The euro crisis (also known as the euro crisis ) is a multi-layered crisis in the European monetary union from 2010 onwards. It includes a national debt crisis , a banking crisis and an economic crisis . The term “euro crisis” does not refer to the external value of the euro, because it remained relatively stable.
The euro crisis results from a multitude of different factors, the weighting of which is controversial. In the case of Greece in particular, the focus is on the development of government debt in the run-up to the crisis. In other eurozone countries , too, the euro crisis made it difficult or even impossible to reschedule national debts without the help of third parties . In some cases, it is less the national debt per se than the macroeconomic debt that is actually seen as the decisive factor for the financing problems. Furthermore, the institutional characteristics of the euro zone and the consequences of the financial crisis from 2007 onwards contributed to the debt crisis. An important cause of the crisis is that in many euro countries, after the elimination of the national currencies and the associated exchange rate mechanism, the development of suitable internal adjustment mechanisms failed.
With the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) set up in 2010 and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), which was adopted in 2011 as its successor , a politically controversial rescue package was adopted. The European Central Bank intervened by lowering interest rates and through volume-limited purchase programs for (already issued) government bonds in the secondary market ( Securities Markets Program , Outright Monetary Transactions ) to prevent a credit crunch . So far, the European Fiscal Compact , an action procedure against macroeconomic imbalances and the European Banking Union have been adopted as measures against the causes of the crisis .
The weighting of the various crisis factors is controversial in the public debate. The conventional economic explanation for the causes of the euro crisis is two-sided. On the economic level, the euro crisis is understood as the first generation currency crisis . Accordingly, in some EU countries, increased government or private borrowing led to relatively higher inflation than in other EU countries. Due to the euro currency union, it was not possible to compensate for the different price developments through exchange rate adjustments , which resulted in persistently high current account deficits in some euro countries and persistently high current account surpluses in others (macroeconomic imbalances). At the political level, the euro currency union has meant that national monetary policy is not possible. The only quick response to economic crises would be fiscal policy , which would place a greater burden on the state budget than monetary policy. Another cause mentioned is that the elimination of exchange rate uncertainty due to the euro currency union resulted in a sharp drop in interest rates in euro countries with traditionally higher inflation; this has caused over-optimistic borrowing and investment behavior. Aided by inadequate banking and capital market regulation, this led to economic bubbles, the bursting of which triggered bank bailouts and economic stimulus programs. The financial crisis from 2007 with its direct costs and the distortions caused by it is also mentioned as a further factor .
In the case of Greece, literature and media reception focus on the development of national debt in the run-up to the crisis. Due to the structural problems within the euro zone, which were expressed, among other things, in the considerable current account imbalances within the euro zone that preceded the crisis, the term "current account" or "balance of payments crisis" is sometimes used for the crisis in the euro zone, which is intended to emphasize that it was not so much the national debt as such, but rather the macroeconomic imbalances that were the decisive factor behind the refinancing problems of some euro countries.
The following section first outlines the many different starting points of the countries involved in the crisis, then the fiscal problems, the imbalances and other factors are examined.
In the system of flexible exchange rates , the exchange rate mechanism balances out the different price levels in different currency areas and thus balances out the macroeconomic imbalances. This situation existed before the introduction of the euro. Since the euro currency union, however, no exchange rate has been able to take on this balancing function; the development of the price level leads to a real loss of competitiveness in countries with higher inflation .
Already in an early phase of the euro zone, various references were made to the fact that after the introduction of the common currency (and also due to corresponding expectations beforehand), strong current account imbalances within the euro zone arose . The current account of a country records the exports of goods and services as the most important components on the assets side, and the corresponding imports of a country on the liabilities side. If a country imports more than it exports, the result is a negative current account balance (current account deficit); if it exports more, the balance is positive (current account surplus). The accumulation of a current account deficit corresponds to the build-up of increasing liabilities to foreign countries - if a country purchases more goods and services from abroad than it sells abroad, the rest of the world builds net claims against the "deficit country".
A divergence process in current account balances has been observed within the euro zone since the end of the 1990s (Fig. 5). One explanation is generally seen in the lower level of interest rates that went hand in hand with the introduction of the euro and the associated integration of the financial and goods markets and meant more favorable refinancing options and better lending conditions for governments and companies . As a result, actors in countries that had difficult access to the financial and especially credit markets before joining the euro zone were able to inquire more and more for foreign goods or services. Some commentators also point to the great importance of the disappearance of exchange rate risks, which have promoted investments in the respective countries (and of course also contributed to the lowering of interest rates themselves), as well as the growth expectations (also resulting from this) that came with the introduction of the euro were connected. This results in two - interdependent - consequences:
- The savings of households decreases due to the ability to obtain loans at relatively favorable terms and to use money for consumption or investment purposes. (Significant) reductions in savings on the part of the southern European states and Ireland involved in the crisis can be determined empirically.
- There is a direct inflow of capital from abroad, as investors perceive the security of the country, which is now part of a common currency, to increase.
Both were expressed in increasing net capital inflows - the counterpart to a current account deficit - which in turn led to price increases in the respective countries (also via indirect channels such as the reduction in unemployment), so that inflation differentials developed between the member states of the euro zone . In the GIIPS countries, inflation was above average, while inflation in creditor countries such as Germany and Finland was below average.
Robert Mundell already pointed out in his theory of optimal currency areas that different wage developments become a source of asymmetrical shocks if wage developments are not coordinated in some form across the currency union . The collective bargaining parties of the GIIPS countries had kept the wage share (in terms of gross domestic product) constant. In a monetary union with different inflation rates in the individual member states, a constant wage share has corresponding effects on unit labor costs . Unit labor costs rise more rapidly in countries with higher inflation. As a result, the competitiveness of countries with higher inflation deteriorated (see also Fig. 2).
By competitive currency devaluation , an economy could again become competitive overnight, this is for the monetary union but not impossible. The alternative for the euro countries with price problems is internal devaluation , i.e. lowering domestic wages and prices. From an empirical point of view, internal devaluation works above all when it is sufficient that wages and prices rise less sharply than at the trading partners. When internal devaluation requires wages and prices to stagnate or fall, it often leads to a lengthy and painful process.
Irrational capital flows
The extraordinary boom in capital inflows in the years before the crisis (2003-2007), which led to a large increase in macroeconomic (private and public) debt, is seen as a major cause of the euro crisis. After the introduction of the euro, there was a strong inflow of capital into the GIIPS countries. Most observers assumed an efficient market allocation and saw the strong capital inflows as an indication of the high economic strength of the GIIPS countries. Conversely, Germany was affected by strong capital outflows and rising unemployment, which was interpreted as an indication of a lack of economic strength; At that time Germany was called the "sick man of Europe". Since the euro crisis, the mood has turned into the opposite. Many economists now see the current account deficits and the sharp rise in unemployment as signs of a chronic lack of competitiveness in the GIIPS countries, which, according to Gerhard Illing, is an irrational exaggeration in the opposite direction.
