Nothing is what it seems

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Nothing is what it seems is a study by Michael Butter that was published in 2018. In this publication Butter analyzes the general features and mechanisms of conspiracy theories.

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In their socialnet review, Dorothee Riese and Johannes M. Kies sum up the five chapters of his book, each of which represents one aspect of the topic: In the first chapter, conspiracy theories are classified as those from above (government) or below (population), inside (domestic) or outside (abroad). Butter also differentiates between real theories of conspiracy (limited spatial and temporal scope, manageable group of perpetrators, e.g. Watergate ) from unreal conspiracy theories (temporally and spatially all-encompassing, unmanageable group of responsible persons).

In the second chapter, Butter examines methods that serve to convey a semblance of seriousness and presents financial interests as a common motive behind the formation and dissemination of theories. Chapter three examines the motives of people wanting to believe in conspiracy theories: feelings of inferiority , group cohesion and identity formation . The basis is often a very traditional worldview that does not understand the complexity of the modern world and continues to be based on the importance of individual actors and their intentions. In the last two chapters, the historical development will be traced and the importance of the Internet presented. Butter recommends historical literacy, media literacy and social literacy as measures to protect against conspiracy theories .

Scientific reception

In the Politische Vierteljahresschrift Eva Marlene Hausteiner Butters praises the conceptual differentiation and his substantial case studies on Eva Herman , Donald Trump and Daniele Ganser's “science simulations ”. However, she is critical of the narrow interpretation of the concept of conspiracy (concentration on individual events and institutions), which leaves open whether conspiracy theories might not occasionally expose real “conspiracies” of a government and thus represent a weapon critical of power in the service of democratic transparency.

She is surprised by Butter's alignment of conspiracy theories with scientific theories: "Although conspiracy theories differ from current scientific theories not least in their sub-complex worldview and understanding of causality, both are meaningful, reduce complexity and, contrary to some interpretations, can be falsified".

Hauseiner finds Butter's theses about the stigmatization and loss of meaning of conspiracy theories and the alleged non-empirical, but functional alliance with populism, controversial. Hausteiner puts the educational therapy Butters (historical, media, and social literacy) into perspective: “The supporters of a conspiracy-theoretically enriched populism are not all educated , and an educational background does not automatically protect against the temptation of simple enemy images . Conspiracy theories make politics not only as a form of knowledge, but also as an emotional resource that cannot be dealt with solely with rationality and counter-knowledge. "

Occasionally the author runs the risk, according to Hausteiner, of overestimating the “specifics of conspiracy-theoretical elements”, the linguistic forms of expression of the conspiracy-theoretical style.

In their 2019 review, Anton and Schink critically point out the deficits of the “catchy” definition of Butters and Michael Barkun, their attribute ascriptions are ultimately worthless from an analytical point of view, as they relate to indefinite quantities (“nothing”, “everything”). The biggest shortcoming is Butter's extremely narrow definition of conspiracy theories, according to which it is an essential characteristic of conspiracy theoretic interpretations that they are always wrong.

The “essentialist” approach chosen by Butter leads Butter into open contradictions, for example when he writes that so-called event conspiracy theories might turn out to be true after all. His understanding leads him to the tautology: Since conspiracy theories are always false, a conspiracy theory has never turned out to be true in retrospect. The reviewers criticize the one-sided selection of secondary literature, since George Cubitt, for example, was only abbreviated and others were not considered at all. Jack Bratich was misunderstood.

Overall, the impression arises that the work was knitted with a hot needle and that the author did not have enough time to pay attention to elementary conceptual work, depth of field and logical stringency. It is worth reading, if only because it currently forms a central reference in the German-language scientific discussion of conspiracy theories and will probably continue to do so in the future.

