Weber parable

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The Weber parable is one of the parables of ancient philosophy . It comes from the Greek philosopher Plato (428 / 427-348 / 347 BC), who explains it in his fictional, literary dialogue Politikos ("The Statesman"). First, the procedure for determining what an art consists of is demonstrated using the art of weaving . This prepares the solution to the actual task: the determination of what constitutes the statesman and statesmanship .

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The dialogue Statesman , whose fictitious plot to v in 399th Is one of Plato's late works. The participants are Plato's teacher Socrates , the mathematician Theodoros of Cyrene , an unnamed "stranger" from Elea and Socrates the Younger . Theodoros and the elder Socrates only take part in the philosophical conversation briefly at the beginning and then limit themselves to listening; the actual dialogue is a dialogue between the stranger and the younger Socrates. The philosophically far superior stranger takes over the control of the conversation. His young dialogue partner largely confines himself to expressing agreement and asking questions.

In research it is mostly assumed that the stranger expresses Plato's own view. However, Harvey Ronald Scodel disagrees. According to his interpretation, Plato wants to distance himself from the research method of the Eleatic school to which the foreigner belongs, by showing the reader its inadequacy.

In the Politikos , the interlocutors want to work out the definition of the statesman and the specifics of his area of ​​responsibility. A first proposal for a definition is corrected after lengthy discussions, but is ultimately rejected by the stranger as inadequate.

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The younger Socrates asks the stranger to make him understand the inadequacy of the first proposed definition. The stranger replies that it is difficult to make the facts understandable if one does not take a "pattern" ( parádeigma , often imprecisely translated as "example") to hand. He suggests first taking something familiar, wool weaving, as a pattern and methodically investigating it, and then using the same method to open up the unknown, statecraft.

First, the stranger explains the conditions under which such a pattern is helpful. This is the case when there is an analogy between the known and the unknown. Based on a recognized commonality, one can deduce the unknown from the known.

Definition of weaving

In determining the art of wool weaving, the stranger proceeds according to the Dihairesis method . A term is defined by dividing a more general term into sub-terms until the definition of the term sought has been reached. Man's products fall into two main groups: the things that enable him to do something and those that protect him from suffering. The means of protection are divided into remedies and repellants, the means of defense into armor and enclosures, the enclosures into those who are supposed to protect from prying eyes, and those who are supposed to protect against cold and heat. The means of protection against cold and heat are either shelter or coverings, the coverings either underlay (on which one sleeps) or wrappings. From the wrappings one proceeds further subdividing to the garments, the characteristic of which is that they are “made from what is bound together”. The art of clothing production consists primarily of the art of weaving, which is where the definition of the term has arrived.

Through this process, weaving is indeed differentiated from many related arts - such as the manufacture of felt or leather - but the stranger points out that the term “weaving art” is not adequately defined. Weaving is namely a weaving together, but it is preceded by another, in its nature opposite working process, carding (carding), which is a separation of what is connected and what is felted together. Other operations that have nothing to do with weaving are fulling and spinning . Thus not everything that belongs to the production of woolen clothing can be counted as the art of weaving. Added to this is the production of the tools that the weaver needs; it is not weaving and yet it is part of the work that must be done to make woolen clothing.

On the basis of these considerations, the stranger realizes that an art must not only be distinguished from other arts that produce different products, but also from their own auxiliary arts, which serve to produce their product but are not involved in its production process. This leads to the distinction between the manufacturing arts, through which a certain product is manufactured and which are therefore its main causes, and auxiliary arts, which serve the manufacture of the required tools and are thus co-causes.

With the main causes of the production of woolen clothing, the stranger first separates fulling as an art in itself. Everything else he calls the art of wool processing. This is divided into a separating and a connecting part. The parting part includes carding, but also part of the treatment on the loom. The connecting part consists of a turning and an interlacing activity. The production of the weft threads (“weft”) and warp threads (“slip”, “warp”) is twisted, the production of the fabric is interwoven . In this way the stranger finally arrives at a precise definition of the weaving; it is the kind of art that "creates a mesh through the linear interweaving of the weft and chain".