The initial over-optimism of the financial markets with regard to the effects of the monetary union and the creditworthiness of the GIIPS countries is emphasized as an essential reason for the high capital inflows in the GIIPS countries. The euro-currency union increased the free movement of capital and the exchange rate uncertainty disappeared. Due to the over-optimism of the financial markets, also due to incorrect regulation, the interest rates for the economies of the GIIPS countries fell very sharply, which caused over-optimistic borrowing and investment behavior. At the same time, this also increased the banks' potential to spread macroeconomic shocks on EU countries. This caused a bubble economy . With the sudden stop of capital inflows, the GIIPS countries then got into a severe economic crisis.
The enormous increase in capital inflows was mainly due to capital inflows that destabilized the financial system, in particular due to excessive brokering of international credit through non-diversified local banks. The financial system stabilizing capital inflows such as B. Foreign direct investments and the brokering of international credit through diversified banks networked across Europe were insufficient. Nevertheless, banking regulation remained the sole concern of the individual EU states. These tended to provide their national banks with financial advantages through under-regulation and under-capitalization. In addition, the capital inflows mainly consisted of short-term funds, which experience has shown can have a destabilizing effect. Funds granted at short notice lead to insufficiently thought out investment decisions and to herd behavior , and overall to poorly prepared investments by investors. If you then recognize exaggerations and bad investments, this leads to a sudden stop , i.e. an exaggeration downwards. Investors withdraw their capital equally from unproductive and productive investments. The credit crunch due to general mistrust means that intact and productive economic structures suffer from a lack of capital and have to be abandoned. Some of the loans granted at the time could no longer be serviced (risk of default) and put a strain on the bank's balance sheets. The inability of domestic banks to lend and the loss of confidence on the part of foreign investors led to a credit crunch at the expense of the real economy and, as a result, to economic crises. The dramatic collapse of the M2 money supply in the GIIPS countries is a clear indicator of such a credit crunch. The strong capital inflow had turned into a capital flight .
Institutional Characteristics of the Eurozone
For the participating states, accession to the euro zone was accompanied by a renunciation of the autonomous use of monetary and exchange rate policy . Among other things, this resulted in two shortcomings relevant to the euro crisis:
- On the one hand, a common currency deprives member states of the ability to use monetary policy to mitigate asymmetrical macroeconomic shocks (e.g. the collapse of real estate markets or parts of the banking system). If these macroeconomic shocks only affect a few member states of a monetary union, an expansionary monetary policy that only affects these states is not possible.
- On the other hand, the participating countries forego the opportunity to improve their competitiveness through competitive currency devaluation .
The convergence test that precedes accession to the euro area should, among other things, ensure that the importance of these two problem areas is kept to a minimum by making a corresponding convergence process a requirement before the introduction of the single currency, which should have limited the need for asymmetrical reactions. ( With recourse to a theory founded by Robert Mundell , one often speaks of the fact that the euro zone should be brought as close as possible to what is known as an optimal currency area .) However, the prescribed measures have repeatedly been criticized as inadequate in view of the serious problems that arise in an emergency . In addition, even the specified criteria were only met by some member states by using so-called creative accounting and benefiting from specific non-structural developments. In the year of its convergence test (2000), for example, Greece's debt level was 104 percent, more than 40 percentage points above the 60 percent limit of the criteria, the inflation rate was lowered considerably through one-off measures, it rose again in the years that followed, and the statistics authority Eurostat had to revise the budget deficit upwards afterwards. When drafting the EU convergence criteria, it was also overlooked that not only the state but also the private sector can cause problems through excessive debt and deterioration in the competitive situation.
Specific consequences from the financial market crisis
The euro crisis should also be viewed in the context of the financial market crisis that preceded it in 2008 . The financial market crisis led to an increased risk assessment worldwide . The government bond market was affected through various channels:
- In the run-up to the financial crisis from 2007 onwards, there was excessive lending to private households, sometimes even detached from the solvency of borrowers. This led to real estate bubbles in the US and some other states. After the bubbles burst, more or less extensive rescue operations for banks had to be launched in many countries . As a result, private debt became national debt, and the increasing national debt burden reduced (in the GIIPS countries) the value of government-issued paper.
- the reduced liquidity of the credit institutions caused a decline in lending, which had a negative impact on economic output (and thus also tax revenues).
In addition, in the course of the financial crisis, the sensitivity of the financial markets to risk with regard to fiscal imbalances increased. For the euro crisis, which is characterized by both drastic and sudden difficulties in access to the refinancing ability of states, these developments in lending - depending on your point of view - represented the triggering factor, or at least one factor for the intensity of the problem. The Expert Council for assessment the macroeconomic development (in short: council of experts) speaks in this context of a twin crisis, in which the banking and debt crises reinforce each other and affect economic production, with the result that they are exacerbated again.
Importance of public debt to the crisis
According to one point of view - which is represented by Marco Pagano , Friedrich Heinemann , Jens Weidmann and Jean-Claude Trichet , among others - the refinancing problems of the crisis countries are primarily the result of excessive government debt and government budget deficits. This group describes the euro crisis as the sovereign debt crisis.
The designation of the euro crisis as the national debt crisis is sometimes a. criticized by Peter Bofinger , because the term national debt crisis obscures the fact that “we actually have a crisis in the financial sector and the banks because they have spent themselves in speculation instead of solid loan financing”, which led to the financial crisis from 2007 onwards . The économistes atterrés ( outraged economists ), an association of over 25 French economists, argue in a similar way in their manifesto, the Scientific Advisory Board of Attac , Thomas Fricke , Albrecht Müller , James K. Galbraith and Walter Wittmann . The term sovereign debt crisis means that the attempted solutions are dominated by a one-sided view of the fiscal criteria. This overlooks the fact that in the financially weak countries - with the exception of Greece - an unsound budget policy cannot be identified. The real cause of the rise in national debt was the financial crisis from 2007 onwards. The correction of the undesirable developments that led to the financial crisis required increased attention.
In the course of the discussion of the fiscal pact, over 120 economists in a public appeal criticized the expression sovereign debt crisis as misleading and declared that so far no country had overcome the crisis through austerity policy . Nobel laureate in economics, Paul Krugman, wrote: “Europe's great delusion is the belief that the crisis was caused by irresponsible financial management. You might argue that this is really the case in Greece. That's true, but even Greek history is more complicated. Ireland, on the other hand, had a budget surplus and low government debt before the crisis. Spain also had a budget surplus and little debt ... The euro itself triggered the crisis. ”If one looks at the GIIPS countries (ie Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain) as an aggregate, the government debt ratio increased until the outbreak of the euro crisis 2007 as a whole even from (Fig. 3).
