The social construction of reality

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The social construction of reality is the work of Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann . It was published in the USA in 1966 under the title The Social Construction of Reality . The German translation by Monika Plessner was published in 1969. It is one of the key works of social constructivism .

Introduction: the problem of the sociology of knowledge

Berger / Luckmann advocate a new beginning in the sociology of knowledge , in which it should be examined how knowledge is developed, conveyed and preserved. This is to be done by analyzing the social construction of reality . Definitions:

“For our purposes it is sufficient to define 'reality' as the quality of phenomena that are present regardless of our will - we can reject them but not wish them away. We define 'knowledge' as the certainty that phenomena are real and have definable properties. "(P. 1)

These are sociological definitions according to which knowledge and reality would always have to be in quotation marks, were it not for a bad style. The decision about the legitimate omission of the quotation marks is left to philosophy , the sociology of knowledge must examine knowledge and reality of people on the street without regard to validity. This shows that different realities apply in different societies, which are generated by different processes.

References to the sociology of knowledge

This concept of the sociology of knowledge differs from the traditional concept of Max Scheler and the different views of his successors. Berger / Luckmann describe this previous sociology of knowledge as “a kind of glossary for the history of ideas”, i.e. more of an explanatory list than a theory of knowledge, whose roots were also strongly rooted in three currents of 19th century German philosophy: the philosophy of history by Marx , Nietzsche and Dilthey .

Marx

Berger / Luckmann refer critically and appreciatively to Marx:

“The starting point of the sociology of knowledge comes from Marx: that man's consciousness is determined by his social being. Understandably, there has been a lot of argument about what kind of determination Marx had in mind. What is certain is that much of the great 'battle for Marx' (...) was in truth a battle for a skewed interpretation of Marx by 'the Marxists of the last days'. (...) From Marx, the sociology of knowledge not only has the sharpest formulation of its central problem, but also some of its central concepts, including for example that of 'ideology' (ideas that act as weapons for social interests) and that of 'wrong' Consciousness' (thinking that is' alienated 'from the social being of the thinker). "(P. 6)

Since Max Scheler and Karl Mannheim, debates about the Marxian pair of terms base / superstructure have shaped the sociology of knowledge :

“Later Marxism tended to equate 'base' with an economic structure, the 'superstructure' of which would then only be its reflex (as for example with Lenin ). Today it is clear that this one-sided economic determinism is a misinterpretation. Their mechanistic rather than dialectical character alone should arouse suspicion. What Marx was concerned with is that human thoughts are based on human activities ('work' in the broadest sense of the word) and thus also on the social structures that arise from this activity. One understands 'base' and 'superstructure' best when one sees them as a permanent interaction between human activity and the world that is brought about by this activity. "(P. 6)

Nietzsche

Nietzsche was more rarely discussed explicitly by the sociology of knowledge than Marx, but was omnipresent at the time of its creation. Above all, his anti-idealism opened up new perspectives on thinking and knowledge.

“Nietzsche developed his own theory of 'false consciousness' in the analysis of the social meaning of deception and self-deception and of illusion as a necessary condition of life. Scheler directly adopted Nietzsche's concept of 'resentment' as a creative factor for certain types of human thought. In exaggeration, one can say that the sociology of knowledge is downright a special way of applying what Nietzsche aptly called 'the art of distrust'. "(P. 7)

Dilthey

The historicism especially Dilthey shearing school is considered by Berger / Luckmann as the immediate predecessor of the sociology of knowledge, especially through his "sense of the relativity of all aspects of human events, that is to say for the inevitable historicity of thinking. The historical dogma that no historical situation could be understood other than under its own conditions could easily be transferred to the emphatic emphasis on the social embedding of thought. ”(P. 7 f.) The sociology of knowledge adopted several concepts and ideas from historicism .

