Unofficial employee

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Unofficial employee ( IM ), secret informator ( GI ) until 1968 , was the MfS-internal term in the GDR for a person who forced or voluntarily provided covert information to the Ministry for State Security (MfS, also "the Stasi") or on events or exerted influence on people without formally working for this authority. With its recently about 189,000 members, the network covered from unofficial employees almost all sectors of society from the GDR, thus forming one of the most important instruments of power and supporting the SED - dictatorship . The main motives for the cooperation are political ideals. Apparently, money only played a subordinate role, and extorted cooperation with the GDR spy apparatus was rare.

In order to stand out from the earlier German police vocabulary and the term V-Mann , the terms secret informator and, since the 1970s, unofficial employee of the MfS were deliberately chosen. The sometimes occurring resolution of the abbreviation IM as "informal employee" comes from the journalism of the post-reunification period .

After German reunification , on the basis of the Stasi Records Act, the federal commissioner for the Stasi records enabled people processed by the MfS and their relatives as well as authorities, researchers and journalists to access the written records of the MfS under different conditions. This brought the identities of many unofficial employees to light.

Number of unofficial employees

IM development by the MfS 1950–1989

The MfS had a network of IMs in all population groups in the GDR. The network of unofficial employees was a key element of the surveillance system in the GDR, as it made it possible to monitor groups of people to whom MfS employees who could openly be identified as such would not have had access. There were IMs in many groups and organizations critical of the regime , such as in artist and church circles, so that the MfS was informed about most of the activities of “hostile-negative people”.

In the course of its existence, the MfS managed around 624,000 people as unofficial employees. Their number rose by leaps and bounds in the context of internal societal crises such as June 17, 1953 , the building of the Wall or the German-German détente . In the mid-1970s, the IM network reached its greatest expansion with over 200,000 employees. The introduction of a changed IM guideline with the aim of further professionalization led to a slight decrease in the number of unofficial employees at the end of the 1970s. Most recently, the MfS employed 173,081 IMs (as of December 31, 1988, without head office clearing, HV A for short ). In 2010 a study by Helmut Müller-Enbergs calculated the number of 189,000 unofficial employees for 1989. Thus there was one IM for every 89 GDR citizens. The historian Ilko-Sascha Kowalczuk questioned this number in 2013, but without giving any other information about the number of unofficial employees. In Müller-Enbergs' extrapolation, however, people who were listed under different aliases and IM categories were included in the statistics several times. The MfS also recorded many people who would not have reported in practice. For this reason, the MfS archived almost 10,000 IM processes in 1987 as so-called file corpses. The MfS itself reported the number of its IMs in 1988 internally as 110,000. Kowalczuk questioned the extrapolation of the unofficial employees abroad. Kowalczuk's IM numbers are themselves controversial, as his theses are by no means convincingly empirically founded. Serious methodological errors in his logical and statistical conclusions were also criticized. Kowalczuk's assertions in the press that the number of IMs was only half as large as previously assumed are inaccurate and belittling, as they see the massive expansion of information obtained by the MfS towards the end of the GDR, which killed almost every second GDR citizen fell, not taken into account.

Kowalczuk's employer, the federal commissioner for the Stasi files (BStU), has meanwhile "factually distanced itself" from Kowalczuk's figures. The federal government made it clear in a small request in 2013. The BStU still reckons, as calculated by Müller-Enbergs, with a total of 189,000 IM, to which the IMK and GMS will be added. According to the BStU, this includes 3,000 to 3,500 unofficial employees of the MfS who worked in the Federal Republic of Germany and Berlin (West), 1550 of which were calculated by Head Office A. However, since the existence of the Stasi records authority, it has been pointed out repeatedly that that IM is not the same as IM, and that the individual case must be examined very carefully in order to assess the individual responsibility or even guilt of an individual. The individual case differentiation applies both to the review of the public service and to research. Verification practice and IM research are much more nuanced than some have suggested. With the clarification of the BStU and the reference to the solidity of the figure of 189,000 IM, the debate about the numbers has been somewhat calmed down.