However, the debt approach is also a starting point for expansion. For example, some point to the emergence of self-fulfilling prophecies in which the refinancing situation of a country deteriorates due to the expectation that the country will only be able to meet its liabilities with difficulty in the future, which then actually makes the expectation a reality; In view of the risk-sensitive climate that also prevails as a result of the financial crisis, lower levels of debt could also have significant effects on solvency.
Robert C. Shelburne analyzed for the Economic Commission for Europe that the sovereign debt crisis was more a consequence than a cause of the euro crisis. Like many other economists, he also sees the ultimate cause in the continuous large current account deficits since the introduction of the euro, which have led to private and government debt crises and ultimately economic crises. However, the current account imbalances can only be partially attributed to public debt, the greater part being caused by private debt. This is supported by the fact that two of the five crisis countries had budget surpluses until the outbreak of the crisis. After the crisis broke out, part of the private debt had to be converted into national debt to prevent banks from collapsing. This made the sovereign debt crisis the most obvious manifestation of the euro crisis for a while.
National causes of the crisis
Both the level of debt and the government's budget deficit were already extremely high in the run-up to the crisis. Between 2000 and 2008, the annual government budget deficit averaged around 6% of economic output (measured in terms of gross domestic product ) - twice as much as the maximum value provided for in the Stability and Growth Pact . The debt ratio , i.e. the ratio of debt to gross domestic product, was already at a very high level at the beginning of the previous decade, then increased only moderately from 104% (2001) to 113% (2008) due to largely stable economic growth of around 4% by 2008 ), but was nonetheless well above the 60% limit of the Stability and Growth Pact and the EU-27 average (62%). In turn, Greece's macroeconomic savings rate has fallen sharply since the end of the 1990s due to a slump in private savings, although the trend has increased since the introduction of the euro in 2001. Authors at the ECB attribute this to financial liberalization in the 1990s and the entry into the common currency union. The loosening of previous liquidity restrictions and the expectation of continued economic growth thus increased the incentives to consume and invest - at the expense of private savings. The current account balance was negative from 1982 to 1998, but to a small extent. From 1999 onwards, it experienced a significant decline in its balance, finally showing a double-digit deficit in the middle of the decade (Fig. 5). The importance of this development is discussed in the Macroeconomic Imbalances section .
The reason for the loss of income and control problems of the Greek state is often pointed to the deep reach of the informal sector of the economy. According to estimates by Friedrich Schneider , the Greek shadow economy reached 25% of the gross domestic product (GDP) in 2009, about 11 percentage points more than the OECD - and 5 percentage points more than the EU-27 average (although it fell between 2004 and 2008). The Greek state also incurs considerable defaults due to tax evasion , which the chairman of the tax investigation authority SDOE, Nikos Lekkas, put in an interview at around 15% of the Greek gross domestic product. In addition, there are repeated references to corruption, especially in the state apparatus. In a survey commissioned by the European Commission, 98% of the Greek citizens questioned said that corruption was a major problem in their country (EU-27: 74%); The global corruption perception index published by Transparency International placed the country in 2009 with an average value of 3.8 out of 10 (10 = least corruption) in 71st place, and in 2012 in 94th place.
Although (as of April 2014) there was talk of successes in terms of budget deficit, “ primary surplus ” in 2013 and “return” to the capital market , the debt level relative to the falling GDP (since 2008) has increased (from 113% in 2008) to 175% of GDP (despite Haircut and despite / due to the austerity measures imposed by the Troika ) increased at the end of 2013. Greece has been in deflation since March 2013 . The Troika calls for extensive structural reforms and budget cuts in 2015 as well; she thinks the Greek forecasts are too optimistic.
Spain and Ireland
Unlike Greece, Spain and Ireland consistently met the criteria of the Euro Stability Pact until 2008. In both countries, the weighted public debt since the introduction of the euro in 1999 has always been well below all EU averages and has also tended to decline, so that in 2007 a value of just under 25% (Ireland) and 36% (Spain) of the Gross domestic product was reached (Germany: 65%). The government budget deficit was also below the 3% limit, and Ireland even had budget surpluses almost entirely. Meanwhile, both the Spanish and Irish economies were characterized by quite high household indebtedness until 2007 (and beyond); the debt-income ratio (household loans and liabilities relative to disposable income) was 130% in Spain in 2007 and 197% in Ireland (euro area average: 94%) (Fig. 1). As early as 2006, German economic researchers warned of economic problems in then prosperous Spain because above-average inflation in the euro area had weakened the relative competitive position.
Ireland and Spain saw significant upheavals in the housing market in 2008. After several years of strong growth in house construction - favored by demographic development, specific starting positions in the real estate sector, easy access to loans and capital inflows from abroad - the value added in the construction industry, accompanied by strong price increases in real estate-related sectors, reached a volume of at the end of 2006 12% of the gross domestic product in Spain and 10% in Ireland (average in the euro zone: 7%). This affected other parts of the national economy as well. In Ireland, for example, real estate-related lending was responsible for nearly 80% of the growth in lending between 2002 and 2008; In 2008, the share of total lending was almost 60%. In both economies there was rapid growth in the construction industry, which in 2007 each reached 14% of gross domestic product, the highest proportion of all OECD countries. In Spain, more than three times as many apartments were completed in 2006 as a decade earlier and, with around 600,000 units, almost as many as in the rest of the EU. After house prices collapsed in the USA in 2007 ( subprime crisis ), the real estate bubble "burst" in Ireland and Spain in the same year. Drastic price declines led to massive sales and layoffs, which hit the entire national economy. In Ireland, the real economic implications were particularly drastic because the crisis on the property market also triggered a banking crisis , which led to considerable refinancing problems in the financial sector and, as a result, a collapse in lending. The Anglo Irish Bank (nationalized on January 29, 2009) played a particularly large role .
While the Irish debt ratio was still at the said 25% in 2007, it increased by around 20 percentage points in 2008 and 2009, also due to government support measures for the financial sector, and finally reached just under 109% of gross domestic product in 2011. In Spain, too, there were upheavals due to the collapse in prices and demand on the housing market. According to estimates by the Spanish National Bank , the crisis between 2007 and 2009 was responsible for a decline of almost 4% in gross domestic product. The burdens on the banking sector were lower than in Ireland, although the rescue measures also put a strain on the national budget in Spain.
