HX convoys

Allied propaganda poster

HX convoys (HX = Halifax ) were militarily secured, regular merchant ship convoys . They drove on the North Atlantic route between Canada and Great Britain during the Second World War . The North Atlantic route was the most important transatlantic connection for Great Britain at the time. Accordingly, the HX convoys, which until August 1940 were the only ones to operate this route, were the most important for the United Kingdom. Their complete interruption would have made a continuation of the war impossible. The Germans mainly used submarines to combat them, but also capital ships, planes and mines. Despite some successes against individual HX convoys, the total loss of shipments from 1939 to 1945 was only 0.9% and was therefore far from a complete interruption.

organization

North Atlantic convoy

Allied aircraft securing the convoy

The HX convoys picked up all ships sailing to Great Britain via the North Atlantic route. The ships came from a variety of North, Central and South American ports and gathered in the Canadian Halifax ( location ). There they sorted into HX convoys for ships with a speed of 9 to 12 knots and HXF convoys (F = Fast) with a speed of 13 to 15 knots. Liverpool ( Lage ), which was approached via the North Canal ( Lage ), was always the end point. Here the convoy broke up and the cargo ships drove on to their actual British ports of destination. From HX 208 on September 17, 1942, the starting point was always New York ( location ).

The HX convoys initially departed every seven to nine days, while the HXF convoys ran more irregularly. With HXF 20 in February 1940, the separation between the fast and normal HX convoy trains ended. Until August 1940 they were the only connection on the North Atlantic route between North America and Great Britain. Then the slower SC convoys (SC = Slow Convoy) were added on the same route.

HX 1 left Halifax on September 16, 1939 with 15 ships and entered Liverpool on September 30 without losses. Another 376 HX convoys followed by the end of the war. HXF 1 first crossed the North Atlantic on September 19, 1939 and reached Liverpool on September 29, 1939. Another 19 HXF convoys followed by February 1940. Depending on the route, weather and enemy situation, the HX convoys needed 14 to 19 days for the crossing and the HXF convoys around 9 to 13 days.

The greatest danger to HX convoys came from German submarines. Right at the beginning of the war, they positioned themselves in the area of ​​the Western Approaches to intercept incoming convoys. At first they operated close to the British and Irish Atlantic coasts in the Rockallbank area ( location ). That is why the Royal Navy secured all HX convoys with special escort groups. These consisted of suitable security vehicles such as destroyers, corvettes, frigates, sloops, trawlers, submarines and others. The escort was initially carried out from 12 ° W , as the German submarines were only particularly active in this area. As a result, the HX convoys drove most of their journey without escort. The German U-boats prepared themselves and tried to attack before the escorts were there. Thereupon the escorts took over the convoys at 15 ° and at the beginning of 1940 at 20 ° W. This meant that the range of the destroyers used for escort service was exhausted, as refueling on the high seas was not yet possible. In order to protect the convoys nevertheless, the Royal Navy used auxiliary cruisers (English Armed Merchant Cruiser). If German capital ships moved in the North Atlantic, battleships also went with the convoy.

In the course of the war, the zone in which submarines attacked HX convoys shifted further and further west in order to evade the escort protection. The British then reorganized the escort service. With two replacements for the escort vehicles, they succeeded for the first time in May 1941 in accompanying HX 129 continuously. In the areas near the coast, land-based aircraft also protected the convoys. Attacks by submarines therefore occurred predominantly in the mid-North Atlantic at this time (English Mid-Atlantic gap).

As a result, the convoy system gradually improved and the chances of the attackers decreased. From 1943 onwards, constant security from the air, which was achieved by escort carriers , catapult aircraft on merchant ships and land-based long-haul aircraft , proved to be advantageous . By mid-1943 at the latest, the attackers no longer had the opportunity to seriously attack the convoys.

Convoys

The Vanoc sank ...

... U 100 at the convoy HX 112

The freighter Empire Tide had an airplane catapult on board. The plane should ...

... shoot down the Focke-Wulf Fw 200, which was using bearing signals to bring submarines to the escort or to attack itself. From 1943 on, ...

