Explosion in Toulouse

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AZF factory tower

The 2001 explosion in Toulouse was a major disaster . On September 21, 2001, there was in to TotalFinaElf belonging fertilizer -Fabrik AZF ( Azote Fertilisants ) in French Toulouse explosion of several hundred tons of ammonium nitrate in a landfill for chemical waste. Large parts of the city were damaged in the explosion, particularly by shattering window panes; 31 people died and several thousand were injured. The cause and extent of the explosion were similar to the explosion at the Oppau nitrogen works on September 21, 1921, exactly 80 years earlier to the day. The plant in Toulouse was built after the First World War as a copy of the Oppau plant. The cause of the accident is unclear.

Dead and injured

The official balance assumes 31 deaths, including 21 employees on the company premises, of which 10 were employees of the Grande Paroisse (operating company of the AZF). There were also over 2,500 people injured, around 30 of them seriously, in the surrounding neighborhoods, mostly hit by broken glass, rubble and debris caused by the shock wave. There were countless victims of psychological effects (depression, anxiety, insomnia), of which 14,000 were still receiving treatment 18 months later.

Property damage

Building opposite the AZF factory that was destroyed after the explosion

There was considerable damage to buildings in the entire south-western city area, to apartments, industrial and other companies and to public facilities (swimming pools, gyms, concert halls, schools, kindergartens, universities (UTM II), bus depot, etc.). The damage is estimated at a total of 1.5 billion euros.

Theses on the cause of the accident

The cause of the accident could not be determined. The following theses were made about the cause of the accident:

Prosecutor's thesis (official thesis to date)

The public prosecutor assumed an accident caused by a spontaneous chain reaction of ammonium nitrate with one or more other substances. In the course of the investigation, several scenarios were set up and z. Partly rejected again:

  • Years of decomposition of contaminated ammonium nitrate under various environmental influences
  • A quarter of an hour before the explosion, an employee would have disposed of contaminated ammonium nitrate with several kilograms of chlorine for swimming pools or DCCNa (sodium dichloroisocyanurate ) in the order of magnitude of a few grams on an ammonium nitrate dump in one of the warehouses.
  • Autoignition in a container filled with ammonium nitrate .

It remains unclear why this ammonium nitrate granulate removed from production could have warmed up beyond the critical limit. The nitrate grains may have been withdrawn from production because they were unstable. Presumably, a decade-long decomposition process resulted in spontaneous ignition.

In France there is no limit to the amount of ammonium nitrate that can be stored . In order to enable explosive self-ignition, three conditions must be met: a casing that promotes pressure build-up, the addition of combustible material such as heating oil and high temperatures.

attack

Since the explosion occurred only 10 days after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 , the theory of an assassination attempt has been widely accepted. This possibility was officially ruled out because there had been no serious declaration of responsibility by a terrorist organization. On October 4, 2001, Environment Minister Yves Cochet announced that contract worker Hassan Jandoubi , who was killed in the explosion, was under observation. The prosecution prevented a search of Jandoubi's home for five days. Jandoubi's life partner destroyed all traces of his clothing and photographs. After a search, police announced that Jandoubi may have sympathized with Islamic terrorists.

The journalists Anne-Marie Casteret († 2006) and Marc Mennessier ( AZF - un silence d'état , see literature) examined the thesis of an attack .


Hydrazine (thesis of the French weekly magazine Valeurs Actuelles July 2006)

UDMH (asymmetrical dimethylhydrazine) is produced in the neighboring SNPE (a powder factory that produces propellants for Ariane solid rockets, among other things ). On the day of the explosion, operations were shut down for maintenance work, and a large amount of UDMH was being stored on site at the same time. UDMH vapors are heavier than air, attack mucous membranes and eyes and have a pungent ammonia odor. Injuries were found in several explosion victims, which could be attributed to it. Witnesses mentioned the smell of ammonia and rotten fish that the wind carried from the SNPE premises. UDMH forms an explosive mixture with the ambient air, which the wind could have blown directly into the nitrate granulate cooling tower and Hangar 221 of the AZF that day. Heated air is blown out of the cooling tower by two fans, whereby the UDMH mixture when ignited may have given the impression that lightning strikes the tower while the tower exploded at the same time. The UDMH could have spread to hangar 221, in which hundreds of tons of ammonium nitrate were stored and the gates of which were open in the direction of the wind at that moment. UDMH reacts with ammonium nitrate to form the liquid explosive astrolite. In the amount given there, astrolite could probably have developed a greater explosive power.

