August Crisis (1941)

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Front line in August 1941. Clearly visible is the front projection near Kiev, which Hitler wanted to pinch off

The August Crisis was a German leadership crisis in July / August 1941 in the German-Soviet War .

When the failure of the Blitzkrieg conception against the Soviet Union became apparent, violent disputes arose over the further conduct of the war. While the High Command of the Army (OKH) wanted to advance further east in order to destroy the enemy army and take its capital Moscow according to the classic theory , Hitler wanted to focus south, around the coal and industrial area in the Donets Basin and the oil wells in Baku to conquer, and so decide the war economically.

In the end, Hitler pushed through a compromise solution in which the two tank groups of Army Group Center initially turned north towards Leningrad and south towards Kiev to clear the flanks and then to advance back to Moscow in the double battle at Vyazma and Bryansk . This led to the Kessel Battle near Kiev , in which large parts of the Red Army could be encircled, but caused the advance to Moscow to fall into the autumn and winter and turn into a catastrophic defeat. After the war, former German generals blamed Hitler's decision for the defeat in the war against the Soviet Union.

situation

The original intention had been to the mass of the Soviet army west of the Dnepr - Daugava destroy -line. Army Group Center reached the Dnepr between July 3rd and 9th and Army Group South on July 10th in Kiev on the Dnepr without destroying the Red Army , on the contrary, it offered fierce resistance and led, for the Germans Side surprising, even counterattacks. Only the Army Group Center with its 2 tank groups was able to encircle larger formations in the Kesselschlacht near Minsk , while the Army Group North and the Army Group South with only one tank group each essentially drove the enemy ahead and lagged behind the Army Group Center. The central idea of ​​the Barbarossa plan had thus failed. In addition, the armored weapon was already heavily decimated and worn out by these battles and wear and tear. The operational guidelines actually provided for a break after 4-5 days of work to restore operational readiness. This had not been observed in the course of the Blitzkrieg strategy. The tank failures (total losses and major repairs) were already 50% on July 13th. On August 22, 1941, Army Group Center reported that the tank units were "so exhausted and worn out" that "an operational use of their masses before a total refreshment is out of the question." Joseph Goebbels noted on August 19 1941 in his diary:

“The Führer gives me a detailed account of the military situation. In the past few weeks it has been very critical at times. Obviously we underestimated the Soviet thrust and, above all, the equipment of the Soviet armies. [...] Inwardly, the Fuehrer is very angry with himself that he was so deceived by the reports from the Soviet Union about the potential of the Bolsheviks. Above all, his underestimation of the enemy tank and air force has given us a lot to create in our military operations. He suffered a lot from it. It was a serious crisis. "

dispute

The chiefs of OKH Walther von Brauchitsch (r.) And Franz Halder, who advocated a quick advance on Moscow

In instruction no. 33 and its amendment no. 33a of July 19 and July 23, 1941, Hitler ordered Panzer Group 2 to be turned south to take the industrial area of Kharkov and advance into the Caucasus . Moscow was to be taken with infantry formations . The 3rd Panzer Group was to advance to Leningrad. The Armored Group 4 should make the 3rd Panzer Group it back fully fit for action by material and personnel duties and the rest are returned to their homeland. In directive 34 of July 30th, these targets were "postponed for the time being" and Panzer Groups 2 and 3 were to be withdrawn from the front for a ten-day refresher. On August 10, Army Group South reported that “the exhausted German infantry were no longer able to attack”, and that they “had therefore ordered the attack on Kiev to be temporarily suspended”, and demanded that H. Gr. Center from the area around Gomel ”. On August 12, 1941, the addition to directive 34 was made. It stipulated that, after the flanks on both sides had been cleared, Army Group Center, the "State, Armaments and Transport Center around Moscow", and Army Group South, should take over the Crimea Donets area. According to the historian David M. Glantz, this instruction represented a compromise. In an "assessment of the eastern position" by the Wehrmacht command staff of the OKW on August 18, 1941, Army Group North and South were judged to be strong enough to do their "task on their own" and therefore Army Group Center could carry out the "decisive blow on Moscow". The operation proposal of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army Walther von Brauchitsch of August 18, 1941 pleaded for an immediate operation in the direction of Moscow. a. "For weather reasons only September / October is available", and the "efficiency of the rapid formations" only allows operations over "limited distances and with reduced combat strength"; therefore their use must be limited to "the one decisive operation". On August 21, Hitler issued an order to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, which stated:

“The most important goal to be achieved before the onset of winter is not the capture of Moscow, but the removal of the Crimea, the industrial and coal region on the Donets and the cutting off of Russian oil supplies from the Caucasus, in the north the closure of Leningrad and the unification with the Finns "

In a study of August 22, 1941, Hitler described "the destruction or removal of vital raw material sources" as even more decisive, "than the occupation or destruction of industrial processing facilities". Industrial companies could be rebuilt in a relatively short time. Foreign countries can also supply “machines and factory equipment to a certain extent”. “The attempt to replace coal, oil, iron, etc. with imports” is completely hopeless.

