Ennahda

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حركة النهضة
Ennahda
Ennahda logo
Party leader Rached al-Ghannouchi
Party leader Rached al-Ghannouchi
Secretary General Ali Larajedh
founding June 6, 1981
Legalization: March 1, 2011
Headquarters 67 Rue Om Kalthoum, Ben Arous, 1001 Tunis
Alignment Islam democracy
conservatism
social conservatism
economic liberalism
Colours) blue red
Parliament seats
54/217
Local councils
2139/7212
mayor
131/350
International connections Muslim Brotherhood
Website www.ennahdha.tn

Ennahda (حركة النهضة Ḥarakat an-Nahḍa 'Movement of Rebirth') is a Tunisian party that is considered to be moderately Islamist . It describes itself as Muslim-democratic, analogous to the Christian Democratic parties in Europe. The party, led by Rached al-Ghannouchi, refers with its name to the Arab Nahda (“reawakening”, “Renaissance”) of the 19th century, which sought to combine the values ​​of Islam with modernity. It is one of the most influential Tunisian parties today.

In 1988 Ennahda emerged directly from its predecessor party, Mouvement de la Tendence Islamique . It was banned under Ben Ali's rule and its followers were politically persecuted. The leadership acted mainly from abroad. After the Jasmine Revolution , she quickly established nationwide party structures throughout Tunisia in 2011.

Since the election to the Constituent Assembly on October 23, 2011, Ennahda has been represented in the Tunisian parliament with varying degrees of strength. From 2011 to 2014 she was part of the transitional government with two junior partners and took part in the Constituent Assembly as the largest parliamentary group.

history

The party can look back on a long history of great personal and structural continuity within political Islam in Tunisia. Its history is closely interwoven with the development of Islamism in Tunisia, so that the history of Ennahda is at the same time in large part the history of political Islam in Tunisia. A characteristic of political Islam in Tunisia is its movement-like character, which for a long time was reflected in a large number of religious and political groups and organizations that were active in various social fields. The majority of them joined together in a single party at the beginning of the 1980s. This aspect is still reflected in the name of the party to this day.

Ennahda was officially founded in 1988. In fact, it was more of a renaming of its illegal predecessor party, which was founded on June 6, 1981 under the name Mouvement de la Tendance Islamique ("Movement of the Islamic Tendency", MTI). The MTI itself goes back to a broader Islamic renewal movement of the 1960s and 1970s, at the center of which was an underground organization called al-ǧamāʿa al-islāmiyya ("The Islamic Group"). It only faced serious competition in the Islamist camp in the early 2000s, in the course of the spread of political Salafism in Tunisia.

The origins

In post-colonial Tunisia , President Bourguiba had ruled since 1956 , whose secularism in the style of Ataturk's religion increasingly seemed to be ousting public life. Comprehensive political and social reforms should eliminate traditional Islamic forms of culture. These included, among other things, the traditional judicial and educational system , wearing the headscarf, fasting in Ramadan and the expropriation of religious foundations such as mosques, Koran schools and other Islamic institutions. As it progressed, Bourguiba's rule assumed increasingly authoritarian features.

Political Islam in Tunisia found its origin in this society, which was partly shaken by cultural crises and authoritarianism. His nucleus was formed by a personal small group of Zaituna graduates with the name al-ǧamāʿa al-islāmiyya . Their goal was to revive the Islamic culture of Tunisia. For this purpose, one of its leading founding members, Raschid al-Ghannuschi, transferred concepts that he had become familiar with during his study visits to Egypt and Syria in the 1950s. He was a member of branch of the Islamic awakening movement Tablighi Jamaat , whose goals and structures he replicated after his return to Tunisia at the beginning of the 1960s. Another source was the movement of the Muslim Brotherhood with which he had been in contact in Egypt and which, in contrast to the Tablighi Jamaat, sought not only a spiritual but also a political renewal. Through influential founding members such as Ghannuschi, Abdelfattah Mourou and Ahmida al-Naifar and also specifically Tunisian approaches found their way into the organization, which developed a regional, Tunisian character. They succeeded in establishing a network of small cells, especially in the southern parts of the country. Within a decade this network developed into a well-established organization that preached the return to Islamic values. The repressive state's distrust of religious organizations meant that the group had to act underground despite its initially apolitical orientation.

