was a draft of the contract, which was submitted to a secret council consisting of four ministers. The members were all close to Madame de Pompadour and tended to be open to an alliance with Austria. After the final wording of the treaty had been drawn up, the other ministers were taken into their confidence in the spring. The French outrage over the Westminster Convention of January 16, 1756 accelerated the conclusion of the treaty significantly. Starhemberg and Bernis now met almost every day for consultations in Paris .

content

Title page of a contemporary print of the contract text, Vienna 1756
Detailed view of the Alliance Fountain in Nancy with the inscription: “Perenne Concordiæ Fœdus Anno 1756” (perpetual contract of unity (in) the year 1756). The fountain was commissioned by the French king's father-in-law, Stanislaus I. Leszczyński , when the contract was signed
First separate article (negotiator document, house, court and state archives Vienna)

Although the contract was signed in Jouy-en-Josas - a property of Foreign Minister Rouillé - Versailles was noted as the place of signature in the text of the contract. The so-called First Treaty of Versailles actually consists of two separate documents: a neutrality convention between Empress Maria Theresa and King Louis XV. and a defensive alliance ("Traité d'amitié & d'union purement défensif").

The defensive alliance includes a preamble , nine articles, two separate articles, and five secret separate articles. It includes mutual troop aid for armed conflicts in Europe - Prussia was meant - with the exception of Franco-British wars . Each side wanted to support the other with at least 24,000 men in the event of an attack. Article II established the status quo for the Old Reich and was directed against the threat to the Reich constitution from Prussia. According to the results of Sven Externbrink, it can be traced back to the objectives of French imperial politics, which wanted to allay fears of a denominational alliance directed against Protestants. Separate Articles I and II deal exclusively with questions of precedent arising from the way in which the treaty was drafted. The secret Separate Article I, on the other hand, is politically particularly serious, because it specifies the triggering of the alliance case also for an attack by a British ally.

Of the 16 articles of the treaty, the clauses on military alliance aid are particularly detailed. The detailed agreements should prevent misunderstandings and uncertainties in the interpretation and are a specific feature of the Franco-Austrian treaties 1756–1759, which contain up to 32 articles. Last but not least, the contract includes the declaration of a universal alliance, hence the declaration of will to enter into a long-term, firm alliance. The validity of the treaty for the successors and heirs of both monarchs, emphasized in Articles III and IV, was intended to prevent the frequent breaches of treaty when rulers changed in the 18th century.

Outline drawing of a copper token from the Roettiers
family of French medalists on the conclusion of the contract. Inscription: "CONCORDIA AUSTRIÆ ET GALLIÆ MDCCLVI".

The provisions of the first Versailles Treaty were expanded in 1757 and converted into an offensive treaty concluded on the anniversary .

Article of the defensive alliance content
Art. I Expression of the friendly intentions of both contracting parties
Art. II Confirmation of the validity of the Peace of Westphalia of 1648 and of all peace and alliance agreements concluded since then, in particular the neutrality convention concluded on the same day
Art. III Assurance of Maria Theresa's military support for the King of France and his successors and heirs in the event of an attack on his European possessions against all powers with the exception of England
Art. IV Assurance of military support for Louis XV. for the Empress-Queen and her successors and heirs (according to the Pragmatic Sanction ) in the event of an attack on their European possessions
Art. V Affirmation of political cooperation
Art. VI In the event of a defense, the contracting parties support each other with 24,000 soldiers, with the exception of the war in America between France and England (affirmation of Art. III)
Art. VII The troop corps mentioned in the previous article should consist of 18,000 infantrymen and 6,000 horsemen and must begin marching no later than six weeks or two months after an enemy invasion. The article also regulates issues relating to the financing of soldiers. At the request of the attacked person, a corresponding cash payment can be demanded instead of troop aid
Art. VIII The contracting parties reserve the right to include other powers in the contract
Art. IX The contract is expected by the rulers in the period of six weeks ratified are
Separate type. I. The sequence of Art. III and IV - Maria Theresa is before Louis XV. named - is not to be understood as a precedent for the primacy of either majesty
Separate type. II The drafting of the neutrality convention and the alliance treaty in French should not be understood as an example of the primacy of the French side in the future
Secret separate articles content
Go Separate type. I. Maria Theresa and Louis XV. also stand by each other against attacks by British auxiliary powers
Go Separate type. II Execution of the intentions behind Art. VIII: in the near future the Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire as Grand Duke of Tuscany and the King of Naples and Sicily as well as possibly later other powers are to be included in the treaty
Go Separate type. III Both parties express their willingness to resolve contentious political and territorial issues, particularly those relating to Italy
Go Separate type. IV For the duration of the current war between England and France in America, neither party undertakes to enter into any new obligations with other powers without the knowledge and participation of the contractual partner
Go Separate type. V The four secret separate articles are to be ratified within six weeks, as provided for in Art. IX of the defensive alliance

