Drug use in Iran

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Drug consumption and the way people deal with mind-altering substances in Iran reflect the changing socio-political background of the country. Up until the beginning of the 20th century, opium consumption was especially common and widespread. The modernizers of the Pahlavi dynasty saw drugs as one of the reasons for the decline and decline of the previous dynasty and tried to control, ban and criminalize their use based on Western models. After 1979, the government of the Islamic Republic attempted to address drug use by enforcing moral standards and punishing delinquents. The Iranian drug law punishes relevant offenses with the death penalty. The number of drug deaths in Iran is nevertheless among the highest in the world. Therefore, a more pragmatic, secular way of changing the situation is being taken.

history

Although attempts were made to limit drug use 400 years ago, the use of opium was a social norm until the 1920s. In addition to pleasure, it was also used as a universal painkiller and sedative, especially in the country, where there was practically no medical care. In times of famine, opium consumption increased because the drug was also used to curb hunger.

Iran brought about a hundred tons of opium onto the market annually; for 1923/1924 a consumption of 609 166 pounds of opium was determined. At the same time it was estimated that around ten percent of Tehran's population were addicted to opium; for 1925, the percentage of opium addicts in the city of Kerman was estimated at one third. Overall, opium production had a significant share in the economic output and exports of Iran, which was then an agricultural country.

Later, opium consumption was seen as an obstacle to modernization. A state monopoly on opium existed from 1928, and from 1938 the cultivation of opium poppies was banned in several regions. Nevertheless, in 1949 there were around 500 so-called opium dens in Tehran, and in the 1950s it was still common and accepted to drink opium tea or coffee in a café. In 1955, the cultivation of opium poppies, the production and the consumption of opium were finally banned nationwide. At the time, Iran was producing up to 1,200 tons of opium annually, and the proportion of opium addicts in the total population was estimated at seven to ten percent. Although it was possible to stop opium production domestically, the smuggling of opium from Afghanistan and Pakistan began at the same time . From 1960, the stronger and cheaper heroin began to replace opium, especially among younger consumers. In 1969 the government found that the ban on growing opium had done nothing and had actually made the drug problem worse: in 1969 it was estimated that 350,000 opium addicts and an annual consumption of 240 tons of opium were estimated. Thus, measures began to be taken primarily in the direction of the decriminalization of drug addiction, education and prevention . Rehabilitation clinics were set up to physically cure drug addicts and enable them to start over without drugs. In the 1970s, however, the country failed to meet its own targets for the number of rehab clinics and trained staff.

In the course of the Islamic Revolution in 1979, the country became the main hub for drugs destined for Europe and North America. The officials responsible for combating drug smuggling had either been executed or were no longer on duty. They were replaced by inexperienced but politically reliable personnel. The drug rehab and rehabilitation facilities were closed. The ban on alcohol, rising unemployment and the deterioration of the health system led to an increase in drug abuse. At that time the government estimated three million addicts (out of a 36 million population). The head of the anti-drug program was the Ayatollah Sadegh Chalkhali , under whom possession of drugs was punished with fines, imprisonment, corporal punishment or execution; Statistics on this are not available. His campaign, which was 200% successful , was slowed down by the first Gulf War and debates about whether someone who smuggled drugs unarmed was at war with God or just spreading corruption on earth . Camps were set up to detain drug addicts until they gave up their addiction. However, these measures could not prevent an increase in consumption, especially that of heroin.

From the 1980s onwards, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the CIA's support for the mujahideen led to an increase in opium production. Some of the opium was processed into heroin in Pakistan and brought to Iran by smugglers, and some of it was only processed into heroin in the Balkans. About half of the drugs produced in Afghanistan were exported through Iran. The Iranian market absorbed 700–800 tons annually, the majority of which was transported to the west and the Gulf States. Heroin has also been produced in Afghanistan since the turn of the millennium, which has the advantage for the smugglers of having to transport less bulky goods; in addition, heroin does not have the special smell of opium. In Peshawar , the hub of smuggling of drugs to the west and of weapons towards Afghanistan was formed.

