Battle of the Little Bighorn: Difference between revisions

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Content deleted Content added
Line 106: Line 106:
In 1878, the army awarded 24 [[Medal of Honor|Medals of Honor]] to participants in the fight on the bluffs for bravery, most for risking their lives to carry water from the river up the hill to the wounded.<ref>[http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/mohind.htm U.S. Army Medal of Honor website.]</ref> Few questioned the conduct of the enlisted men, but many questioned the tactics, strategy, and conduct of the officers.
In 1878, the army awarded 24 [[Medal of Honor|Medals of Honor]] to participants in the fight on the bluffs for bravery, most for risking their lives to carry water from the river up the hill to the wounded.<ref>[http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/mohind.htm U.S. Army Medal of Honor website.]</ref> Few questioned the conduct of the enlisted men, but many questioned the tactics, strategy, and conduct of the officers.


== The Reno Court of Inquiry ==
== Battle Controversies ==
The battle was the subject of an army Court of Inquiry, made at Reno's request, in 1879 in [[Chicago]], in which Reno's conduct was scrutinized. Some testimony was presented suggesting that he was drunk and a coward, but since none of this came from army officers, Reno's conduct was found to be without fault. However, Lieutenant Jesse Lee, Reno Court of Inquiry transcriber, wrote the following letter to General Miles, who was accusing Reno and Benteen of betrayal: {{cquote|Your chapter on Custer’s last fight (which said that Benteen and Reno were traitors) is a vindication I have long wished to see from the pen of one who writes “without fear or favour or affection"; one whose potent words of truth will carry conviction to millions who wanted light in clean, straight-up rays about that tragic event. I thank God that you have lived to spread before the world what I believe to be “the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth” on Custer. I was Recorder on the Reno Court of Inquiry, but the proceedings were never published in full. I talked with many Indians who were in that fight, and your chapter is almost identical with what I learned from a variety of sources.}}{{Fact|date=August 2007}}
The battle was the subject of an army Court of Inquiry, made at Reno's request, in 1879 in [[Chicago]], in which Reno's conduct was scrutinized. Some testimony was presented suggesting that he was drunk and a coward, but since none of this came from army officers, Reno's conduct was found to be without fault.


Benteen has been criticized for "dawdling" on the first day of the fight, and disobeying Custer's order. The charge of cowardice can easily be leveled at Reno, who ordered a panicked retreat after his own Indian scout was shot in the face, splattering blood and brains over Reno's face. Reno defenders point out that while the retreat was indeed disorganized, Reno did not withdraw from his position until it was clear that he was outnumbered and outflanked.
Benteen has been criticized for "dawdling" on the first day of the fight, and supposedly disobeying Custer's order to bring ammunition. The charge of cowardice has been leveled at Reno through the years due to his hastily ordered retreat. Reno defenders point out that while the retreat was disorganized, Reno did not withdraw from his position until it was clear that he was outnumbered and outflanked.


Lieutenant General [[Nelson A. Miles]], the US highest military commander in 1895 and one of the most successful Indian fighters of all times, wrote in 1877 while studying the battlefield: ''"The more I study the moves here [on the Little Big Horn], the more I have admiration for Custer."'' <ref>Sklenar, page 341.</ref>
Lieutenant General [[Nelson A. Miles]], the United States' highest military commander in 1895 and a participant in several battles with the Indians, wrote in 1877 while studying the battlefield: "The more I study the moves here [on the Little Big Horn], the more I have admiration for Custer."<ref>Sklenar, page 341.</ref>


Still, Custer made strategic errors from the start of the campaign, leaving a battery of Gatling guns at the steamboat ''Far West'' on the Yellowstone River on 21 June, and refusing General Terry's offer an additional battalion of soldiers, which Custer surely could have used. Military theorist [[Carl von Clausewitz]], in his book ''[[On War]]'', said that "the greatest possible number of troops should be brought into action at the decisive point", and that "the superiority at the decisive point is a matter of capital importance".<ref>http://www.clausewitz.com/CWZHOME/VomKriege2/BK3ch08.html</ref> Custer, who knew he was outnumbered although he did not know how much, divided his smaller force into three smaller detachments (not counting the fourth detachment, for the pack train, which was unavoidable), exposing each to defeat by a massively superior enemy force. Additionally, Custer failed to perform an adequate reconnaisance and sent Benteen's detachment off with no clear objective, away from the main battle. At the crucial moment, as the 7th's fate hung in the balance, Custer's men were widely scattered and unable to support each other, and Custer's own detachment had neither the numbers and the firepower to stave off the massed Indian assault.<ref>Goodrich, Thomas. Scalp Dance: Indian Warfare on the High Plains, 1865-1879. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1997. p. 233; Wert, Jeffry D. Custer: The controversial life of George Armstrong Custer. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1964/1996. p. 327.</ref>
Many historians believe Custer made strategic errors from the start of the campaign, refusing the use of a battery of Gatling guns and General Terry's offer of an additional battalion of soldiers. It is believed Custer suspected that he would be outnumbered by the Indians, although he did not know by how much. The division of his force into four smaller detachments (including the pack train) is believed to be evidence of inadequate reconnaisance in determining the size of the Indian village. By the time the battle began, Custer's men were widely scattered and unable to support each other, with Custer's own detachment unable to stave off the massed Indian assault.<ref>Goodrich, Thomas. Scalp Dance: Indian Warfare on the High Plains, 1865-1879. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1997. p. 233; Wert, Jeffry D. Custer: The controversial life of George Armstrong Custer. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1964/1996. p. 327.</ref>