Abdelfattah Mourou, one of the founders of the party

Mouvement de la Tendance Islamique

In the 1970s there were increasing protests against the political leadership in Tunisia. The protests were mainly driven by the left opposition, against whom the state responded with repression. In order to weaken the left opposition, the government loosened its relationship with religious groups and gave the corresponding structures as a counterweight greater freedom for organization and public debate.

Branches of the ǧamāʿa al-islāmiyya were particularly active at the universities . The flagship of these university groups was the Association pour la sauvegarde du Quran (Association for the Preservation of the Koran). In this organization, prominent representatives of the movement discussed Islam as a solution to current social problems. These debates were also noticed outside of the groups. They formed the starting point for a broad Islamist student movement. At the end of the 1970s, supporters of the burgeoning Islamist opposition gathered in the numerous student organizations around the Association , many of whom were later to belong to Ennahda's predecessor party, Mouvement de la tendance islamique . In the course of the 1970s, a broad network of covert and open groups emerged, engaged in intellectual exchange with one another and in battle with secular groups. In the university environment in particular, there were militant clashes between Islamic and left-wing groups. The general social dynamics resulted in an increasing politicization of the Islamic groups, which resulted in increasingly open political demands of the movement. The Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979 led to a surge in political Islam in Tunisia, which the government increasingly viewed as a threat.

The secret organization of the ǧamāʿa al-islāmiyya was uncovered at the beginning of 1981 by state secret services. In order to forestall a ban, the leadership under Raschid al-Ghannuschi and Abdelfattah al-Mourou publicly declared on June 6, 1981 the establishment of a new party called Mouvement de la tendance islamique . With this move they hoped not only to avoid a ban, but also to take a step towards legality. Bourguiba had previously announced that it would loosen its one-party rule as part of a political liberalization and open the field for other parties. The MTI quickly became the largest reservoir of the Islamist movement in Tunisia, uniting the members of the numerous scattered groups and organizations. The requirements of the MTI can be summarized in five essential points:

1. Revival of the Islamic character of Tunisia

2. Revival of Islamic thought in Tunisia

3. Combating nepotism and foreign influence

4. Creation of a social system based on private property

5. Fight imperialism by promoting political and cultural unity at all levels

These demands meant a radical break with Bourguiba's secularization policy. Legalization of the party was not allowed. Instead, there was the first major wave of repression against the MTI in August 1981, in which a number of members, including the management level, were arrested and some remained in custody for years. From the mid-1980s, a number of splits followed, including from a Salafist faction, which however disappeared into insignificance over decades. Another split took place through a liberal faction around founding member Ahmida al-Naifar. In 1987 there was a new wave of arrests against party members under the accusation of a planned coup, which has not yet been clearly clarified. Despite this repression and minor splits on its fringes, the MTI retained its central position as a reservoir within political Islam.

Ban under Ben Ali

On November 7, 1987, then Prime Minister Ben Ali took over the post of Bourguiba, who was suffering from signs of old age. Like his predecessor, Ben Ali promised liberalization of Tunisia. Under the motto of the “National Pact”, economic and political reforms were intended to break up the old structures and enable broad political participation by various population groups. Religious content was still directed by the state. Unauthorized sermons in mosques were prohibited. Likewise religiously oriented parties. Despite the ban, the MTI remained active and tried again to obtain legal status. With a view to the upcoming parliamentary elections in 1989, she appeared from then on under the name Ḥarakat an-Nahḍa . When admission was denied, the party decided to have its candidates run on independent lists. The government initially allowed this and, according to official figures, the representative party won around 14% of the votes. As a result, there was renewed repression against Ennahda in the spring of 1991. The party has been accused of running a militant wing and working towards a coup. Reference was made to Ghannushi's statements, which were increasingly influenced by rhetoric of violence, and the fact that he had not rejected the accusations. There were riots in different parts of the country. Among other things, Ennahda supporters attacked the headquarters of the ruling party. One person was killed in the attacks.

Around 30,000 party members were arrested in the course of the wave of repression. Some members of the party leadership were imprisoned until the 2011 revolution, while others, including Rashid al-Ghannuschi, managed to go into exile. From there they maintained their networks and tried to intervene in Tunisian politics from outside. Until the Jasmine Revolution, Ennahda had no visible presence within Tunisia from 1991.