The smugglers are often recruited from ethnic and religious minorities (especially the Baluch ) who live in the underdeveloped provinces of Sistan and Balochistan and Khorasan . Trade and smuggling are considered a tradition there and many locals have hardly any alternative sources of income there. The families and villagers hold together against the state power, from which they feel excluded.

Iran tried in various ways to stem the flow of drugs, such as concrete walls blocking mountain passes, minefields and vehicle barriers, which cost more than 800 million US dollars. In 1999 about 100,000 police officers, soldiers and militiamen were involved in the fight against drug smuggling; 2,800 men from the Iranian security apparatus were killed in clashes with the smugglers. In the past 30 years, 3,734 Iranian border guards have been killed and more than 12,000 injured in clashes with smugglers. Among the 254 tons of drugs seized in Iran in 2000, 6.2 tons were heroin, 20.2 tons of morphine, 179 tons of opium and 31.6 tons of cannabis. Most of it was produced in the country itself. Confiscated opium is processed into codeine in the Iranian pharmaceutical industry .

In 2001, about 40% of all crimes committed in Iran were related to drugs and of about 170,000 prison inmates, about 68,000 were imprisoned for drug trafficking and 32,000 for drug addiction at the same time. Several people arrested for drug offenses were released for lack of space in the prisons. A total of around 1.7 million people were imprisoned for drug offenses from 1980 to 2000.

Intravenous consumption, and with it hepatitis and HIV, spread among inmates in rehab . In the 1990s, the opinion spread that the path to criminalizing drug use and controlling the influx of drugs was not working. In 2000, a gram of heroin was available on the black market for three to four US dollars. Depending on the narrow or broad interpretation, it was estimated between 1.2 and 3 million drug users, of whom a third had already used intravenous means. Many of them had become acquainted with this method in prison. In addition, little was known about the risks of HIV and other diseases that could be transmitted by sharing injection equipment. For example, no educational brochures were distributed in the country. The number of drug deaths rose from 717 in 1996 to around 1000 in 2000. Surveys in Iranian cities at the time showed that three quarters of those questioned had consumed opium and almost 40 percent heroin in the past few months. Outpatient treatment of drug addicts began again, and self-help organizations were allowed to be set up. The government of the Islamic Republic was particularly concerned with the high HIV prevalence among heroin users. Thus, the approach to the problem was resecularized and adapted: measures to educate and limit the demand for drugs were combined with the fight against smuggling.

Today Iran is one of the countries with the most serious addiction problem in the world and at the same time it is one of the most important transit countries for drugs from Afghanistan to Europe. Between a third and a half of the heroin seized worldwide is seized in Iran. Drugs remain a supposed way out for the Iranian youth from unemployment, lack of prospects, entertainment and a socially restricted life. 94 percent of the drug users are male, half are married and around 20 percent are unemployed.

Therapy offers

Since the turn of the millennium, drug addiction treatment initiatives have been permitted again. While state institutions for drug withdrawal rely on forced labor and indoctrination (similar to American bootcamps ), several clinics and outpatient facilities have emerged that first subject patients to detoxification or methadone treatment and then prepare them for life after the addiction in group therapies. However, the relapse rate is relatively high because the social circumstances that favor drug abuse persist.

Anti-Narcotic Drugs Act

In 1989 the Anti-Narcotic Drugs Act was passed, which was amended in 1997 and 2011. It criminalizes a large number of drug-related offenses. The death penalty is mandatory for 17 offenses, including the cultivation of opium poppies, coca or cannabis for drug production (death penalty for the fourth conviction), smuggling, transport, production of raw materials for drug production (death penalty and confiscation of property from 5 kg) and manufacture, transport and import / export of drugs (death penalty and confiscation of property from 30 grams of cocaine , heroin , morphine or synthetic drugs or on the fourth conviction) and armed drug smuggling. In the ten years after the law was introduced, 10,000 smugglers were executed, mostly after brief trials led by an officer of the secret service.

