Outright monetary transactions

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As Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) (in German also: monetary outright transactions , literally unconditional monetary policy operations) is called a by the European Central Bank advertised (ECB) instrument under which the euro system of short-term in advance unlimited extent buying bonds of states in Euro area can perform. So far (as of September 2018) no state has made use of an OMT program, which means that no government bond purchases have been made as OMTs. However, it is generally assumed that the mere announcement in the past has had a calming or interest-rate lowering effect on the financial markets.

According to the ECB, the objective of OMTs is, in particular, to ensure the monetary policy transmission of their key interest rate changes to the member states and thus the uniformity of the monetary policy of the European Central Bank. During the euro crisis , the ECB repeatedly had difficulties in influencing interest rates in the euro area by changing its key interest rates. This so-called transmission mechanism only worked in some states, in others it was blocked to a considerable extent. The ECB attributed this blockade to a large extent to excessive risk assessments by investors with regard to the government bonds of individual countries. A comprehensive purchase of such bonds by the national central banks of the euro zone could, in the opinion of the bank, ease the situation in this environment and in this way reactivate the transmission mechanism in the countries concerned, which at the same time would restore the uniformity of monetary policy.

With the OMT decision of the ECB in September 2012, the Securities Markets Program (SMP) was discontinued.

development

ECB President Mario Draghi announced on July 26, 2012 that the ECB would “do whatever it takes within [its] mandate to preserve the euro”. This was widely interpreted as an indication of a resumption of government bond purchases. On August 2, 2012, he announced that the ECB was considering further interventions in the government bond markets and could also envision other unconventional measures. The modalities of the promised OMTs were finally decided by the Governing Council on September 6, 2012 (OMT decision).

According to Draghi, 21 of the 22 members of the Governing Council supported the OMT decision. It is widely assumed that the dissenting vote was that of the Deutsche Bundesbank, represented by its President Jens Weidmann (see also below).

OMT are from another program of the ECB, which was announced on January 22, 2015 extended program for the purchase of assets (Expanded Asset Purchase Program, EAPP), to distinguish. Even if this also - among other things - provides for the purchase of European government bonds, it is independent of a possible OMT program and also differs in its modalities. In addition, the programs have a different purpose: While OMTs are intended to work towards improved monetary policy stability in individual countries affected by an acute problem situation, the expanded purchase program aims to help avert deflation risks through continuous purchases of government bonds of various origins .

Function and rationale

Modalities

The decision on the implementation and termination of OMTs is incumbent on the Governing Council . The main requirement is that the country concerned has already made use of one of the rescue facilities of the euro area ( ESM or EFSF ) and strictly adheres to the conditions there (so-called conditionality ). (The EFSF was created in 2010 to temporarily support eurozone countries with loans and guarantees if necessary; it is currently expiring and can no longer be drawn on again. The ESM is the permanent stabilization mechanism of the eurozone introduced in 2012 with a maximum lending capacity The use of the ESM requires the ratification of the European Fiscal Treaty , which among other things stipulates compliance with certain deficit limits.) In order to be able to activate an OMT program, a complete EFSF or ESM adjustment program is not necessary be traversed; A so-called precautionary program (Enhanced Conditions Credit Line, ECCL) can also suffice. The adjustment program must, however, include the possibility of EFSF / ESM primary market purchases . (One speaks of a purchase on the primary market when the bonds are bought directly from the issuer - in this case the respective state -; a purchase on the secondary market in turn denotes the purchase of some other market participant who in turn holds the title from the state or another The ECB wants to force the respective participating states to make a contribution themselves (because the surcharges on government bonds can be reduced by fulfilling the program conditions) and to reduce the risk of moral hazard , specifically an abuse of OMTs as a substitute for one's own reform efforts, prevent.

OMTs are open market transactions on government bonds that are carried out as final transactions (outright transactions), i.e. the Eurosystem would buy up the respective government bonds on the market for an unlimited period of time. The purchases are made exclusively on the secondary market , i.e. not directly from the issuing state. According to the ECB when the program was announced, mainly papers with a remaining term of between one and three years are eligible for purchase. In advance there is neither a time limit for the implementation of OMTs nor a volume limit on the state titles bought up via OMT programs. The ECB does not claim preferential creditor status ( pari passu ) for the securities acquired under the OMT program . In the event of default by a country with an OMT program, the ECB would be treated like any other creditor, unless national provisions of the applicable legal system provide otherwise. In this regard, OMTs stand out from both the SMP and the International Monetary Fund credit lines .