Reconstruction after the revolution

The leadership of the party at an event in 2011

On March 1, 2011, the Tunisian interim government legalized Ennahda as part of a general amnesty and tens of thousands of supporters were released from prison. Ennahda built up a functioning structure of regional subdivisions and youth and women's organizations within a short period of time. Rashid al-Ghannushi had already returned from exile on January 30, 2011, and received applause from Ennahda supporters. The party was then considered to be the best organized and broadest-based party in post-revolutionary Tunisia, and its ability to mobilize suddenly after two decades of absence surprised many observers. The reasons for this lie on the one hand in the party's networks, which were clandestinely maintained on a personal level. On the other hand, the development process was accelerated by the support of a network of new actors who belonged to various Islamic grassroots movements. These movements had developed particularly in the 2000s. Although they originally had only minimal contact with Ennahda, they shared her vision of an Islamic identity for Tunisia. The actors of these movements had also built up various educational and social initiatives during the years of Ennahda's absence, whose organizations acted primarily as social service providers and had filled gaps left by the state in the course of neoliberal reforms. These were in particular study courses, kindergartens or afternoon offers for religious studies in schools. Their established networks and their experience in organizational development flowed into the new Ennahda, which was able to open its nationwide offices on a municipal, regional and national level and fill its party ranks from the grassroots to the top of the party. Last but not least, Ennahda was considered politically unencumbered by her years of persecution by the Tunisian state, since, unlike numerous other parties, she had never compromised with the Ben Alis regime.

Participation in the Assemblé Constituante Tunisienne

In the elections for the Constituent Assembly (Assemblé Constituante Tunisienne) on October 23, 2011, Ennahda emerged as the strongest parliamentary group with 37% of the vote, or 81 of the total of 217 seats. The Assemblé Constituante Tunisienne had to choose after the revolution for the position of interim parliament, the government and a new constitution elaborated. In both processes, Ennahda played a leading role, including with Souad Abderrahim . They formed the government together in a coalition of the two smaller secular parties, Congrès pour la République and Ettakatol .

In its election manifesto, the party had opted for a policy of cultural identity. The program called for a return to Islam and the Arabic language as standards of value and culture, within the framework of which autocracy should be overcome. In addition, Ennahda explicitly called for a democratic republic as a state model in its program. In particular, the commitment to the Islamic character of Tunisia met with suspicion among many Tunisians and led to a strong polarization between Ennahda and the fragmented secularist camp that formed the majority in the Constituent Assembly. The latter feared an Islamization of Tunisia along the lines of the Islamic Revolution in Iran.

In this context, particularly sensitive articles of the new constitution were controversial. Article 2 in Ennahda's bill initially provided for the anchoring of Sharia law as the basis of the constitution. A question about which there was heated controversy within the constitution, but also within the party itself. The party leadership spoke out internally against explicitly naming the Sharia in the constitution and ultimately prevailed with this line, whereupon Ennahda withdrew her motion in the assembly. Similar problems caused the discussion about a blasphemy paragraph proposed by Ennahda with Article 6 , which should criminalize the violation of religious feelings of the three Abrahamic religions, especially Islam. The party abandoned this proposal, too, mainly due to warnings from international human rights organizations.

In addition to these controversies, Ennahda came under fire for her work in the governing coalition. The allegations were directed against a failed economic policy and the deteriorating security situation. From 2012 onwards, there were increasingly violent demonstrations and clashes, particularly between Salafists, secularists and the police. The violence reached its preliminary climax with the murder of two left-wing politicians, Shukrī Bil'īd and Muḥammad Brāhmī, in February and July 2013. Ennahda was accused of not sufficiently distancing itself from Salafism and even supporting it. In this climate, negotiations on the constitution could only be continued with great difficulty and with the mediation of the UGTT trade union federation. With its end on January 27, 2014 and the adoption of the new constitution, Ennahda resigned from the government due to the deadlocked situation and new elections were called.

Since 2014

After Ennahda was replaced by the Nidaa Tounes party as the strongest parliamentary group in the elections for the People's Representative Assembly at the end of 2014 , it went into the opposition, but was again represented in the Essid cabinet with a minister from February 2015. After the split in Nidaa Tounes' faction on November 10, 2015, it is again the strongest force in the Tunisian parliament. Since August 2016, Ennahda has supported the Chahed cabinet, for which it provides three ministers and three state secretaries.