Media reception

Tobias Sedelmaier from the NZZ finds the portrayal of Butter illuminating. He worked out basic constants of the conspiracy theories, which, in addition to secrecy and intent, included an absolute Manichaean good-evil scheme as a third component . At the beginning there is always the question “ cui bono ” (who is using it)? Conspiracy theorists are thus, according to Sedelmaier, “intellectual wrongdoers who use the path of deduction as a one-way street”. The utopian element of these theories lies in the simplification of the facts ( complexity reduction) to generate the false belief that people can actively change something in the circumstances: “The reduction of a complexity that is otherwise difficult to resolve suggests the ability to act. If, instead of difficult geostrategic, cultural and social processes, it is Angela Merkel who is primarily to blame for the refugee crisis in Germany, something can be actively done about it, such as refusing to vote and personal dimensions. The decisive factor here is the belief that individual actors are behind the conspiracies and that their machinations could be kept secret for decades.

Helmut Mayer ( FAZ ) starts out from the issue of migration , which he sees as an occasion for conspiracy theories, and urges caution to misinterpret high polls in favor of these theories. In reality, these values ​​often only expressed uncertainty, but did not yet agree with the explicit theories of a “group of mutually agreed, behind the scenes pullers”. Populist denunciation of elites is not a conspiracy theory per se. Mayer values ​​Butter's research because it sharpens the mind for such differentiations. He goes on to show that butter attributes the impression of widespread approval mainly to the effects of advertising on the Internet and thus relativizes it. The media response disguises the fact that conspiracy theories are stigmatized as unjustified claims to knowledge, "while they could appear as legitimate forms of alleged knowledge until the first decades of the last century - at least in Europe and the United States".

The time According -Rezension Tobias Haberkorn butter revised to some extent the "classical interpretation of Konspirations faith as a (r) mental (s) Pathology " as Richard Hofstadter in his essay on the paranoid style had developed. For Butter, conspiracy theories are “ stigmatized knowledge” that is scientifically proven to be false, but that does not say anything about the psychological function for their followers, about their cultural significance and their history. In Butter's view, conspiracy theorists absolutize conventional scientific procedures in a completely unrealistic way, for example by overestimating the influence of individuals or groups on the course of history (“Nothing happens by chance”) or by exaggerating actual interdependence towards total causal determination (“Everything is interconnected "). For conspiracy theorists, the false appearance of incomplete representations of facts is not an expression of ignorance, but an intention to deceive (“Nothing is as it seems”). Michael Barkun , to whom butter often refers , had already worked out these three properties as well as the typology .

Butter distinguishes dangerous from harmless theories and warns of "conspiracy panic": there is disagreement about the way the world and society work, even between people who do not believe in conspiracy theories, and this is "more threatening to democracy in the end". Conspiracy theories are "an indication of the fragmentation of society that is endangering democracy".

After Butter, conspiracy theories were much more common in the past than they are now, that they were a standard part of official politics, such as Abraham Lincoln's theory of a slave-owner conspiracy. Philipp Schnee from Deutschlandfunk basically agrees with this representation, but in places it seems like a first draft. The question of "how knowledge of conspiracy theory works, or why so many people find it difficult to cope with complexity and confusion," comes up a bit briefly.

In his interview with Wirtschaftswoche on April 20, 2018, Butter stated that up until the 1960s, conspiracy theories were part of the public discourse and were deliberately disseminated by elites and governments for centuries; after that they migrated to the subcultures , only to be disseminated via the Internet today, especially critical of the elite and the government. The number of supporters of today's conspiracy theories is overestimated. In 1918 or 1818 the following of official conspiracy theories, which were mainly disseminated by the government, was much larger compared to today's from the Internet.

