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India and the PRC maintained good relations throughout the [[1950s]], focusing on the [[Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence]] proposed by the prime ministers of the two countries in [[1953]]. However, the Indian government under Prime Minister [[Jawaharlal Nehru]] adopted a policy of aggressive military deployment in the border area shortly after the PRC sent troops to Tibet in [[1950]] to assert its longstanding claim to the territory. China disputed India's claim that the [[Line of Actual Control]] was a demarcation line. Until 1962, India and China both maintained forces in the disputed area. Periodically each side accused the other of moving troops over the border as each side tried to extend its line of actual control. A few [[skirmish]]es occurred during this time.
India and the PRC maintained good relations throughout the [[1950s]], focusing on the [[Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence]] proposed by the prime ministers of the two countries in [[1953]]. However, the Indian government under Prime Minister [[Jawaharlal Nehru]] adopted a policy of aggressive military deployment in the border area shortly after the PRC sent troops to Tibet in [[1950]] to assert its longstanding claim to the territory. China disputed India's claim that the [[Line of Actual Control]] was a demarcation line. Until 1962, India and China both maintained forces in the disputed area. Periodically each side accused the other of moving troops over the border as each side tried to extend its line of actual control. A few [[skirmish]]es occurred during this time.

While both sides' interests in the disputed territories were driven by nationalistic sentiments, the Chinese also had a pragmatic consideration for defending these desolate and virtually unpopulated areas, namely to protect the Sichuan-Tibet Highway, which runs near the border and was the primary route for reinforcing the PLA presence in Tibet prior to the opening of [[Qinghai-Tibet Railroad]] in 2006. This is an obvious motivation for China to guard the border zealously, but somehow it escaped Nehru's reasoning.


Both Chinese and Indian sources continued the dispute until the cause escalated into war. India disputed troop movements and border claims by China. Negotiations between the two countries deteriorated over the following months. This transformed a boundary problem into a dispute, which then progressed into a border war. China maintained that parts of the boundaries remained undetermined and needed to be negotiated. The Indians held that previous events had already determined the boundaries and therefore decided to establish checkposts along them.
Both Chinese and Indian sources continued the dispute until the cause escalated into war. India disputed troop movements and border claims by China. Negotiations between the two countries deteriorated over the following months. This transformed a boundary problem into a dispute, which then progressed into a border war. China maintained that parts of the boundaries remained undetermined and needed to be negotiated. The Indians held that previous events had already determined the boundaries and therefore decided to establish checkposts along them.

Revision as of 16:33, 14 September 2006

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Sino-Indian War

Though a short border skirmish, the Sino-Indian War created bitter enmity between the two Asian giants, China and India.
DateOctober 10November 21, 1962
Location
Result Chinese victory and subsequent ceasefire
Belligerents
People's Republic of China India
Commanders and leaders
Liu Shaoqi Krishna Menon
Casualties and losses
1,000 Killed or Wounded 2,400 Killed or Wounded
4,023 Captured

The Sino-Indian Border War (Simplified Chinese: 中印边境战争; Traditional Chinese: 中印邊境戰爭; pinyin: Zhōng-Yìn Biānjìng Zhànzhēng; Hindi:भारत-चीन युद्ध; transliteration: bhārat-chīna yuddha), began on 10 October 1962. It was triggered by a dispute over the Himalayan border in Arunachal Pradesh (which is called South Tibet in China) between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of India. Another battlefield was Aksai Chin, which was claimed to be strategic for the PRC, as it enabled a western connection (China National Highway G219) between the Chinese territories of Tibet and Xinjiang. The war ended when the Chinese unilaterally declared a ceasefire on 20 November 1962, to go into effect at 00:00 21 November 1962, after defeating India in both disputed areas.

The Sino-Indian War is one of the largest military conflicts fought at such a high altitude and an example of mountain warfare, with combat taking place at over 4267 metres, or 14,000 feet.[1] Another high-altitude conflict was the Kargil War of 1999.

Causes of the war

British India and Tibet had never clearly marked their mutual border. The British Survey of India mapped the boundaries of Aksai Chin and the British government put up boundary markers, but administrative borders lay further south.

The British claimed that the McMahon Line, which was drawn up during the Simla Conference of 1914 and agreed to by the Tibetans, was valid. However, because of disagreements with the British, the Qing Dynasty authorities and later the Republic of China refused to accept the terms imposed by Britain. China refused to recognize the boundary on the grounds that Tibet, which was claimed as a dependency of China since the rule of the Qing Dynasty, could not make treaties. As a result, China did not recognize the validity of the McMahon Line. Even the independence of India in 1947 and the establishment of the PRC in October 1, 1949, did not fully resolve the border issues.