Political orientation

Ennahda's political orientation is controversial in public opinion within Tunisia as well as internationally. The party's ideological roots go back in part to the Muslim Brotherhood. Accordingly, a tract by Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, was found on Ennahda's homepage before the Jasmine Revolution. In the text with the title “Are we a people capable of acting?” Jihad was legitimized as a war of defense and propagated as a means of wars of conquest. This article disappeared from the website after 2011 and the party has taken a moderate tone ever since. Nevertheless, the general secretary of Ennahda, Hamadi Jebali, held a party meeting in Sousse on November 13, 2011, together with members of parliament from the radical Islamic Palestinian Hamas . Jebali described the event as a “divine” moment in a “new state” and “hopefully in a sixth caliphate ”, and that the “liberation” of Tunisia would bring “with the will of God the liberation of Jerusalem ”. Critics therefore accuse the party of being moderate and democratic and of hiding their true intentions. On the other hand, observers of Islamism explain the party's temporary radicalization with Ben Ali's dictatorial methods. Mass imprisonments and torture applications have radicalized both the movement and subsequently the state. For the time being, it was feared that the moderate tones could quickly fade away if the government were to take over. Ennahda's leaders emphasized their democratic orientation. Ziyad Djoulati , a member of the party's executive committee, spoke of the need for a consensus-based democracy in which no party exploits its voting superiority in elections.

Parts of the party leadership during the tenth party congress in 2014 in Hammamet, Tunisia : Zied Ladhari, Fathi Ayadi, Ali Larajedh , Raschid al-Ghannuschi and Abdelfattah Mourou (from left to right)

During the time of its participation in the constituent assembly, the party actually showed itself to be very willing to compromise and the new constitution, which it helped to shape, served as the basis for a democratic system that was unique among the Arab states. There is a close exchange with the Turkish ruling party AKP, which supporters often cite Ennahda as a role model. In an interview with Deutschlandradio Kultur, the Ennahda politician Samir Dilou stated in May 2011 that it was not a religious party, but a “modern party against the background of an Islamic worldview”, comparable to the German or Italian Christian Democracy.

During its tenth party congress from May 20-22, 2016, Ennahda decided to separate its party structures from movement elements in cultural and religious work. Since then, she has officially advocated a separation of the spheres between politics and religion. In their self-portrayal, they now officially see themselves as “Muslim-democratic” and distance themselves from political Islam. Mosques are places of sermons and, as religious sites, “places of reunification of the Tunisian people” and not a political space. Ennahda described her future politics as detached from ideological guidelines and oriented towards the everyday needs of the population: a realpolitical turnaround , symbolized by the joint appearance of the party leadership and Beji Caid Essebsi , leader of the secularist Nidaa Tunes.

See also

Web links

literature

  • Amel Boubekeur: Islamists, Secularists and Old Regime Elites in Tunisia: bargained Competition . In: Mediterranean Politics . Volume 21, No. 1. Oxford 2016.
  • Jason Brownlee; Tarek Masoud; Andrew Raynolds: The Arab Spring - Pathways of Repression and Reform . Oxford 2015.
  • Mohamed Elhachmi Hamdi: The Politicization of Islam. A Case Study of Tunisia . Boulder, 1998.
  • Francesco Cavatorta; Fabio Merone: Moderation through exclusion? The journey of the Tunisian Ennahda from fundamentalist to conservative party . In: Democratization , Volume 5, No. 20. London, 2013.
  • Francesco Cavatorta; Fabio Merone: Post-Islamism, ideological evolution and 'la tunisianité' of the Tunisian Islamist party al-Nahda . In: Journal of Political Ideology , Volume 20, No. 1. London, 2015.
  • Francesco Cavatorta; Fabio Merone; Stefano Torelli: Salafism in Tunisia. Challenges and Opportunities for Democratization . In: Middle East Policy , Volume 19, No. 4. Malden, 2012.
  • Francesco Cavatorta; Rikke Haugbølle: Beyond Ghannouchi. Islamism and Social Change in Tunisia . In: Middle East Report , Volume 262.Washington 2012
  • Kenneth J. Perkins: A History of Modern Tunisia . Cambridge, 2004.
  • Kenneth J. Perkins: Historical Dictionary of Modern Tunisia , Cambridge, 1997.
  • Monica Marks: Convince, Coerce, or compromise? Ennahda's Approach to Tunisia's Constitution . Doha, 2014.
  • Karima El Ouazghari: An-Nahda in Transition. An Islamist movement in the context of changing opportunity structures in Tunisia . Frankfurt am Main, 2012.
  • Menno Preuschaft: Tunisia as an Islamic democracy. Rāšid al-Ġannūšī and the time after the revolution . Münster, 2011.
  • Farzana Shaikh: Islam and Islamic Groups. A Worldwide Reference Guide , Essex, 1992.
  • Sami Zemni: The extraordinary Politics of the Tunisian Revolution: The Process of Constitution Making . In: Mediterranean Politics . Volume 20, No. 1. Oxford 2015.