Investigation of statecraft

In determining statesmanship, methodologically the same task arises as in the definition of weaving. Weaving has been set apart from all other arts with which it has something in common. Likewise, statecraft is to be determined by distinguishing it from all other arts which also serve the common good and could therefore dispute its claim to care for the state.

Even before the presentation of the Weber parable, the two interlocutors had come to the provisional, still unsatisfactory result that statecraft was the voluntary maintenance of a herd of bipedal creatures that voluntarily subordinated itself. The characteristic of voluntariness distinguishes the statesman from the tyrant . Differences from the shepherd are that the statesman does not raise and feed his flock and that they are not solely under his care.

The task now remains to delimit statecraft as the main cause from the co-causes and from other main-causal arts in the state and thus to work out their specificity. All arts that contribute to the continued existence of the state are to be considered. While in the art of weaving only the manufacture of their tools is one of the contributory causes, in the case of the state all manufacturing industries belong to this class. In the state as a community based on the division of labor, any production of property - even those that are only for pleasure - is one of the causes of its continued existence. Because of the diversity and variety of the activities under consideration here and their purposes, the subdivision into sub-terms, as it has been successfully used for weaving, meets with difficulties, so the procedure must be adapted to the particularity of this case.

The activities of service providers are one of the main causes of the stranger. Those involved in services include slaves, day laborers and wage workers, as well as merchants and ship owners, shopkeepers and money changers, heralds and secretaries, fortune tellers and priests. In contrast to the statesman, anyone engaged in such activities does not lay claim to state control or participation in it; Such a claim can only occur with priests and high officials determined by lot and their employees. Therefore, it is usually easy to distinguish these groups from the statesman.

The differentiation is more difficult, however, in the case of a special group of service providers who deal with state affairs and are therefore considered as competitors of the statesman. The stranger describes them as men who partly “ resemble lions and centaurs and other beings of this kind”, partly “ satyrs and the weak but agile animals”; they quickly exchange appearance and ability with one another. The stranger and the younger Socrates now want to take a close look at this “strange” type of service provider and distinguish it from the statesman. The stranger describes the type of person concerned with state affairs as "the greatest magician among all sophists and the most experienced in this art". The characterization as "magician" ( góēs ) - this derogatory term is often used for charlatans, swindlers and fraudsters - shows that the stranger is extremely critical of the group of people we are talking about. From his point of view (which corresponds to Plato's own view), it is a question of dubious politicians who wrongly pass themselves off as statesmen and who are in reality the most sophisticated and therefore most dangerous charlatans. They are the ones to whom the various existing constitutions offer the opportunity to come to power.

The stranger distinguishes the real statesman from such alleged statesmen. This does not owe its power to its wealth; Its rule is neither based on violence and arbitrariness, nor is it legitimized in compliance with the provisions of an existing constitution or in the consent of the ruled. Rather, through his knowledge of science, he is qualified in the correct exercise of dominion over people. His competence based on this is the point of view that legitimizes his exercise of power. In this regard, the stranger compares the statesman with the doctor. A doctor is not qualified as such because he is wealthy, or because ignorant patients consider him competent and therefore allow himself to be treated by him, or because he follows certain written regulations, but his qualification consists solely of his expertise, which actually enables him to heal.

States art differs from allied arts - those of the speaker, the judge and the general - in that it has no such limited tasks. Your area of ​​responsibility includes everything that government supervision extends to. The statesman has an integration knowledge that is superior to mere specialist knowledge. Its task is not a special task, but the coordination, the comprehensive planning and the control of the whole.