“Almost every US president, from Washington to Lincoln to Eisenhower, was a conspirator. That was completely established in the past, ”quotes Die Welt am Sonntag from Butter's work. Conspiracy theories provided "in a confusing, multi-causal and chaotic environment the key to a rare good - certainty". The potential for radicalization in these theories and the cultural reference are also important to butter.

literature

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Dorothee Riese / Johannes M. Kiess: Michael Butter: "Nothing is as it seems" (conspiracy theories) . In: socialnet reviews , ISSN  2190-9245 , June 14, 2018, accessed October 19, 2018.
  2. ^ Eva Marlene Hausteiner: Butter, Michael (2018): "Nothing is as it seems" - About conspiracy theories . In: Political quarterly . tape 59 , no. 4 , December 1, 2018, ISSN  1862-2860 , p. 779–781 , doi : 10.1007 / s11615-018-0117-5 ( springer.com [accessed December 23, 2018]).
  3. ↑ (1989). Conspiracy myths and conspiracy theories. Journal of the Anthropological Society of Oxford, 20, 12-26
  4. ^ Anton, A. (2011). Unreal Realities: On the Sociology of Knowledge of Conspiracy Theories. Berlin: Logos. Anton, A., Schetsche, M., & Walter, MK (Eds.). (2013). Conspiracy: Sociology of Conspiracy Thought. Wiesbaden: Springer. Aupers, S. (2012). 'Trust no one': Modernization, paranoia and conspiracy culture. European Journal of Communication, 27 (1), 22-34. Coady, D. (Ed.). (2006). Conspiracy theories: The philosophical debate. London: Routledge. Coady, D. (2013). Rumors, conspiracy theories and propaganda. In A. Anton, M. Schetsche & MK Walter (eds.), Conspiracy: Sociology of Conspiracy Thought (pp. 277–299). Wiesbaden: Springer. Cubitt, G. (1989). Conspiracy myths and conspiracy theories. Journal of the Anthropological Society of Oxford, 20, 12-26. Dentith, M. (2014). The philosophy of conspiracy theories. London: Palgrave. Elter, A. (2005). The War Sellers: A History of US Propaganda 1917–2005. Frankfurt a. M .: Suhrkamp. Marcus, GE (Ed.). (1999). Paranoia within reason: A casebook on conspiracy as explanation. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Parish, J., & Parker, M. (Eds.). (2001). The age of anxiety: Conspiracy theory and the human sciences. Oxford: Blackwell
  5. ↑ Jack Bratich: Conspiracy Panics: Political Rationality and Popular Culture , 2008, SUNY Press.
  6. ^ Anton, A. & Schink, A. (2019). Review of Michael Butter (2018). "Nothing is what it seems." About conspiracy theories. Zeitschrift für Anomalistik Volume 19 (2019), pp. 471–486
  7. ↑ Tobias Sedlmaier: I think, so I'm crazy | NZZ . April 26, 2018, ISSN  0376-6829 ( nzz.ch [accessed January 15, 2019]).
  8. ↑ Helmut Mayer: Arguments don't help. Michael Butter knows about conspiracy theories. In: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, March 14, 2018.
  9. ↑ Michael Butter: "Nothing is what it seems". About conspiracy theories. Retrieved January 15, 2019 .
  10. ↑ By Tobias Haberkorn: Conspiracy Theories: You have to prove that to me first. Retrieved December 25, 2018 .
  11. ↑ Barkun, Michael (2003). A Culture of Conspiracy: Apocalyptic Visions in Contemporary America. Berkeley: University of California Press. pp. 3-4.
  12. ↑ Conspiracy theories: You have to prove that to me first . In: ZEIT ONLINE . ( zeit.de [accessed on October 19, 2018]).
  13. ↑ "Nothing is as it seems": About conspiracy theories by Michael Butter - Suhrkamp Insel Bücher Buchdetail. Retrieved on October 19, 2018 (blurb).
  14. ↑ Michael Butter: "Nothing is what it seems" - against better judgment . In: Deutschlandfunk Kultur . ( deutschlandfunkkultur.de [accessed October 19, 2018]).
  15. ↑ Niklas Dummer: Michael Butter: "Conspiracy theories are big business". Retrieved October 19, 2018 .
  16. ↑ WORLD: In the eye of the conspiracy . March 1, 2015 ( welt.de [accessed January 15, 2019]).
  17. ↑ In the Eye of the Conspiracy . In: The world . March 1, 2015 ( welt.de [accessed December 21, 2018]).