Imperial letter

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A letter from 1870 is called Kaiserbrief . In it, the princes in Germany offered the Prussian king and holder of the north German federal presidium , Wilhelm I , the crown of a German emperor . The reason was the upcoming accession of the southern German states to the North German Confederation .

It was drawn up by the North German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck on November 27, 1870 and signed by Ludwig II (born 1845, reigned 1864–1886) on November 30, 1870. As King of Bavaria , Ludwig was the highest-ranking German monarch after the Prussian king himself. Ludwig's uncle, Prince Luitpold of Bavaria , who later became Prince Regent (1886–1912), personally presented the letter to the Prussian king on December 3, 1870. The aim of the letter was to persuade the hesitant Wilhelm to accept the title and to give the title greater legitimacy.

This was flanked by an emperor's deputation , i.e. a group of members of the Reichstag who visited the holder of the Federal Presidium in Versailles . The Reichstag and Bundesrat had already on 8/9. December adopted a constitutional amendment that made the North German Empire into the German Empire and also gave the holder of the Federal Presidium the title of emperor. On December 18, Wilhelm accepted the dignity offered to him by both sides. The constitutional amendment came into force on January 1, and Wilhelm was introduced to office in the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles on January 18 (during the Franco-Prussian War ).

Extract from the content

“After southern Germany joined the German constitutional alliance, Ew. Majesty conferred presidential rights extend over all German states. I have declared myself ready to unite them in one hand in the conviction that this will serve the overall interests of the German fatherland and its allied princes, but at the same time with the confidence that the rights to which the Federal Presidium is entitled under the constitution through the restoration of a German Reich and the German imperial dignity are designated as rights, which Ew. To exercise majesty in the name of the entire German fatherland due to the unification of its princes. I have therefore turned to the German princes with the suggestion, together with me at Ew. To bring your Majesty to the suggestion that the exercise of the presidential rights of the Federation be combined with the use of the title of German Emperor. "

Initiating the letter

Otto von Bismarck, 1873
Ludwig II., 1870

Even if the historical circumstances that allowed this letter to come about have now been largely clarified, their interpretation is still very controversial. This document, which is important for the establishment of the German Reich, could well be considered the result of behavior that is dubious under constitutional law , and therefore perhaps even a form of corruption.

Wilhelm's hesitation

Wilhelm I was very reluctant to take on the title of German emperor, considering the Prussian title to be old and an imperial title to be artificial. He only received the Federal Constitution per se . For their part, the southern German princes were not necessarily ready to accept Wilhelm's wish to call themselves “ Emperor of Germany ” because they did not want to recognize a new sovereign over themselves. After all, it was both Wilhelm and Bismarck's concern to make the act of conferring and establishing the new dignity appear as one of the German princes and not of the parliaments. It was still clearly remembered that 22 years earlier (1848) Wilhelm's brother and predecessor Friedrich Wilhelm IV had rejected the imperial deputation , which had proposed the imperial crown for a small German empire on behalf of the Frankfurt National Assembly , on the grounds that he had the imperial crown could not accept without "the free consent of the crowned heads, the princes and the free cities of Germany" , since he was not a born emperor. Bismarck could therefore only win Wilhelm's approval if the German princes and free cities asked him to accept the imperial crown, "the old, legitimate, since 1806 dormant crown of the German nation" , as Wilhelm had described it elsewhere. This, in turn, could only be done by the King of Bavaria , since he - after the King of Prussia - was considered the highest-ranking of the princes in Little Germany .

Ludwig's opposition to Prussia

Ludwig II., King since 1864, was a supporter of the Greater German Solution , a German unification including Austria and thus also under the leadership of the Austrian Emperor, moreover and above all with full preservation of Bavarian sovereignty. He had not got over the defeat in the Austro-Prussian War of 1866, in which Bavaria, along with Saxony, Baden, Württemberg, Hanover, Hesse-Darmstadt, Kurhessen and Nassau had stood as allies on Austria's side. Bavaria had to pay Prussia 30 million guilders in compensation and, in the event of war, subordinate its army to Prussian supreme command ( protective and defensive alliances ).