For years a debate raged as to whether Custer himself had disobeyed Terry's order not to attack the village until reinforcements arrived. Finally, almost a hundred years after the fight, a document surfaced which indicated that Terry actually had given Custer considerable freedom to do as he saw fit (Maria Adam's controversy, which eventually stated that the story was true <ref>Researcher William Graham doubted the story, which stated that Custer's black servant Mary Adams had heard a conversation between Custer and Terry, the latter saying that the former had complete freedom. Graham found that Mary Sadams wasn't with the 7th cavalry in 1876. However, recent studies have shown that Maria Adams, Mary's sister, was Custer's servant.</ref>).
For years a debate raged as to whether Custer himself had disobeyed Terry's order not to attack the village until reinforcements arrived. Finally, almost a hundred years after the fight, a document surfaced which indicated Terry actually had given Custer considerable freedom to do as he saw fit.


[[Image:Pawnee bill wild west show c1905.jpg|thumb|right|200px|''Death of Custer'' - A dramatic portrayal of Native American man ''stabbing'' Custer, with dead Native Americans lying on ground, in scene by Pawnee Bill's Wild West Show performers. c.1905]]
[[Image:Pawnee bill wild west show c1905.jpg|thumb|right|200px|''Death of Custer'' - A dramatic portrayal of Native American man ''stabbing'' Custer, with dead Native Americans lying on ground, in scene by Pawnee Bill's Wild West Show performers. c.1905]]

Revision as of 16:41, 3 November 2007

Battle of the Little Bighorn
Part of the Black Hills War

Custer Massacre at Big Horn, Montana —
June 25, 1876
, artist unknown
DateJune 25June 26, 1876
Location
Result Native American victory
Belligerents
Lakota,
Northern Cheyenne,
Arapaho
United States
Commanders and leaders
Sitting Bull,
Crazy Horse
George A. Custer †,
Marcus Reno,
Frederick Benteen,
James Calhoun †
Strength
949 lodges (probably 950-1,200 warriors) 31 officers,
566 troopers,
15 armed civilians,
~35-40 scouts
Casualties and losses
At least 54 killed,
~168 wounded (according to Sitting Bull and Red Horse); or 136 killed, 160 wounded
~268 killed (16 officers, 242 troopers, 10 civilians/scouts),
~55 wounded

The Battle of the Little Bighorn — also known as Custer's Last Stand and Custer Massacre and, in the parlance of the relevant Native Americans, the Battle of the Greasy Grass — was an armed engagement between a Lakota-Northern Cheyenne combined force and the 7th Cavalry of the United States Army. It occurred June 25June 26, 1876, near the Little Bighorn River in the eastern Montana Territory.

The battle was the most famous action of the Indian Wars and was a remarkable victory for the Lakota and Northern Cheyenne. A U.S. cavalry detachment commanded by Lieutenant Colonel George Armstrong Custer was annihilated. It was, however, not the greatest Indian military victory over U.S. forces; that was the Battle of the Wabash in 1791, when Little Turtle and an alliance of Ohio tribesmen killed and wounded nearly a thousand U.S. soldiers.

Prelude to battle

Thousands of Indians had slipped away from their reservations through early 1876. Military officials planned a three-pronged expedition to corral them and force them back to the reservations, using both infantry and cavalry, as well as a small detachment of Gatling guns. Brig. Gen. George Crook's column moved north from Fort Fetterman in the Wyoming Territory toward the Powder River area. Col. John Gibbon's column of 6 companies of the 7th Infantry and four of the 2nd Cavalry marched east from Fort Ellis in western Montana Territory. The third column under Brig. Gen. Alfred Terry (including George Custer's 7th Cavalry; Companies B, D and I, 6th U.S. Infantry; Companies C & G, 17th U.S. Infantry; and the Gatling gun detachment of the 20th Infantry) departed westward from Fort Abraham Lincoln in the Dakota Territory. They were accompanied by teamsters and packers with 150 wagons and a large contingent of pack mules.[1]

The coordination and planning went awry on June 17 when Crook's column was delayed after the Battle of the Rosebud and was forced to stop and regroup. Gibbon and Terry proceeded, joining forces in late June near the mouth of the Rosebud River. They formulated a plan that called for Custer's regiment to proceed up the Rosebud River, while Terry and Gibbon's united columns would proceed up the Bighorn and Little Bighorn rivers. The officers hoped to trap the Indian village between these two forces. After discovering a large Indian trail on June 15, the 7th Cavalry split from the remainder of the Terry column on June 22 and began a pursuit along the trail. Custer was offered the use of the Gatling guns but declined, saying they would slow his command.[2]. He also declined the offer of two further companies of cavalry on the basis that his regiment could handle anything they found without other assistance. Custer's scouts arrived at an overlook 14 miles (23 km) east of the Little Bighorn River on the night of June 24, as the Terry/Gibbon column was marching toward the mouth of the Little Bighorn.