In the meantime there is evidence that the number of informants of the MfS was significantly larger than that of the IM. In the residential area, she relied on respondents (AKP) to get information about neighbors. These weren't usually IM. They were controlled by MfS employees, mostly full-time IM (HIM) under legend. So they kept silent about the real reason for their curiosity and, as representatives of the city administration, the army and customs, tried to make their contact persons talkative. AKP were recorded in files in which their willingness to talk was documented. Samples from card indexes in Rostock and Saalfeld show that around 18% and 5.9% of the population were recorded as predominantly AKP willing to talk. The AKP alone made up many times the number of IM in these municipalities. However, there were other informants and cooperation partners. In Karl-Marx-Stadt (since 1990 Chemnitz again) the MfS kept in contact with 'good people', people who were ready to help the MfS. At the workplace, in companies, state institutions or social organizations, the MfS worked together with 'official' partners. As a rule, these were people in key positions, i.e. mostly managers. These were mostly controlled at the workplace in order to clarify security problems, mostly personnel issues. Official partners of this kind were expected to provide the MfS with information, but also to receive information from the MfS and take them into account when deploying personnel. Although the contacts were not unofficial, they were mostly informal. Speeches with official partners could interfere with the fate of people and lead to difficulties in career or travel matters. The MfS maintained official cooperation primarily with nomenclature cadres. These were party-affiliated functionaries who exercised the real power in the SED dictatorship.

The distribution of IMs varied from region to region and fluctuated between 80 and 160 inhabitants per unofficial employee, depending on the district. The districts Cottbus, Schwerin and Magdeburg had the highest IM density, while Berlin, Halle and Leipzig had the lowest.

The majority of the unofficial employees worked in Germany. Only individual data is available on the scope of the IM network abroad. It is estimated that the MfS (including the HV A) recently employed around 3,000 unofficial employees in the "operational area" of the Federal Republic and 300 to 400 IMs in western countries. Overall, the number of German citizens who were in the service of the MfS in the course of its existence is estimated at around 12,000. Many of these were former citizens of the GDR who moved to the Federal Republic of Germany on behalf of the MfS. The majority of these IMs, however, were born in the Federal Republic and worked for the Ministry for State Security out of sympathy with the GDR.

The IM were predominantly male (83% of the IM in the GDR, 72% of the IM in the Federal Republic) and the majority belonged to the SED (around every 20th party member was IM). The group of 25 to 40 year-olds was particularly well represented (proportion between 30 and 40%, compared to 24% in the entire GDR population), the number of pensioners and those under 25 was comparatively low. Helmut Müller-Enbergs cites political ideals as the main motives for the cooperation . In his opinion, money only played a subordinate role, and extorted cooperation with the GDR informers was also rare.

activity

The information was usually reports on the behavior of people from the personal or professional environment of the unofficial employee. Close friends and family members were also often spied on by unofficial employees. After the fall of the Wall, these cases were often revealed and led to the termination of friendship or marriage. Some of the unofficial employees acted out of political conviction, others promised themselves discounts or they were put under pressure. The cooperation period lasted an average of six to ten years, but in individual cases it could also last considerably longer.

The internal differentiation between the individual unofficial employees was important. There were great differences between the GMS (social security employee, i.e. the publicly known state-loyal citizen), the IMB (unofficial employee observation, for foreign intelligence services) and the IMS (unofficial security employee). Collective files containing reports and interviews with people who were not themselves IM were also kept under the code name of an IM. This could, for example, be neighbors of security-relevant objects. People who were classified as persistent political opponents by the MfS ( hostile-negative persons ) were monitored with several recruited IM from their personal environment, depending on their importance.

IM categories

In Directive 1/79 of the Minister for State Security, Erich Mielke , valid from 1980 to 1989 , the work of the IM was regulated and the following categories were defined.

Unofficial employee with special tasks (IMA)

IMAs were used for “offensive” measures in the “operational area” (i.e. the Federal Republic ). This primarily concerned contacts with German journalists in order to launch information in the local media. These tasks could be carried out permanently, temporarily or once by the IMA. Most recently, the MfS had 16 Federal German IMAs.