Under this command, 55,000 Bavarian soldiers, led by the Prussian Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, went to war with France in 1870; Ludwig had refused to take the lead. He had also stayed away from the victory celebrations in Versailles and had rejected the request made to him by his own government and on behalf of Bismarck to make the Prussian king German emperor. His government, however, had already announced accession to the German Reich without his consent, while Ludwig was still complaining about France's war losses.

Ludwig's financial problems

From the beginning, Ludwig was less interested in government affairs than in a representative representation of his royalty in culture and architecture. Ludwig's castles put a huge strain on his private finances. Prince Eulenberg-Hertefeld, secretary of the Prussian ambassador in Munich, described how the king had shattered state finances and also tried privately to receive money from all possible sources, such as a loan of 20 million guilders from the Prince of Thurn und Taxis . He also asked the Austrian emperor, the kings of Belgium and Sweden, even the (Turkish) sultan and the Shah of Persia for money.

Agreements on the imperial letter

Telegram from Count Werthern

Bismarck, but also the Bavarian ministers, tried in vain for weeks to persuade the king to give in. The Prussian ambassador, Count Werthern , sent a telegram to Bismarck on November 19, 1870 with the following wording:

"Top secret. The King of Bavaria got into a big financial embarrassment because of buildings and theaters. Six million guilders would be very agreeable to him, provided the ministers did not find out. For this sum he would also decide to proclaim the emperor and travel to Versailles. The purpose of Count Holnstein's trip is to be with Ew. Your Excellency to speak about this. "

As early as November 20, 1870, Bismarck telegraphed the head of the Federal Chancellery in Berlin, Delbrück : “I hope to come to an end with Bavaria. If it succeeds, it seems beyond doubt that Kaiserfrage wants to be brought from there. "

Agreement with Bavaria and King Ludwig

On November 23, 1870, Bismarck had reached an agreement with the representatives of the Bavarian government about joining the German Reich, whereby Bismarck made major concessions to Bavaria (own post and telecommunications, own railways and in peacetime an own army ), and declared moved when he returned from this negotiation: “Now the Bavarian contract would be ready and signed. German unity has been achieved, and so is the Kaiser. ” His employees found the contract signed, with two empty champagne bottles next to it.

Colonel stable master Count Holnstein, Ludwig's confidante and personal representative, arrived in Versailles two days later on November 25, 1870, where he was immediately received by Bismarck without first contacting the Bavarian negotiating delegation. Nothing is known about the course of the conversation, only the result of an agreement between the parties involved. On November 26, 1870, Bismarck announced this to his employees, albeit in a somewhat alienated form, in a confidential note that he added to the official letter to the head of the Delbrück State Chancellery about the agreement with the Bavarian government representatives on November 23, 1870 Enclosed contracts, noted:

“Following my letter today, I will share Ew. pp. still confidently with the fact that I also discussed the imperial question with the Bavarian ministers and stated that they were willing to initiate the same at the suggestion of Bavaria. According to your hints, I assume that a letter from His Majesty the King of Bavaria to His Majesty the King, in which the application is being made, is already on its way. "

In fact, he had only just come to an agreement with Ludwig's representative about his monetary claims. As a precaution, he formulated the supposedly expected letter, the later imperial letter, himself on November 27, 1870. He had refrained from his original demand that Ludwig should come to Versailles personally. He sent the draft of the imperial letter together with a personal letter to Ludwig, which he began with exuberant words of thanks: “Most Serene and Most Powerful King! For the gracious openings made to me by Count Holnstein on the orders of Your Majesty, I ask the very highest of you to graciously accept the reverent expression of my thanks. ” He then came to speak of the Kaiserbrief:

“With regard to the German imperial question, in my reverent judgment it is above all important that its suggestion does not come first from any other party such as your majesty and especially not from the parliament. The position would be falsified if it did not owe its origin to the free and well-considered initiative of the most powerful of the princes joining the league. I have taken the liberty of handing Holnstein a draft of a declaration to be addressed to my most gracious king and, with the necessary changes to the version, to the other allies at his request. "

Holnstein took the train back to Munich with the Bavarian State Ministers, who had represented Bavaria when the Bavarian Accession Treaty was signed, and brought Bismarck's draft to their attention there. On November 30, 1870, Holnstein arrived at Hohenschwangau Castle , where Ludwig was staying, with this letter and was only received by the king when he informed them that he would have to return to Versailles at 6 p.m. He then explained to the king that in any case he would go back to Versailles, be it with or without a result, but then it was to be expected that the troops standing in front of Paris would proclaim William I emperor. Ludwig Bismarck's draft was copied with minor changes and handed over to Holnstein, who brought it to Munich for sealing. In an accompanying letter, Ludwig asked his cabinet secretary to check the letter and, should a differently worded letter seem more appropriate to him, "the matter is broken up and I authorize you to tear up the letter to the King of Prussia". The cabinet secretary, meanwhile, sealed the letter on December 1, and Holnstein arrived back in Versailles the next day, where he received the letter from Ludwig's uncle, Prince Luitpold of Bavaria , who was to take over his post as Prince Regent after Ludwig was incapacitated (1886–1912) , handed over.

On December 3, 1870, Bismarck was delighted in a telegram to Ambassador Count Werthern:

“Tell Count Bray that His Majesty the King, from the hands of His Royal Highness the Prince Luitpold, received the letter from His Majesty the King Ludwig dated November 30th with lively thanks. accepted and thank King Ludwig for the renewed activity of his majesty's patriotic sentiments. The difficulties feared at the Reichstag because of the treaties will, I hope, be overcome. "

Count Holnstein

Count Max von Holnstein

Count Maximilian von Holnstein (1835–1895) knew Ludwig from his childhood days. In 1866 he was pardoned by Ludwig from imprisonment for a fortress, which he had served because of an honor duel, and appointed Royal Bavarian Colonel Master. He came from the Wittelsbach family and held the count's rule over Schwarzenfeld , Rauberweiherhaus, Thanstein and Pillmersried in the Upper Palatinate . He enjoyed Ludwig's full confidence, which he only lost three years before his death because of his resistance to the king's waste of money. He operated Ludwig's incapacitation and was appointed as his guardian. After Ludwig's death, he remained the chief stable master of the Prince Regent Luitpold until 1892 and then retired to his castle in Schwarzenfeld, where he died in 1895.

Holnstein was also economically successful and was one of the co-founders of the Bayerische Vereinsbank . He played the central role in handling the agreements with Bismarck. The details of the processing of the promised payments were determined with him and he received 10% of the money flowing to Ludwig for his services. Bismarck has paid tribute to his services to German unification: “Count Holnstein has made a considerable contribution to the formal conclusion of our national unification by removing the external obstacles of the two trips made in a sleepless week and the skillful execution of his assignment in Hohenschwangau Imperial question acquired. "

Count Werthern, the Prussian ambassador in Munich, recommended to Bismarck on December 24, 1870, in connection with the ratification of the Bavarian accession treaties by the Bavarian parliament, which appeared to be uncertain, to discuss the king's position on this question "also with Count Holnstein, which is best informed of the king's intentions and views. ” Holnstein's influence on Ludwig must indeed have been conspicuous. In 1882, Prince Eulenberg-Hertefeld reported a remark: "Holnstein must know some strange thing about the king and use it as a weapon - the king no longer loves him and nevertheless obeys him."