7th Cavalry organization and deployment

The 7th Cavalry was a veteran organization created just after the American Civil War. Several men were veterans of the war, including many of the leading officers. A significant portion of the regiment had previously served four-and-a-half years at Ft. Riley, Kansas, during which time it fought one major engagement and numerous skirmishes, experiencing casualties of thirty-six killed and twenty-seven wounded. Six other troopers had died of drowning and fifty-one from cholera epidemics.

Half of the 7th Cavalry had just returned from eighteen months of constabulary duty in the deep South, having been recalled to Fort Abraham Lincoln to reassemble the regiment for the campaign. Approximately 20% of the troopers had been enlisted in the prior seven months (139 of an enlisted roll of 718), were only marginally trained, and had no combat or frontier experience. A sizable number of these recruits were immigrants from Ireland, England, and Prussia, just as many of the veteran troopers had been prior to their enlistments.

Of the 44 officers and 718 troopers then assigned to the 7th Cavalry (including a second lieutenant detached from the 20th Infantry and serving in L Troop), 13 officers (including the regimental commander, Col. Samuel D. Sturgis, who was on detached duty) and 152 troopers did not accompany the 7th during the campaign. Among those left behind at Fort Abraham Lincoln was the regimental band.

Following a night forced march on June 24June 25, in which Crow Indian scouts reported to Custer the presence of what was judged a very large encampment of Indians, Custer divided the 7th Cavalry into four detachments:

  • The largest detachment consisted of Troops C, E, F, I, and L, personally led by Custer. It numbered 13 officers, 198 men (7 of whom would eventually be detached before the "last stand") and 3 civilians—newspaper reporter Mark Kellogg and 2 scouts. Two of Custer's relatives later joined the column. Troop C was commanded by Custer's brother, Capt. Thomas Custer, and L Company by his brother-in-law, 1st Lt. James Calhoun. This detachment marched along a ridge line on the east bank of the Little Bighorn in an attempt to enter the encampment from the north.
  • A second detachment, led by Maj. Marcus Reno, was sent into the Little Bighorn valley to provoke an engagement. This detachment consisted of Troops A, G, and M, and numbered 11 officers, 131 troopers, and most of the approximately 35 Sioux, Ree/Arikara and Crow scouts.
  • A third detachment was led by a company commander, Capt. Frederick Benteen, and was made up of Troops D, H, and K, with 5 officers and 110 men. Custer ordered Benteen to scout nearby valleys and attack any body of Indians he encountered. While he did so, Benteen would be out of supporting distance from the rest of the command. [3]Benteen himself described his mission to his wife in a letter days after the action, "General Custer divided the 7th Cav into 3 Battalions —about 15 miles from an indian village, the whereabout of which he did not know exactly. I was ordered with 3 Co's., D, H, & K, to go to the left for the purpose of hunting for the valley of the river—indian camp—or anything I could find. I found nothing, and after marching 10 miles or so in pursuit of the same determined to return to Custer's trail."[4]
  • The last group was the regimental pack train, consisting of 7 or 8 troopers from each company and escorted by Troop B. Commanded by Capt. Thomas McDougall, this sizable force had 2 officers, 127 troopers, and 7 civilian packers.

Each of the first three detachments was to seek out the Indian encampments, attack them, and hold them in place until the other two detachments arrived to support. Custer had employed similar tactics in 1868 during the Battle of the Washita.

Battle

Reno's attack

The first detachment to attack was Major Reno's, conducted after receiving orders from Custer issued by Lt. William W. Cooke. The orders, made without accurate knowledge of the village's size, location, or propensity to stand and fight, were to pursue the Indians and "bring them to battle." However, Custer did promise to "support [Reno] with the whole outfit." Reno's force crossed the Little Bighorn at the mouth of what is today Reno Creek and immediately realized that the Lakota and Northern Cheyenne were present "in force and not running away."

Sending a message to Custer, but hearing nothing in return, Reno advanced rapidly northward, stating that he drove the enemy "with ease." However, he suspected "a trap" and stopped a few hundred yards short of the encampment, dismounting and deploying in a skirmish line, as standard army doctrine called for. In a skirmish line, every fourth trooper handles the horses for the troopers taking firing positions, thus immediately reducing a fighting force by 25 percent. The troopers on the skirmish line were positioned five to ten yards apart, with officers to their rear and troopers with horses behind the officers. After about 20 minutes of long distance firing, Reno's battalion had taken only one casualty but the odds against him had become more obvious (Reno estimated five to one) and Custer had not reinforced him. Trooper Billy Jackson reported that by then, the Indians had massed for a mounted attack by more than 500 warriors,[5] turning Reno's exposed left flank and forcing him into a hasty withdrawal into the timber in a loop of the river.[6] Here the Indians pinned Reno and his men down, and he was then forced to make a disorderly retreat across the river to reach the high ground of the bluffs on the other side. The retreat was confused and immediately disrupted by Cheyenne attacks at close quarters. Reno later reported that three officers and 29 troopers were killed during the retreat and subsequent fording of the river, with another officer and 13-18 men missing. Most of these men were left behind in the woods, although many eventually rejoined the detachment.

The battlefield today.