Unofficial employee of the defense with enemy connections or for the immediate processing of persons suspected of hostile activity (IMB)

IMB were particularly significant IM who were in direct contact with people classified as hostile by the Stasi and who trusted them. They were used directly to work on operational processes (OV). Individual IMB could also travel to the NSW countries to observe or scout people or objects there . For this purpose, they were provided with intelligence materials and foreign currency . Of particular interest to the MfS were people who belonged to oppositional groups or who held church functions. Citizens who had interesting relationships with people in the NSW for the MfS were also recruited as IMB. This could be employees of clubs, organizations, but also of parties. Interesting were people who were related to employees of the security organs of the Federal Republic (for example in the police, as well as the constitution protection or the federal intelligence service ). If the MfS knew of such connections, an attempt was made to recruit the person in the GDR - possibly with pressure. This IM category was created in 1980 from the amalgamation of the IMF (unofficial employee of the internal defense with enemy connections to the operational area) and IMV (unofficial employee who directly collaborates on the processing and unmasking of people suspected of hostile activity). Until 1968 they were only referred to as Secret Employees (GM). On December 31, 1987, the MfS had 3955 IMBs.

Unofficial employee on a special mission (IME)

IME were IM that were used by the MfS for special tasks. They had special knowledge (for example, expert IM for handwriting recognition or toxicologists ), were specialized in observations and investigations, or were employed in key positions. At universities or academies, for example, they should uncover research trends and scientific and administrative deficiencies. Until 1968 they were also referred to as Secret Employees on Special Operations (GME). In June 1988 the MfS counted 7375 IME.

Unofficial employee to ensure conspiracy and liaison (IMK)

IMK were used by the MfS for various logistical tasks. Depending on the service provided, they were given an additional code that specified the type of support. People who provided the MfS with conspiratorial apartments , rooms or objects with the previous abbreviation KW (conspiratorial apartment) or KO (conspiratorial property). Those IMKs used as deck addresses or deck telephones were referred to as IMK / DA or IMK / DT. People who ensured conspiracy by providing other security were given the designation IMK / S. In 1989 the MfS had a total of 30,500 IMK. These were mostly people who passed on little information themselves, but who had special trust in the MfS (with regard to the necessary conspiracy ). Occasionally, clandestine apartments and properties were also registered as IMK if full-time and unofficial MfS employees rented them with fictitious or real personal data (e.g. as a secondary apartment).

Unofficial employee for political-operational penetration and securing of the area of ​​responsibility (IMS)

IMS were persons employed in security-relevant areas (companies, social institutions, research and educational institutions as well as state institutions) who reported on the behavior of people. They should recognize suspicions at an early stage, act preventively and prevent damage and make a significant contribution to ensuring internal security in their area of ​​responsibility. Until 1968, they were mostly carried under the name of Secret Informator (GI). With their last 93,600 members, the IMS formed the largest category of unofficial informants. Other sources assume an IMS share of up to 85 percent for the 1980s.

Social Security Worker (GMS)

The GMS were active in leading positions in business and administration and should appear openly “partisan” and “state-conscious”. They were used to gather information and were supposed to relieve the other unofficial employees. As a rule, they were not used for the direct “processing” of “hostile-negative people”. Towards the end of the MfS there were around 33,300 GMS. Even though they partly worked like IM, GMS were not classified as IM by the MfS; GMS operations were subject to different guidelines. For this reason, the historian Ilko-Sascha Kowalczuk pleaded in 2013 that these should not be statistically recorded as IM.

Leadership IM (FIM)

Reliable IMs suitable for guiding people with "experience in operational work" were able to lead and guide three to five IMs or GMSs "on behalf of the MfS ... under the guidance and control of an operational employee". They were able to operate largely independently when awarding contracts and maintaining connections. Until 1968 they were referred to as the Secret Main Informers (GHI). In June 1988 there were 4,657 FIMs. In addition, the Headquarters Reconnaissance 26 FIM deployed in Germany. In addition, there was a group of about 3,500 people of full-time executive IM (HFIM) who worked and were paid for the MfS under a pseudo-employment relationship in a “area of ​​responsibility” without employment or military employment. These were included in the regular establishment plan of the Stasi in 1986.

IM candidate / IM preliminary

A person who was recorded in a process with the aim of attracting unofficial cooperation and who had intended or conducted initial talks, but who had not yet been recruited, was recorded in the files as a preliminary IM ( VL-IM or V-IM ) guided. For this purpose, an IM preliminary process was created and recorded centrally. The people to be recruited were often subjected to an operational identity check beforehand . If an advertisement was promising, the actual recruiting phase began and the IM process was converted into a regular IM process after the candidate had given their consent. Otherwise, the process was canceled and archived or converted into a so-called " operational process " (OV) in which material was taught to exert pressure or other IMs were set up to influence the candidate.

