One China Policy

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One-China policy ( Chinese  一個中國政策  /  一个中国政策 , Pinyin Yige Zhōngguó zhengce ) today usually referred to by the People's Republic of China understood political premise that there is only one " China is" that in addition to the controlled by the People's Republic of mainland China with Macau and Hong Kong also includes the Republic of China- controlled Taiwan . All states that want to establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China must recognize this premise. The People's Republic of China identifies this “one China” with itself. The People's Republic of China regards compliance with the one-China policy as a prerequisite for peaceful reunification.

Map of the "official" borders of the Republic of China (Taiwan) including mainland China, Mongolia , Tuva and Kachin State . The map shows the historical maximum claims for an imaginary “united Republic of China”, as they were in part in the 1930s to 1950s. Real territorial claims and claims, for example against Mongolia, Tajikistan , Russia , Myanmar , India, etc. are no longer raised by the Republic of China.

Interpretations of the One China Policy

The flags of the two Chinas flutter side by side in San Francisco's Chinatown . The overseas Chinese there are divided in their loyalty to the two countries.

One interpretation that emerged during the Cold War is that either the People's Republic of China or the Republic of China is the sole legitimate government of all of China and the other is illegal. As a result, most western states had relations with the Republic of China until the 1970s , while most of the states of the Eastern bloc had relations with the PRC. While the Republic of China sees itself as the spearhead of democracy in a country that has been overrun by communist "rebels", the PRC sees itself as the victor over the Republic of China in the communist revolution. Although the ROC no longer presents itself as the sole legitimate government of all of China, the PRC's position remained unchanged until 2000 when it, too, softened its position. This new policy continued until the DPP was voted out of office in 2008. Thereafter, the previous one-China policy was continued by the re-elected KMT government. This change in power eased relations on the Taiwan Strait . The United States hoped that this would increase economic cooperation across the region.

The changed position of the PRC became clear in the anti-secession law of 2005, which proclaimed an indivisible China, but no longer clearly identified it with the PRC. Since 2004, Beijing has not made any significant statements that represent the PRC as the only legitimate China and thus slightly changed its definition of the one China. It has thereby staked out a concept known as the " 1992 consensus " which defines that there is a China consisting of mainland China and Taiwan, but there are different interpretations of that one China.

Another interpretation of the one China is that there is only one geographic region of China that was split into two governments by the Chinese Civil War . This is essentially the position of the Taiwanese supporters of the Chinese reunification , whose goal is that the "one China" will eventually be unified under a common government. Since 2005, this position has been close enough to that of the PRC to allow for a high-level dialogue between the Chinese Communist Party and the then opposition coalition of Taiwan ( Pan-Blue Coalition ).

One China Politics and Diplomatic Relations

Recognition of the one-China policy is a prerequisite for any political body to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC. The PRC has therefore endeavored in the past to receive the following statements from other nations: "The government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal government of all of China [...] and Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People's Republic of China" . Many nations do not agree with this and have often made lengthy efforts to find language regulations that speak of a China but are acceptable to both sides. Some countries use terms such as acknowledge , understand and take note , while other words support or recognition for Beijing's position using the status of Taiwan.

The term “ Chinese Taipei ” is the only acceptable name on most international playing fields, as “Taiwan” suggests that Taiwan would be a separate state and “Republic of China” suggests that there are two Chinas; both would violate the People's Republic's one-China policy. Most states that recognize Beijing bypass the diplomatic nomenclature by setting up "trade offices" that represent their interests on Taiwanese soil, while the interests of the Republic of China abroad through the TECO ( Taipei Economic and Cultural Office , Taipei Economic and Cultural Office) Cultural offices ). Nations that have diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China have no formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan; instead, foreign policy relationships are maintained through formally private organizations such as the German Institute in Taipei .

In view of its economic efficiency, the People's Republic of China is advancing its international goals and claims to order more and more confidently, not only with regard to its raw material interests, but also with regard to its one-China policy.

Germany

Since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1972, Germany has pursued the one-China policy based on the principle of one country, two systems and also accepts the presidential democracy in Taiwan. In diplomatic practice, Taiwan's status has been the subject of constant discussion. For example, Germany's one-China policy does not allow contacts with high-ranking representatives from Taiwan. On March 15, 2006 , the German government responded to a small request regarding the issuing of a visa for private entry by the Taiwanese foreign minister as follows: "In coordination with the other EU states, the Taiwanese president, the vice-president, the prime minister, the foreign minister, the Minister of Defense and the President of Parliament have not been granted a visa, either for business or private travel purposes. "

United States

Relations between the United States and Taiwan are based on the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) passed by the US Congress in 1979 , in which the United States expresses its support for the continued democratic development of Taiwan . The US declaration contained therein to arm Taiwan with defensive weapons if necessary puts a strain on diplomatic relations between China and the United States. The USA and China are also strategically interested in the small island states of the Pacific (PIS). The PRC has been armed with military equipment. In August 2011, the aircraft carrier Liaoning completed its first test drive. “Some claim that the South Pacific was already chosen by Beijing as a strategic backyard. Others in the region already see the USA challenged as a unipolar hegemon and a new Cold War looming. "

Taipei is active in the Pacific to persuade the PIS to diplomatically recognize Taiwan. So there has been a diplomatic race between the two Chinas. China's influence on the Pacific region was also known in 2007 as checkbook diplomacy . Taiwan countered by the same means; the PIS could get money from both sides.