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ ZEIT ONLINE Muslim Democrats. Retrieved April 28, 2020 .
  2. ^ Ennahda's Uneasy Exit From Political Islam. Retrieved April 28, 2020 .
  3. ↑ Ennahda celebrates as the election winner: Tunisia has chosen Islam , STERN, October 25, 2011. Accessed on November 24, 2011.
  4. ^ The Economic Agendas of Islamic Parties in Tunisia and Morocco: Between Discourses and Practices. Retrieved April 28, 2020 .
  5. ↑ Islamists win by a large margin . In: sueddeutsche.de . 2011, ISSN  0174-4917 ( online [accessed November 7, 2017]).
  6. ↑ Reiner Wandler: Islamist Ennahda Party: Tunisia's only people's party . In: The daily newspaper: taz . October 26, 2011, ISSN  0931-9085 ( online [accessed November 7, 2017]).
  7. ↑ Kenneth J. Perkins: A History of Modern Tunisia . Cambridge 2004, pp. 130 ff .
  8. ↑ Mohamed Elhachmi Hamdi: The Politicization of Islam. A Case Study of Tunisia . Boulder 1998, p. 18-22 .
  9. ↑ Menno Preuschaft: Tunisia as an Islamic democracy. Rāšid al-Ġannūšī and the time after the revolution . Münster 2011, p. 15-31 .
  10. ↑ Monica Marks and Sayida Ounissi: Ennahda from within: Islamists or “Muslim Democrats”? A conversation . In: Brookings . March 23, 2016 ( online [accessed November 7, 2017]).
  11. ↑ Mohamed Elhachmi Hamdi: The Politicization of Islam. A Case Stury of Tunisia . Boulder 1998, p. 34 f .
  12. ↑ Francesco Cavatorta; Fabio Merone: Post-Islamism, ideological evolution and 'la tunisianité' of the Tunisian Islamist party al-Nahda . In: Journal of Political Ideology . tape 20 , no. 1 . London 2015, p. 33 f .
  13. ^ Farzana Shaikh: Tunisia . In: Islam and Islamic Groups. A Worldwide Reference Guide . Essex 1992, p. 246 f .
  14. ↑ Kenneth J. Perkins: Association pour la sauvegarde du Quran . In: Historical Dictionary of Tunisia . London 1997, p. 27 .
  15. ↑ Kenneth J. Perkins: Mourou, Abd al-Fatah . In: Historical Dictionary of Tunisia . London 1997, p. 114 f .
  16. ↑ Karima El Ouazghari: An-Nahda in Transition. An Islamist movement in the context of changing opportunity structures in Tunisia . Frankfurt am Main 2012, p. 13 .
  17. ↑ Mohamed Elhachmi Hamdi: The Politicization of Islam. A Case Study of Tunisia . Boulder 1998, p. 36-43 .
  18. ↑ Francesco Cavatorta; Fabio Merone; Stefano Torelli: Salafism in Tunisia. Challenges and Opportunities for Democratization . In: Middle East Policy . tape 19 , no. 4 . Malden 2012, p. 141 ff .
  19. ↑ Francesco Cavatorta; Fabio Merone: Moderation through exclusion? The journey of the Tunisian Ennahda from fundamentalist to conservative party . In: Democratization . 5th edition. No. 20 . London 2013, p. 867 ff .
  20. ↑ Kenneth J. Perkins: Mouvement de la Tendence Islamique . In: Historical Dictionary of Tunisia . London 1997, p. 115 f .
  21. ↑ Kenneth J. Perkins: A History of Modern Tunisia . London 1998, p. 185 .
  22. ↑ Mohamed Elhachmi Hamdi: The Politicization of Islam . S. 61-65 .
  23. ↑ Ibid .: p. 65 ff.
  24. ↑ Karima El Ouazghari: An-Nahda in Transition . S. 11 .
  25. ^ A b Joshua Hammer: In a Worried Corner of Tunis . In: The New York Review of Books . October 27, 2011, ISSN  0028-7504 ( online [accessed November 7, 2017]).
  26. ↑ Monica Marks: Convince, Coerce, or compromise? Ennahda's Approach to Tunisia's Constitution . Doha 2014, p. 11 .