Historical processing

When the BStU authority was set up, a large number of full-time MfS employees were officially hired, but also countless unofficial employees who were not recognized. The latter was possible because checking the BStU employees for previous Stasi cooperation (in contrast to other authorities) was sometimes handled laxly. For example, the first head of the Schwerin BStU branch stated publicly: “We had agreed that everyone should check themselves.” In 1998 it turned out that an informal Stasi employee (according to “Spiegel” IM “Delia”) had up to this point Head of the archives of this branch.

In the process of coming to terms with GDR history, there have been repeated trials against authors who have named former unofficial employees by name. Several former IMs failed in 2010 when they tried to prevent them from being named.

The abuse of children and young people as unofficial employees of the MfS has hardly been researched so far.

literature

  • Ilko-Sascha Kowalczuk : Stasi specifically. Surveillance and repression in the GDR. Beck, Munich 2013, ISBN 978-3-406-63838-1 .
  • Helmut Müller-Enbergs : The unofficial employees. In: BStU: Anatomy of State Security - History, Structure, Methods. Berlin 2008, pp. 35–38 (PDF; 471 kB) .
  • Helmut Müller-Enbergs (ed.): Inofficial employees of the Ministry for State Security. Part 1: Guidelines and Implementing Regulations. Ch. Links Verlag, Berlin 1996, ISBN 3-86153-101-1 .
  • Helmut Müller-Enbergs (ed.): Inofficial employees of the Ministry for State Security. Part 2: Instructions for working with agents, scouts and spies in the Federal Republic of Germany. Ch. Links Verlag, Berlin 1998, ISBN 3-86153-145-3 ( Google Books ).
  • Helmut Müller-Enbergs (ed.): Inofficial employees of the Ministry for State Security. Part 3: Statistics. Ch. Links Verlag, Berlin 2008, ISBN 978-3-86153-441-9 (in collaboration with Susanne Muhle; Google Books ).
  • Jörn Mothes , Gundula Fienbork a. a. (Ed.): Damaged Souls. GDR youth and state security . Edition Temmen, Rostock 1996, ISBN 3-86108-881-9 .
  • Francesca Weil: Target group of the medical profession. Doctors as unofficial employees of the Ministry for State Security of the GDR. (= Hannah Arendt Institute for Research on Totalitarianism: Reports and Studies . No. 54). V & R Unipress, Göttingen 2008, ISBN 3-89971-423-7 .
  • Ingrid Kerz-Rühling , Tomas Plänkers : Traitors or seduced. A psychoanalytical investigation of unofficial employees of the Stasi . Ch. Links Verlag, Berlin 2004, ISBN 978-3-86153-327-6 (with the collaboration of Helmut Müller-Enbergs).

