Byzantine diplomacy

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Byzantine Diplomacy covers the principles and methods, mechanisms, ideals, and techniques that the Byzantine Empire used to negotiate with other states and advance its foreign policy goals. Dimitri Obolenski believed that the preservation of civilization in Eastern Europe was thanks to the skills and ingenuity of Byzantine diplomacy, which is a lasting Byzantine contribution to the history of Europe and the Middle East .

Challenges and goals

Emperor Basil receives the ambassadors of Serbia and Croatia

After the "fall of Rome" (476) the main challenge of Byzantium (Ostrom) was to maintain relations with its various neighbors, including Germanic tribes , Bulgarians , Slavs , Huns (whose empire fell apart after the death of Attila in 453) and the Persian Sassanid Empire , later Avars , Franks , Lombards , Georgians , Armenians and Arabs . This helped to maintain its status as an important power factor in Central and Eastern Europe and in the Middle East, although after the beginning of the Arab expansion and the subsequent loss of territory, Byzantium needed almost 200 years to emerge as a great power again.

Most of these neighbors (except for the Sassanid Empire and later the Caliphate) lacked a key resource available to Byzantium, namely a formalized and canonized legal system. When, for example, new (Slavic) empires were finally formed in the Balkans and they created political structures, they were dependent on the (Byzantine) empire, on which they were largely based.

Contrary to the classical authors, who liked to draw a sharp line between war and peace, for the Byzantines diplomacy was a form of war with different methods. With a regular army , which did not exceed 300,000 men in late antiquity and only comprised around 100,000 men after the losses of the 7th century, the security of the empire was based on active diplomacy. The Byzantine "Barbarian Division ( scrinium barbarorum )" was the first foreign intelligence service to collect information about rivals of the empire from all conceivable sources.

Principles and methods

Reports by Byzantine diplomats have come down to us at least partially in the form of text fragments; mention should be made of late antique historians such as Olympiodoros of Thebes , Priskos (especially on the Huns under Attila ) and Menander Protektor (see Sizabulos and Turxanthos ). Byzantine diplomacy tied its neighbors into a network of international and interstate relations controlled by the empire itself. This point revolved around making deals. The Byzantine historian Evangelos Chyros assumed the following points:

  • The new ruler was welcomed into the family of kings
  • There was an assimilation of Byzantine attitudes and values
  • As a formalization of the second point, there were laws

In order to initiate this process, the Byzantines developed a number of primarily diplomatic methods for themselves. For example, foreign diplomats often stayed in Constantinople for years . Members from foreign noble families were routinely invited to stay in Constantinople, not only as potential guests but also as a useful pledge in the event that the political situation in their home countries changed. Another popular method has been to overwhelm the visitor with the grand display of wealth and pomp. Constantinople's wealth also served as a means of propaganda and a means of impressing strangers.

Such was Luitprand of Cremona , who had been sent as an emissary to the Byzantine capital, overwhelmed by the imperial residence, the luxurious dining and entertainment of guests by acrobats. Special care was taken to stimulate as many senses as possible in the visitors: there were brightly shining things to see, terrifying noises, and tasty food.

The fact that Byzantium generally prefers diplomacy to war in its dealings with the “barbarians” is not surprising: The East Romans, faced with the ever-present danger of having to fight on two fronts - in the east against the Sassanid Empire , later against Arabs and Turks , in the north against Slavs and steppe nomads  - knew from experience how expensive wars are, both in terms of costs and the loss of labor. Diplomacy was specifically used as a "weapon" in cases of war. If z. For example, if the Bulgarians became a threat, the Kievan Rus could be subsidized. A threat from the Rus could be counteracted with the support of the Pechenegs . If the Pechenegs became problematic, the Cypchaks could be contacted, etc. There was always someone behind the enemy who appreciated the emperor's generous support. Another principle of Byzantine diplomacy was effective interference in the internal affairs of other states. In 1282, Michael VIII financed a revolt in Sicily against Charles I of Anjou , known as the Sicilian Vespers . Emperor Herakleios once intercepted a message from his Persian rival Chosrau II ordering the execution of a general. Herakleios added 400 more names to the message and redirected the messenger, provoking a rebellion from the listener.

literature

  • Franz Dölger (Ed.): Regesta of the imperial documents of the Eastern Roman Empire from 565–1453 . Part 1: Regesta from 565-1025. Munich / Berlin 1924.
  • AD Lee: Information and Frontiers: Roman Foreign Relations in Late Antiquity . Cambridge 1993.
  • Jonathan Shepard (Ed.): Byzantine diplomacy . Aldershot 1992.

Individual evidence

  1. a b Dimitri Obolensky: The Principles and Methods of Byzantine Diplomacy . Byzantium and the Slavs. St Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1994, ISBN 0-88141-008-X , pp. 3.
  2. On the strength of the late Roman army, cf. summarizing Alexander Demandt : The late antiquity . 2nd edition Munich 2007, pp. 305ff .; John Haldon: Byzantium in the seventh century . 2nd edition Cambridge 1997, pp. 208ff. The information provided by Agathias , according to which the army under Justinian I effectively comprised only 150,000 men, is mostly viewed as underestimated in research.
  3. Michael Antonucci: War by Other Means: The Legacy of Byzantium . In: History Today 43. (2), February 1993, pp. 11-13. findarticles.com of May 21, 2007
  4. ^ Iver B. Neumann: Sublime Diplomacy: Byzantine, Early Modern, Contemporary . In: Millennium: Journal of International Studies 34 (3), August 2006, pp. 869-870. ISSN  1569-2981 . clingersael.nl (PDF; 201 kB).
  5. Evangelos Chrysos: Byzantine Diplomacy, AD 300-800: Means and End . In: Jonathan Shepard, Simon Franklin: Byzantine Diplomacy: Papers from the Twenty-Fourth Spring Symposium of Byzantine Studies, Cambridge, March 1990 (Society for the Promotion of Byzant) . Variorum, 1992, ISBN 0-86078-338-3 , pp. 35.
  6. ^ Angeliki E. Laiou: Writing the Economic History of Byzantium . In: Angeliki E. Laiou: The Economic History of Byzantium (Volume 1). Dumbarton Oaks 2002. p. 3.
  7. ^ Iver B. Neumann: Sublime Diplomacy: Byzantine, Early Modern, Contemporary . In: Millennium: Journal of International Studies 34 (3), August 2006, pp. 870–871. ISSN  1569-2981 . clingersael.nl (PDF file; 201 kB).