The purchases would add liquidity to the market; The ECB wants to compensate for this expansion of the monetary base by fully siphoning off the liquidity supplied by OMTs if possible (complete sterilization ), i.e. withdrawing it from the market elsewhere (for example by selling other bonds or by soliciting or giving incentives to Commercial banks to increase their balances in the deposit accounts of the central banking system). The accompanying liquidity absorption is used by the ECB in many operations to reduce the risk of inflation.

All information about the intended form of the OMT is derived from press releases and statements of the ECB. After ECB President Draghi initially announced that he would publish the drafting of the legal details of the program soon, he stated in July 2013 that the bank would probably only publish the related legal act when the implementation of an OMT program is imminent.

Reason

The ECB justified its decision by stating that it would like to use OMTs to restore the functioning of the Eurosystem's monetary policy transmission mechanism. It is referring to the fact that in the course of the euro crisis it became increasingly difficult for the bank to pass on monetary policy impulses to the market. This relates in particular to the control of the inflation rate : the ECB is usually able to control it by changing its main refinancing rate (base rate). The changed key interest rate then initially affects the interest rate at which companies and households can borrow from commercial banks or at which they can deposit their assets; this in turn leads to a change in savings and investment behavior, which, by adjusting inflation expectations, has corresponding price effects. There are also a large number of other channels through which decisions by the ECB have an impact on the real economy.

Some of these channels were severely disrupted during the euro crisis. For example, the ECB cut its interest rates several times; However, due to the tense economic and political situation in some countries, the interest rate cut in these countries had hardly any impact on the interest rates of commercial banks (and thus the real economy). In addition, due to the general situation of the banking system, some commercial banks themselves suffered from refinancing difficulties . In the course of the crisis, the yield premiums on the government bonds of some euro countries, which have risen drastically in some cases, are of particular importance in this mechanism. They not only influence the spending behavior of the public sector, but they are also held to a considerable extent by the commercial banks of the issuing state, so that a self-reinforcing dynamic sets in: If the economic situation in a country worsens, the yield on its government bonds rises. This in turn worsens the refinancing ability of the commercial banks, which react by restricting lending and in turn accelerate the country's economic downturn. In addition, transactions on the national interbank market (i.e. the market on which commercial banks borrow money from one another) are primarily secured with domestic government bonds, so that, in the ECB's view, any uncertainty in this regard also leads to disruptions in the interbank market.

In the view of the ECB, these circumstances made unconventional measures such as OMTs necessary. The bank assumes that an important reason for the generally high level of intra-European yield differentials on public debt is the market participants' exaggerated fears that individual countries could voluntarily or involuntarily turn away from the euro (speech nomination risk). This would result in considerable uncertainty for their (euro-denominated) claims. A certain yield differential is normal in a currency union and reflects different risks; however, this was partly irrationally high (end of 2012). By promising with the OMTs that the ECB would intervene by buying bonds in a country that is seriously in difficulty (but not yet insolvent), it believes it can counteract the downward dynamic described. From the bank's point of view, the risk perception of market participants should therefore decline in the wake of the OMT decision. This would then also free up the transmission channel that would enable the ECB to control price stability again.

economic aspects

Effects on government bond rates

Casiraghi et al. (2013) consider the effects of the OMT decision on the yield of Italian government bonds using an event study model with a two-day time window. Event studies of this type are based on a comparison of the extrapolated values ​​in the immediate run-up to the respective event with the actual values ​​in the immediate aftermath of the event. According to the OMT resolution of August 2, 2012, you can thus determine a significant decline in yields of around 0.6 percent for two-year securities and no significant change in the yield on ten-year paper. The details of the program on September 6th again resulted in a significant decline in long-term bond yields (0.5 percent).

Using high-frequency trading data, Altavilla, Giannone and Lenze (2014) also come to the conclusion, based on an event study, that the OMT decision resulted in a yield decline for Spanish and Italian government bonds with a two-year term of around two percent, while the yield for German and French ones Bonds with the same maturity remained unchanged. The return effects shown by Altavilla, Giannone and Lenze (2014) are of a cumulative nature and combine the effects of Draghi's announcement of July 26, 2012 (if necessary, do everything possible to save the euro), the OMT decision of August 2 and the announcement of the details of the program on September 6th.