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ See Helmut Müller-Enbergs: Secret Informator (GI). In: Roger Engelmann, Bernd Florath, Walter Süß u. a. (Ed.): The MfS-Lexikon - terms, persons and structures of the state security of the GDR. Ch. Links Verlag, 3rd revised edition, Berlin 2016, ISBN 978-3-86153-900-1 , page 103, online version on bstu.de .
  2. ↑ More Stasi informers than expected. In the GDR there was apparently even more snooping and betrayal than previously assumed: According to a study, the number of unofficial employees at the Stasi has to be revised upwards. March 10, 2008, accessed September 15, 2018 .
  3. ↑ Bundestag printed matter 16/7919 (PDF; 113 kB), response of the federal government to the minor question from the FDP parliamentary group, January 29, 2008.
  4. ↑ Dieter Herberg, Doris Steffens / Elke Tellenbach: Keywords of the turning point. Word book on public language use 1989/90. (Writings of the Institute for German Language. 6) Berlin / New York 1997, p. 285 f. (on Google Books ).
  5. ↑ a b c d Cf. Helmut Müller-Enbergs : The unofficial employees. In: BStU: Anatomy of State Security - History, Structure, Methods. Berlin 2008, pp. 35–38, https://web.archive.org/web/20140203051044/http://www.bstu.bund.de/DE/Wissen/Publikationen/Publikationen/handbuch_inoffizielle_mueller-enbergs.pdf?__blob = publicationFile .
  6. ↑ See Helmut Müller-Enbergs: IM statistics 1985–1989. In: BF informed. 3/93, BStU, Berlin 1993, p. 55.
  7. ↑ Focus Online: GDR history: More Stasi informers than expected , viewed on March 10, 2010.
  8. ↑ See Spiegel Online from February 21, 2013: New study on GDR informers: The slim Stasi , last viewed on March 13, 2013.
  9. ↑ Christian Booß: The IM who wasn't. http://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/streit-um-stasi-forschung-der-im-der-keiner-war/7921198.html
  10. ↑ July 22, 2003, ARD chat with Marianne Birthler. http://stasiopfer.de/component/option,com_simpleboard/Itemid,203/func,view/id,1058897118/catid,4/
  11. ↑ Weill, Francesca. Target group medical profession. Doctors as unofficial employees of the Ministry for State Security (Reports and Studies 54), Göttingen 2007; Müller-Enbergs, Helmut. About yes-people and no-people. In: Hecht, Marco; Praschl, Gerald: I said no. Civil courage in the GDR. Berlin 2002, pp. 147–166. That. Why does one become IM? To motivate the unofficial cooperation with the State Security Service. In: Behnke, Klaus; Fuchs, Jürgen (Ed.): Decomposition of the soul. Psychology and psychiatry in the service of the Stasi. Hamburg 1995, pp. 102-129.
  12. ↑ Sven Felix Kellerhoff: The Stasi had many more informants than known. In: world. September 26, 2014, accessed June 4, 2018 .
  13. ^ Matthias Schlegel: The explosive files about the top comrades. Stasi chief Erich Mielke once had an extensive secret dossier drawn up on top comrades in the SED and the government. A new book reveals details of the "Rote Nelke" shelf for the first time. In: Der Tagesspiegel. October 1, 2014, accessed June 4, 2018 .
  14. ↑ Christian Booß, Helmut Müller-Enbergs: The indiscreet society. Studies on the denunciation complex and on unofficial employees. Police Science Publishing House, Frankfurt am Main 2014, ISBN 978-3-86676-384-5 .
  15. ↑ See Jens Gieseke: Die Stasi 1945–1990. Munich 2011, p. 116.
  16. ↑ See Helmut Müller-Enbergs: The unofficial employees. In: BStU: Anatomy of the State Security. MfS-Handbuch IV / 2, Berlin 2008, p. 38.
  17. ^ Heinrich August Winkler: The long way to the west. Volume 2: German history from the Third Reich to reunification. Munich 2000, p. 324.
  18. ↑ Regina Karell: Unofficial employees of the GDR State Security in the Gera district in 1989. Erfurt 2008, ISBN 978-3-932303-61-6 , p. 100.
  19. ↑ See Helmut Müller-Enbergs: The unofficial employees. P. 4, p. 39.
  20. ↑ More Stasi informers than expected. In the GDR there was apparently even more snooping and betrayal than previously assumed: According to a study, the number of unofficial employees must be revised upwards. In: Focus. March 10, 2008, accessed June 4, 2018 .
  21. ↑ See Helmut Müller-Enbergs: Inoffizielllicher Arbeiter (IM). In: Roger Engelmann, Bernd Florath, Walter Süß u. a. (Ed.): The MfS-Lexikon - terms, persons and structures of the state security of the GDR. Ch. Links Verlag, 3rd revised edition, Berlin 2016, ISBN 978-3-86153-900-1 , page 170, online version on bstu.de .