Atop the bluffs, Reno's shaken troops soon linked up with the detachment of Captain Benteen, arriving from the south. This force had been on a lateral scouting mission when it had been summoned by Custer's messenger John Martin (Giovanni Martini) with the message "Come on...big village, be quick...bring pacs." Benteen's coincidental arrival on the bluffs was just in time to save Reno's men from possible annihilation. Their detachments were then reinforced by McDougall and the pack train. The 14 officers and 340 troopers on the bluffs organized an all-around defense and dug rifle pits.

Despite hearing heavy gunfire from the north, including distinct volleys, Benteen concentrated on reinforcing Reno's badly wounded and hard-pressed battalion, rather than continuing on toward Custer. Benteen's apparent reluctance to reach Custer prompted later criticism that he had failed to follow orders. After an hour, nearing 5:00 p.m., Capt. Thomas Weir and Company D moved out against orders to make contact with Custer. They advanced a mile, to what is today Weir Ridge, and could see in the distance Lakota warriors on horseback shooting at objects on the ground. By this time, Custer's battle had concluded, and what Weir witnessed was most likely warriors shooting at dead bodies on the Custer battlefield. The other companies eventually followed by assigned battalions, first Benteen, then Reno, and finally the pack train. Growing Lakota attacks forced all seven companies to return to the bluff before the pack train, with the ammunition, had moved even a quarter mile. There they remained pinned down for another day, but the Indians were unable to breach this tightly held position.

Custer's fight

Most interpretations of Custer's battle are complete conjecture, since none of his men survived. The gunfire heard on the bluffs by Reno and Benteen's men was from Custer's fight. His force of roughly 210 men was engaged by the Lakota and Northern Cheyenne approximately 3.5 miles (6 km) to the north. Having isolated Reno's force and driven them away from the encampment, the bulk of the warriors were free to pursue Custer. The route taken by Custer to his "Last Stand" remains a subject of debate. One possibility is that after ordering Reno to charge, Custer continued down Reno Creek to within about a half mile (800 m) of the Little Bighorn, but then turned north, and climbed up the bluffs, reaching the same spot to which Reno would soon retreat. From this point on the other side of the river, he could see Reno charging the village.

File:X-33628.jpg
Lieutenant Colonel Custer on horseback and his U. S. Army troops make their last charge at the Battle of the Little Bighorn.

Custer then rode north along the bluffs, and descended into a drainage called Medicine Tail Coulee, which led to the river. Some historians believe that part of Custer's force descended the coulee, going west to the river and attempting unsuccessfully to cross into the village. Indian accounts (dismissed by traditional historians, though given more credence today) report that Custer first attempted to ford the river at the north end of the camp. Gunfire from Indian sharpshooters, however, drove Custer and his men back. One account notes that these Indian sharpshooters shot several of the cavalrymen (including one in a buckskin jacket) off their mounts, and that other troopers had to dismount to help the wounded men back onto their horses.[7] Historians claim this scenario might explain Custer's purpose for Reno's attack, indicating that he may have intended to coordinate a "hammer-and-anvil" tactic, with Reno holding the Indians at bay at the southern end of the camp, while Custer drove them against Reno's line from the north. Custer's attempt to cross the coulee may have been inspired by the belief that it was the northern end of the Indian camp, when in fact it was only the middle.

Many historians, however, claim that Custer never approached the river, but rather continued north across the coulee and up the other side, where he gradually came under attack. According to this theory, by the time Custer realized he was badly outnumbered, it was too late to break back to the south where Reno and Benteen could have provided assistance. Two men from the 7th Cavalry later claimed to have seen Custer engage the Indians including the young Crow scout Ashishishe, known by his translated name Curley, and the trooper Peter Thompson, who allegedly fell behind Custer's column. The accuracy of their recollections remains controversial, with battle participants and historians almost universally discrediting Thompson's claim.

By almost all accounts, within less than an hour Custer's force was completely annihilated.[8][9][10] David Humphries Miller, who between 1935 and 1955 interviewed the last Indian survivors of the battle, wrote that the Custer fight, lasted less than one-half hour.[11] Eyewitness accounts from Indians, many of them conflicting, were collected for many years afterward and continue to be analyzed.[12][13] The Lakota asserted that Crazy Horse personally led one of the large groups of warriors that eventually overwhelmed the cavalrymen.[14][15]

The exact number of Indian warriors participating in he battle has never been determined and remains controversial to this day. It has been estimated that in the overall battle the warriors outnumbered the 7th Cavalry by approximately three to one, or roughly 1800 against 600.[16]. In Custer's immediate battle, this ratio could have increased to as high as nine to one (1800 against 200) after his isolated command became the main focus of the fighting. Some historians claim the ratio of Custer's battle to be as low as three to one. Nevertheless, Custer's detachment was severly outnumbered on open terrain.