Processing of payments to Ludwig

The information on the amount of the payments made by Prussia to Ludwig fluctuates. This is also due to the fact that the German Reich standardized the currency in 1876 and converted it from guilders to gold marks in Prussia . Overall, Ludwig seems to have received a little more than six million gold marks. In addition to a first large down payment, he is said to have been given the guarantee that annual payments would only start later. Current payments began in 1873 at an initial amount of 300,000 gold marks, which are said to have increased by the end of 1885. In 1884 Ludwig also received a special payment of 1 million gold marks. The payments were made secretly with the help of Swiss banks and flowed into Ludwig's private fortune.

Since neither King Wilhelm nor the Parliament were allowed to know about the arrangement, Bismarck took the amounts from the Welf Fund , which was confiscated in the Prussian victory of 1866 , from the private fortune of the royal house of Hanover, estimated at around 42 million guilders . The property was considered confiscated until England recognized the annexation of Hanover by Prussia. During this time, the income flowed to Prussia. Bismarck viewed the Guelph Fund as outside parliamentary control and used its proceeds as a reptile fund . It was not until 1892 that Kaiser Wilhelm II decreed that the income from the Welfenfonds should go to the head of the former royal house of Hanover. Only after Ludwig's death and Bismarck's resignation as Chancellor in 1890 did the payments become known. Bismarck declared it to be a loan granted to the King of Bavaria, which he never assumed would be repaid.

Different assessments of Ludwig's behavior

Since the payments and their circumstances became known, there has been a dispute over whether the imperial letter was based on bribery. Ludwig's behavior was defended by saying that it was in line with political practice to negotiate monetary payments when giving up or restricting sovereignty, as is often the case with payments in the form of annuities or other allowances to deviating sovereigns. Ludwig was to a certain extent seduced by his advisors. A few years earlier, Bavaria had also had to pay Prussia 30 million guilders as reparations. Ludwig's admirers also deny that their king would have been able to change his mind for money.

This is countered by the fact that at the time of the telegram from Graf Werthern the Bavarian government had already declared its willingness to join the North German Confederation and was unable to assert itself with its demand for repayment of the reparations. Furthermore, it was clear to everyone that the monarch's private property was separate from the state's property. On his accession to the throne, Ludwig II had openly and joyfully admitted to the constitution, which denied him previous absolute rights to state assets - even if he soon dreamed of strengthening royal power.

In any case, by virtue of the Bavarian constitution, the king could no longer dispose of the state revenue. That Ludwig must have been aware of this is proven by the secret and disguised processing of the cash payments. Bismarck was only able to meet the guaranteed cash payments in installments because larger withdrawals from the Guelph Fund would not only have been noticed, but would also have attacked its holdings, which would have contradicted the conditions of the confiscation. In any case, Bismarck had also tried to maintain embarrassing secrecy. From the beginning he had got involved in the game of hide-and-seek, also in front of the Bavarian government. This is also proven by his official announcement of November 26, 1870 about Ludwig's change of heart - after he had just secretly reached an agreement with Holnstein - to the head of the Federal Chancellery in Delbrück . (The Bavarian ministers would have suggested a letter from Ludwig corresponding to this, which had already been sent to Versailles). Everyone involved was aware of what the interests of the Bavarian state on the one hand and the private interests of the monarch on the other.

Unclear financial circumstances

Neuschwanstein, construction site, 1886

Thus, there is a lot to support the interpretation that King Ludwig demanded and received payments from a third party outside the Bavarian state budget for a constitutional act, i.e. an official act, which went into his private assets. Nowadays it would be called corruption. In order to relieve it, however, one must bear in mind that between November 19 (telegram from Werthern) and December 3, 1870 (delivery of the Kaiserbrief by Prince Luitpold) negotiations were still under way on Bavaria's accession to the German nation-state . Part of the negotiations were the definition of the Bavarian reservation rights and the personal participation of Ludwig in the imperial question. For Ludwig these were related questions, in which he could hardly have distinguished between himself and the state.