India and the PRC maintained good relations throughout the 1950s, focusing on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence proposed by the prime ministers of the two countries in 1953. However, the Indian government under Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru adopted a policy of aggressive military deployment in the border area shortly after the PRC sent troops to Tibet in 1950 to assert its longstanding claim to the territory. China disputed India's claim that the Line of Actual Control was a demarcation line. Until 1962, India and China both maintained forces in the disputed area. Periodically each side accused the other of moving troops over the border as each side tried to extend its line of actual control. A few skirmishes occurred during this time.

While both sides' interests in the disputed territories were driven by nationalistic sentiments, the Chinese also had a pragmatic consideration for defending these desolate and virtually unpopulated areas, namely to protect the Sichuan-Tibet Highway, which runs near the border and was the primary route for reinforcing the PLA presence in Tibet prior to the opening of Qinghai-Tibet Railroad in 2006. This is an obvious motivation for China to guard the border zealously, but somehow it escaped Nehru's reasoning.

Both Chinese and Indian sources continued the dispute until the cause escalated into war. India disputed troop movements and border claims by China. Negotiations between the two countries deteriorated over the following months. This transformed a boundary problem into a dispute, which then progressed into a border war. China maintained that parts of the boundaries remained undetermined and needed to be negotiated. The Indians held that previous events had already determined the boundaries and therefore decided to establish checkposts along them.

Events in the war

Various border conflicts and "military incidents" between India and China flared up throughout the summer and fall of 1962. According to Chinese sources, in the June of 1962, a small skirmish broke out between the two sides, and dozens of PLA were killed and wounded. Units of the Indian and Chinese militaries maintained close contact throughout September 1962; however, hostile fire occurred only infrequently.

Given how unprepared the Indian military was at the start of the war, it is quite probable that Nehru never anticipated the full-scale combat that followed. But it was also well documented that he had pursued since November 2, 1961, an intentional and official policy of placing small military outposts at increasingly forward positions, backing up his thrill public blusters on the territorial dispute with China.[2] Eventually many of these outposts were pushed past the McMahon Line, violating even India's own definition of the border. No documented justification was ever offered for the transgression, but it was probably intended as bargaining chips in anticipated negotiations. The Chinese side, however, decided to react with force. This miscalculation was a serious embarrassment for Nehru, and all subsequent Indian governments enforced a strict policy of coverup, including the continuing refusal to declassify their own Henderson-Brooks-Bhagat Report.

On September 8, 1962, a 600-strong Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) unit launched a surprise attack on one of the Indian forward posts at Dhola on the Thagla Ridge, three kilometers into the Chinese side of the McMahon Line. Nehru had gone to London to attend a Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference and when told of the act, said to the media that the Indian Army had instructions to free the territory from PLA occupation. This decision was made despite the location of the conflict. Furthermore, Nehru's directives to Defense Minister V.K. Krishna Menon were unclear, and the response, code named Operation LEGHORN, got underway only slowly. By the time an Indian battalion reached the Thagla Ridge in the Chedong region on September 16, Chinese units controlled both banks of the Namka Chu River. The day after, India's Chief of the Army Staff Kaul ordered his men to re-take the Thagla Ridge. On September 20, at one of the bridges on the river a firefight developed, killing nine Chinese and Indian soldiers.

On 10 October, an Indian military patrol moved toward the bridges of Yumtso La, to be met by an emplaced Chinese position of some 1000 soldiers. The patrol was forced to retreat after taking heavy fire, suffering 50% casualties; however, the total number of killed and wounded on the Indian side was actually higher. This date of this conflict is often given as the official start of the Sino-Indian Border War [1].

On October 12, Nehru proclaimed India's intention to drive the Chinese out of areas of conflict including Dhola, which resides beyond the territory previously claimed by India. On October 14, Indian defence minister Menon called for his men to fight China to the last man and the last gun. The Henderson-Brooks-Bhagat Report speculates that these announcements triggered the subsequent Chinese invasion into the disputed territories [2].

On October 20, 1962, the Chinese People's Liberation Army launched two coordinated attacks, 1000 kilometers apart, in the Chip Chap valley in Ladakh and the Namka Chu river. Some skirmishes also took place in Sikkim, which India claimed as a protectorate, at the Nathula Pass. After securing a substantial portion of the disputed territory, the Chinese made an offer to negotiate on October 24. The Indian government promptly rejected this offer and tried to regroup during a lull in the fighting.