With the introduction of the euro, Portugal experienced a large inflow of capital, partly based on the disappearance of the exchange rate risk and partly on unrealistic risk assessments by investors and the resulting extremely low interest rates. In the mid-1990s, Portugal's net external debt was close to zero; by 2007 it rose - according to figures from Ricardo Reis - to 165 billion euros (which corresponds to 97.5 percent of the gross national product). The capital inflows did not lead to an increase in productivity ; on the contrary, it sank. Presumably there was a misallocation of capital. In contrast to Spain and Ireland, Portugal did not have to cope with a real estate bubble bursting in the immediate run-up to the euro crisis . Similar to Spain, however, private household indebtedness was also quite high in Portugal (2007: 127 percent of disposable income compared to a euro area average of 94 percent; see chart). The current account deficit rose to over 10 percent of gross domestic product between 1997 and 2000, fell again to 6 percent by 2003 and then rose again; In 2008 it was 12.1 percent. Here the developed labor costs and labor productivity significantly apart. According to OECD surveys, overall economic labor productivity increased by almost 1 percent per year between 1998 and 2008, while unit labor costs rose by 3 percent per year during the same period (Fig. 2).
The national debt ratio in 2007 was around 68 percent of the gross domestic product, which at that time roughly corresponded to the average for the euro area of 66 percent and Germany's 65 percent. Portugal injured as Greece since the euro was introduced in 1999 throughout the the Stability and Growth Pact established three-percent criterion concerning the maximum permissible budget deficit . The average value between 1999 and 2007 was −4.1 percent. In 2013 the budget deficit was 4.9 percent; GDP fell by 1.4 percent in real terms; the currency reserves fell from 18.0 to 14.3 billion euros.
Italy had a higher national debt ratio than many other countries for decades (see list of countries by national debt ratio ):
Italy's national debt ratio, as of April 2017 (2017–2022: estimate), source: International Monetary Fund 1990 1995 2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 94% 109% 105% 102% 106% 103% 106% 116% 115% 116% 123% 129% 132% 132% 133% 133% 132% 129% 127% 123% 120%
The Italian economy has grown only weakly since around 2000: the annual real growth rate of the gross domestic product since 2000 averaged only around 1.1% due to the financial crisis from 2007 , which affected the real economy in many industrialized countries in 2009 (and partly also in 2010) had an impact, Italy also experienced a recession.
In the crisis states as well as at the international and European level, various measures have been discussed and, in some cases, adopted and implemented, which are intended to help combat the causes of the debt crises and alleviate their symptoms and consequences.
Actions by the European Union and its Member States
Debt relief ("haircut")
A measure that has been discussed and only implemented in relation to Greece to reduce the symptoms of the debt crisis, namely the lowering of the high repayment and interest burdens in the debtor states from the debt incurred , is debt relief . Under this measure, the creditors finally waive the repayment of part or all of their claims vis-à-vis the debtor states . As a rule, this measure only achieves the necessary approval of the renouncing creditors if serious attempts are also made in the debtor state to eliminate the genuine causes of the debt crisis, since otherwise the creditors would face a new haircut for their residual claims in the future.
After the support from the rescue funds, Greece has so far been the only country in the euro area to have received debt relief for a considerable part of its debts in spring 2012. Corresponding creditors have effectively waived around 75% of their claims.
Loans and guarantees ("euro rescue package")
Under the colloquial term euro rescue package , member states of the euro zone, the European Union and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) provide the debtor states with emergency loans and emergency guarantees. This is intended to avoid the risk of sovereign defaults in euro countries due to liquidity bottlenecks and thus at least temporarily secure financial stability in the euro area.
By the end of 2013, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain had made use of the euro rescue packages. This is also open to other countries in the eurozone if their national debts and interest can no longer be serviced on their own.
In order to be able to grant Greece the urgently needed emergency loans at short notice, the representatives of the euro bailout fund initially started a construct that was approved in night meetings from April 2010. As a result, it became clear that shortly after the bailout fund was approved, the loans were insufficient in terms of amount and the quota had to be increased. From July 2012, the euro rescue package should be replaced by a permanent measure, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), whereby its funds should only be granted under strict conditions . The ESM should initially be equipped with a volume of a maximum of 500 billion euros. Even before the introduction, various parties discussed the fact that this volume might not be enough and that it was 1 to 2 trillion. Euros should be increased. Therefore, before the introduction of the ESM in March 2012, the EU heads of state and government should check again whether the envisaged ESM upper limit would be sufficient.
Whether the emergency loans and guarantees, known as the rescue package, can help the crisis countries is controversial and depends in particular on other factors. The rescue package alone enables the heavily indebted states to take on additional debt or to extend debts due by bypassing the capital market and with favorable conditions. In this way, the bankruptcy of a state is initially only postponed. There is a general opinion that the rescue package can at best help avoid state bankruptcy if the debtor state simultaneously initiates intensive efforts to combat the causes. If this does not happen, the crisis indebtedness of a state would even increase through the rescue package and the situation would worsen.
The EU rescue packages are legally controversial because, until the beginning of the sovereign debt crisis, the EU treaties were always understood to mean that the liability of the European Union and the EU member states for the liabilities of other member states was excluded due to the non -bailout clause . Many politicians have put this view into perspective in the face of the debt crisis.
The EU rescue packages are controversial from a democratic point of view because, according to previous standards, gigantic aid packages were only pushed through very late and under pressure in parliaments and committees , without the expected effectiveness being sufficiently discussed and checked.
The EU rescue packages are controversial from a tactical negotiating point of view, because countries that are already over-indebted would be given additional funds. This increases the “blackmail potential” of these states vis-à-vis the immediate creditors, because the debtor states increasingly represent a so-called systemic risk.
The ongoing subsequent increases in rescue packages that have already been adopted, as well as the ongoing reports that related parallel measures have not been implemented or have not been implemented adequately, indicate that considerable errors were made in the allocation of rescue package loans and guarantees.
"Six-pack" for budgetary discipline and against macroeconomic imbalances
The Stability and Growth Pact was reformed by resolution of the European Parliament on September 28, 2011. The so-called "six-pack" provides for stricter requirements on budget discipline in the EU states, including semi-automatic fines running into billions for deficit sinners and economies with strong current account deficits or surpluses. If a country violates the medium-term budget targets for a sound fiscal policy, a qualified majority of the euro countries can ask it to change its budget within five months (in serious cases within three months). If there is no improvement, the European Commission has the final option to impose sanctions amounting to 0.2% of the gross domestic product of the deficit offender (0.1% if the EU recommendations on combating macroeconomic imbalances are not implemented ), if not a majority in the eurozone is against it. According to the new rules, sanctions can also be decided if a budget deficit approaches the upper limit of 3% of gross domestic product. In addition, there should be stricter control of the national debt. Countries with a debt ratio of over 60% are being asked to reduce their debt above the limit by one twentieth annually for three years. The withheld fines are to flow into the European rescue fund EFSF.
The Euro Plus Pact proposes economic policy coordination measures to achieve greater convergence of the economies in the euro area. Progress by the euro countries is to be measured using objective indicators - for example unit labor costs.