Ludwig will also have to be credited with the fact that from his point of view the separation of state property from royal private property was by no means self-evident. At the end of the monarchy in 1918, this question was to become extremely controversial among lawyers and led to the Bavarian law on the Wittelsbach compensation fund. Because at the beginning of the 19th century, the Bavarian royal house of Wittelsbach , from which Ludwig was also a descendant, transferred its property to the ailing state (also in accordance with the Bavarian constitution of 1818), and the state had taken over the supply of the Wittelsbach family. After 1918, lawyers from the former royal family took the view that a separation between state assets and the household assets of the Wittelsbach family had not yet been carried out in Bavaria. The compromise found thereupon led to the establishment of the Wittelsbach Compensation Fund, into which the former home of the Wittelsbach family flowed (also the castles Berg and Hohenschwangau, but not the castles of King Ludwig II, which remained state property) and whose income has since been used to support the members of the former Serving royal family.

In any case, from today's perspective, Ludwig's behavior has not caused the state any damage. Because the total of six million gold marks that he received, which can be proven to be used to settle building bills such as B. were used for the Herrenchiemsee Castle , roughly corresponded to the value of the actual expenditure for Neuschwanstein Castle, the most famous of the King Ludwig castles. In 2006 alone, it was visited by over a million people. The annual income from this castle for the Free State already exceeds the amount in question.

See also

literature

  • Otto von Bismarck: Works in Selection , Vol. IV, The Foundation of the Empire, Part Two: 1866–1871 . Scientific Book Society, Darmstadt 2001, ISBN 3-534-14465-1 .
  • Erika Brunner: The tragic king . 3rd edition, Glowasz, Berlin 2002, ISBN 3-925621-10-5 .
  • Philip Fürst Eulenberg-Hertefeld: The end of King Ludwig II. Ed. Klaus von See, Insel, Frankfurt am Main 2001.
  • Lothar Gall : Bismarck , Ullstein, Berlin 1997, ISBN 3-548-26515-4 .
  • Franz Herre: Bavaria's Märchenkönig Ludwig II. 6th edition, Heyne, Munich 2001, ISBN 3-453-08509-4 .
  • Otto plant : Bismarck the founder of the empire . CH Beck, Munich 1997, ISBN 3-406-42725-1 (from the English by Peter Hahlbrock).
  • Heinrich August Winkler : The long way to the west . Vol. I, CH Beck, Munich 2002, ISBN 3-406-46001-1 .