  22. ↑ The "Guideline No. 1/79 for working with unofficial employees (IM) and social employees for security (GMS)" in the Stasi media library of the Stasi records authority
  23. ↑ See Helmut Müller-Enbergs: Inofficial employee with special tasks (IMA). In: Roger Engelmann, Bernd Florath, Walter Süß u. a. (Ed.): The MfS-Lexikon - terms, persons and structures of the state security of the GDR. Ch. Links Verlag, 3rd revised edition, Berlin 2016, ISBN 978-3-86153-900-1 , page 174, online version on bstu.de .
  24. ↑ See Helmut Müller-Enbergs: Secret employee. In: Roger Engelmann, Bernd Florath, Walter Süß u. a. (Ed.): The MfS-Lexikon - terms, persons and structures of the state security of the GDR. Ch. Links Verlag, 3rd revised edition, Berlin 2016, ISBN 978-3-86153-900-1 , page 103, online version on bstu.de .
  25. ↑ See Helmut Müller-Enbergs: Unofficial employee of the defense with enemy connections or for the immediate processing of persons suspected of hostile activity (IMB). In: Roger Engelmann, Bernd Florath, Walter Süß u. a. (Ed.): The MfS-Lexikon - terms, persons and structures of the state security of the GDR. Ch. Links Verlag, 3rd revised edition, Berlin 2016, ISBN 978-3-86153-900-1 , page 173, online version on bstu.de .
  26. ↑ a b cf. Ilko-Sascha Kowalczuk: Stasi concrete - surveillance and repression in the GDR. Munich 2013, p. 223.
  27. ↑ See Helmut Müller-Enbergs: Secret Employees in Special Use (GME). In: Roger Engelmann, Bernd Florath, Walter Süß u. a. (Ed.): The MfS-Lexikon - terms, persons and structures of the state security of the GDR. Ch. Links Verlag, 3rd revised edition, Berlin 2016, ISBN 978-3-86153-900-1 , page 103, online version on bstu.de .
  28. ↑ See Helmut Müller-Enbergs: Inofficial employee for securing conspiracy and liaison (IMK). In: Roger Engelmann, Bernd Florath, Walter Süß u. a. (Ed.): The MfS-Lexikon - terms, persons and structures of the state security of the GDR. Ch. Links Verlag, 3rd revised edition, Berlin 2016, ISBN 978-3-86153-900-1 , page 174, online version on bstu.de .
  29. ↑ Cf. Ilko-Sascha Kowalczuk: Stasi concrete - surveillance and repression in the GDR. Munich 2013, pp. 224–226.
  30. ↑ See Helmut Müller-Enbergs: Inofficial employee for political-operational penetration and securing of the area of ​​responsibility (IMS). In: Roger Engelmann, Bernd Florath, Walter Süß u. a. (Ed.): The MfS-Lexikon - terms, persons and structures of the state security of the GDR. Ch. Links Verlag, 3rd revised edition, Berlin 2016, ISBN 978-3-86153-900-1 , page 174, online version on bstu.de .
  31. ↑ a b cf. Ilko-Sascha Kowalczuk: Stasi concrete - surveillance and repression in the GDR. Munich 2013, p. 220.
  32. ↑ See Helmut Müller-Enbergs: Social employee for safety (GMS). In: Roger Engelmann, Bernd Florath, Walter Süß u. a. (Ed.): The MfS-Lexikon - terms, persons and structures of the state security of the GDR. Ch. Links Verlag, 3rd revised edition, Berlin 2016, ISBN 978-3-86153-900-1 , page 108, online version on bstu.de .
  33. ↑ a b See Helmut Müller-Enbergs: Leadership IM (FIM). In: Roger Engelmann, Bernd Florath, Walter Süß u. a. (Ed.): The MfS-Lexikon - terms, persons and structures of the state security of the GDR. Ch. Links Verlag, 3rd revised edition, Berlin 2016, ISBN 978-3-86153-900-1 , page 96, online version on bstu.de .
  34. ↑ a b cf. Ilko-Sascha Kowalczuk: Stasi concrete - surveillance and repression in the GDR. Munich 2013, p. 224.
  35. ↑ List of abbreviations of the authority of the Federal Commissioner for the records of the State Security Service of the former German Democratic Republic
  36. ↑ See Helmut Müller-Enbergs: IM candidate IM Vorlauf . In: Roger Engelmann, Bernd Florath, Walter Süß u. a. (Ed.): The MfS-Lexikon - terms, persons and structures of the state security of the GDR. Ch. Links Verlag, 3rd updated edition, Berlin 2016, ISBN 978-3-86153-900-1 , p. 169.
  37. ↑ "Attribution of ex-informers is allowed" ( Memento of December 17, 2010 in the Internet Archive ), MDR , December 14, 2010. (Concerns the Herbert G case; not to be confused with Holm S., who also has the code name IM "Schubert" wore.)
  38. ↑ Hans-Jürgen Grasemann: Courts give offenders a face. Groundbreaking judgments against Stasi informers. (No longer available online.) Archived from the original on September 29, 2017 ; accessed on June 4, 2018 .
  39. ^ IN THE "Schubert" conflict. Retrieved June 4, 2018 .
  40. ↑ Kwiatkowski Celofiga: Followed students. hsozkult.de Communication and specialist information for the historical sciences.