EU fiscal pact ("debt brake")
On January 30, 2012, 25 of the 27 EU states (all except Great Britain and the Czech Republic) adopted a European fiscal pact with strict upper limits for national debt as a voluntary commitment . The voluntary commitment consists in the 25 EU states mutually promising to anchor this so-called “debt brake” in national law, if possible in the constitution. However, it has not been clarified how the debt brakes, which are based on an international treaty and thus escape the legally binding force of European law, can be implemented. Nevertheless, it is at least seen as a clear political signal that (almost) all EU states will give priority to sound budgetary policy in the future. In professional circles it is assumed that a regulation such as a debt brake was inevitable in order to counter the devaluations of the rating agencies and to regain confidence in the international financial markets. In German political circles, the fiscal pact is also seen as a necessary basis to be able to further increase the rescue package, in which Germany has a considerable share.
European financial supervision and banking union
One problem of the twin crisis (banking crisis and debt crisis) is the systemic importance of banks. As early as the financial crisis from 2007 and the consequences of the insolvency of Lehman Brothers , it became clear that systemically important banks are too big to fail . However, the European Commission's initial plans for a central European banking supervisory authority failed due to resistance from the EU member states , as they did not want to give up any competencies in national supervision of banks. The reform of European financial supervision has attempted to remedy the problem. To this end, 2011, with the European System of Financial of the European Systemic Risk Board and the European Banking Authority established who wanted to bring about a degree of harmonization of the rules that monitor but still decided to leave primarily with the national supervisory authorities of the Member States. In the opinion of the Council of Economic Experts, this reform was inadequate. Despite the establishment of new institutions, there is still no effective supervisory and insolvency regime for systemically important financial institutions. It is questionable whether the reforms that have been decided are sufficient to avoid the socialization of the costs arising from a crisis in systemically important banks and thus a further burden on the national budget. In the further course of this, this system also proved to be insufficient to cope with the financial crisis. In particular, the experience from the sovereign debt crisis in Cyprus has shown that the national banking supervisory authority did not react adequately to the crisis.
This refusal by the member states to set up a joint European banking supervisory authority only disappeared at the end of 2011 after EU currency commissioner Olli Rehn warned of a renewed banking crisis in Europe and warned that the sovereign debt crisis could not be brought under control without a stable banking system . In June 2012, Commission President José Manuel Barroso re-launched plans for central banking supervision: In his view, the largest banks from all 28 member states should be placed under the supervision of a European authority. At the EU summit on June 29, 2012, it was decided that the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) may only give direct financial aid to banks once an efficient banking supervision system at European level with the participation of the European Central Bank (ECB) has been installed for the euro zone. At the same time, the summit instructed the EU Commission to present a corresponding mechanism; These original plans for comprehensive European banking supervision met with criticism, especially in Germany and Great Britain. In September 2012, Barroso presented the EU Commission's plans in his “State of the Union” speech to the European Parliament: According to this, the ECB should take over the supervision of the banks that apply for ESM aid as early as January 1, 2013. In a second step, the ECB should take control of systemically important large banks in the euro area from July 2013 and over all banks in the euro area from the beginning of 2014. Ultimately, the ECB would have been responsible for overseeing more than 6,000 banks. In December 2012, the European finance ministers agreed on the key elements for creating single banking supervisory mechanism ( Single Supervisory Mechanism, SSM ) as part of a so-called. European banking union. On March 19, 2013, the EU Council announced that an agreement had been reached with the European Parliament on the establishment of a central European banking supervisory authority for the euro zone. According to this, the ECB should in future monitor all banks in the euro zone whose total assets account for over 30 billion euros or 20 percent of a country's economic output.
In March 2014, the European Commission agreed on the final modalities of the banking union. This culminated in the publication of the EU Resolution Directive (BRRD) and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRB) in May 2014. From November 2014, the ECB took up its new role in banking supervision under the SSM.
Financial transaction tax
Since the presentation of a draft law by the EU Commission on September 28, 2011 by the President of the European Commission José Manuel Barroso ("so that the financial sector also makes its fair contribution"), the introduction of a "harmonized financial transaction tax for the entire European Union ”or at least a“ common financial transaction tax ”of some of the member states.
The wording of the justification for the draft law included:
“The first is to ensure that the financial sector makes an appropriate contribution in times of budgetary consolidation in the Member States. The financial sector played a major role in creating the economic crisis, while the governments, and therefore the citizens of Europe, bore the cost of the massive taxpayer-funded rescue packages for the financial sector. […] Second, a coordinated framework at EU level would help strengthen the EU internal market. [...] "
Since January 22nd, 2013 there has been an official "enhanced cooperation" on a common financial transaction tax of eleven member states.
Actions by the European Central Bank
Provision of foreign currency liquidity
On May 9, 2010, the American FED , the ECB and other central banks reactivated weekly dollar facilities to supply the market with dollar liquidity. Originally, this instrument was used at the beginning of the financial crisis from 2007 and was used again after the collapse of Lehman Brothers at the end of 2008. As a result, the provision was extended several times, including a reduction in interest rates, and remained in effect until February 2014 as planned . The ECB initiated a similar program to cover foreign currency liquidity requirements with the Bank of England in December 2010; this was also extended three times and expired as planned at the end of September 2014. In addition, in the months from October to December 2011, the ECB also carried out dollar refinancing operations with a three-month term, also in cooperation with other central banks, in order to meet the liquidity needs of the commercial banks.
Purchase of government and private bonds - Securities Markets Program (SMP) and Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT)
On May 9, 2010, in a coordinated action with several EU countries that decided on the first 750 billion euro rescue program this weekend, the ECB gave itself the opportunity to use both private and - which was a novelty - with immediate effect. Buying government bonds on the secondary market ( Securities Markets Program, SMP). The SMP was maintained continuously from its implementation until September 2012. Two periods of strong bond purchases can be identified: On the one hand, the period from May to the beginning of July 2010 (approx. 60 billion euros) and the period between the beginning of August 2011 and mid-January 2012 (approx. 140 billion euros) (see adjacent graphic ). The total volume of the SMP was around 210 billion euros. The transactions were basically sterilized Nature (sterilized) - that is, the central bank withdrew the market, OBTAINED through acquisitions liquidity again by other so-called fine-tuning operations with the aim to eliminate the risk of inflation. The amount of bond purchases was advertised weekly, but not their composition. This was only communicated selectively after the end of the program (see below); As of December 31, 2012, Italian securities accounted for almost half of the total volume (nominal 218 billion euros, book value 208.7 billion euros), followed by Spanish (20%) and Greek (16%).