... escort carriers like the biters in HX convoy trains

From 9 to 16 October 1939 that crossed ironclad Germany on the sea routes of the HX convoys. But she only found single drivers, which she sank each time. The first loss occurred with the HX 5A. U 34 sank the British freighter Malabar (7976 GRT) on October 29 .

In the first half of 1940 there was practically no combat against the HX convoys. The Navy was otherwise busy with the preparation and occupation of Denmark and Norway as well as the subsequent campaign in the west . In the second half of 1940, the German submarines operated from French bases conveniently located on the Atlantic. During this time, the few existing submarines managed to inflict losses of up to 24% on a few HX convoy trains. The only successful attack by a German capital ship on an HX convoy occurred during this time: On November 5, 1940, the Admiral Scheer from HX 84 sank six ships (47,792 GRT) east of Newfoundland, including the only security ship, the auxiliary cruiser Jervis Bay ( Location ). Following this incident, two subsequent HX convoys were stopped and ordered back to Canadian ports.

After no attacks on HX convoys had taken place at the turn of the year 1940/1941, they began again from February 1941. The German battleships Gneisenau and Scharnhorst captured HX 106 on February 8, 1941. However, they did not attack it, as the security consisted of the British battleship Ramillies , among other things . During this time, when German capital ships were in the Atlantic, heavy British surface forces were carried in every HX convoy. Furthermore, in 1941 in particular, Focke-Wulf Fw 200 combat aircraft of the Kampfgeschwader 40 increased reconnaissance flights in the eastern North Atlantic. They also sighted HX convoys and brought submarines to them using bearing signals. They also attacked ships in the convoy directly and were sunk. During this time, the Italian submarines stationed in Bordeaux also succeeded in sinking ships. The Calvi and the Veniero each sank a straggler from HX 92.

In the first half of 1941, the submarines and aircraft made significantly less successful attacks on HX escorts. The first submarine losses also occurred on the convoy. So on March 17, 1941 at HX 112 , the escort vehicles Walker sank the German submarine U 99 ( Lage ) under Lieutenant Otto Kretschmer and Vanoc the U 100 ( Lage ) under Lieutenant Schepke . Up to this point in time, Kretschmer was - and remained so until the end of the war - the most successful submarine commander (in terms of sunk tonnage) of the Second World War. In the second half of 1941, only three HX escorts suffered losses. The British succeeded more and more in diverting them around known submarine positions. To do this, they also accepted considerable detours in some cases. In November and December there were very few submarines in the North Atlantic because of other missions. During this phase, the HX convoys had no enemy-related losses.

After the USA entered the war , the submarine command shifted the focus of the submarine war directly to the North American coast. In the first half of 1942 the HX convoys suffered no enemy-related losses. In the second half of 1942, the submarines returned to the North Atlantic route. Occasionally they managed to find and attack HX convoys. The number of submarines attacking in packs had increased considerably in the meantime, but this also caused problems - as with the convoy HX 217. There were 16 submarines with the convoy. On December 8, 1942, there was a collision between U 221 and U 254 ( Lage ), in which the latter sank.

In the first half of 1943 sightings and attacks on HX convoys increased. The losses increased both in the convoys and in the attacking submarines. When the submarine losses became rampant in May, all attacks on the following HX convoys were temporarily suspended on May 24, 1943. The submarines left the North Atlantic convoy route and operated in other sea areas, so the convoys HX 240 to HX 253 could cross the North Atlantic unhindered. The German submarines, which were back in the North Atlantic from September 1943, got in touch with some HX convoys, but were not sunk. Most of the convoys avoided known submarine positions. It also happened that the Allied escort vehicles and aircraft were able to thwart all attacks and sink the attackers. This is what happened with the HX 264, in which two submarines were sunk without any losses of their own.

In 1944, HX convoys lost a total of two shiploads. The majority of the HX convoys did not capture the German submarines and aircraft. The cargo ship Daghestan carried a Sikorsky R-4 helicopter with the HX 274 . This first - still unarmed - US helicopter was extensively tested from January 6 to 21, 1944. The HX 300, which departed in July 1944, was the largest convoy of the Second World War with 167 merchant ships. He suffered no losses.