Krishnamurthy, Nagel and Vissing-Jorgensen (2014) also identify significant return-reducing effects of the OMT decision on the government bond markets of the GIIPS countries. The authors analyze three different channels of action - the risk of currency exchange, the risk of default and the risk of segmentation in the market for domestic government bonds - and they find evidence for the last two factors. In a further event study, Szczerbowicz (2012) shows the positive effects of the OMT decision on the refinancing costs of banks and states in the euro zone. In particular, the refinancing costs of those states that threatened to lose access to the capital markets fell drastically.

Criticism of the way the program works

Regarding the practicability of the program, it has been suggested early on that activation by requiring an adjustment program comes with excessive policy costs; these ultimately deter those states from making use of it that would actually do well to make use of an OMT program. After the Italian parliamentary elections at the beginning of 2013 failed to produce a clear majority and a protracted government formation process was to be feared, some observers expressed particular doubts as to whether the OMTs, because they were linked to an adjustment program of the European Union, might not also be too vulnerable to political instability.

In addition, some commentators noted at various points in time that, as a result of the decision, the interest rates on government bonds fell, but the transmission mechanism - and thus the actual goal - had by no means regained its functionality. Hristov et al. (2014) investigate this question in the context of a VAR model , where they come to the conclusion that the falling yields on the government bond markets had only a very minor effect on the lending activity of the banking system; this connection has become weaker and weaker in the course of the crisis, which leads the authors to doubt the suitability of OMTs as a problem-solving mechanism for a monetary policy transmission that has stalled.

Another possible problem with the OMT resolution, according to some observers, is that by lowering the interest rate premiums on government bonds, it may have relieved political pressure on countries and institutions to implement necessary reforms.

Another vulnerability lies in the dependence on the other Eurosystem governments due to the strict conditionality. At the end of April 2014, for example, at a discussion event at Bielefeld University, the German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble questioned whether the German government would allow OMT bond purchases. Schäuble said, referring to the EFSF / ESM program required for OMT bond purchases with the possibility of primary market purchases, the ECB could not make a decision on OMT bond purchases "because it has bound itself to conditions that it does not have . Because ESM decisions are unanimous and we will of course not adopt such a program after this announcement by the ECB. "

Political framework

Role of the German Bundesbank

The President of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Jens Weidmann, who is believed to have voted against the OMT decision as the only representative in the Governing Council (see above), stated immediately after the Council meeting that OMTs could pose significant risks between the Redistribute taxpayers from different countries; but only parliaments and governments are authorized to do so. In addition, monetary policy runs the risk of falling into the wake of fiscal policy. At the press conference on August 2, 2012, Draghi Weidmann had already named Weidmann as a deviator on the question of the purchase of further government bonds, which had led to resentment at the Bundesbank and its weighted members of the ECB Council. A few days before the OMT decision, Weidmann reiterated his negative stance on further government bond purchases in an interview.

The Bundesbank's reaction was markedly different from that of the German government. German Chancellor Angela Merkel said after the OMT decision that the ECB was acting within its mandate, which was generally seen as implicit approval of the decision.

Potential candidates

Spain was discussed as a possible candidate for an OMT program early on, but this expectation of many investors has repeatedly proven to be wrong. Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy confirmed in January 2013 that he “currently” sees no need for a program, but that the option exists and it is absurd to exclude it forever.

Ireland signaled interest in an OMT program in early 2013. Irish Finance Minister Michael Noonan said at the time that his government had not yet decided whether to work towards using OMTs; Dublin is trying to meet all conditions within the next few months. Shortly afterwards, he described an application for an OMT program that had not yet been specifically planned as likely.

A claim by Portugal was also discussed intensively, especially from early to mid-2013. At that time, the Portuguese government, like Ireland, was planning to leave the EFSF bailout fund. For this purpose, the EU Commission also discussed the possibility of making use of an OMT program. However, the ECB had previously made it clear that OMTs were not intended to facilitate the return to the government bond market.

