Delay battle

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Block diagram delay battle wear phase
Block diagram of delayed battle troop allocation
Delay battle in a schematic representation
Anti-tank mines of the German Armed Forces from Swedish production: right DM31 (inert training version), middle and left drill mine DM70. The red signal body on the DM31 indicates that the mine has defused itself after a certain period of time.

The delaying operation is a type of operation that comes into play particularly when the opponent is quantitatively superior. During the First World War , the delay in the disguised withdrawal of German troops and the expansion of new positions was used in the Battle of Verdun. Other historical defensive battles were the defense of Tsingtau in 1914, the battle of Zusmarshausen in 1648 and the Appomattox campaign of 1865. This tactical concept of a mobile fighting style was used by the Bundeswehr in particular during the operational planning of the Cold War to help the armed forces involved in the battle Weapons of the high numerical superiority of the Warsaw Pact troops. Even today, the delay battle plays a central role in NATO maneuvers. In a modern land war, depending on the situation, the individual types of combat defense, delay and attack / counterattack can alternate rapidly and / or merge into one another. The delay battle is one of the most demanding types of battle, which demands a high degree of coordination from the troop leaders.

aims

The objectives of the delay battle include:

  • Time savings through targeted abandonment of rooms. The delay battle is usually set up in front of the front edge of the defense ( VRV ) in order to give the main forces the opportunity to set up the defense
  • Enemy advance is slowed down and forced in a certain direction by means of arresting or throwing mine barriers . The enemy's attack is "channeled"
  • Enemy armored and infantry forces are deliberately worn out by fire and movement and subsequent evasion in alternating positions
  • Own forces are spared in that the cover forces slow down the advance of the opponent by delay and thereby give the main forces the opportunity to prepare for defense
  • Enemy tank formations are forced early by the delayed battle to develop and surrender their focus and can therefore be fought and destroyed more easily
  • The delay battle is not looking for a decision, but creates the conditions for a counterattack from the depths

principle

The delay battle takes place in the delay zone that has already been explored in advance, usually in front of the VRV, i.e. the actual line of defense. The delay area, which is usually secured in the front section by field posts or standing patrols, consists of several delay lines (VZL) in which a temporary defense of the cover troops is to take place. The delay battle is usually led by a tank or tank grenadier battalion, which is deployed within the framework of the superior brigade or as a separate delay unit. During the Cold War, a typical delay unit (VzgVbd) often consisted, depending on the assignment, of a reinforced tank reconnaissance battalion to which Panzergrenadier, tank pioneer , artillery VB and RASIT or PARA radar troops were subordinate to the battlefield reconnaissance. The delay action comes about through the creation of ambushes, fire and the movement of planned evasive troops, as well as through guarded barriers. The defensive section of a brigade is around 25 km deep and 15 km wide in its combat strip, that of a delay zone for the cover forces around 10 km in front of the VRV.

example

" Border security and the start of the delayed battle in the 'delay zone' by so-called 'Covering Forces' to gain time for the main forces to deploy; the attacker's gain in terrain should be kept as low as possible. "

In NORTHAG's GDP, several delay battles were planned for the V case . The Dutch Corps, reinforced by the Bundeswehr's delay forces , was given the task of delaying for 24 hours between the zone border and the Elbe Lateral Canal , while the bulk of the NL Corps was preparing for defense at the ESK. The starting point for this consisted of the 41st NL-PzBrig and parts of the 3rd Panzer Division Buxtehude . Scouting trains from Pz AufklBtl 3 Lüneburg would have encountered enemy reconnaissance aircraft from the 5th NVA Army in an early phase . The 1st British Corps, as the right neighbor of the 1st German Corps, had the task of decelerating with two tank brigades over a width of 70 kilometers between the inner German border and the VRV. The I. DE Corps with a combat section in the Lüneburg Heath also delayed with two brigades to a width of 80 kilometers. In the north sector the PzGrenBrig 32 as VzgVbd of the 11th Panzer Grenadier Division and in the south the reinforced PzBrig 2 of the 1st Panzer Division . Corps reserve here were the PzLehrBrig 9 from Munster and the Airborne Brigade 27 until the 3rd PzDiv was completely available.

procedure

Preparing for the delay includes assessing the situation, which includes assessing one's own and the enemy situation. After that, the troops of the delay unit and the fire regulation for supporting high-angle weapons ( mortars and artillery ) are made. The planned delay zone is subdivided into several delay lines (VZL) on which tank, tank reconnaissance or tank grenadier companies have taken positions (advanced positions and positions in depth), whereby one or more focal points can be formed. The VZL receive time markings for which an evasion into the prepared change position is provided. At a certain distance from the front combat troops are the fireplaces of the tank artillery. Further down is the disposal area (VfgR) of the operational reserve, usually an armored formation, which has to be ready for a counterattack into the flank of the enemy. If advance detachments of an enemy tank or motorized rifle formation approach , a temporary fire fight is carried out. Then your own part of the troops avoids fighting in one platoon or flipping over to the next / next but one change position. The enemy's balance of power is successively reduced through the war of attrition that is waged in this way. The aim should be that the opposing combat strength is significantly reduced before it can develop its full effect in front of your own VRV. The evasion into the change position is often done through lanes of their own fall arrest / throwing mine barriers. The enemy armored units suffer further losses of combat vehicles through mine barriers and are “channeled” in certain directions, where they continue to be targeted by tank destroyers , anti-tank helicopters and ground attack aircraft . For the delay group, the delayed battle ends at a recording line near the VRV, where it is recorded by its own position force. Due to limited human resources, during the Cold War only a “refresher” of the delay association and the next assignment as a follow-up assignment were planned. Sometimes even the tactical use of atomic mines (ADM - Atomic Demolition Munition ) was planned in the delay battle.