Role of the royal mistress Madame de Pompadour

François Boucher (1703–1770): Portrait of the Marquise de Pompadour (1756), oil on canvas, 201 × 157 cm, Alte Pinakothek . The painting is interpreted by the art historian Andrea Weisbrod as a staging of the extensive influence of the mistress at court in the context of the Versailles treaties of 1756/57.

The rapprochement between France and Austria was brought about by Austria's State Chancellor Wenzel Anton von Kaunitz through King Louis XV. Mistress Madame de Pompadour initiated , since on the French side the traditional contacts for negotiations, Foreign Minister Rouillé and War Minister d'Argenson , were considered supporters of the old political system (i.e. the alliance with Prussia). Madame de Pompadour played an intensive role in the progress of the negotiations, with the conclusion of the contract, according to recent research, ultimately being based on the personal decision of Louis XV. was based. The king chose the young Abbé de Bernis, who was patronized by his mistress, and who, in the opinion of the historian Eckhard Buddruss, probably spoke that he was less conservative in alliance politics than established French diplomats. The role of Madame de Pompadour, in particular her influence on the allegedly weak monarch Louis XV, on the other hand, on the basis of contemporary memoir literature, has been overestimated in some places in older research and has long been judged very negatively under mystical circumstances. A drawing from 1756 in the private caricature book of the artist Charles-Germain de Saint-Aubin (1721–1786), who worked for the Versailles court, illustrates the conclusion of the contract in the form of a hint of a kiss from Starhemberg and the mistress, who as a social climber needs a ladder to get on a level with the Austrian envoy. With the beginning of the secret negotiations, the mistress is no longer mentioned in Starhemberg's diplomatic reports and it is unclear whether she took part in them. Although a direct influence on the content of the contract cannot be proven, the assumption of the mediator role alone showed Madame de Pompadour's stable position at the Versailles court. Accordingly, a portrait made on her behalf by François Boucher in 1756, which was presented to the public in the Louvre salon exhibition in 1757, is viewed in particular as a documentation and staging of her position of power following the successful conclusion of the first Treaty of Versailles.

Engraving after a gem by Jacques Guay , engraved by Madame de Pompadour

Follow and reception

Title page of the new edition of the memorandum Doubts and Questions about the Treaty of Versailles of May 1, 1756 […] by
Jean-Louis Favier , published in 1789

The news of the conclusion of the contract quickly spread across Europe. The court aristocrat Charles-Philippe d'Albert, Duc de Luynes (1695-1758) noted in his journal on May 5, 1756 that the contract was discussed in all foreign newspapers and that its existence in Versailles had to be admitted. The French representatives abroad were only officially informed on May 31, 1756. The information was communicated to the electoral ambassadors in Versailles and Vienna and to the first minister, Count Brühl , at the beginning of June 1756. The Roman Curia had known about the ongoing Austro-French secret negotiations since February 21, 1756, but one can only guess how exactly this information found its way to Rome. In any case, the papal envoys - the nuncios in Vienna and Paris - only found out about it later and in some cases were not able to correctly evaluate the information available until the conclusion of the contract in May. The alliance of the two great Catholic powers of Europe was welcomed in Rome as it corresponded to the denominational interests of the Curia. However, when the text of the treaty became known, it was disappointing in this respect: denominational issues play no role in the individual articles. In addition, the religious-political provisions of the Peace of Westphalia confirmed in Article II were not recognized by the papacy.

The assessment of the first Treaty of Versailles turned out to be far more differentiated than after the defeat of Roßbach, which was catastrophic for the reputation of the Bourbons in 1757 and the final loss of most of the French colonial empire in North America in 1763. In testimonies from the Versailles court, there are briefly optimistic forecasts for the future, from the banishment of the acute danger of war on the continent to the prospect of an everlasting peace in the face of the understanding between the two most powerful dynasties in Europe.