On August 23, Heinz Guderian flew to Hitler's headquarters to change his mind. He argued that Moscow was the "traffic and communications center", the "political hub" and an "important industrial area", the case of which would make "a tremendous moral impression on the Russian people, but also on the rest of the world." He pointed to the “mood of the troops”, which “expected nothing other than the advance on Moscow”, and the “wear and tear of strength and equipment” if the distance Roslavl - Lochwiza of 450 km had to be covered twice, as well as the loss of time who could prevent the last blow on Moscow. Hitler allowed Guderian to finish and then began to explain in detail. He argued that "Ukraine's raw materials and food base" were vital for the war to continue. The Crimea must be eliminated as the "aircraft carrier of the Soviet Union" against the Romanian oil fields. ( See: Soviet air raids on Ploieşti ) Hitler uttered the sentence:

"My generals don't understand a war economy"

According to Guderian, all those present, u. a. Keitel , Jodl and Schmundt nodded at Hitler's every sentence, and he was left with his own opinion.

The Commander-in-Chief of the 2nd Army Maximilian von Weichs emphatically advocated the turning away of his unit in order to close the dangerous open flank that had arisen when Army Group South remained behind.

The chief quartermaster of Army Group South, General Friedrich Weinknecht, reports that only stops like the Kessel Battle of Kiev allowed the establishment of well-advanced supply districts for supplies. According to Ihno Krumpelt , who headed a staff that planned the supply of the land forces for Operation Barbarossa , an advance on Moscow at that time would only have been possible with a "radical combination of all means of transport" on the Eastern Front at Army Group Center.

decision

On August 22nd, the Commander-in-Chief of Army Group Center Fedor von Bock received the order to turn Panzer Group 2 Guderians and 2nd Army von Weichs to the south. On August 30, in a personal conversation with Brauchitsch, Hitler agreed to the General Staff's basic operational idea of ​​seeking the decision before Moscow. On August 25th, Panzer Group 2 and 2nd Army turned south. On September 1, the High Command of Army Group South sent the OKH a situation assessment, in which they demanded that Panzer Group 2 and the 2nd Army “be presented not only to the Desna, but over the Desna” and that they “the destruction battle in Ukraine ”as“ of decisive importance for the outcome of the whole Eastern campaign ”. The Red Army tried to prevent this advance by violent flank attacks, but could not prevent the tongs from closing on September 15 and the Soviet troops being trapped in the front promontory near Kiev. According to the Soviet general staff officer Kyrill D. Kalinow, the Commander-in-Chief Budyonny had the order to hold Kiev at all costs so that the Ukrainian industrial areas could be evacuated, so the withdrawal order was only given at the last minute on September 10th. The advance on Moscow did not begin until September 30, which meant a loss of time of almost two months.

In the summer offensive of 1942 , however, Hitler was able to fully enforce his economic strategy. Joseph Goebbels noted in his diary on October 2, 1942:

“He states once again that the military actions of the past year did not go according to plan. His plan would have been different. He did not want to advance on Moscow, but on the Caucasus. Moscow is relatively uninteresting for us. Interesting and decisive are the economic foundations of the Soviet Union, which are undoubtedly to be found on the Don, the Kuban, the Volga and in the Caucasus. Brauchitsch was the one who thwarted this plan and thus gave the eastern campaign a completely different direction than the one wanted by the Führer. This year, the Fiihrer declares that, by and large, his operational and strategic plan will be carried out militarily. "

rating

As the first general, Chief of Staff Franz Halder made Hitler responsible for the defeat at Moscow in his 1949 study "Hitler als Feldherr". It had come “what had to come”. The engines that were already “heavily used before the battle for Kiev” were “at the end of their power” during the battle for Moscow, plus the autumn mud and the unusually early and unusually harsh winter. In 1965, General Carl Wagener developed an eight-page simulation game in his book “Moscow 1941” in which Moscow would be included on September 15 and the German troops would have taken winter-proof positions in time to then have the best chance of winning in 1942 .