criticism

Time estimates for delay action by NATO units were often not realistic during the Cold War. 24 or more hours of halting struggle appeared to be hardly practicable due to maneuvering experience and simulations in view of the scarce resources available and the great quantitative superiority of the attacking Warsaw Pact. A maximum of eight hours seemed to correspond more to the real conditions of a large-scale combat with linked arms. However, this short period would have to be viewed as extremely critical, because in most cases it would not have been sufficient to allow the main body of defenders to march on the VRV and establish combat readiness . Thus, in the event of a massive tank advance, the defense would have collapsed quickly in the initial phase.

literature

  • HDv Heeresdienstvorschrift 100/900, leadership terms, Bonn 2007
  • HDv Army Service Regulations 100/100, Leadership in Battle, Bonn 2007
  • Rainer Oestmann: I order that… !, Walhalla Fachverlag, Regensburg 2012, ISBN 978-3-8029-6023-9
  • Stefan Erminger: The development of the types of combat: Operative thinking and acting in German armed forces, Kindle Edition, 2010, ISBN 3640650611

Web links

Notes and individual references

  1. The attack on Verdun
  2. ^ History of the Marine Infantry 1675-1919. The delay battle in the defense of Tsingtau
  3. Video: Exercise Winter Wolf - Panzergrenadiers in the delay battle , Bundeswehr.de from January 15, 2018
  4. Transition from marching to combat order
  5. HDv 100/100: "The armored combat troops include the armored troops and the armored infantry troops. Due to their mobility and the protection of their armored combat vehicles, the Panzergrenadierruppe is particularly suitable for quickly switching between mounted and dismounted combat methods in order to ensure the impact force of armored troops. The direct and close cooperation between the armored troops and the armored infantry troops, in addition to working with combat support, is a prerequisite for success. Their versatility and responsiveness enable them to gain and maintain the initiative and bring about a decision. "
  6. forward observer
  7. ^ DR PT 2a RASIT, Radar d'Acquisition et de Surveillance Terrestre: French pulse Doppler tank reconnaissance radar for ground surveillance. The RASIT radar was introduced in the tank reconnaissance troops in 1986/87 and was mostly mounted on a Fuchs TPz. The detection range ranged from 8,000 meters for individuals and 20,000 meters for vehicles
  8. ↑ Tank reconnaissance radar. The PARA was used in the radar troops or light reconnaissance troops of the tank reconnaissance troops. The PARA system is used to detect moving targets.
  9. Heinz Magenheimer: The defense of Western Europe. Doctrine, strengths, deployment planning - an inventory from the perspective of NATO, Bernard & Graefe aktuell, Koblenz, 1986, p. 66, ISBN 3-7637-5345-1
  10. ^ "The frontier of the Federal Republic should be defended with strong forces", in FAZ, November 18, 1982 and also in Eberhard Wagemann: Problems of Defense of Central Europe in ÖMZ, 2/1977, p. 91
  11. Considerations for deployment planning. Defense mandate and deployment question of NATO in the defense of Western Europe in Heinz Magenheimer: The defense of Western Europe. Doctrine, stock of strength, deployment planning - an inventory from the perspective of NATO, Bernard & Graefe aktuell, Koblenz, 1986, p. 65, ISBN 3-7637-5345-1 ( limited preview in Google book search)
  12. ^ General Defense Plan
  13. Heiner Möllers, Rudolf J. Schlaffer: Sonderfall Bundeswehr ?: Armed Forces in National Perspectives and in International Comparison, Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co KG, 2014, p. 95, ISBN 978-3-11-034812-5 .
  14. Heiner Möllers, Rudolf J. Schlaffer: Sonderfall Bundeswehr ?: Armed Forces in National Perspectives and in International Comparison, Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co KG, 2014, p. 24, ISBN 978-3-11-034812-5 .
  15. Bruno Thoss: NATO strategy and national defense planning: Planning and building the Bundeswehr under the conditions of a massive nuclear retaliation strategy 1952-1960. R. Oldenbourg Verlag Munich, 2006. P. 611, ISBN 978-3-48-671189-9 .
  16. Oliver Bange & Bernd Lemke: Ways to Reunification: The Two German States in Their Alliances 1970 to 1990 (Contributions to Military History, Volume 75), Helmut R. Hammerich: Chapter The NORTHAG, the German I. Corps and the Defense of Northern Germany until 1988 Pp. 290 - 305. De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2013, ISBN 978-34867-1719-8