The SMP was terminated by the ECB on September 6, 2012 with immediate effect. It was replaced by outright monetary transactions (OMTs), which enable the ECB to buy up a potentially unlimited number of government bonds on the secondary market, but only if the respective countries are in an ESM or EFSF program or are already recipients of a bailout through the IMF and the European Union. The IMF should monitor the implementation of the corresponding program; If a country does not meet the requirements imposed on it, the corresponding OMTs should be discontinued. The OMTs are to be used primarily for bonds with a one to three year term and, as in the case of the SMP, are sterilized. In particular, the ECB is in the OMT to the claimed related to Greek bond purchases preferred creditor claim (Preferred creditor status) to (pari passu) ; In the event of a restructuring event, it should ensure that the claims of the ECB are settled preferentially (i.e. before those of private investors). The approximately 200 billion euros that had already been purchased under the SMP are not affected by this change, according to Draghi.
Interest rate decisions
The interest rate for main refinancing operations (“key interest rate”) was initially not changed by the ECB during the crisis and thus remained at the level of 1.00% set in May 2009. With reference to the increased risk of inflation (among other things due to rising raw material prices), the key interest rate was increased to 1.25% on April 13, 2011. Two months later, there was another increase of 25 basis points to 1.50%, which was justified by the dangers of inflation from energy and raw material prices on the one hand and the liquidity accumulated by the ECB's policy in recent years on the other. The rate hike was withdrawn on November 9th. On December 14, 2011, the key interest rate was cut again by 25 basis points to 1.00%; a further decrease will follow on July 11, 2012 to 0.75%. In particular, on July 11, 2012, the ECB lowered the interest rate for the deposit facility, which had already been changed in step with the key interest rate from May 2009, by 25 basis points to 0.00%. As of May 8, 2013, the main refinancing rate was reduced to 0.50% and that for the marginal lending facility by 50 basis points to 1.00%.
At the beginning of May 2010, the credit rating requirements for Greek government bonds (and securities fully guaranteed by the Greek state) for credit transactions with the ECB were suspended so that they could be used as collateral for credit transactions between the ECB and commercial banks, regardless of their rating. In July 2011, the ECB did the same with regard to Portuguese government bonds (as it has done for Ireland since March 2011).
On December 8, 2011, the ECB expanded the pool of accepted collateral in such a way that asset-backed securities with a lower credit rating and, for the first time, loans to small and medium-sized companies were also accepted. In mid-February 2012, the ECB announced a further easing by announcing the acceptance of traditional bank loans as collateral. At the end of June 2012, the ECB announced that it would in future accept other types of securities as well as certain securities ( e.g. residential mortage backed securities ) with an even lower credit rating - on the scale of some rating agencies already only the second-best rating within the junk level . On September 6, 2012, the ECB decided to soften the criteria once again by adding all rating requirements for collateral to be deposited for credit transactions between the, for countries that belong to the OMT program (see above under “Purchasing government and private bonds”) ECB and commercial banks have been dropped.
From July 25, 2012, Greek government bonds or other securities fully guaranteed by Greece were no longer accepted as collateral in refinancing transactions; With reference to the country's positive development, the ECB revoked this decision with effect from December 21, 2012. Cypriot papers and papers guaranteed by the Cypriot state, which were no longer accepted as collateral by default as a result of several downgrades by rating agencies in June 2012, regained their central bank eligibility on May 2, 2013 as a result of a country-specific relaxation of the requirements, albeit during the week the bond exchange was briefly suspended again at the end of June 2013.
At the end of July 2013, the ECB announced planned changes to the basic alignment of its collateral requirements. According to commentators, the underlying technical modifications required due to a reduction of haircuts and made a reduction of the required rating grade asset-backed securities (asset-backed securities, ABS).
With the resolutions in May 2010, several unlimited refinancing transactions with a three-month term have been carried out until today (as of August 2013) . Since a change in the procedure in the wake of the Lehman crisis to commercial banks there at a given interest rate by the ECB with the mobilization of collateral required for three months any sums of money received ( fixed rate tenders with full allotment); The same procedure continued - and continues to this day (as of August 2013) - the weekly main refinancing operations with a one-week term. By decision of December 6, 2012, the ECB announced that it would maintain this allocation procedure “as long as necessary”; According to later decisions, this will apply in any case until at least July 2014.
On December 8, 2011, the ECB announced two long-term refinancing operations (LTROs) with a term of three years (fixed rate tenders with full allotment, see above). The first three year deal was launched on December 21st. In excess of the expectations of analysts, around 489 billion euros were allocated to 523 banks; the interest rate to be paid corresponds to the average key interest rate over the three-year term. The measures were also intended to improve the supply of liquidity and improve the market for covered bonds; Part of the allotted amount was probably also used to purchase government bonds. The second 3-year LTRO on February 29, 2012 led to an allocation of almost 530 billion euros to 800 financial institutions, whereby additional collateral was accepted compared to the first edition of the program (see "Credit requirements for government bonds" above) moved smaller institutions to raise liquidity. In January 2013, the banks in the euro area repaid EUR 137 billion of these loans.
Purchase of secured securities - Covered Bond Purchase Program (CBPP2)
The second major programmatic innovation was implemented by the ECB by reactivating the Covered Bond Purchase Program ( CBPP) in October 2011. As part of this program, between November 2011 and October 2012 so-called covered bonds , i.e. securities backed by collateral ( for example, mortgage bonds ) are acquired at primary and secondary market worth 40 billion euros. The first CBPP was used between June 2009 and June 2010 in the wake of the financial market crisis. In the opinion of commentators, the measure was primarily aimed at securing the money supply for the banking institutions, which was made more difficult in the course of the ongoing crisis; in the run-up to problems on the interbank market, the sale of covered bonds had increasingly replaced traditional ways of obtaining liquidity.
The CBPP2 expired on October 31, 2012 as planned; To date, the ECB had realized a purchase volume of just under 16.5 billion euros.
Share capital increase
On December 16, 2010, the ECB decided, for the first time in twelve years, to increase its capital by almost double to around EUR 11 billion, which it justified with increases in volatility in various areas and the ability to continue building reserves; in particular, the move was generally interpreted as a reaction to the uncertainty of the bond holdings acquired as part of the SMP.
Proposals and Unsolved Actions
Common bonds and Eurobonds
A widely discussed proposal provides for the issue of jointly guaranteed bonds in order to lower the refinancing costs of the countries affected by the crisis. There are different concepts. Most of the proposals begin with individual states joining forces and creating an institution that issues bonds. These bonds could in turn be made subject to national or joint liability. It is conceivable that the states involved would only have to be liable for the part of the paper issued by them (and the corresponding costs); If a state uses 30 percent of the instrument to finance it, for example, its liability would also be limited to this portion. Another and more widespread possibility, on the other hand, is joint liability for the bonds. In this case, if a state could no longer meet its payment obligations, the investors would have a direct claim against the other countries involved.