Legal evaluation

Judicial referral

The OMT decision was, among other things, the subject of several (connected) proceedings before the German Federal Constitutional Court , which concern measures of the Eurosystem in connection with the euro crisis . By order of December 17, 2013, the court separated the subjects of the proceedings relating to the OMT decision from the main proceedings; by decision of 14 January 2014, it suspended the separate proceedings and referred several questions to the European Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling . The Federal Constitutional Court ruled in its 6-2 vote that OMTs should not be covered by the mandate of the European Central Bank from its point of view because they "were no longer a monetary policy measure, but a predominantly economic policy measure". and to the extent that there is a violation of Art. 119 and Art. 127 Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Furthermore, the court found the program's modalities to be incompatible with the prohibition of monetary budget financing enshrined in Art. 123 TFEU. Each of these violations would also justify an act of ultra vires in the sense of the Honeywell decision of the court, which would mean that German constitutional bodies, authorities and courts - including the Deutsche Bundesbank - would not be allowed to participate in the cross-competence act. As indicated in Honeywell , the Federal Constitutional Court, however, gives the European Court of Justice the opportunity to interpret the contract and to decide on the validity and interpretation of the acts in question before the determination of an Ultra-Vires act. The Federal Constitutional Court currently sees the above-mentioned legal violations on the basis of its own interpretation; however, the European Court of Justice could limit the validity of the OMT ruling or bring about an interpretation that conforms to primary law and is compatible with the Basic Law . This presupposes that a haircut is ruled out, that government bonds from individual member states are not purchased in unlimited amounts and that interventions in price formation on the market are avoided as far as possible.

The Advocate General at the European Court of Justice , Cruz Villalón , assessed OMTs in his final motion of January 14, 2015 as an unconventional monetary policy measure that is fundamentally covered by the mandate of the ECB. However, he considers the active and influential role of the ECB in the (genuinely political) EFSF and ESM programs to be problematic under EU law because they are shaped by economic policy. As a result, he affirmed the compatibility with the TFEU in this respect, provided that the ECB “refrains from any direct intervention in the financial assistance programs to which the OMT program is linked” and the “obligation to state reasons and the requirements arising from the principle of Provide proportionality, strictly comply ". The additional question submitted by the Federal Constitutional Court, whether there is also a violation of the prohibition of monetary state financing ( Art. 123 TFEU), is answered in the negative by Villalón, with the proviso that the program, if it should be implemented, “will be carried out under temporal circumstances that actually the Enable the formation of a market price for the government debt ”. At present, however, there are no indications that a “disproportionate” incentive is being created for the purchase of government bonds on the primary market.

On June 16, 2015, the European Court of Justice , chaired by Vassilios Skouris, ruled that the ECB's OMT program is lawful.On June 21, 2016, the Federal Constitutional Court, chaired by Andreas Voßkuhle, largely agreed with this view in the proceedings that were temporarily suspended in January 2014. At the same time, it set conditions: purchases must not be announced in advance, their volume must have been limited in advance. In addition, bonds should only be bought from countries that can still finance themselves on the market, there must be a certain period between issue and purchase, and the bonds must be sold again as soon as the situation has improved. The plaintiffs, including the Bundestag parliamentary group of the Left Party , the association Mehr Demokratie around the former Federal Minister of Justice Herta Däubler-Gmelin and the CSU politician Peter Gauweiler were not dissatisfied: the court had drawn clear lines that the federal government and the Bundestag would have to act if they were to be exceeded. If they do not intervene, they see the opportunity to take legal action again.

View of the ECB

In the opinion of the ECB, the OMT decision does not exceed its mandate. The measure is aimed precisely at achieving the original monetary policy goal of price stability in the euro zone by reopening the channels of monetary policy control that were impaired as a result of the euro crisis. Furthermore, OMTs do not constitute monetary budget financing within the meaning of Art. 123 TFEU. In its oral statement before the German Federal Constitutional Court in June 2013, the bank emphasized in particular that it imposes blocking periods on newly issued government bonds, before which the paper is not purchased. In addition, the Eurosystem's central banks would “monitor the issuing behavior of Member States, banks and market players for signs of inappropriate cooperation” and react accordingly to such signs.