In February 2017, US President Donald Trump accepted the one-China policy in a phone call with China's head of state Xi.

Africa

The People's Republic of China is Africa's largest foreign trade partner. Chinese infrastructure investments have been viewed as a form of diplomacy for years. It is also about Africa supporting the one-China policy. Other conditions, such as the observance of human rights, which are increasingly demanded by Western countries, do not exist. Taiwan's diplomatic isolation goes hand in hand with this. Relations with Africa are part of China's South-South policy and politics on an equal footing. This set China apart from Western countries at the beginning of these relations. However, under international pressure, China has also participated in peacekeeping operations in Africa. Another aspect is that China interferes indirectly in the national politics of its African partner countries in order to legitimize its one-China-politics.

One China Policy and Relations between the People's Republic and the Republic of China

Recognition of the one-China policy is also a prerequisite for the PRC for dialogue with groups in Taiwan. The one-China policy of the PRC forbids formulations calling for “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan” and makes it clear that efforts to “divide the unity of China” can be countered with military force.

According to the Anti-Secession Act 2005, the PR China made it clear that its interpretation of “one China” is no longer rigid and that “one China” no longer necessarily refers to the PRC. She has offered talks with parties in Taiwan and the Taiwanese government based on the 1992 consensus . He postulates that there is a China, which can be interpreted differently. Nonetheless, this policy means that Taiwan formally gives up its strivings for independence and that any formulation after "one nation, two states", similar to the German Ostpolitik or Korean reunification , is excluded.

"One China" was the formulation of the Republic of China before the 1990s, whereby it was asserted that the Republic of China and not the PRC represented this one China. In 1991, President Lee Teng-hui said he would not attack the communist authorities' right to control the mainland. This meant an indirect recognition of the People's Republic of China by the Republic of China. During the 1990s, President Lee moved away from the one-China phrase, leading many to believe he sympathized with the idea of ​​Taiwanese independence. In 1999, Lee proposed a two-state theory of the relationship between mainland China and Taiwan, to which Beijing reacted indignantly. Then the semi-official dialogue ended.

Taiwan maintains diplomatic relations with 22 countries in Central and South America, Africa, the Pacific and also with the Vatican. So these states have no diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China. In contrast, the EU states, the USA, Japan, Russia and the ASEAN states have no official representation in Taiwan. Your unofficial representatives are called institutes, offices, trade offices or associations.

After the election of Chen Shui-bian in 2000, the Republic of China proposed negotiations without preconditions. Although Chen did not explicitly reject Lee's two-state theory, he did not explicitly support it. In 2001 there were unsuccessful attempts to find a mutually acceptable phrase such as “follow the 1992 consensus”. After President Chen took over the presidency of the Democratic Progressive Party , he clarified his policies and said it was clear that both sides of the road were separate states. This formulation was sharply criticized by the opposition pan-blue coalition. This pursues a one-China policy, but opposes the definition of the PRC as this "one China".

In the Republic of China, the one-China policy was promoted in the 2004 presidential election . Chen Shui-bian made his position clear again and publicly denied the one-China policy, as it implied that Taiwan was part of the PRC. His challenger Lien Chan supported the policy of "One China, Different Interpretations", as they did in 1992. Lien Chan and his runner-up James Soong said after the election that they do not see the reunification of China as the highest goal of their policy towards the PRC Do not rule out the possibility of Taiwan's independence at a later date.

On March 14, 2005, the PRC passed an anti-secession law authorizing the use of military force to counter moves that diverge from the one-China policy. However, this law does not refer to the PRC as “one China”. In April and May 2005, Lien Chan and James Soong visited mainland China separately and expressed their support for the "1992 Consensus" and the concept of "One China". Both also clarified the position of their parties against Taiwan's independence. The PR of China continues to have a military presence vis-à-vis Taiwan; the PR has stationed a large part of its most modern weapon systems on the coast of Taiwan.

After Tsai Ing-Wen was elected in January 2016 and took office on May 20, 2016, the People's Republic of China shut down all communication channels with the Republic of China, as Tsai Ing-Wen did not adhere to the "1992 consensus".

See also

Individual evidence

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