The historian Ernst Klink , on the other hand, judged that the "getting stuck of Army Group South" made "the flanking encirclement of the enemy lying in front of it by the 2nd Army and 2nd Panzer Army inevitable". In addition, "The Conquest of Moscow" would have "not initiated a final victory even in the event of the occupation of a smoking ruins". For Jürgen Förster , the “severity of this dispute” “already reflects the growing awareness that the planning basis was flawed, that the Blitzkrieg in 1941 could no longer be won and that the Wehrmacht would be forced to another campaign in 1942.” Christian Hartmann believes the importance and the Consequences that the military attach to this dispute for "far overrated". In the Halder case in particular, the "psychologically very informative" process can be stated that the dispute was preceded by the gradual insight, the obvious misjudgment of the Soviet military potential, and that he was incapable of self-criticism and shifted the responsibility more and more onto Hitler. For Ian Kershaw , Hitler's “severely restricted concession” to his generals in Directive No. 34 of August 12, can possibly be explained by a “diarrheal illness” from which he suffered in the first week of August. For the GDR historian Hans Busse, both plans were unreal, because the superiority of the socialist social order with its complete agreement of goals between the Soviet people, the Soviet army and the leadership made any war against the Soviet Union hopeless.

literature

  • Heinrich Uhlig: The influence of Hitler on the planning and leadership of the Eastern campaign . In: European Publication eV (Ed.): Power of attorney for conscience . Munich 1965.

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Barbarossa deployment instructions. Printed in: Erhard Moritz: Fall Barbarossa . Berlin 1970, p. 151 ff.
  2. ↑ David M. Glantz: Barbarossa Derailed. The Battle for Smolensk July 10-10 September 1941 . Helion & Company 2010, Volume 2. Chapter 10 Conclusions.
  3. ↑ Rudolf Steiger : Tank tactics in the mirror of German war diaries 1939–1941 . Freiburg 1973, p. 160.
  4. ^ Franz Halder: War diary. Daily records of the Chief of the Army General Staff 1939–1942. Stuttgart 1962, Volume 3, p. 74. (Report on the overall condition of the fast troops by Walter Buhle ). Quoted in Uhlig, p. 238.
  5. ↑ Steiger, p. 160.
  6. ↑ Elke Fröhlich (ed.): The diaries of Joseph Goebbels . Munich 1993, part 2, volume 1, p. 260 f.
  7. ↑ a b Instructions No. 33, No. 33 a, No. 34, No. 34 a printed in: Walther Hubatsch : Hitler's instructions for warfare . Bonn undated, pp. 140 ff.
  8. ↑ Halder's War Diary, Volume 3, p. 167.
  9. ↑ Glantz: Barbarossa Derailed . Chapter: "German Strategic Planning: The Tilt toward Kiev".
  10. ↑ Percy Ernst Schramm (ed.): War diary of the High Command of the Wehrmacht . Bonn undated, Volume 1, p. 1054. Quoted in Uhlig, p. 258.
  11. ^ War diary of the OKW, Volume 1, p. 1056.
  12. ↑ War diary of the OKW, Volume 1, p. 1062. Quoted in Uhlig, p. 248.
  13. ^ War diary of the OKW, Volume 1, p. 1063 ff.
  14. ↑ Heinz Guderian: memories of a soldier . Stuttgart 1994, p. 182.
  15. ↑ Guderian, p. 181 f.
  16. ↑ Johannes Hürter : Hitler's Army Leader, The German Commanders-in-Chief in the War against the Soviet Union 1941/42 . Munich 2007, p. 294.
  17. ↑ Friedrich Weinknecht: The Eastern Campaign. My memories as OQu of the command post South OKH / GenQu . Printed in the appendix to: Elisabeth Wagner (Ed.): Der Generalsquartiermeister . Munich 1963, p. 266.
  18. ↑ Ihno Krumpelt : The material and the warfare . Frankfurt am Main 1968, p. 151.
  19. ↑ Klaus Gerbet (Ed.): Generalfeldmarschall Fedor von Bock. Between duty and defense. The war diary . Munich 1995, p. 254.
  20. ↑ Jürger Forester : Adolf Hitler . In: Stig Förster, Markus Pöhlmann, Dierk Walter (Hrsg.): Warlords of world history . Munich 2006, p. 348.
  21. ↑ H.Gr.'s Diary Süd from September 1, 1941. Quoted in Uhlig, p. 269.
  22. ↑ Kyrill D. Kalinow: Soviet marshals have the floor . Hamburg 1950, p. 114 f.
  23. ↑ Fröhlich, The Diaries of Joseph Goebbels , Part 2, Volume 6, p. 46.
  24. ^ Franz Halder : Hitler as a general . Munich 1949, p. 43 f.
  25. ^ Carl Wagener : Moscow 1941. The attack on the Russian capital . Bad Nauheim 1965, p. 199 ff.
  26. ↑ MGFA (ed.): The German Reich and the Second World War . Stuttgart 1990, Volume 4, p. 651.
  27. ↑ Forster, p. 348.
  28. ^ Christian Hartmann : Halder. Chief of Staff of Hitler 1938–1942 . Paderborn 1991, p. 284.
  29. ↑ Ian Kershaw : Hitler. 1936-1945 . Munich 2002, p. 556.
  30. ↑ Hans Busse: The failure of the "Barbarossa" plan of operations in the summer of 1941 and the militaristic legend of the "leadership crisis". In: Journal of Military History . Issue 1/1962, Berlin 1962, p. 62 ff.