New conception of the sociology of knowledge

In their predecessors, Berger / Luckmann criticize what they consider to be a narrower perspective when determining the subject of investigation. Classical sociology of knowledge has primarily dealt with scientific knowledge and ideologies, i.e. it pursued epistemology , the history of ideas and the history of ideas . Berger and Luckmann, on the other hand, plead for an expansion of the object of investigation, because "theoretical knowledge is only a small and not even the most important part of what circulates as knowledge in a society". As a reaction to the one-sidedness of their predecessors that they have seen, they bring everyday knowledge to the fore in this work . The following strong references emerge:

These theories are used undogmatically as tools for a new coherent whole. Berger / Luckmann see the result, the new sociology of knowledge, as part of empirical sociology, not as a discussion of the fundamentals of sociology. The new question will be: "How is it possible that subjectively intended meaning to objective factuality is ?" (P 20)

The basics of knowledge in the everyday world

The reality of the everyday world

Berger / Luckmann want to analyze both the knowledge that regulates the behavior of normal consumers in everyday life and the essence of everyday reality. Consciousness in the everyday world functions subjectively, meaningfully, intentionally and object-related. It is thus separated from forms of consciousness in other worlds: dream , theoretical physics , play and, in a broader sense, also art and religion . A certain order of reality structures the everyday world. Aspects of this order are language , technology , social relationships , the here and now as the center, the differentiation into near and far zones, the specifics of the working world , intersubjectivity , different possible perspectives, self- evident, the development of routine and problem areas, the development of a framework of experience and a time structure that makes both the concept of permanent time flow and individual time periods conceivable.

Social interaction in the everyday world

The basic model of social interaction in the everyday world is the face-to-face situation in which people interact with one another in action, reaction and counter-reaction (reciprocity). The other is simply perceived as a different subject in his subject character and forms the model for one's own perception of the self as a mirror image. The face-to-face interaction is dynamic, flowing and flexible, but follows predefined typifications. The distance from the face-to-face situation in indirect interaction or the reference to contemporaries, ancestors and descendants increases the anonymity in the typifications.

Language and knowledge in the everyday world

Human expression has the power of objectivation; that is, it manifests itself in the products of human activity. The intersubjective world is pervaded by objectivations: signs, symbols and above all language. It is both the origin and the main reference to the everyday world. It forms semantic fields by typifying and anonymizing, i.e. That is, it subsumes specific experiences under general orders of meaning. At the same time, language offers the potential to skip the face-to-face level and transcend the everyday world.

The general knowledge pool is organized in semantic fields and contains a lot of recipe knowledge. These fields are familiar to people to varying degrees and function as the main categories of experience. Each subject guarantees the validity of this knowledge so that no doubts arise when functionality is running. When in doubt at the latest, it becomes apparent that the fields and categories are arranged in a relevance structure and assigned different levels of relevance. Everyday knowledge is always incomplete, there is always room for further why-questions. People live with the feeling that something is always going on behind their backs.

The distribution of knowledge is organized in a complex manner; the family, the general private environment and the experts are important entities. In order to cope, it is necessary to be roughly informed about the distribution of social knowledge.

Society as an objective reality

In contrast to animals, humans are open to the world and produce themselves socially. What is considered normal is culturally and historically different. For every human being there is an institutionalized social order produced by human beings. They can be checked and passed on as typed.

Knowledge about institutions already structures the everyday world through socialization . To this end, sediments of knowledge and meaning form traditions. Roles are internalized by people and represent the social order. This institutionalization can be enforced to different degrees. Crises of legitimation can lead to historical change or produce new sub-sense worlds. The degree of reification plays a major role: How strongly are society or roles perceived as given by nature or by God? The social order forms a symbolic world of meaning that integrates all institutions, thereby legitimizing itself and giving society “meaning”. In the event of crises, deviants or contact with foreign cultures and thus other symbolic worlds of meaning, the previous one must be theoretically legitimized. Berger / Luckmann list mythology, theology and science as possible supports for the world of meaning, in applied form therapy and nihilation (here: annulment). Competing world specialists can support the existing world of meaning and even form monopolies on it, e.g. B. the churches.