It has been claimed in defense of Custer that some of the Indians were armed with repeating Spencer and Winchester rifles, while the 7th Cavalry carried single-shot Springfield Model 1873 carbines. These rifles had a slow rate of fire and tended to jam when overheated. The carbines had been issued with a copper cartridge, and troopers soon discovered that the copper expanded in the breech when heated upon firing, thus jamming the rifle. Troopers were forced to manually extract the cartridges with a knife blade, rendering the carbines useless in combat except as a club. Opposing warriors carried a large variety of weapons, from bows and arrows to possibly Henry rifles.[17] The primary weapon may have been bows and arrows. Many Indians, including the thirteen year-old Black Elk, claimed to have acquired their first gun from dead troopers at the battle.[18] The Sioux warrior White Bull described the Indians as systematically stripping slain troopers of their guns and cartridge belts so that as the losses mounted among Custer's men, the gunfire from the Indians steadily increased.[19]

Indian accounts documented in paintings on buffalo hides, indicate a fight between bows and arrows and cavalry pistols.[20] This representation may support the belief of the Army's carbines malfunctioning. The open terrain of the battlefield could have given Lakota and Cheyenne bows and arrows a deadly advantage. Custer's troops were trapped on higher ground from which direct fire at the Indians would have been difficult. On the other hand, the Lakota and Cheyenne were able to shoot their arrows from a distance by launching them in high arching indirect fire. A large volume of arrows could have ensured severe casualties.

When the bodies of the dead cavalrymen were discovered, many appeared to have their skulls crushed, possibly by any of a number of styles of heavy, stone-headed Indian war clubs.[21] It is not known if these injuries occured during the battle or post-mortem.

Custer was believed to have used a pair of Webley RIC (Royal Irish Constabulary) double action revolvers during the battle, instead of the Colt Single Action Army issued to his troops.[22]

Custer's resistance

Recent archaeological work at the battlefield site indicates that Custer initially deployed his troops in skirmish lines per Army doctrine, with the troopers divided into groups of four, with one man holding the horses and three firing. This deployment would have resulted in a reduction of Custer's effective firepower strung out over several long skirmish lines. As individual troopers were wounded or killed, these skirmish lines would have become untenable.[23] Recent documentaries suggest that there may not have been a "Last Stand," as traditionally portrayed in popular culture. Instead, archaeologists suggest that Custer's troops weren't surrounded but rather overwhelmed by a single charge. This scenario corresponds to several Indian accounts stating Crazy Horse's charge swarmed the resistance, with the surviving soldiers fleeing in panic. At this point, the fight became a rout with warriors riding down the fleeing troopers and hitting them with lances and coup sticks.[24] Many of these troopers were believed to have ended up in a deep ravine 300-400 yards away from what is known today as Custer Hill. At least 28 bodies were discovered in the gulch, their deaths believing to have served as the battle's final actions. According to other Indian accounts, about 40 men made a desperate stand around Custer, delivering volley fire.[25] Many of the Indian casualties were believed to have been suffered during this closing segment of the battle.

Indian casualties have never been determined and estimates widely vary, from as few as 36 dead (from Indian listings of the dead by name) to as many as 300. The Sioux Chief Red Horse told Col. W. H. Wood, that the Indians suffered 136 dead, and 160 wounded during the battle.[26] Many historians do not agree with this number, since Indians were not known to keep such statistics. It is believed that many Indians, when interviewed, simply fabricated numbers of casualties to appease frustrated interviewers. Many historians believe the Indian casualities were much lower than Chief Red Horse's estimates.

While many of Custer's troops were recruits who did not possess an adequate level of military training and skill, archaeological evidence also suggests that they were undernourished and in poor physical condition. However, this was usually the case in the army at this time.[27]

The aftermath

After the Custer force was annihilated, the Lakota and Northern Cheyenne regrouped to attack Reno and Benteen. The fight continued until dark (approximately 9:00 p.m. by local timekeeping) and for much of the next day, with the outcome in doubt. Reno credited Benteen's leadership with repulsing a severe attack on the portion of the perimeter held by Companies H and M.[28] On June 26 the column under Terry approached from the north, and the Indians drew off in the opposite direction. The wounded were given what treatment was available at that time; five later died of their wounds. Two of the regiment's three surgeons had been with Custer's column; the remaining doctor was assisted by interpreter Fred Gerard.

File:X-33633.jpg
Lieutenant Colonel Custer and his U. S. Army troops are defeated in battle with Native American Lakota Sioux and Northern Cheyenne, on the Little Bighorn Battlefield, June 25, 1876 at Little Bighorn River, Montana.

The soldiers on Reno Hill did not know what had happened to Custer and his men until the Indians withdrew. An examination was immediately made of the Custer battle site. The Indian dead had mostly been removed from the field. The 7th's dead were identified as best as possible and hastily buried where they fell. Custer was found to have been shot in the left chest and left temple. Either wound would have been fatal, though he appeared to have bled only from the chest wound, meaning his head wound may have been delivered post-mortem. He also suffered a wound to the arm. Some Lakota oral histories assert that Custer committed suicide to avoid capture and subsequent torture. Several Indian accounts do note multiple soldiers committing suicide near the end of the battle, but the claim of Custer's suicide is usually discounted since he was right-handed. His body was found near the top of Custer Hill, also known as "Last Stand Hill," where a large obelisk inscribed with the names of the 7th's dead now stands. Most of the dead had been stripped of their clothing, mutilated, and were in an advanced state of decomposition, such that identification of many of the bodies was impossible.[29]

From the evidence, it was impossible to determine what exactly had transpired, but there was evidence of organized resistance.[30] Several days after the battle, the young Crow scout Curley gave an account of the battle which indicated that Custer had attacked the village after crossing the river at the mouth of Medicine Tail Coulee and had been driven back across the river, retreating up the slope to the hill where his body was later found.[31] This scenario seemed compatible with Custer's aggressive style of warfare, and with some of the evidence found on the ground, and formed the basis for many of the popular accounts of the battle.