On February 20, 1945, U 1276 (Wendt) sank the corvette Vervain , which secured the HX 337. Immediately afterwards, the sloop Amethyst, also part of the escort, sank the German submarine. The last attack took place on April 18, 1945 on HX 348. U 1107 (Parduhn) sank the freighter Cyrus H. McCormick (7181 GRT) and the tanker Empire Gold (8028 GRT).

Listed below are all HX convoys that have had at least one enemy-related loss of a shipload. The losses were caused by German capital ships, submarines, airplanes and sea mines as well as by Italian submarines. This does not include losses due to collisions, weather, British sea mines or operating errors by the ship's crew.

Convoy	Departure	Arrivals	Shiploads	Sunk shiploads	GRT	Percentage loss	German losses
HX 5	October 17, 1939	October 29, 1939	16	2	12,642	12.5%	0
HX 14	December 29, 1939	January 12, 1940	40	1	7,267	2.5%	0
HX 22	February 22, 1940	March 9, 1940	35	1	5,068	2.8%	0
HX 47	June 2, 1940	June 17, 1940	58	3	18,045	5.1%	0
HX 49	June 9, 1940	June 24, 1940	50	3	26,081	6%	0
HX 53	June 25, 1940	July 10, 1940	43	1	5,758	2.3%	0
HX 55	3rd July 1940	July 18, 1940	40	2	15,650	5%	0
HX 60	July 23, 1940	August 7, 1940	60	3	17.102	4.9%	0
HX 62	July 31, 1940	August 15, 1940	79	2	7,496	2.5%	0
HX 65	August 12, 1940	August 27, 1940	51	8th	53,756	15.6%	0
HX 66	August 16, 1940	August 31, 1940	51	4th	17057	7.8%	0
HX 71	September 5, 1940	September 20, 1940	33	1	5,242	3%	0
HX 72	September 9, 1940	September 21, 1940	47	11	72,737	23%	0
HX 76	September 26, 1940	October 10, 1940	40	1	4,956	2.5%	0
HX 77	September 30, 1940	October 15, 1940	37	4th	28,735	10.8%	0
HX 79	October 8, 1940	October 23, 1940	49	12	75,063	24%	0
HX 83	October 24, 1940	November 7, 1940	38	1	6,993	2.6%	0
HX 84	October 28, 1940	November 5, 1940	38	5	33,628	13.1%	0
HX 90	November 21, 1940	5th December 1940	41	9	52,817	21.9%	0
HX 92	November 29, 1940	December 12, 1940	24	4th	26,111	16.6%	0
HX 107	February 3, 1941	February 28, 1941	29	3	18,316	10.3%	0
HX 109	February 13, 1941	March 4, 1941	38	3	22,907	7.8%	0
HX 112	March 1, 1941	March 20, 1941	42	5	34,505	11.9%	2 submarines
HX 115	March 17, 1941	April 3, 1941	34	3	13,032	8.8%	0
HX 121	April 16, 1941	May 3, 1941	50	4th	35,495	8th %	1 submarine
HX 126	May 10, 1941	May 28, 1941	37	9	54,451	24.3%	0
HX 133	June 16, 1941	July 3, 1941	64	4th	28.207	6.25%	2 submarines
HX 209	September 24, 1942	October 9, 1942	40	1	11,651	2.5%	2 submarines
HX 212	October 18, 1942	November 2, 1942	54	6th	52,000	11.1%	0
HX 217	November 27, 1942	December 14, 1942	39	3	20,929	7.6%	2 submarines
HX 222	January 6, 1943	January 22, 1943	35	1	14,547	2.8%	0
HX 223	January 14, 1943	February 2, 1943	57	2	16,480	3.5%	0
HX 224	January 22, 1943	February 5, 1943	64	3	24,823	4.6%	1 submarine
HX 227	February 18, 1943	March 6, 1943	71	2	14,352	2.8%	0
HX 228	February 28, 1943	March 15, 1943	87	4th	24,175	4.7%	2 submarines
HX 229	March 8, 1943	March 23, 1943	40	13	93.502	34%	1 submarine
HX 230	March 18, 1943	April 2, 1943	46	1	7176	2.1%	0
HX 231	March 25, 1943	April 10, 1943	62	6th	41,500	9%	2 submarines
HX 232	April 1, 1943	April 16, 1943	51	4th	24,221	7.8%	0
HX 233	April 6, 1943	April 21, 1943	58	1	7.134	1.7%	1 submarine
HX 234	April 12, 1943	April 29, 1943	46	1	10,218	2.1%	4 submarines
HX 237	May 1, 1943	May 17, 1943	47	3	21,389	6.3%	4 submarines
HX 305	August 25, 1944	September 10, 1944	97	2	17,048	2%	0
HX 332	January 13, 1945	January 28, 1945	48	1	8,262	2%	0
HX 348	April 3, 1945	April 20, 1945	90	2	15.209	2.2%	0