Comparison between weaving and statecraft

In the last phase of the dialogue it is worked out that there is not only a formal analogy between weaving and statecraft with regard to the procedure for defining, but also a substantive analogy: statecraft is, as it were, a “royal interweaving” that provides a “fabric”. As the stranger explains, there are virtues that are at odds with each other in a certain way: bravery, which is characterized by speed, vehemence and sharpness, and prudence (sōphrosýnē) , which has characteristics such as slowness and gentleness. Each of these virtues has an area in which it is needed. But where that belonging to bravery is not appropriate, it appears as arrogance and recklessness, and where that which characterizes prudence is out of place, one speaks of cowardice and indolence. One-sided supremacy of one of the two intrinsically valuable qualities leads to the downfall of the state. Therefore a regulatory body is needed. The statesman has the task of recognizing the mixed characters of people from different qualities and inclinations through examination, assigning each of them the optimal training and appropriate task according to his special disposition, and supervising everyone. In this the statesman is like the weaver who guides and supervises the walkers, carders and spinners. In weaving, the firmness of the brave corresponds to the texture of the tight warp, the gentleness of the prudent to that of the soft weft. The right interweaving, which the statesman has to take care of, means both the constructive interaction of the different natures in the state and the correct shaping and harmonization of the qualities in the souls of the individual citizens. It also includes the separation of the good from the bad, which is a matter of course in every “compositional art”; No producer knowingly mixes the good (suitable) with the bad (unsuitable), but everyone rejects the bad. So even the statesman in the state must not tolerate the influence of bad people. His art creates “the most wonderful and best of all fabrics” through the right interweaving of the different types of mind.

Modern reception

In his controversial speech, Rules for the People's Park, published in 1999 as an essay, the philosopher Peter Sloterdijk goes into great detail on Plato's Dialog Politikos and also comments on the Weber parable. He believes that Plato is presenting “the program of a humanistic society”, the direction of which is incumbent on an “expert kingdom”. Plato's statesman is the only “full humanist” in this society; his task is "the property planning in an elite that must be specially bred for the sake of the whole". This statesman sort and connect the people, but with their voluntary consent. The “explosiveness of these considerations” is “impossible to misunderstand” for the modern reader. By this Sloterdijk means possibilities that may open up in a future biotechnological age.

Text editions and translations

  • Elizabeth A. Duke et al. (Ed.): Platonis opera , Volume 1, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1995, ISBN 0-19-814569-1 (authoritative critical edition)
  • Gunther Eigler (Ed.): Plato: Theaitetos. The sophist. The statesman (= Plato: works in eight volumes , vol. 6). Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt 1970 (critical edition; edited by Peter Staudacher, Greek text by Auguste Diès, German translation by Friedrich Schleiermacher )
  • Plato: late dialogues I. Theaetetus. The sophist. The statesman. Kratylos. Artemis, Zurich and Munich 1974, ISBN 3-7608-3640-2 (German translation by Rudolf Rufener , introduction by Olof Gigon )
  • Friedo Ricken (Ed.): Plato: Politikos. Translation and commentary (= Plato: Works , Vol. II 4). Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 2008, ISBN 978-3-525-30407-5

literature

  • Ruby Blondell: From Fleece to Fabric: Weaving Culture in Plato's Statesman . In: Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 28, 2005, pp. 23–75
  • Melissa S. Lane: Method and Politics in Plato's Statesman . Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1998, ISBN 0-521-58229-6 , pp. 46-61, 139-146, 171-182
  • Mitchell Miller: The Philosopher in Plato's Statesman . 2nd, expanded edition, Parmenides Publishing, Las Vegas 2004, ISBN 1-930972-16-4 , pp. 55-113
  • Kenneth M. Sayre: Metaphysics and Method in Plato's Statesman . Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2006, ISBN 978-0-521-86608-8 , pp. 92-135