"Custer's Last Stand." Lieutenant Colonel Custer standing center, wearing buckskin, with few of his soldiers of the Seventh Cavalry still standing.

The Crow scount White Man Runs Him was the first to tell General Terry's officers that Custer's force had "been wiped out."

The 7th Cavalry suffered 52% casualties: 16 officers and 242 troopers killed or died of wounds, 1 officer and 51 troopers wounded. Every soldier in Custer's detachment was killed, although for years rumors persisted of survivors.[32] The sole survivor that was found by General Terry's troops was Captain Keogh's horse Comanche.[33]

By July, the 7th cavalry had been restocked with officers and new recruiting efforts were underway. It would again take the field in pursuit of its adversaries, but its legacy remains the Little Bighorn.

Scene of Custer's last stand, looking in the direction of the ford and the Indian village, 1877.

In 1878, the army awarded 24 Medals of Honor to participants in the fight on the bluffs for bravery, most for risking their lives to carry water from the river up the hill to the wounded.[34] Few questioned the conduct of the enlisted men, but many questioned the tactics, strategy, and conduct of the officers.

Battle Controversies

The battle was the subject of an army Court of Inquiry, made at Reno's request, in 1879 in Chicago, in which Reno's conduct was scrutinized. Some testimony was presented suggesting that he was drunk and a coward, but since none of this came from army officers, Reno's conduct was found to be without fault.

Benteen has been criticized for "dawdling" on the first day of the fight, and supposedly disobeying Custer's order to bring ammunition. The charge of cowardice has been leveled at Reno through the years due to his hastily ordered retreat. Reno defenders point out that while the retreat was disorganized, Reno did not withdraw from his position until it was clear that he was outnumbered and outflanked.

Lieutenant General Nelson A. Miles, the United States' highest military commander in 1895 and a participant in several battles with the Indians, wrote in 1877 while studying the battlefield: "The more I study the moves here [on the Little Big Horn], the more I have admiration for Custer."[35]

Many historians believe Custer made strategic errors from the start of the campaign, refusing the use of a battery of Gatling guns and General Terry's offer of an additional battalion of soldiers. It is believed Custer suspected that he would be outnumbered by the Indians, although he did not know by how much. The division of his force into four smaller detachments (including the pack train) is believed to be evidence of inadequate reconnaisance in determining the size of the Indian village. By the time the battle began, Custer's men were widely scattered and unable to support each other, with Custer's own detachment unable to stave off the massed Indian assault.[36]

For years a debate raged as to whether Custer himself had disobeyed Terry's order not to attack the village until reinforcements arrived. Finally, almost a hundred years after the fight, a document surfaced which indicated Terry actually had given Custer considerable freedom to do as he saw fit.

Death of Custer - A dramatic portrayal of Native American man stabbing Custer, with dead Native Americans lying on ground, in scene by Pawnee Bill's Wild West Show performers. c.1905

Custer's widow Libby actively affected the historiography of the battle by suppressing criticism of her husband. A number of participants decided to wait for her death before disclosing what they knew; however, she outlived almost all of them. As a result, the event was recreated along tragic Victorian lines in numerous books, films and other media. The story of Custer's purported heroic attack across the river, however, was undermined by the account of participant Gall, who told Lt. Edward Godfrey that Custer never came near the river.[37] In spite of this counterclaim, however, other Indian witnesses dismissed Gall's own account as self-serving, and questioned his role in the fight.[38] At any rate, Custer's legend was embedded in the American imagination as a heroic officer fighting valiantly against savage forces, an image popularized in Wild West extravaganzas hosted by showman "Buffalo Bill" Cody, Pawnee Bill, and others.

By the end of the 20th century, the general recognition of the mistreatment of the various Indian tribes in the conquest of the American West, and the perception of Custer's role in it, have changed the image of the battle and of Custer. The Little Bighorn is now viewed by some as a confrontation between relentless U.S. westward expansion and warriors defending their land and way of life.

Battlefield preservation

Indian Memorial

The site was first preserved as a national cemetery in 1879, to protect graves of the 7th Cavalry troopers buried there. It was redesignated Custer Battlefield National Monument in 1946, and later renamed Little Bighorn Battlefield National Monument in 1991.

Memorialization on the battlefield began in 1879 with a temporary monument to U.S. dead. This was replaced with the current marble obelisk in 1881. In 1890 the marble blocks that dot the field were added to mark the place where the U.S. cavalry soldiers fell. The bill that changed the name of the national monument also called for an Indian Memorial to be built near Last Stand Hill. On Memorial Day 1999, two red granite markers were added to the battlefield where Native American warriors fell. As of December 2006, there are now a total of ten warrior markers (three at the Reno-Benteen Defense Site, seven on the Custer Battlefield).[39]

7th Cavalry officers at the Little Bighorn

An obelisk commemorates the U.S. dead.

Crittenden was on loan to the 7th Cavalry from the 20th U.S. Infantry, since the cavalry regiment was short on officers.

Photo taken in 1894 by H.R. Locke on Battle Ridge looking toward Last Stand Hill top center. Wooden Leg Hill can be seen at the far top right.