The advantages of such models are usually seen in the fact that it would enable states to refinance themselves at lower interest rates on the capital market. This applies in particular to the version with joint liability, as particular failure risks become less important. In addition, such joint bonds can increase market liquidity - also via the channels of the interbank market. On the other hand, there is often a moral risk in the case of joint liability , since the joint issue of bonds gives less affluent participants incentives to mismanage or take on excessive debt at the expense of the more affluent partners. For this reason, some commentators are calling for greater fiscal policy integration in the case of such joint bonds, which also includes interventions in the national budget sovereignty (Eurobonds).
A modified concept by Markus Brunnermeier provides that an institution itself buys government bonds from countries in the Eurozone in proportion to the respective economic power and uses them as collateral for the issue of two types of securities (European Safe Bonds) - a safe one (higher seniority of claims) and a less secure type. The aim is in particular to counter the lack of secure securities during the euro crisis.
According to an approach - discussed in particular after its adaptation by the Finnish Prime Minister - states affected by the crisis could issue Pfandbrief-like bonds that would be covered, for example, by state assets or (future) tax revenues. This hedge, it is expected, would lower refinancing costs. Another advantage is seen in the fact that such bonds, through their cover assets, provide a strong incentive not to allow any default events to occur.
Splitting up or leaving the euro
The proposals for the reintroduction of national currencies or a split into north euro and south euro are intended to allow better account of the national characteristics (in particular the anticipation of inflation) in the context of monetary policy. With the reintroduction of a national currency would by the exchange rate mechanism , the purchasing power parity would be restored to other economies, the competitiveness that suddenly improve. In theory, this would remove the macroeconomic imbalances. Instead, the states could each prefer a monetary union and join the one that suits them. Whether the competitiveness can actually be improved by a devaluation depends on the reaction of the market participants. According to Barry Eichengreen , it can be expected that lenders will anticipate higher inflation in the exit countries or the southern euro and therefore demand higher interest rates. Currency devaluation and higher inflation could also trigger a wage-price spiral . In any case, a devaluation of the currency causes a real appreciation (increase) of private and public debt. For these reasons, the benefits of leaving the euro or a southern euro are controversial. A big problem is that it should be clear to every market participant that the devaluation is the main purpose of the split. In order to avoid the devaluation of their own financial assets, financial institutions, companies and private households would in the worst case move their money abroad in a system-wide bank run . Since the split-up countries already have problems with refinancing anyway, they could not support the banking system. The result would be a financial crisis that is very likely to impact economic growth and employment.
According to the special report of the German Advisory Council on the assessment of macroeconomic development on July 5, 2012, concepts of splitting up or leaving the north of the euro are associated with high risks:
- For the financial markets this would mean a central regime change, capital shifts could occur, which would put a considerable strain on the situation of the financial systems of the exit countries.
- A dissolution of the monetary union would bring German investors considerable losses. The German foreign claims against the euro area amount to € 2.8 trillion plus € 907 billion Target-2 claims of the German Bundesbank. Some of these debts would become irrecoverable.
- In the short term, there could be an uncertainty shock with a 5% drop in German economic output.
- The revaluation associated with the reintroduction of the DM would in the long run considerably impair the international competitiveness of the German economy not only in Europe but also worldwide.
According to Malte Fischer , the exchange rate is not a decisive factor for the demand for German products, because they are not very price-sensitive due to their high product quality. The 2015 spring report of the German Council of Economic Experts points to significantly improved protective mechanisms in the euro area, such as the banking union, the ESM and instruments of the ECB.
North and South Euro
One proposal for solving the debt crises envisages introducing two currency unions instead of the existing euro currency union, in which states that are very heterogeneous in terms of economic and financial ideas try to use one currency: in each of the two currency unions, states with a similar economic and financial structure could be introduced as well as similar monetary policy approaches have their own common currency. Because most of the currency-relevant differences exist between the north and south of the EU countries, most of the time they speak of a north euro and a south euro . The concept is based on the assumption that if the currency area is split, the long-term benefits will outweigh the short-term and long-term disadvantages. According to a scientific study by the Austrian Institute for Economic Research in 2012, an economic crisis similar to that of 2009 could be expected for Austria and would last for two years. It would take about five years for the deficits in the gross domestic product to be made good. Unemployment would temporarily increase by around 180,000 people. The Institute for Higher Studies determined a drop of 7.5% for Austria with the introduction of a northern euro by 2016 and an increase in the unemployed of 80,000 people. According to the authors, these figures relate to an “optimistic” reference scenario in which it is assumed that the crisis countries will lower their unit labor costs through internal devaluation, recapitalize their banks and repay their loans. In addition, the euro countries would have to be prepared to accept further haircuts and, if necessary, to recapitalize further banks and, if necessary, to top up the ESM . Nevertheless, economic growth, especially in the southern countries, would be very small for many years, which would make it difficult to repay the loans. With a north euro, the growth rate of the Austrian gross domestic product would be negative for two years, but then rise again to around 2%.
Alternatively, Markus C. Kerber , Professor of Public Finance and Economic Policy at the Technical University of Berlin, suggested keeping the euro as a whole, but also introducing a northern euro - Kerber calls it the “Guldenmark” - as a parallel currency. This should be borne by countries with a current account surplus - specifically Germany, the Netherlands, Finland, Austria and Luxembourg. The Guldenmark could help to balance out differences in competition between north and south.
Individual countries leaving the euro
Another proposal for solving the debt crisis provides for individual euro states to withdraw from the common currency, the euro, and the Eurosystem , and instead reintroduce a national currency and a national currency system, for example, in order to devalue the euro and reduce competitive deficits. For Greece with its particularly pronounced macroeconomic imbalances, this is being discussed intensively under the term “ Grexit ”. In a Grexit, Volker Wieland, a member of the Advisory Council for the assessment of macroeconomic development, sees opportunities to achieve international competitiveness more quickly and, until then, to lower unemployment.
In a historical comparison of 71 currency crises, seven economic researchers from the Leibniz Institute for Economic Research (Ifo) found this tendency in 2012 that countries recovered much more quickly after currency devaluations than after internal devaluations . Detailed comparisons of the internal devaluation in Latvia and Ireland with currency devaluations in Italy, Thailand and Argentina confirmed to the Ifo researchers that the currency devaluations were beneficial (also socially). The possible effects of a Greek currency devaluation on debt amounts (balance sheet effects) would be more in favor than against an exit. Technically and organizationally, a Grexit is possible with moderate costs. Grexit is therefore a viable alternative for Greece.
Nevertheless, the opinion is widespread that no country leaves the euro zone voluntarily. Forced exclusion is probably not possible. Nevertheless, Greece could be forced to introduce an additional currency of its own ( complementary currency ), namely if the countries that previously guaranteed Greek loans no longer stand for further tranches from the aid packages (e.g. because Greece has not complied with demands) and Greece no longer receives any loans on the capital market (ie fails to find buyers for newly issued government bonds). In early 2015, Der Spiegel published a detailed scenario of how Greece could leave the euro.