Discussion of the OMT decision in the literature

The European legal admissibility predominantly affirmative

In a discussion of the order for reference of the German Federal Constitutional Court, Gerner-Beuerle, Kucuk and Schuster (2014) criticize that an adequate legal assessment requires dealing with the economic justification of the ECB in order to weigh up the potential economic positive effects and the moral hazard problem to be able to make. This should have led to the conclusion that the program was appropriate and in accordance with the contracts. Steinbach (2013) considers the OMT decision to be compatible with Art. 123 TFEU ​​because the assessment amounts to the empirical question of whether the high yield spreads between safe (German) bonds and those of the crisis states go beyond what is justified on the basis of the fundamental values ​​( then there would be a de facto transfer of resources in favor of the ECB) or not; Experience from past events speaks in favor of the former, so that there can be no budget financing. In addition, the ECB has a wide leeway in exercising its monetary policy control. According to Thiele (2014), the effects of a measure taken by the ECB are insignificant for its assignment to the area of ​​economic or currency policy; rather, their purpose is to be taken into account. In the present case this is of a monetary policy nature and OMTs are therefore in any case potentially suitable for achieving the monetary policy objective, which means that they are compatible with the mandate of the ECB.

Wendel (2014) argues on the other hand that the classification as an economic or currency policy measure is irrelevant. Article 18 (1) of the ECB Statute, which is relevant for open market operations, does not provide for any differentiation in this regard, but rather an alignment with the objectives of the ECB (primarily price stability). Economic policy measures could very well be helpful here from time to time. But even if you want to use a different standard, the OMT decision is justifiable; by linking the ECB to the existence of an ESM / EFSF program, this shows precisely that the bank does not pursue an independent economic policy, but “merely supports economic policy in accordance with its mandate”. For a similar reason, no violation of Art. 123 TFEU ​​can be identified. The ECB could make use of a margin of appreciation for itself, which was "legally acceptable []", with the conditionality of the OMT program again speaking in favor of admissibility, because it can be observed that the countries apparently have a strong incentive that To leave the rescue facilities as quickly as possible, which indicates a strictly disciplining effect of the same.

Simon (2015) sees no violation of Art. 123 , Art. 125 TFEU ​​or other EU law provisions in the ECB's declaration of willingness to buy ; the occasional purchase of government bonds on the secondary market is permitted and an increase in the risks for the Eurosystem can also be accepted as part of other measures. It is conceivable, however, that the ECB might overstretch its mandate when the transactions are actually carried out by softening the credit rating requirements too much. Mayer (2014) believes that the question of EU law admissibility ultimately comes down to whether the statement by the ECB that it is a question of a monetary policy measure is correct; However, this is controversial even in the economic discourse and therefore cannot be convincingly invalidated, since courts cannot simply use their own assessment of the question authoritatively to justify a legal violation. On the basis of the Honeywell decision, the OMT decision is also compatible with the German constitutional court rulings insofar as a possible overstepping of competences with a view to the controversial discussion of the question in science is neither obvious nor leads to a significant shift in the competency structure to the detriment of the Federal Republic of Germany ; because the ECB is acting with OMTs in an area in which member states cannot act at all in the absence of a corresponding institution - but then they cannot be deprived of any competence.

Lammers (2015) recognizes no violation of the prohibition of joint liability under Art. 125 TFEU, because a credit event could lead to a reduction in central bank assets. However, the member states are not obliged to make additional payments for their NCBs and the reduced distributions by the NCBs to the states would have to be compensated in the national budgets, but do not constitute membership liability within the meaning of the treaty. Art. 123 TFEU ​​also only relates to primary market purchases and stands the Measures therefore also not counteract.

The European legal admissibility predominantly negative

Schmidt (2015) affirms a violation of Art. 127 TFEU ​​because the ECB is pursuing the illegitimate dual objective of lowering the interest rates on government bonds and normalizing the interest rate premiums with the OMTs. According to Article 127 (5) TFEU, the national authorities would have to take measures to ensure the stability of the financial system, while the ESCB could only contribute to their smooth implementation. The OMT decision is also in conflict with the prohibition of monetary state financing under Art. 125 TFEU ​​because only individual states benefit from it (selectivity); the selectivity also raises doubts about the monetary policy character of the measure. The position of the ECB, intending to “remedy the disruption of the monetary policy transmission mechanism”, is legally irrelevant, because adopting this line of argument represents “carte blanche for every action”. Mody (2014) also considers OMTs to be incompatible with Art. 125 TFEU. Once they have been installed, OMTs come into play when the ESM alone is no longer sufficient, with the result that there is a considerable risk of failure. The fact that an OMT program also undermines its budgetary discipline by lowering the yield on the government bonds of the state in question also speaks in favor of the existence of monetary budget financing.