Civilians killed

Notable scouts/interpreters in the battle

Prominent Native Americans in the battle

Battle of the Little Big Horn in popular culture

  • Soon after the battle, Anheuser-Busch commissioned a painting of "Custer's Last Stand" which was distributed as a print to saloons all over America. The painting itself was so common as to became a cultural icon. It is reputed to still be in some bars today.
  • In an episode of The Twilight Zone entitled "The 7th Is Made Up of Phantoms", three members of a modern National Guard troop encounter the same signs Major Reno and his men did while participating in war games and are able to join the battle on the side of Custer.
  • The film Little Big Man leads up to the battle and features a reconstruction of it in the final scenes, complete with a confused and manic Custer realizing to his horror that he and his command are "being wiped out".
  • The 1958 Walt Disney film Tonka is a highly fictionalized history of the horse, Comanche, that survived the battle. This was the first film to tell the story of Custer's Last Stand from the Indian point of view and a fairly accurate version of the battle takes place near the end of the film. As of March, 2007, the film is not available on video.
  • George MacDonald Fraser places his fictional anti-hero, Flashman at the battle in the book Flashman and the Redskins. Flashman survives the battle thanks to an Indian woman he has had intercourse with and to his illegitimate son, Frank Standing Bear, who had grown up among the Sioux. Flashman elsewhere comments that the Battle of the Little Big Horn is more proof that any sane person should run the other way from any military action where the Irish tune Garryowen is played beforehand. The drinking song was also popular among British soldiers at the Charge of the Light Brigade, which he also survived, barely.
  • A short story by Frederick Forsyth, in his collection "The Veteran", concerns a fictional survivor of the battle.
  • The Histeria! episode "Megalomaniacs!" featured a sketch about Custer's Last Stand in which the Kid Chorus, misled by its name, think that Custer is running a custard stand. (This sketch only appeared in network reruns to replace a controversial sketch about the Spanish Inquisition.)

See also Cultural depictions of George Armstrong Custer.

References

  • Sklenar, Larry, To Hell with Honor, General Custer and the Little Big Horn, Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 2000
  • Barnard, Sandy, Digging into Custer's Last Stand. Huntington Beach, California: Ventana Graphics, 1998. ISBN 0-9618087-5-6.
  • Brininstool, E. A., Troopers With Custer. Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania: Stackpole Boooks, 1994. ISBN 0-8177-1742-9.
  • Connell, Evan S., Son of the Morning Star. New York: North Point Press, 1984. ISBN 0-86547-510-5.
  • Dustin, Fred, The Custer Tragedy: Events Leading Up to and Following the Little Big Horn Campaign on 1876. Ann Arbor, Michigan: Edwards Brothers, 1939.
  • Fox, Richard Allan, Jr., Archaeology, History, and Custer's Last Battle. Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993. ISBN 0-8061-2496-2.
  • Goodrich, Thomas. Scalp Dance: Indian Warfare on the High Plains, 1865-1879. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1997.
  • Graham, Col. William A., The Custer Myth: A Source Book for Custeriana. New York: Bonanza Books, 1953.
  • Hardoff, R. G. (editor), Camp, Custer and the Little Big Horn. El Segundo, California: Upton and Sons, 1997.
  • Mails, Thomas E. Mystic Warriors of the Plains. New York: Marlowe & Co., 1996.
  • Michno, Gregory F., Lakota Noon, the Indian narrative of Custer's defeat, Mountain Press, 1997.
  • Miller, David, H., Custer's Fall, the Indian Side of the Story, University of Nebraska Press, 1985.
  • Neihardt, John G. (editor), Black Elk Speaks. University of Nebraska Press, 1979.
  • Nichols, Ronald H. (editor), Men with Custer: Biographies of the 7th Cavalry: June 25, 1876 . Hardin, Montana: Custer Battlefield Historical and Museum Association, 2000.
  • Nichols, Ronald H. (editor), Reno Court of Inquiry. Hardin, Montana: Custer Battlefield Historical and Museum Association, 1996.
  • Panzeri, Peter, Little Big Horn, 1876: Custer’s Last Stand. London, UK: Osprey, 1995. ISBN 185532458X.
  • Perrett, Bryan. Last Stand: Famous Battles Against the Odds. London: Arms & Armour, 1993.
  • Reno, Marcus A., The official record of a court of inquiry convened at Chicago, Illinois, January 13, 1879, by the President of the United States upon the request of Major Marcus A. Reno, 7th U.S. Cavalry, to investigate his conduct at the Battle of the Little Big Horn, June 25-26, 1876. on-line in the University of Wisconsin Digital Collections
  • Sarf, Wayne Michael, The Little Bighorn Campaign, Conshohocken, Pennsylvania: Combined Books, 1993.
  • Vestal, Stanley. Warpath: The True Story of the Fighting Sioux Told in a Biography of Chief White Bull. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1934.
  • Viola, Herman J., Little Bighorn Remembered: The Untold Indian Story of Custer's Last Stand. Westminster, Maryland: Times Books, 1999, ISBN 0-812932-5-6-0.
  • Wert, Jeffry D. Custer: The controversial life of George Armstrong Custer. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1964/1996.