Iran is the country with the highest number of executions per capita in the world. Three quarters of all those sentenced to death were charged with drug offenses. Nowhere else in the world are so many people executed for drug offenses. While the international community has criticized the high number of executions, there are also voices within Iran calling for an even tougher course against drug traffickers. The Iranian Deputy Interior Minister complained in June 2001 that almost 16,000 people actually deserved the death penalty, but only 1,735 were executed.

The Iranian government sees the death penalty as a means of combating drug smuggling. However, the high number of executions is not offset by a decline in smuggling, so that even Iranian government members admit that the death penalty is not effective. Those executed for drug offenses include a disproportionately large number of members of ethnic minorities (above all the Baluch ), citizens of Afghanistan and members of impoverished Persian-speaking parts of the population.

The Iranian Anti-Narcotic Drugs Act violates human rights commitments made by Iran to the world community in several ways . Specifically, by signing the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights , Iran has committed itself not to arbitrarily apply the death penalty, which the Iranian judicial system in its current form cannot guarantee, not least because forced confessions cannot be ruled out. The mandatory application of the death penalty for certain offenses also does not meet this criterion; For the execution of a sentence of this magnitude, a judicial decision that includes all the circumstances of the act is essential. Iranian law also does not provide for the possibility of a pardon; Convicts are usually executed shortly after being sentenced. In addition, Iran has committed to using the death penalty only for the most serious crimes, excluding drug possession, manufacture and trafficking. With the practice of executing people under the age of 18, Iran is violating several agreements.

Drug Control Authority

With the Anti-Narcotic Drugs Act, a drug control agency was also set up to combat drugs. This body is headed by 12 people, namely the President, the Attorney General, the Minister of the Interior, the Minister of Information, the Minister of Health, the Minister of Education, the Minister of Culture and Islamic Education, the Chief of State Broadcasting, the Chief of Police, the Chief of the Prison Administration , the chairman of the Tehran Revolutionary Court and the commander of the Basij . The president appoints a secretary to run the organization. It had a budget of $ 80 million in 2002, 50% of which was earmarked for measures to reduce demand.

Cooperation between this agency and other government organizations is difficult because it is not a government agency. This often leads to coordination problems with regard to strategy and financing. Drug control officials accuse other government organizations of failing to provide assistance. In addition, very influential agencies benefit from drug trafficking and the authorities' hands are tied accordingly. The salaries of civil servants are so low that they can easily be bribed by the traders and smugglers; drug dealers often go unpunished.

There is evidence that high-ranking Iranian military, especially commanders of the units stationed near the border with Afghanistan and Pakistan , are involved in the drug trade as the main players in the drug trade with Afghanistan. On January 21, 2011, the newspaper Die Welt reported, with reference to cables from the US Embassy in Baku, that Iranian government authorities were also heavily involved in drug trafficking.