Individual evidence

  1. ^ Ernst Rudolf Huber: German constitutional history since 1789 . Volume III: Bismarck and the Reich. 3rd edition, W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart 1988, pp. 751-753.
  2. ^ House of Bavarian History : Founding of the German Empire in 1871 (PDF), accessed on September 20, 2013.
  3. ↑ See also Otto Plant, Bismarck der Reichsgründer , CH Beck, Munich 1997, p. 503; Heinrich August Winkler, The Long Way To The West , Vol. I, CH Beck, Munich 2002, p. 210.
  4. ↑ Franz Herre, Bavaria's Märchenkönig Ludwig II. , 6th edition, Heyne, Munich 2001, pp. 168–169.
  5. ^ Franz Herre, Bavaria's Märchenkönig Ludwig II. , 6th edition, Heyne, Munich 2001, pp. 263-265.
  6. ↑ Philip Fürst Eulenberg-Hertefeld, The End of King Ludwig II. , Ed. Klaus von See, Insel-Verlag, Frankfurt am Main 2001, p. 18 f.
  7. ^ Franz Herre, Bavaria's Märchenkönig Ludwig II. , 6th edition, Heyne, Munich 2001, p. 268.
  8. ↑ Otto von Bismarck, Works in Selection , Vol. IV, The Foundation of the Reich, Part Two: 1866–1871 , Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt 2001, p. 575, no. 325.
  9. ↑ Otto von Bismarck, Works in Selection , Vol. IV, The Foundation of the Reich, Part Two: 1866–1871 , Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt 2001, p. 576, No. 327.
  10. ^ Franz Herre, Bayerns Märchenkönig Ludwig II. , 6th edition, Heyne, Munich 2001, p. 268 f.
  11. ↑ Otto von Bismarck, Works in Selection , Vol. IV, The Foundation of the Reich, Part Two: 1866–1871 , Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt 2001, p. 583, No. 331.
  12. ↑ Otto von Bismarck, Works in Selection , Vol. IV, Founding the Empire, Part Two: Founding the Empire, Part Two: 1866–1871, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt 2001, p. 584, no. 333; see. Document on German history in documents and images (DGDB).
  13. ↑ Franz Herre, Bavaria's Märchenkönig Ludwig II. , 6th edition, Heyne, Munich 2001, p. 274.
  14. ↑ Franz Herre, Bavaria's Märchenkönig Ludwig II. , 6th edition, Heyne, Munich 2001, p. 270 f.
  15. ↑ Franz Herre, Bavaria's Märchenkönig Ludwig II. , 6th edition, Heyne, Munich 2001, p. 274.
  16. ↑ Otto von Bismarck, Works in Selection , Vol. IV, The Foundation of the Reich, Part Two: 1866–1871 , Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt 2001, p. 592, No. 339.
  17. ↑ Otto Plant, Bismarck der Reichsgründer , CH Beck, Munich 1997, p. 503; Herre, p. 269; Lothar Gall, Bismarck , Ullstein, Berlin 1997, p. 518.
  18. ↑ Franz Herre, Bavaria's Märchenkönig Ludwig II. , 6th edition, Heyne, Munich 2001, p. 274.
  19. ↑ Otto von Bismarck, Works in Selection , Vol. IV, The Foundation of the Reich, Part Two: 1866–1871 , Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt 2001, p. 612, Document No. 350.
  20. ^ Letter from Prince Eulenberg to Herbert von Bismarck from August 26, 1882, in: Klaus von See (ed.), Philip Fürst Eulenberg-Hertefeld, Das Ende König Ludwigs II. , P. 135.
  21. ↑ Lothar Gall, Bismarck , Ullstein, Berlin 1997, p. 518.
  22. ^ A b Franz Herre, Bayerns Märchenkönig Ludwig II. , 6th edition, Heyne, Munich 2001, p. 269.
  23. ↑ Franz Herre, Bavaria's Märchenkönig Ludwig II. , 6th edition, Heyne, Munich 2001, p. 269; Otto Plant, Bismarck the Reichsgründer , CH Beck, Munich 1997, p. 503; see. also Heinrich August Winkler, The long way to the west , vol. I, CH Beck, Munich 2002, p. 210.
  24. ^ Franz Herre, Bayerns Märchenkönig Ludwig II. , 6th edition, Heyne, Munich 2001, p. 268 f.
  25. ↑ Erika Brunner, Der tragische König , Berlin, 3rd ed. 2002, p. 274; Franz Herre, Bavaria's Märchenkönig Ludwig II. , 6th edition, Heyne, Munich 2001, p. 269; Otto Plant, Bismarck der Reichsgründer , CH Beck, Munich 1997, p. 503.
  26. ↑ Otto Plant, Bismarck der Reichsgründer , CH Beck, Munich 1997, p. 503.
  27. ↑ Franz Herre, Bayerns Märchenkönig Ludwig II. , 6th edition, Heyne, Munich 2001, p. 272; Plant, p. 503 fn. 22.
  28. ↑ Brunner, p. 274.
  29. ^ Franz Herre, Bavaria's Märchenkönig Ludwig II. , 6th edition, Heyne, Munich 2001, p. 261 f.
  30. ↑ Franz Herre, Bavaria's Märchenkönig Ludwig II. , 6th edition, Heyne, Munich 2001, pp. 95, 108.
  31. ^ Franz Herre: Bayerns Märchenkönig Ludwig II. 6th edition, Heyne, Munich 2001, p. 269.