With the legitimation processes and the framework of the institutions, a dialectic of ideal and material processes is formed, which together transform symbolic worlds of meaning. “It is sociologically essential that every symbolic world of meaning and every legitimation is a product of man. The basis of their existence is the life of living people. Separated from this their basis, they have no empirical status. "(P. 138)

Society as a subjective reality

People internalize subjective reality through socialization. The primary socialization (mostly by the parents) conveys norms, role models, language, etc. The process of relating to significant others who become generalized others is important. The secondary socialization in subworlds conveys role-specific special knowledge and other aspects of values, norms and language; the processes at this level are extremely diverse and differentiated. The validity of subjective reality is preserved through routine and the management of crises in borderline situations . The routine is conveyed through significant others (family, superiors, ...) and other others (the mass of working people, ...). The communication arises mainly through constant conversations (conversation machine), which always assume the routines of the everyday world. A radical transformation of existing subjective reality corresponds to a re-socialization in a new strong structure of plausibility .

With simple forms of social division of labor (farmer, knight, ...), socialization is also a simple process, but results in a strong identity. In more differentiated forms of society, competing realities promote a socialization that deviates from the norm.

“Probably all people, once they are socialized, are latent 'traitors to themselves'. The psychological difficulty of this betrayal, however, becomes greater when it is necessary to decide which 'self' is to be betrayed on a case-by-case basis. ”(P. 181)

So then there are different self-realities and roles in humans. When contrary worldviews compete in public, the general feeling for the relativity of all worlds increases. The own identity is relativized and gives way to a practice of changing roles.

In general, one cannot speak of collective identity, but of widespread identity types that are perceived and lived by people pre-theoretical and pre-scientific. Specific identity theories are always themselves embedded in a larger picture of reality. "Simply put: every psychology has a cosmology as a prerequisite". (P. 187)

The social construction of reality encounters organic requirements and limits in humans: The biological constitution of individuals - represented in terms of lifespan, hunger, socialized animality and diseases - each pronounced in concrete forms of e.g. B. Diet (what causes nausea?) Or orgasm (which are the "right" sexual objects?). In this sense there is a constant, mutually defining process between the individual, society and nature:

“Humans are biologically determined to construct a world and to inhabit it with others. This world becomes his dominant and definitive reality. Your limits are set by nature. However, once he has constructed it, it acts back on nature. In the dialectic between nature and the socially constructed world, the human organism is still being remodeled. In this dialectic man produces reality - and himself. "(P. 195)

Conclusions: sociology of knowledge and sociological theory

Berger / Luckmann see their work only as a systematic attempt at a new beginning in the sociology of knowledge, which should now provoke further discussions and research. You plead

  • for an upgrading of the sociology of language and religion in theoretical sociology
  • for the development of a sociological psychology according to George Herbert Mead
  • for the conscious inclusion of the dialectic between the individual (or identity) and society (i.e. the social construction of reality) in sociology
  • against an ahistorical sociology
  • for the specified and precise execution of dialectical processes instead of their mere assertion
  • for comprehensive empirical research: relationships between institutions and the symbolic worlds of meaning that legitimize them - "To cite just one example: the current interest of sociologists in theories derived from psychoanalysis would soon take on a completely different color if these theories were not - positive or negative - would be valid as dogmas of a 'science', but would be recognized through analysis as the legitimation of a highly peculiar and probably significant construction of reality in modern society. Such an analysis should of course exclude the question of the 'scientific viability' of these theories and treat them merely as givens for an understanding of the subjective and objective reality from which they come and on which they have an effect. ”(P. 200)
  • against the limitation of sociology to positivism , although it should not turn away from empirical research
  • for the position, sociology is despite all these insights a science and could also value-free be
  • for the constant contact between sociology and history and philosophy
  • for a humanistic sociology with the research topic "Society as part of a human world, created by people, inhabited by people and in a ceaseless historical process creating people again" (p. 201)

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Berger, Peter L. / Luckmann, Thomas (1969/1987): The social construction of reality. A theory of the sociology of knowledge. With an introduction to the German edition by Helmuth Plessner. Translated by Monika Plessner . Frankfurt / Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag. P. 70.

literature

  • Peter L. Berger, Thomas Luckmann: The social construction of reality. A theory of the sociology of knowledge . 3rd edition, Frankfurt a. M. 1972 (1970). ISBN 3-10-807101-7 .