An explanation for the ignition of the air-UDMH mixture would either be a contact of UDMH with chromium trioxide (which was used to measure the carbon monoxide content on the factory premises; 11 kg of this was stolen in the factory laboratory shortly before), or an electricity incident in the SNPE.

course

The accident occurred on September 21, 2001 at 10:17 a.m. After a series of small explosions, a nitrate silo and two adjacent warehouses exploded . Around 300 tons of the fertilizer ammonium nitrate exploded . 460 employees worked in three shifts in the plant. Two chimneys collapsed and of the two halls in the center of the explosion, only a crater ten meters deep and fifty meters wide remained. In the smoking ruins of the devastated factory, members of the company fire brigade and volunteers from the neighborhood provided first aid. The police, fire brigade and civil defense organized their operations very quickly . The population was called on to stay at home and lock the windows, as there was a risk of toxic gases emanating from the destroyed plant. There was a smell of ammonia over the site of the accident . A reddish cloud first moved north towards the city center and later west. The shock wave hurled entire truck trains through the air, brought down a nearby shopping center and severely damaged all surrounding buildings. Window panes were broken within a radius of five kilometers. Numerous students were injured at a middle school in the neighborhood. The city freeway to the south was turned into a field of rubble by a hail of rubble and rocks, numerous cars were destroyed and drivers were injured. In the city center, three kilometers away, the detonation caused a panic. The telephone network collapsed. There was a pungent smell of ammonia from the gas cloud moving towards the city center . Respirators were distributed in the city center. The Toulouse subway has been evacuated due to smoke penetrating it. The population was warned to stay indoors and close the windows, which for many was not possible as their window panes had just broken. Toulouse-Blagnac airport and Toulouse-Matabiau train station were closed and 90 schools evacuated. The residents were told over the radio not to drink tap water and to use as little water as possible. After many people tried to leave the city by car, the southern city exits and the ring road around the center were closed by the police.

The authorities gave the all-clear at an early stage and informed the population on the radio that the first measurements did not reveal any harmful substances. The next day, newspapers reported that three of the five air measuring stations had been damaged by the post-explosion shock wave, which was equivalent to a 3.4 magnitude earthquake. The two functioning measuring stations were located at a greater distance from the factory and the toxic ammonia cloud that was escaping . The inhabitants of the Toulouse metropolitan area were only gradually informed about the pollution of drinking water. In 14 municipalities that were supplied with treated drinking water from the Garonne River, citizens were advised not to consume drinking water. In the city of Toulouse, residents were assured that the drinking water was of perfect quality. There were no warnings about the consumption of vegetables or fruits grown in the area. The long-term health effects are still unknown.

Structural situation

The plant was originally located outside the city of 650,000 people, but Toulouse, with its aerospace and aerospace industries, developed so rapidly that the industrial zone has long been surrounded by residential quarters. In addition to the AZF plant, there are two other plants that manufacture explosives: Tolochimie and SNPE, which makes fuel for the Ariane rockets. As early as 1988 and 1989, environmentalists had repeatedly drawn attention to the dangers and inadequate security measures in the industrial zone in Toulouse. Because of "a political blackmail with jobs" nothing was changed in this situation.

In the storage halls of the AZF factory, built in the mid-1920s, there were neither temperature nor humidity sensors. There were also no video cameras to monitor stocks. The concrete floor slab was poured in 1930. Apparently the camp did not have the protective walls provided in Germany for separating larger quantities of the substance. The warehouses were mainly reserved for ammonium nitrates, which could not be marketed due to technical deficiencies. During their routine visits to the factory premises in previous years, state inspectors had not considered it necessary to check the warehouses. During the last inspection visit before the explosion in May, the inspectors did not go to the warehouses. The fertilizer factory appeared to be inadequately equipped for an emergency. After the explosion, no siren alarms warned the population in the neighboring residential areas of possible health risks. The alarm system was attached to a wall that overturned as a result of the explosion. In the emergency plans there were regulations for 24 types of accidents. Action plans for an explosion accident were not in place, although the latent risk of explosion from ammonium nitrate is known.

The future of the company premises

As a continuation of the industrial activity in Toulouse would have been difficult to enforce, the AZF company was closed against the will of the 450 employees there. The buildings and industrial facilities that were still preserved were removed and the soil of the entire factory premises was decontaminated. The then Mayor of Toulouse Philippe Douste-Blazy (appointed Minister of Health shortly thereafter) was chosen from several proposals for redesigning the area : the establishment of an international cancer research center, which opened on May 5, 2014.

See also

literature

sources

  1. ^ Report de l'inspection générale de l'environnement: Usine de la société Grande Paroisse à Toulouse; Accident du 21 septembre 2001 ( Memento of November 26, 2006 in the Internet Archive ) Original French-language document of October 24, 2001, p. 14. ( English translation )
  2. ^ Anti-terror probe into French blast CNN Oct 4 2001
  3. ^ Explosion in France may have been Terrorism The Michigan Daily Oct 5 2001
  4. ↑ Terrorism link to French explosion The Guardian Oct 5 2001
  5. ^ Paul Seabright What Explosion? London Review of Books Nov 1 2001
  6. ↑ kooperation-international.de: France: Cancer clinic “Oncopole” in Toulouse handed over to its destination. May 8, 2014, accessed June 23, 2014.

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Coordinates: 43 ° 34 ′ 2 "  N , 1 ° 25 ′ 39"  E