See also

literature

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. For example Bundesbank: Glossary. Monetary policy outright transactions. Retrieved April 13, 2015.
  2. For details, see the section “Effects on government bond interest”. See also Peter Spiegel and Michael Steen: Fears ECB bond scheme has its weakness. In: Financial Times (FT.com). February 26, 2013, accessed April 12, 2015; Bench press. In: The Economist. (On-line). June 8, 2013, accessed April 12, 2015.
  3. ECB, Speech by Mario Draghi, President of the European Central Bank at the Global Investment Conference in London, July 26, 2012 , accessed on December 8, 2018.
  4. Cf. for example Matthias Benz: The ECB President indicates intervention. In: Neue Zürcher Zeitung. No. 173, July 27, 2012, p. 1.
  5. ^ Matthias Benz: EZB ready to intervene. In: Neue Zürcher Zeitung. No. 178, August 3, 2012, p. 31.
  6. See ECB: 6 September 2012 - Technical features of Outright Monetary Transactions. Press release. Retrieved February 14, 2014.
  7. See Michael Steen: Super Mario reaches the last level - German politics. In: Financial Times (FT.com). September 7, 2012, accessed April 12, 2015.
  8. See Michael Steen: Weidmann isolated as ECB plan approved. In: Financial Times (FT.com). September 6, 2012, accessed on April 12, 2015. At the press conference after the Council meeting, Draghi said there had been a dissenting vote, but that the ECB would “not comment on the details. You can speculate about it. ”See ECB: Introductory statement to the press conference (with Q&A). September 6, 2012, accessed April 13, 2015.
  9. See EFSF: European Financial Stability Facility FAQ (PDF file, 0.4 MB). March 19, 2015, accessed April 13, 2015.
  10. a b c d e f g Cf. ECB: 6 September 2012 - Technical features of Outright Monetary Transactions. Press release. Retrieved February 14, 2014.
  11. See Lionel Barber, Michael Steen: Interview with Mario Draghi. Interview with Mario Draghi. In: Financial Times (FT.com). December 13, 2012, accessed April 18, 2015.
  12. See ECB: 6 September 2012 - Technical features of Outright Monetary Transactions. Press release. Accessed on April 21, 2015. The fact that the remaining term is used is evident from Draghi's answer at the subsequent press conference, cf. ECB: Introductory statement to the press conference (with Q&A). September 6, 2012, accessed April 13, 2015.
  13. See ECB: 6 September 2012 - Technical features of Outright Monetary Transactions. Press release. Accessed on February 14, 2014. In some cases reference is made to the negotiating power of the ECB, which it could use to force a change in the national liability regime. See, for example, Joseph Cotterill: Seniority, the SMP, and the OMT. In: Financial Times Alphaville. September 6, 2012, accessed April 14, 2015.
  14. Critical to the inflation-reducing effect of the absorption method preferred by the ECB Joe Weisenthal: The Truth About The ECB's Plans To 'Sterilize' Its Purchases Of Government Debt. In: Business Insider. (On-line). September 9, 2012, accessed April 14, 2015; Michael McMahon, Udara Peiris and Herakles Polemarchakis: Outright Monetary Transactions sterilized? VoxEU, October 30, 2012, accessed April 21, 2015.
  15. See ECB: Introductory statement to the press conference (with Q&A). July 4, 2013, accessed on April 14, 2015. See also ECB only to publish OMT legal act if activation imminent. In: Reuters. (On-line). April 29, 2013, accessed April 13, 2015; Michael Steen and Ralph Atkins: Draghi's 'Dirty Harry' act keeps euro crisis at bay. In: Financial Times (FT.com). July 22, 2013, accessed on April 13, 2015. The ECB had previously clarified this in its written statement in January 2013 in the proceedings before the German Federal Constitutional Court: “The legal act that implements this fundamental monetary policy decision of the ECB Council has so far been not yet adopted and therefore not published in the Official Journal of the European Union. On the one hand, the specific conditions for OMTs still had to be worked out. On the other hand, the mere announcement of this instrument has a desirable monetary policy effect [...] The European Central Bank will therefore only adopt and publish the formal resolution on monetary policy outright transactions at the time when transactions on the secondary markets should be imminent. " Frank Schorkopf: Constitutional Complaints 2 BvR 1390/12, 2 BvR 1439/12 and 2 BvR 1824/12. Organstreit proceedings 2 BvE 6/12 ( PDF file via Handelsblatt [Online], 7.1 MB ). Letter of January 16, 2013 to the Federal Constitutional Court, accessed on April 15, 2015, p. 18.
