Office patronage

from Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Office patronage refers to the unjustified preference given to applicants when filling offices and positions (especially in the public service or in the academic world) on the basis of party book management , world views, membership of a scientific school or personal acquaintances (relatives - see nepotism -, club or Liaison companionship) instead of a selection of the best.

The patronage in the Foreign Service , which has been criticized to this day, was the subject of an investigation by an international commission of historians ; this presented its results to the public in October 2010. Thus, even were suspected Nazi war criminals in the 1950s in the Foreign Office cliques form and make a career.

The practice of patronage has already been described by Max Weber . In his famous lecture Politics as a Profession on January 28, 1919, Weber explained that in the past the princes, conquerors and the successful party leaders would have given fiefs , donations of land and benefices .

“Today there are offices of all kinds in parties, newspapers, cooperatives, health insurance companies, municipalities and states that are awarded by the party leaders for loyal service. All party struggles are not only struggles about objective goals, but above all: about patronage of offices. "

Max Weber differentiated between ideology and office patronage organizations.

Even Theodor Eschenburg the phenomenon of "patronage" section. He distinguished between lordship patronage , supply patronage , reward patronage and proportional patronage:

“Patronage of power mostly serves to secure party political influence. Positions of power are secured by hoisting loyal 'comrades-in-arms' into important posts. Supply patronage is also common. 'Deserved functionaries', campaigners, water carriers or even dignitaries who have lost their posts are given an office. You are indebted to those who grant this patronage. This also ensures power and influence. Related to this is reward patronage for faithful service. After all, proportional patronage is especially widespread among the large popular parties. "

Former German President Richard von Weizsäcker wrote:

“It is the parties and their factions that exclusively decide on political advancement or exclusion. In doing so, they have a deep aversion to any side-entrant , unless they expect an immediate gain in reputation from him. They secure their influence deep into society through patronage. Loyal service is rewarded with positions of all kinds. The most important thing for the party is always the path to power in the state. For the individual it leads over power in the party. Internal party unity of opinion should strengthen the power struggle. A system of rewards and punishments aims at the greatest possible discipline . Deviants are called to order. "

Take the judiciary as an example: as a result of the patronage of offices in criminal prosecution , part of the legally stipulated administration of criminal justice does not take place. The fact that Attorneys General (Head of Attorneys General at the higher regional courts ) and Chief Public Attorneys (director of public prosecution in district courts) are often chosen by party affiliation and government area, and that German law does not independent, but only one instructions dependent prosecutor ( § 146 GVG) knows, leads to the fact that undesired investigative procedures are often not even initiated in politics or are (pre) quickly terminated.

The most important critics of office patronage include Hans Herbert von Arnim as well as Erwin and Ute Scheuch.

In political and administrative science, the term patronage is hardly used anymore because it cannot be operationalized enough. According to Jörg Auf dem Hövel, it has been replaced by the term “party politicization”.

See also

literature

  • Hans-Herbert von Arnim : Office patronage by political parties . No. 44 of the publications of the Karl-Bräuer-Institute of the Federation of Taxpayers, Wiesbaden 1980
  • Sarah Bunk: Is patronage a criminal offense? In: Law Studies & Exams . Edition 3/2016. Tübingen 2016, p. 110-112 ( PDF ).
  • Wolfgang Mousiol: Office patronage. Danger to democracy . Ruhland Verlag, Bad Soden 2013

Individual evidence

  1. "Because that is you: a murderer" . In: Die Zeit , No. 5/2006.
  2. ^ The office and the past: German diplomats in the Third Reich and in the Federal Republic . Karl Blessing Verlag, 2010, ISBN 978-3-89667-430-2
  3. ^ Theodor Eschenburg: Ämterpatronage , extended version of a lecture. Schwab, Stuttgart 1961, 74 pp.
  4. ^ Theodor Eschenburg: What is office patronage? In: Die Zeit , No. 50/1960
  5. Richard von Weizsäcker: Stand up to where you want to run away. Despite the fun society: Those who understand politics as a calling are not old-fashioned . In: Die Zeit , No. 10/2003
  6. Hans Maier: How independent are public prosecutors? In: Hans Herbert von Arnim : Corruption .
  7. Jörg Auf dem Hövel: Politicization of public administration through parties? Root cause research and normative debate . In: Journal for Parliamentary Issues, 1/1996