Remarks

  1. ↑ Harvey R. Scodel: Diaeresis and Myth in Plato's Statesman , Göttingen 1987. Scodel interprets pp. 15-19 the fact that Socrates the Elder is present but never intervenes in the conversation as tacit disapproval of the teachings of the stranger. Maurizio Migliori, for example, takes the opposite view: Arte politica e metretica assiologica , Milano 1996, pp. 208f.
  2. ↑ See on this part of the dialogue Friedo Ricken (Ed.): Platon: Politikos. Translation and commentary (= Plato: Werke , Vol. II 4), Göttingen 2008, pp. 91–141.
  3. ↑ Kenneth M. Sayre opposes the translation with “Example”: Metaphysics and Method in Plato's Statesman , Cambridge 2006, p. 97. Cf. Melissa S. Lane: Method and Politics in Plato's Statesman , Cambridge 1998, p. 46 Note 67.
  4. ↑ Plato, Politicus 277c-279b. See Friedo Ricken (ed.): Plato: Politikos. Translation and commentary (= Plato: Werke , Vol. II 4), Göttingen 2008, pp. 142–147. On the interpretation of the comparison between weaving art and statecraft and on the methodology of the foreign see Sylvain Delcomminette: L'Inventivité Dialectique dans le Politique de Platon , Bruxelles 2000, pp. 238-258, 273-320; David A. White: Myth, Metaphysics and Dialectic in Plato's Statesman , Aldershot 2007, pp. 68-74, 78f., 97f., 118-129; Stanley Rosen: Plato's Statesman. The Web of Politics , New Haven 1995, pp. 81-118; Kenneth M. Sayre: Metaphysics and Method in Plato's Statesman , Cambridge 2006, pp. 77-112; Melissa S. Lane: Method and Politics in Plato's Statesman , Cambridge 1998, pp. 56-61; Lambros Couloubaritsis: Le paradigme platonicien du tissage comme modèle politique d'une société complexe . In: Revue de philosophie ancienne 13, 1995, pp. 107–162.
  5. ↑ Plato, Statesman 279b-280a. See Stanley Rosen: Plato's Statesman. The Web of Politics , New Haven 1995, pp. 101-104; Mitchell Miller: The Philosopher in Plato's Statesman , 2nd Edition, Las Vegas 2004, p. 61.
  6. ↑ Plato, Politicus 280a-281d.
  7. ↑ Plato, Politicus 281d-e.
  8. ^ Plato, Politikos 282a – 283b. See Stanley Rosen: Plato's Statesman. The Web of Politics , New Haven 1995, pp. 112-118; Mitchell Miller: The Philosopher in Plato's Statesman , 2nd Edition, Las Vegas 2004, p. 62.
  9. ^ Plato, Politikos 279a, 287a – b. See Friedo Ricken (ed.): Plato: Politikos. Translation and commentary (= Plato: Werke , Vol. II 4), Göttingen 2008, pp. 165–167.
  10. ↑ Plato, Politicus 276e.
  11. ↑ Plato, Politicus 267e-268c, 275d-e.
  12. ↑ Plato, Politikos 287b – 289d. See Mitchell Miller: The Philosopher in Plato's Statesman , 2nd Edition, Las Vegas 2004, pp. 74-82.
  13. ↑ The "ship's master " (naúklēros) was both owner and captain of a ship.
  14. ↑ Plato, Politicus 289c-291a.
  15. ^ Plato, Politikos 291a – c; see. 289c.
  16. ↑ Plato, Statesman 292b-293e.
  17. ↑ Plato, Politicus 304d-305e.
  18. ↑ Plato, Politicus 305e-306a.
  19. ^ Plato, Politikos 306a – 308b.
  20. ↑ See Jacob Frederik M. Arends: Survival, War and Unity of the Polis in Plato's Statesman . In: Polis 12, 1993, pp. 154-187, here: 165-179; Hans Joachim Krämer : Arete in Platon and Aristoteles , Heidelberg 1959, pp. 148–154, 164f., 172f.
  21. ↑ Plato, Statesman 308b-311c.
  22. ^ Peter Sloterdijk: Rules for the human park , Frankfurt am Main 1999, pp. 52–54.