  16. For an overview cf. ECB: Transmission mechanism of monetary policy. Retrieved April 14, 2015.
  17. See also Mario Draghi: The monetary policy of the European Central Bank and its transmission in the euro area. Speech, Bocconi University, Milan, November 15, 2012, accessed April 18, 2015.
  18. See also Claire Jones: Q&A on revamped ECB bond-buying process. In: Financial Times (FT.com). September 6, 2012, accessed April 17, 2015.
  19. See ECB: Monthly Bulletin. September 2012 (PDF file, 4.3 MB). 2012, accessed on April 21, 2015, p. 8.
  20. See ECB: Introductory statement to the press conference (with Q&A). December 6, 2012, accessed April 18, 2015.
  21. See Mario Draghi: The monetary policy of the European Central Bank and its transmission in the euro area. Speech, Bocconi University, Milan, November 15, 2012, accessed April 18, 2015.
  22. Marco Casiraghi, Eugenio Gaiotti, Lisa Rodano, Alessandro Secchi: The impact of unconventional monetary policy on the Italian economy during the sovereign debt crisis. Questioni di Economia e Finanza (PDF file, 765 kB). Banca d'Italia, No. 2013, September 2013, accessed on January 28, 2015.
  23. ^ Carlo Altavilla, Domenico Giannone, Michele Lenza: The Financial and Macroeconomic Effects of the OMT Announcements. CSEF Working Papers, Center for Studies in Economics and Finance, University of Naples, No. 352, January 2014, Internet http://www.csef.it/WP/wp352.pdf, accessed May 25, 2014.
  24. Arvind Krishnamurthy, Stefan Nagel and Annette Vissing-Jorgensen: ECB Policies Involving Government Bond Purchases: Impacts and Channels (PDF file, 2.3 MB). August 2014. Retrieved April 12, 2015.
  25. Urszula Szczerbowicz: The ECB unconventional monetary policies: have they lowered market borrowing costs for banks and governments? (PDF file, 590 kB). Working Paper, Center d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales, Nos. 2012–36, 2012. Accessed April 12, 2015.
  26. See Peter Spiegel, Michael Steen: Fears ECB bond scheme has its weakness. In: Financial Times (FT.com). February 26, 2013, accessed April 20, 2015.
  27. See Wolfgang Münchau : The eurozone crisis is not finished. In: Financial Times (FT.com). February 3, 2013, accessed April 20, 2015.
  28. Nikolay Hristov, Oliver Hülsewig, Thomas Siemsen, Timo Wollmershäuser: Smells Like Fiscal Policy? Assessing the Potential Effectiveness of the ECB's OMT Program ( Memento of the original from September 23, 2015 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link has been inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. , (PDF file, 0.4 MB). CESifo Working Paper Series 4628, CESifo, Munich 2014, accessed on April 21, 2015. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.cesifo-group.de
  29. See for example Wolfgang Münchau: The eurozone crisis is not finished. In: Financial Times (FT.com). February 3, 2013, accessed April 20, 2015; Hans-Werner Sinn : Europe's Next Moral Hazard. Project Syndicate, April 24, 2014, accessed April 21, 2015.
  30. Will Schäuble cash in on the ECB's miracle weapon? In: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ.net). May 25, 2014, accessed April 12, 2015.
  31. ^ A b Gerald Braunberger and Stefan Ruhkamp: Bundesbank openly criticizes decision. In: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ.net). September 6, 2012, accessed April 11, 2015.
  32. Cf. ECB: Introductory statement to the press conference (with Q&A). August 2, 2012, accessed April 12, 2015.
  33. Paul Carrel, Noah Barkin and Annika Breidthardt: Special Report: Inside Mario Draghi's euro rescue plan. In: Reuters. (On-line). September 25, 2012, accessed April 12, 2015.
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