Instead, the isolation of Prussia in continental Europe caused by the Franco-Austrian defensive alliance strengthened King Frederick II , with some delay, in his decision to open the supposedly inevitable armed conflict with an attack on the Electorate of Saxony planned as a preventive attack . The main reason for this, however, was the political rapprochement between Austria and Russia in the following months. With Prussia's attack on Saxony, the alliance for the Houses of Bourbon and Habsburg surprisingly occurred: France was embroiled in a war on the soil of the Holy Roman Empire, which, according to Foreign Minister Rouillé, ran counter to the foreign policy interests of the kingdom. In view of the close family ties between the Bourbons and the Albertines ruling in Electoral Saxony as well as the Prussian breach of international law, a military reaction by Louis XV was in Versailles. however, viewed as essential.

The first Treaty of Versailles can be seen as a turning point in the reversal of the alliances , but had far more far-reaching consequences. The rapprochement with Austria was rejected by a large part of the political public in France. The severe defeat in the Seven Years' War and France's decline in power politics in the following years were considered the result of this process. The first treaty of Versailles in 1756 was a heavy burden, especially for the Habsburg Queen Marie Antoinette , as she was seen as the embodiment of the alliance and therefore openly hated her. During the French Revolution , the demand arose to end the alliance with Austria and to regain Prussia as a “natural” ally. The works of Jean-Louis Favier (1711–1784), whose first memorandum on this subject, Doutes et questions sur le traité de Versailles du May 1, 1756, were particularly influential until the Revolution ; entre le roi et l'impératrice Reine de Hongrie ('Doubts and questions about the Treaty of Versailles of May 1, 1756; between the King and the Empress, the Queen of Hungary') was already available in August 1756.

In May 2006, an Austro-French conference was held in Vienna on the occasion of the 250th anniversary of the first Treaty of Versailles.

Contract text

  • Clive Parry: The Consolidated Treaty Series. 231 volumes, New York 1969-1981, here: Volume 40 (1969), pp. 333-349.

literature

  • Alfred von Arneth : History of Maria Theresa, Vol. 4: Maria Theresa after the War of Succession 1748–1756 , Vienna 1870, pp. 388–461. Google digitization
  • Lucien Bély: Révolution diplomatique , in: Derselbe (Ed.): Dictionnaire de l'Ancien Régime. Royaume de France XVIe – XVIIIe siècle , 3rd edition Paris 2010, pp. 1098–1100, here 1099.
  • Max Braubach : Versailles and Vienna from Ludwig XIV. To Kaunitz. The preliminary stages of the diplomatic revolution in the 18th century (Bonner Historische Forschungen, 2), Bonn 1952, pp. 444f.
  • Eckhard Buddruss: The French policy on Germany 1756–1789 (publications by the Institute for European History Mainz, Department of Universal History, 157), Mainz 1995, p. 83.
  • Edmond Dziembowski: La guerre de Sept Ans, 1756-1763 , Paris 2015, pp. 110-130.
  • Sven Externbrink: Louis XV. as a foreign policy maker. On the political “style” of the monarch (using the example of the Renversement des alliances) , in: Klaus Malettke / Christoph Kampmann (eds.): French-German relations in recent history. Festschrift for Jean Laurent Meyer on the occasion of his 80th birthday (Research on the history of the modern age, 10) , Münster 2007, pp. 221–240.
  • Michel Kerautret : Le renversement des alliances de 1756 , in: Versailles 14 (2014), pp. 64–69.
  • John Rogister: Madame de Pompadour et la négociation du traité de May 1756 avec la Cour de Vienne , in: Revue d'histoire diplomatique 124/3 (2010), pp. 275-291.
  • Jörg Ulbert: The history of the impact of the “diplomatic revolution”. The assessment of the renversement des alliances and the alliance with Austria in the French public and politics , in: Sven Externbrink (Ed.): The Seven Years War (1756–1763). A European World War in the Age of Enlightenment , Berlin 2011, pp. 159–179.
  • Richard Waddington : Louis XV et le renversement des alliances. Préliminaires de la Guerre de Sept Ans , Paris 1896, Chapter VII, pp. 309-332 (negotiations); Chapter VIII, pp. 333–371 ("Traité de Versailles. Son effet en Europe"). URL: http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k1248007/f4.item ( Gallica ).