On October 24, 120 officers and jawans of the Ahir Charlie Company of the 13 Kumaon Regiment, almost all of them hailing from the Ahirwal region (southern Haryana), were airlifted from Hyderabad to the Chushul sector. They were deployed on the Rezang La Ridge to defend the highest air strip in the world located at 16,000 feet - just across the Chinese claim line.(see details:Yadav)

Indian forces were hampered by logistic inadequacy and significant inferiority in numbers and combat readiness. The Indian deployment covered a large area and Indian units required an airlift for more supplies. The Indian jawans also lacked both sufficient supplies and training for mountain combat.

Neither side declared war, used their airforce, or fully broke off diplomatic relations; however, the conflict is commonly referred to as a war. It is important to remember that this war coincided with the Cuban Missile Crisis and was viewed by the western nations at the time as another act of aggression by the Communist block. This view obviously suited the Indian interests.[3] The Chinese side, although clearly winning from the start, thus had strong strategic reasons to contain and conclude the conflict as quickly as possible.

Once the fighting resumed in mid November, the PLA quickly annihilated the Indian 4th division in the eastern theatre and penetrated close to the outskirts of Tezpur, Assam, a major frontier town nearly fifty kilometers from the Assam-North-East Frontier Agency border. By November 20 there was no organised Indian resistance anywhere in the disputed territories.

Due either to logistical problems (according to official Indian accounts) or for political reasons (according to all non-Indian accounts as well as leaked versions of the Henderson-Brooks-Bhagat Report) the PLA did not advance farther, and on November 21 it declared a unilateral cease-fire. The United States Air Force flew in massive supplies to India in November, 1962, but neither side wished to continue hostilities. The PLA withdrew to positions it had occupied before the war and on which China had staked its diplomatic claim..

After the war

After India's defeat, Indian Defense Minister Menon resigned. Prime Minister Nehru also faced harsh accusations from government officials. Neither the People's Republic of China nor India officially admitted to starting the war as accusations continued between the two governments.[1]

The Indian government commissioned an investigation, resulting in the Henderson-Brooks-Bhagat Report on the causes of the war and the reasons for defeat. However, the Indian government has refused to declassify the relevant documents. No known commission of inquiry has reported for the Chinese side on the events that led to the war. India's defeat in 1962 led to an overhaul of the Indian Army in terms of doctrine, training, organization and equipment.

In the early 1980s, following a shift of emphasis in the Indian military, the Indian army began to actively patrol the Line of Actual Control (LoAC). Friction began to ensue over the Chinese occupation of the Sumdorong Chu pasturage, lying north of Tawang. The Indian media gave the matter national prominence, and an angry exchange of official protests between the Chinese and Indian governments followed. The Indian Parliament passed a bill setting up the state of Arunachal Pradesh, a territory in which China claims 11 of 15 districts.

In 1993 and 1996, the two sides signed the Sino-Indian Bilateral Peace and Tranquillity Accords, an agreement to maintain peace and tranquillity along the LoAC. Ten meetings of a Sino-Indian Joint Working Group (SIJWG) and five of an expert group have taken place to determine where the LoAC lies, but little progress has occurred. Recently, as a goodwill gesture during the visit of Chinese Prime Minister to India, China recognised the territory of Sikkim, as belonging to India.

Neither the Indian nor the PRC governments appear very interested in disturbing the status quo, and the disputed boundary, called by Indians the Line of Actual Control or the McMahon Line, does not currently appear to be a possible major flashpoint. Military commissions from China and India meet regularly in the capitals of both countries to discuss the status of the border. However, they have made little progress in resolving this contentious border issue.

On July 6th, 2006, the historic silk road passing through this territory was reopened, signalling further hopes of reconciliation between the two powers.

References

  1. ^ a b c Calvin, James Barnard (1984). "The China-India Border War". GlobalSecurity.org. Retrieved 2006-06-14. {{cite web}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help); Unknown parameter |month= ignored (help)
  2. ^ a b Maxwell, Neville (2001). "Henderson Brooks Report: An Introduction". stratmag.com. Retrieved 2006-08-18. {{cite web}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help); Unknown parameter |month= ignored (help)
  3. ^ Goldman, Jerry (1997). "The Cuban Missile Crisis, October 18-29, 1962". hpol.org. Retrieved 2006-08-18. {{cite web}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help); Unknown parameter |month= ignored (help)

Bibliography

  • Gunnar Myrdal. Asian Drama; An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations. New York: Random House, 1968

See also

External links