  27. ↑ Francesco Cavatorta; Rikke Haugbølle: Beyond Ghannouchi. Islamism and Social Change in Tunisia . In: Middle East Report . tape 262 . Washington 2012, p. 22-25 .
  28. ↑ Francesco Cavatorta; Fabio Merone: Moderation through exclusion? The journey of the Tunisian Ennahda from fundamentalist to conservative party . London 2013, p. 857 f .
  29. ↑ Francesco Cavatorta; Rikke Haugbølle: Beyond Ghannouchi . S. 21 .
  30. ↑ Elus - Souad Abderrahim. In: marsad.tn. Retrieved July 5, 2018 (French).
  31. ↑ Jason Brownlee; Tarek Masoud; Andrew Raynolds: The Arab Spring - Pathways of Repression and Reform . Oxford 2015, p. 137-142 .
  32. ↑ ḥarakat an-nahḍa: barnāmiǧ ḥarakat an-nahḍa min aǧal tūnis al-ḥurrīya wa al-ʿdāla wa al-tanmīya. 2011, Retrieved November 7, 2017 (Arabic).
  33. ↑ Sami zemni: The extraordinary Politics of the Tunisian Revolution: The Process of Making Constitution . In: Mediterranean Politics . tape 20 , no. 1 . Oxford 2015, p. 12 f .
  34. ↑ Monica Marks: Convince, Coerce, or compromise? S. 20th f .
  35. ↑ Ibid .: p. 24 ff.
  36. ↑ Amel Boubekeur: Islamists, Secularists and Old Regime Elites in Tunisia: bargained Competition . In: Mediterranean Politics . tape 21 , no. 1 . Oxford 2016, p. 115 ff .
  37. ↑ Amina al-Zayani: Tunisia ratifies new constitution . In: Al-Monitor . January 28, 2014 ( online [accessed November 7, 2017]).
  38. ↑ MP resignations lead Ennhada to gain majority in Tunisian parliament . In: Middle East Monitor . November 10, 2015 ( online [accessed November 7, 2017]).
  39. ↑ Khadija Katja Wöhler-Khalfallah: Democracy Concepts of the Fundamentalist Parties of Algeria and Tunisia - Claim and Reality. In: International Journal of Conflict and Violence. Volume 1, No. 1, 2007; Khadija Katja Wöhler-Khalfallah: Islamic fundamentalism: from the primitive community to the German Islam Conference. Hans Schiler, Berlin 2008, p. 123 f.
  40. ^ Mischa Benoit-Lavelle: Hamas Representative Addresses Tunisian Political Rally - Tunisia Live . In: Tunisia Live . November 15, 2011 ( online [accessed November 7, 2017]). Hamas Representative Addresses Tunisian Political Rally - Tunisia Live ( Memento of the original from November 8, 2017 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link has been inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice.  @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.tunisia-live.net
  41. ↑ Joshua Hammer: In a Worried Corner of Tunis . In: The New York Review of Books . October 27, 2011, ISSN  0028-7504 ( online [accessed November 7, 2017]).
  42. ↑ Reiner Wandler: Islamist Ennahda Party: Tunisia's only people's party . In: The daily newspaper: taz . October 26, 2011, ISSN  0931-9085 ( online [accessed November 7, 2017]).
  43. ↑ Joachim Scholl; Samir Dilou: - "We don't want a state of God" . In: Deutschlandfunk Kultur . ( deutschlandfunkkultur.de [accessed on November 7, 2017]).
  44. ↑ Monica Marks: How big were the changes Tunisia's Ennahda party just made at its national congress? In: Washington Post . May 25, 2016, ISSN  0190-8286 ( online [accessed November 7, 2017]).
  45. ^ Frédéric Bobin: La Tunisie s'interroge sur la mue du parti islamiste Ennahda . In: Le Monde.fr . May 21, 2016, ISSN  1950-6244 ( online [accessed November 7, 2017]).
  46. ^ Sarah Souli: Why Tunisia's top Islamist party rebranded itself . In: Al-Monitor . May 23, 2016 ( online [accessed November 7, 2017]).