Web links

Commons : Treaty of Versailles (1756)  - collection of images, videos and audio files

See also

Individual evidence

  1. Eckhard Buddruss: The French policy on Germany 1756–1789 (publications by the Institute for European History Mainz, Department of Universal History, 157), Mainz 1995, p. 120. This is followed by Katja Frehland-Wildeboer: Treue Freunde? The Alliance in Europe 1714–1914 (Studies on International History, 25), Munich 2010, p. 161.
  2. The section on the history of negotiations is based on: Eva Kathrin Dade: Madame de Pompadour. The mistress and diplomacy (Externa, 2), Cologne / Weimar / Vienna 2010, pp. 167–171.
  3. ^ Clive Parry: The Consolidated Treaty Series, Vol. 40, New York 1969, p. 338.
  4. ^ Sven Externbrink: After the "diplomatic revolution". Function and tasks of the French Reichstag legation, in: zeitenblicke 11, No. 2, [30.01.2013], paragraphs 18–22. URL: http://www.zeitenblicke.de/2012/2/Externbrink/index_html .
  5. Katja Frehland-Wildeboer: Loyal friends? The Alliance in Europe 1714–1914 (Studies on International History, 25), Munich 2010, p. 157.
  6. Michael Bloch: 3. The role of Madame de Pompadour in the Seven Years War . From: Madame de Pompadour - The Seven Years War. URL: https://www.historicum.net/themen/pompadour-und-ihre-zeit/krieg-und-politik/der-7jaehrige-krieg/artikel/3_Die_Rolle_der_Madame_de_Pompadour_im_Siebenjaehrigen_Krieg/ ; Guido Braun: From the political to the cultural hegemony of France 1648–1789 (WBG German-French History, IV), Darmstadt 2008, p. 95f.
  7. L'Alliance de… faite en may 1756. par L'abbé de B [The Alliance of…, concluded in May 1756 by Abbé B.], in: Charles-Germain de Saint-Aubin: Livre de Caricatures tant bonnes que mauvaises , [Paris approx. 1740–1775], p. 286. The caricature book is available as a digitized version: https://waddesdon.org.uk/the-collection/item/?id=17182 .
  8. ^ Eva Kathrin Dade: Madame de Pompadour. The mistress and diplomacy (Externa, 2), Cologne / Weimar / Vienna 2010, p. 169.
  9. Andrea Weisbrod: Madame de Pompadour and the power of staging , Berlin 2014, pp. 69, 72–76.
  10. ^ Stephan Skalweit: France and Frederick the Great. The rise of Prussia in the public opinion of the 'ancien régime' (Bonner Historische Forschungen, 1), Bonn 1952, pp. 87f.
  11. ^ René Hanke: Brühl and the Renversement des alliances. The anti-Prussian foreign policy of the Dresden court 1744-1756 (Historia profana et ecclesiastica, 15), Berlin / Münster 2006, p. 306.
  12. ^ Johannes Burkhardt: Farewell to the religious war. The Seven Years' War and papal diplomacy (Library of the German Historical Institute in Rome, 61), Tübingen 1985, pp. 34, 41, 43f. Further, with source texts in the appendix: ibid., Pp. 31–55.
  13. Edmond Dziembowski: La guerre de Sept Ans, 1756–1763, Paris 2015, pp. 123–124.
  14. Edmond Dziembowski: La guerre de Sept Ans, 1756–1763, Paris 2015, pp. 216–219.
  15. ^ Heinz Duchhardt: Baroque and Enlightenment (Oldenbourg floor plan of history, 11), 4th revised. and exp. Edition of the volume The Age of Absolutism , Munich 2007, p. 122.
  16. Jörg Ulbert: The history of the impact of the "diplomatic revolution". The assessment of the renversement des alliances and the alliance with Austria in the French public and politics , in: Sven Externbrink (Ed.): The Seven Years War (1756–1763). A European World War in the Age of Enlightenment , Berlin 2011, pp. 159–179, here 174, 178. On Favier: ibid., Pp. 164, 171. Memorandum in the edition of 1778, a new edition took place in the revolutionary year of 1789: http: //www.mdz-nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn=urn:nbn:de:bvb:12-bsb11098002-7 (digitized version of the Bavarian State Library).
This version was added to the list of articles worth reading on October 4, 2016 .