All losses from ships in HX convoys, by year.

year	Convoys	Shiploads	Convoys with casualties	losses	Losses in percent
1939	22nd	431	2	3	0.7%
1940	91	3424	18th	72	2%
1941	70	3050	7th	31	1.8%
1942	54	1811	3	11	0.5%
1943	53	2958	12	41	1.3%
1944	55	4085	1	2	0.04%
1945	32	1985	2	3	0.05%
total	377	17,744	45	163	0.9%

See also

• EN convoys
• Northern convoys
• WS convoys
• List of allied convoy routes in World War II

literature

• Arnold Hague: The allied convoy system 1939-1945: its organization, defense and operation. Vanwell, St. Catharines 2000, ISBN 1-55750-019-3 .
• Clay Blair : The Submarine War. The hunters 1939–1942. Wilhelm Heyne Verlag , Munich 1998, ISBN 3-453-12345-X .
• Clay Blair: The Submarine War. The hunted 1943–1945. Wilhelm Heyne Verlag, Munich 1999, ISBN 3-453-16059-2 .

Web links

• Jürgen Rohwer , Gerhard Hümmelchen : Chronicle of the naval war 1939-1945

Individual evidence

1. ↑ Clay Blair: The Submarine War. The hunters 1939–1942. P. 241.
2. ↑ Clay Blair: The Submarine War. The hunters 1939–1942. P. 355.
3. ↑ Jürgen Rohwer, Gerhard Hümmelchen: Chronik des Maritime War 1939–1945, October 1939 , accessed on November 17, 2012.
4. ↑ Clay Blair: The Submarine War. The hunters 1939–1942. P. 256.
5. ^ Jürgen Rohwer, Gerhard Hümmelchen: Chronik des Maritime War 1939–1945, February 1940 , accessed on November 17, 2012.
6. ↑ Jürgen Rohwer, Gerhard Hümmelchen: Chronik des Maritime War 1939–1945, December 1940 , accessed on November 17, 2012.
7. ↑ Clay Blair: The Submarine War. The hunters 1939–1942. Pp. 312-313.
8. ↑ Jürgen Rohwer, Gerhard Hümmelchen: Chronicle of the Sea War 1939–1945, December 1942 , accessed on November 17, 2012.
9. ↑ Jürgen Rohwer, Gerhard Hümmelchen: Chronik des Maritime War 1939–1945, May 1943 , accessed on November 17, 2012.
10. ^ Jürgen Rohwer, Gerhard Hümmelchen: Chronik des Maritime War 1939–1945, November 1943 , accessed on November 17, 2012.
11. ↑ Jürgen Rohwer, Gerhard Hümmelchen: Chronik des Maritime War 1939–1945, January 1944 , accessed on November 17, 2012.
12. ↑ Clay Blair: The Submarine War. The hunters 1939–1942. P. 773.
13. ^ Jürgen Rohwer, Gerhard Hümmelchen: Chronicle of the Sea War 1939–1945, April 1945 , accessed on November 17, 2012.
14. ^ Arnold Hague: The allied convoy system 1939-1945.

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