Notes

  1. ^ See Sarf for a breakdown of the composition of each of these columns.
  2. ^ See Panzeri.
  3. ^ For an alternative theory concerning Custer's intentions in deploying Benteen to the left based on detailed examination of the terrain using Google Earth see this web articleGoogle Earth analysis which also refutes accusations of Benteen travelling slowly.
  4. ^ Benteen letter to his wife, 2 July 1876, Grahram, Col. W. A, "The Custter Myth" New York, Bonanza Books, 1953, pg 187,
  5. ^ Goodrich, Thomas. Scalp Dance: Indian Warfare on the High Plains, 1865-1879. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1997. p. 242
  6. ^ Perrett, Bryan. Last Stand: Famous Battles Against the Odds. London: Arms & Armour, 1993; p.8
  7. ^ Michno, 1997, pp. 117-119
  8. ^ Miller, David Humphries, "Custer's Fall", Lincoln, Nebraska, University of Nebraska Press, 1985, pg 158
  9. ^ Graham, Benteen letter to Capt. R.E. Thompson, pg 211
  10. ^ Graham, Gall's Narrative, p. 88
  11. ^ Miller, David Humphreys, Custer's Fall, the Indian Side of the Story. Lincoln, Nebraska, University of Nebraska Press, 1985, (reprint of 1957 edition) pg 158
  12. ^ Miller, David Humphries, "Custer's Fall", Lincoln, Nebraska, University of Nebraska Press, 1985
  13. ^ For an analysis of Curley's account, see Graham, pp. 10-18. Fox, pp. 316-317 discusses Thompson.
  14. ^ Graham, pp. 45-56.
  15. ^ Michno, 1997
  16. ^ cf Michno's account of the numbers, pp. 10-20. He gives a low estimate of about 1000 warriors. Other scholars have given much higher numbers, upwards of 3000. A moderate number, 1800-2000, has been advocated by Fox and Utley.
  17. ^ Michno, 1997, pp. 212, 226
  18. ^ Michno, 1997, pp. 85, 98.
  19. ^ Vestal, Stanley. Warpath: The True Story of the Fighting Sioux Told in a Biography of Chief White Bull. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1934; also, Michno, 1997, p. 216-217: testimony of Red Hawk; p. 221: testimonry of Iron Hawk.
  20. ^ Michno, 1997, p. 221: testimony of Iron Hawk, and elsewhere.
  21. ^ cf. Goodrich, p. 246. For illustrations of the war clubs, see Mails, Thomas E. Mystic Warriors of the Plains. New York: Marlowe & Co., 1996. pp. 464-71.
  22. ^ John A. Doerner, Chief Historian, Little Bighorn Battlefield National Monument
  23. ^ Fox, pp. 295-318.
  24. ^ Michno, 1997, p. 215: testimony of Yellow Nose.
  25. ^ Michno, 1997, pp. 284-285
  26. ^ Graham, Col. W. A. The Custer Myth. NY, Bonanza Books, 1953, pg 60.
  27. ^ Barnard, pp. 121-136.
  28. ^ Reno Court of Inquiry
  29. ^ Brininstool, 60-62.
  30. ^ Michno, "Lakota Noon", Mountain Press Publishing.
  31. ^ Fox, pp. 10-13.
  32. ^ Graham, 146. Lt. Edward Godfrey reported finding a dead 7th Cavalry horse (shot in the head), a grain sack, and a carbine at the mouth of the Rosebud; he conjectured that a soldier had escaped Custer's fight and rafted across the river, abandoning his played out horse.
  33. ^ Comanche, badly wounded, had been overlooked or left behind by the Native Americans, who had taken the other surviving horses. Comanche was taken back to the steamer Far West and returned to Fort Abraham Lincoln to be nursed back to health.
  34. ^ U.S. Army Medal of Honor website.
  35. ^ Sklenar, page 341.
  36. ^ Goodrich, Thomas. Scalp Dance: Indian Warfare on the High Plains, 1865-1879. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1997. p. 233; Wert, Jeffry D. Custer: The controversial life of George Armstrong Custer. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1964/1996. p. 327.
  37. ^ Godfrey incorporated this into his important publication in 1892 in The Century Magazine.
  38. ^ Michino, 1997, p. 296
  39. ^ National Park Service website for the Little Bighorn Battlefield
  40. ^ Above table based upon Nichols, Men With Custer...

Further reading

  • Chiaventone, Frederick J., A Road We Do Not Know: A Novel of Custer at the Little Bighorn. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996.
  • Connell, Evan S., Son of the Morning Star: Custer and the Little Bighorn. New York: North Point Press, 1984.
  • Gray, John S., Custer's Last Campaign: Mitch Boyer and the Little Bighorn Reconstructed. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1991.
  • Sklenar, Larry, To Hell with Honor, Custer and the Little Bighorn. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2000.
  • Michno, Gregory F., Lakota Noon: The Indian Narratives of Custer's Defeat. Missoula, Montana: Mountain Press Publishing, 1997.
  • Sandoz, Mari., The Battle of the Little Bighorn. Lippincott Major Battle Series. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1966.
  • Utley, Robert, Custer: Cavalier in Buckskin. Norman: Univ. of Oklahoma Press; Revised edition, 2001.
  • Welch, James w/Stekler, Paul, Killing Custer - The Battle of the Little Bighorn and the Fate of the Plains Indians. New York: Norton, 1994.

External links