German-Polish non-aggression pact
The German-Polish declaration - also known as the Piłsudski-Hitler pact - was concluded between the National Socialist Reich government under Adolf Hitler and the Polish government, which was dominated by the marshal and de facto ruler Józef Piłsudski , who did not hold any state office , and was dated January 26, 1934 German Foreign Minister Konstantin Freiherr von Neurath and the Polish Ambassador Józef Lipski signed in Berlin . Hitler unilaterally terminated the contract on April 28, 1939.
purpose
In the ten-year non-aggression pact , it was agreed that future disputes between the two states would be resolved peacefully. In particular, the difficult situation of the areas that Germany had to cede due to the provisions of the Peace Treaty of Versailles should be regulated in this way. Germany made claims on Danzig and the Polish Corridor and demanded a correction of the border in Upper Silesia .
Environment and development
Poland was an ally of France at the time and had signed a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union in 1932 . The “ four-party pact ” between Great Britain , France, Germany and Italy , operated by Benito Mussolini in 1933, was viewed by Poland as a threat. It should form the basis for solving the major political problems in Europe. As early as the 19th century, however, the major European powers had regulated their relations with one another on a case-by-case basis at the expense of smaller states. France represented Poland's interests in this pact, but Piłsudski and Foreign Minister Beck feared that a four-party pact could result in an initial revision of the borders at Poland's expense. This treaty was initialed on June 7, 1933 , but was never ratified . Poland saw a second danger in Germany's policy towards the Soviet Union , which was based on the Rapallo Treaty . On 5 May 1933, already had conformist German Reichstag unanimously agreed to follow-up treaty to Rapallo, the Treaty of Berlin of 1926 to extend. The worst consequence of this treaty could be a new division of Poland . The Polish leadership hoped to avoid both of these dangers by signing the non-aggression pact with Germany. The signing was preceded by a war threat from Poland to Germany if it ratified the four-party pact. According to France, this war threat was "not really meant seriously"; one can see in it an indication of the nationally irritable mood in Warsaw.
Hitler feared that France, together with its allies Poland and Czechoslovakia, could take action against Germany. Incidents in the Polish Corridor and in the Free City of Danzig were frequent; Piłsudski's intervention in Danzig, which could lead to war, seemed possible. Plans for a war with Poland had a tradition in the Reichswehr Ministry and also in the Foreign Office . Hitler verbally advocated easing the situation on Germany's eastern borders; At the same time, however, he operated the armament of the Wehrmacht . He tried to keep the Danzig party comrades of the NSDAP in check. In 1934 he still saw Germany as vulnerable. The Reichswehr was then the Polish army still inferior in terms of forces. In May 1933, a few months after taking power , Hitler took the diplomatic initiative on this non-aggression pact and put out diplomatic feelers to Poland.
The non-aggression pact marked a turning point in the politics of the German Reich. The primary goal was no longer just the revision of the Versailles Treaty , but an expansive policy with the aim of creating “new living space in the East” . With this, Hitler turned away from the cooperative revision policy with the Soviet Union. In 1935, Hermann Göring , special emissary for Poland, hinted at the role Hitler intended Poland to play: Poland was to take part in a conquest of the Soviet Union as a junior partner or Trabant of Germany and, as a share of the spoils, to take part in the south of the Soviet Union, the Ukraine , can expand to the east.
In terms of propaganda , the pact was one of Hitler's first great successes. From then on, whenever he spoke of peace - and he did so often in those years - he could always indicate that he was the only German politician who was ready for reconciliation with Poland. Even Gustav Stresemann had told the Polish Foreign Minister in 1925 that he refused to renounce war. The pact was also a blow to the French policy of collective security. Poland had not even consulted the allied France before the treaty was signed.
On April 28, 1939, four weeks after the British-French declaration of guarantee for Poland, Hitler canceled the non-aggression pact with Poland and the German-British naval agreement .
On August 31, 1939, through the Tannenberg company, the SS faked the attack on the Gleiwitz transmitter , which served as a pretext for the attack on Poland . The Second World War began on September 1 , as Great Britain and France declared war on the German Reich two days later. Shortly afterwards , the Soviet Union occupied eastern Poland - following the agreements in the German-Soviet non-aggression pact - in order to regain the territories that had been lost after the First World War and in the Riga Peace Treaty after the Polish-Soviet War .
Historical evaluation
The Freiburg historian Gottfried Schramm sees this treaty as "the only dramatic and momentous turn that Germany's Ostpolitik has undergone between the capitulation of imperial Germany and the Hitler-Stalin Pact ". Other historians, on the other hand, see the approach of the new Reich government only as a change in method, not in goals. Beate Kosmala only attests to her "tactical willingness to communicate" through which "Poland has become a variable instrument in an Eastern political program of conquering 'living space'". In the opinion of the historian Klaus Hildebrand , Poland was in Hitler's eyes the "archenemy who would not lose this stigmatizing quality in the future either."
See also
literature
- Zygmunt J. Gasiorowski: The German-Polish Non-aggression Pact of 1934 . In: Journal of Central European Affairs . No. 15 , 1955, ISSN 0885-2472 , p. 3-29 .
- Hans Roos: Poland and Europe. Studies on Polish Foreign Policy 1931–1939 (= Tübingen Studies on History and Politics . Volume 7 ). Mohr, 1957, ISSN 0564-4267 .
- Gottfried Schramm : The change of course of the German Poland policy after Hitler came to power . In: Roland G. Förster (Ed.): "Operation Barbarossa". On the historical site of German-Soviet relations from 1933 to autumn 1941 (= contributions to military history . Volume 40 ). Oldenbourg, Munich 1993, ISBN 3-486-55979-6 , p. 23-34 .
- How Poland was betrayed . In: Der Spiegel . No. 48 , 1980 ( online ).
Web links
- Declaration between Germany and Poland on the renunciation of the use of force, signed in Berlin on January 26, 1934 , in: Herder Institute (ed.): Documents and materials on East Central European history. Topic module "Second Polish Republic" , edit. by Heidi Hein-Kircher (accessed April 25, 2014)
Individual evidence
- ↑ K. Lapter: pact Pilsudski Hitler . In: Polsko-niemiecka deklaracja o niestosowaniu przemocy z 26 stycznia 1934 . Warszawa 1962 (Cz II doc 11).
- ↑ Gottfried Schramm: Basic Patterns of German Ostpolitik 1918–1939 . In: Bernd Wegner (Ed.): Two ways to Moscow. From the Hitler-Stalin Pact to Operation Barbarossa . Piper Verlag, Munich and Zurich 1991, p. 16 .
- ↑ Beate Kosmala: Poland . In: Wolfgang Benz , Hermann Graml and Hermann Heiss (Hrsg.): Encyclopedia of National Socialism . Klett-Cotta Verlag, Stuttgart 1997, p. 642 .
- ↑ Klaus Hildebrand: The past realm. German foreign policy from Bismarck to Hitler . Stuttgart 1996, p. 590 .