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ a b Bijan Nissaramanesh, Mike Trace and Marcus Roberts: L'apparition de la réduction des risques en Iran. (pdf) Bulletin n ° 8. Program politique des stupéfiants de la Fondation Beckley, July 1, 2005, p. 4 , archived from the original ; Retrieved June 2, 2017 (French).
  2. ↑ a b c d Bijan Nissaramanesh, Mike Trace and Marcus Roberts: L'apparition de la réduction des risques en Iran. (pdf) Bulletin n ° 8. Program politique des stupéfiants de la Fondation Beckley, July 1, 2005, p. 1 , archived from the original ; Retrieved June 2, 2017 (French).
  3. ↑ a b c Amir Arsalan Afkhami: From Punishment to Harm Reduction: Resecularization of Addition in Contemporary Iran . In: Ali Gheissari (Ed.): Contemporary Iran: economy, society, politics . Oxford University Press, Oxford 2009, ISBN 978-0-19-537849-8 , pp. 195 .
  4. ↑ a b c Amir Arsalan Afkhami: From Punishment to Harm Reduction: Resecularization of Addition in Contemporary Iran . In: Ali Gheissari (Ed.): Contemporary Iran: economy, society, politics . Oxford University Press, Oxford 2009, ISBN 978-0-19-537849-8 , pp. 196 .
  5. ↑ a b c d A. William Samii: Drug Abuse: Iran's “Thorniest Problem” . In: The Brown Journal of World Affairs . tape IX , no. 2 , September 2003, p. 290 .
  6. ↑ a b Amir Arsalan Afkhami: From Punishment to Harm Reduction: Resecularization of Addition in Contemporary Iran . In: Ali Gheissari (Ed.): Contemporary Iran: economy, society, politics . Oxford University Press, Oxford 2009, ISBN 978-0-19-537849-8 , pp. 200 .
  7. ↑ a b c d e Amir Arsalan Afkhami: From Punishment to Harm Reduction: Resecularization of Addition in Contemporary Iran . In: Ali Gheissari (Ed.): Contemporary Iran: economy, society, politics . Oxford University Press, Oxford 2009, ISBN 978-0-19-537849-8 , pp. 202-203 .
  8. ↑ United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention: Illicit drugs Situation in the regions neighboring Afghanistan and the response of ODCCP. October 2002, p. 4 , archived from the original ; accessed on June 6, 2017 .
  9. ↑ United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention: Illicit drugs Situation in the regions neighboring Afghanistan and the response of ODCCP. October 2002, p. 6f , archived from the original ; accessed on June 6, 2017 .
  10. ↑ A. William Samii: Drug Abuse: Iran's “Thorniest Problem” . In: The Brown Journal of World Affairs . tape IX , no. 2 , September 2003, p. 295 .
  11. ↑ Iran steps up war on drugs as neighboring Afghanistan's opium trade booms. The National, June 4, 2014, accessed May 30, 2017 .
  12. ↑ a b c Bijan Nissaramanesh, Mike Trace and Marcus Roberts: L'apparition de la réduction des risques en Iran. (pdf) Bulletin n ° 8. Program politique des stupéfiants de la Fondation Beckley, July 1, 2005, p. 2 , archived from the original ; Retrieved June 2, 2017 (French).
  13. ↑ a b United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention: Illicit drugs Situation in the regions neighboring Afghanistan and the response of ODCCP. October 2002, p. 5 , archived from the original ; accessed on June 6, 2017 .
  14. ↑ A. William Samii: Drug Abuse: Iran's “Thorniest Problem” . In: The Brown Journal of World Affairs . tape IX , no. 2 , September 2003, p. 287 .
  15. ↑ a b Bijan Nissaramanesh, Mike Trace and Marcus Roberts: L'apparition de la réduction des risques en Iran. (pdf) Bulletin n ° 8. Program politique des stupéfiants de la Fondation Beckley, July 1, 2005, p. 5 , archived from the original ; Retrieved June 2, 2017 (French).
  16. ↑ a b Amir Arsalan Afkhami: From Punishment to Harm Reduction: Resecularization of Addition in Contemporary Iran . In: Ali Gheissari (Ed.): Contemporary Iran: economy, society, politics . Oxford University Press, Oxford 2009, ISBN 978-0-19-537849-8 , pp. 201 .
  17. ↑ Bijan Nissaramanesh, Mike Trace and Marcus Roberts: L'apparition de la réduction des risques en Iran. (pdf) Bulletin n ° 8. Program politique des stupéfiants de la Fondation Beckley, July 1, 2005, p. 3 , archived from the original ; Retrieved June 2, 2017 (French).
  18. ↑ Amir Arsalan Afkhami: From Punishment to Harm Reduction: Resecularization of Addition in Contemporary Iran . In: Ali Gheissari (Ed.): Contemporary Iran: economy, society, politics . Oxford University Press, Oxford 2009, ISBN 978-0-19-537849-8 , pp. 205 .
  19. ↑ a b c d O. Hlinomaz, S. Sheeran u. C. Bevilacqua: Legal Research Series. The Death Penalty for Drug Crimes in Iran: Analysis of Iran's International Human Rights Obligations , Human Rights in Iran Unit (HRIU), University of Essex, March 2014, pp. 9-10
  20. ↑ Amir Arsalan Afkhami: From Punishment to Harm Reduction: Resecularization of Addition in Contemporary Iran . In: Ali Gheissari (Ed.): Contemporary Iran: economy, society, politics . Oxford University Press, Oxford 2009, ISBN 978-0-19-537849-8 , pp. 207 .
  21. ↑ United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention: Illicit drugs Situation in the regions neighboring Afghanistan and the response of ODCCP. October 2002, p. 26f , archived from the original ; accessed on June 6, 2017 .
  22. ↑ O. Hlinomaz, S. Sheeran et al. C. Bevilacqua: Legal Research Series. The Death Penalty for Drug Crimes in Iran: Analysis of Iran's International Human Rights Obligations , Human Rights in Iran Unit (HRIU), University of Essex, March 2014, p. 11
  23. ↑ Section 2 of the Iranian Anti-Narcotic Drugs Act of 1997
  24. ↑ Section 4 of the Iranian Anti-Narcotic Drugs Act of 1997
  25. ↑ Section 8 of the Iranian Anti-Narcotic Drugs Act of 1997
  26. ↑ Section 9 of the Iranian Anti-Narcotic Drugs Act 1997
  27. ↑ Section 11 of the Iranian Anti-Narcotic Drugs Act of 1997
  28. ↑ O. Hlinomaz, S. Sheeran et al. C. Bevilacqua: Legal Research Series. The Death Penalty for Drug Crimes in Iran: Analysis of Iran's International Human Rights Obligations , Human Rights in Iran Unit (HRIU), University of Essex, March 2014, p. 12
  29. ↑ A. William Samii: Drug Abuse: Iran's “Thorniest Problem” . In: The Brown Journal of World Affairs . tape IX , no. 2 , September 2003, p. 292 .
  30. ↑ O. Hlinomaz, S. Sheeran et al. C. Bevilacqua: Legal Research Series. The Death Penalty for Drug Crimes in Iran: Analysis of Iran's International Human Rights Obligations , Human Rights in Iran Unit (HRIU), University of Essex, March 2014, pp. 18–19, p. 29
  31. ↑ O. Hlinomaz, S. Sheeran et al. C. Bevilacqua: Legal Research Series. The Death Penalty for Drug Crimes in Iran: Analysis of Iran's International Human Rights Obligations , Human Rights in Iran Unit (HRIU), University of Essex, March 2014, p. 20
  32. ↑ O. Hlinomaz, S. Sheeran et al. C. Bevilacqua: Legal Research Series. The Death Penalty for Drug Crimes in Iran: Analysis of Iran's International Human Rights Obligations , Human Rights in Iran Unit (HRIU), University of Essex, March 2014, p. 32
  33. ↑ O. Hlinomaz, S. Sheeran et al. C. Bevilacqua: Legal Research Series. The Death Penalty for Drug Crimes in Iran: Analysis of Iran's International Human Rights Obligations , Human Rights in Iran Unit (HRIU), University of Essex, March 2014, pp. 21-22
  34. ↑ O. Hlinomaz, S. Sheeran et al. C. Bevilacqua: Legal Research Series. The Death Penalty for Drug Crimes in Iran: Analysis of Iran's International Human Rights Obligations , Human Rights in Iran Unit (HRIU), University of Essex, March 2014, p. 34
  35. ↑ Section 33 of the Iranian Anti-Narcotic Drugs Act of 1997
  36. ↑ A. William Samii: Drug Abuse: Iran's “Thorniest Problem” . In: The Brown Journal of World Affairs . tape IX , no. 2 , September 2003, p. 294 f .
  37. ↑ US Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control, Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act, March 2012: IRGC-QF GENERAL GHOLAMREZA BAGHBANI (PDF; 96 kB)
  38. ↑ Boris Kálnoky: Iran is one of the world's largest heroin traffickers , Die Welt , January 21, 2011.