In order to avoid speculative upheavals and further capital flight from a euro crisis state in the event of an exit from the euro, according to the general opinion, such an exit would have to come very suddenly without prior notice. Since a withdrawal from the euro has not yet been provided for in the EU treaties, a so-called "simplified treaty amendment procedure" was proposed in a simulation game by the FAZ in 2011. Barry Eichengreen does not consider a spontaneous complete changeover to be possible. Unlike in the 19th century, central and commercial banks would have to rewrite the software for their IT systems and for all ATMs. A political debate and a legislative process at European level and at national parliaments would also be necessary. During this time, all citizens and investors would have a strong incentive to withdraw their money from the economy leaving the euro zone before the expected devaluation of 20-30%. In contrast, Born et al. the positive experiences with the splitting up of the former Czechoslovakia in a week of February 1993.
Another problem is the risk of infection. Such a step could also shake confidence in the banking systems of other countries affected by the crisis. A Greek exit could lead to capital flight from other southern European countries, since then there is fear that these could also exit and that citizens want to protect their savings in "hard" euros from being converted to a "soft" new currency. This flight of capital would lead to further destabilization, which in a self-fulfilling prophecy could trigger a chain reaction of further exits. After two reports in spring 2015 by the German Council of Economic Experts and the International Monetary Fund IMF, the risk of contagion was significantly reduced or manageable due to the protective mechanisms described above in the euro area, such as the banking union, the ESM and the instruments of the ECB. There is hardly any risk of contagion through trade relations. Little remains of the contagion risks for banks outside Greece in 2010. Speculative risks are already lower because violations of the rules of the monetary union are now rejected more strongly and more credibly.
Debt relief through a one-off property levy
Other proposals for reducing national debt are one-off property levies or forced bonds . Because according to DIW, the high national debt is offset by high private assets. Private households with higher assets and incomes could be used to refinance and reduce national debt. Such a charge would have several advantages. On the one hand, there is no need to fear any dampening of consumer demand. It would also reduce the increased inequality of wealth . One difficulty is precisely identifying assets and preventing tax evasion and tax offenses . Most of the countries in crisis have an above-average proportion of untaxed shadow economies , an above-average widespread practice of tax evasion, capital flight or particularly low tax rates.
The DIW calculates that a property levy of 10%, which would affect the richest 8% of the population, would provide 230 billion euros for Germany. This could presumably be transferred to other European countries. Historically, there are many examples of such property taxes in Germany, v. a. the military contribution from 1913, the Reichsnotopfer as part of the Erzberger tax and financial reforms of 1919 as an extraordinary property levy , the compulsory loan 1922/1923, for which all persons with assets over 100,000 marks were required to sign, and the property levy 1949, which was part of the Burden Equalization Act from 1952 was regulated more precisely.
A proposal by the SPD-affiliated economist Harald Spehl envisages debt relief for states along the lines of this German burden sharing . Since the public debts in Germany (2.5 trillion euros) are matched by creditor positions in the same amount, and the private assets in Germany comprise at least 6.6 trillion euros, national debts could be reduced to the same level as the burden sharing with the help of a property levy limited to the wealthiest population group A period of 30 years can be repaid by means of a German debt relief fund . The Greens and the Left Party are calling for something similar.
Actors in the financial markets are increasingly of the opinion that, at least in the case of the Greek debt crisis, "an end with horror, namely a default by Greece, would be preferable to an endless horror" (as of February 2012). Occasionally there is a demand that the 130 billion euros no longer be made available as a further rescue package, but rather only a bridging loan for the repayment of repayment obligations due in March 2012 in Greece. Bankruptcy is the best from the point of view of a country like Greece, because it would then have the chance of a real fresh start, as well as from the point of view of other countries and especially the euro zone, which are now better positioned to bankrupt states such as Greece prepared. In the spring of 2015, the Expert Council for the Assessment of Macroeconomic Development (SVR) examined the possible effects of a Greek default, which is shown above as the trigger for an exit from the euro. In addition to the known risk of contagion and its significant reduction, the SVR draws attention to the problems of the Greeks and Greek banks, which still have to service loans in euros after a currency changeover, and the possible intensification of the crisis for the Greek real economy. The study placed the risk of contagion from Greece ahead of the insolvency risks, which would reduce the economic recovery in the entire euro area if the necessary adjustments were not made in other member states or reforms that had already been implemented were rolled back.
Development and measures in the individual countries
The debt and budget situation of the most affected countries
Compared to other industrialized nations such as the United States, Great Britain or Japan, the national debt ratio of the euro area is at a comparatively low level. In the years before the financial crisis from 2007, current crisis countries such as Ireland or Spain complied with the criteria of the Stability and Growth Pact in an exemplary manner, and over several years even budget surpluses were achieved (which has only happened once in Germany since 1970). In most of the crisis countries, the national debt ratio rose mainly because economic output declined in the financial crisis from 2007 onwards and bank rescue and economic programs were implemented on the other. In most of the crisis countries (with the exception of Greece) the debt crisis had not emerged before the financial crisis.
When comparing the national debt ratios (i.e. the national debt in relation to the gross domestic product ), it must be taken into account that the solvency of the respective country depends on the specific circumstances. A country that is solvent under normal circumstances can appear insolvent if it gets into an economic crisis and its economy shrinks (recession). The assessment also depends on the refinancing conditions. Even a country with a balanced budget can appear over-indebted if the interest rate suddenly rises sharply. The premiums for hedging against the default of government bonds (i.e. the so-called credit default swap spreads or CDS spreads), particularly from Greece, but also from Portugal, rose sharply until the end of 2011 (see chart on the right). In 2012, Italy and Spain had to repay a very large volume of government bonds they had taken out. According to calculations by DZ Bank, Italy has a capital requirement - the years 2012 to 2014 added up - totaling 956 billion euros, Spain 453 billion euros. This high national debt ratio was still a cause for concern in 2018. The head of the Austrian financial market supervisory authority, Helmut Ettl , saw price bubbles in some real estate markets, stock exchanges and the crypto economy, in particular, the continued high national debt in some EU countries as the “first warning sign” of a new financial crisis. In view of the many unsolved problems in the euro area, the persistent low interest rate environment, the global trade dispute, the conflicts in the Arab world, Brexit and the crisis of multilateralism, which is being replaced by multi-nationalism, there are signs of a new "geopolitical recession", according to Ettl " in the room.
|National debt of
the most affected countries and the EU
as a percentage of GDP
- Maastricht criterion is a maximum of 60 percent.
(2014, 2015: estimates)
|European Union (27 countries)||62.8%||62.5%||74.6%||80.2%||83.0%||86.8%||90.2%||88.2%||90.0%|
|Public budget balance as a percentage of GDP
- Maastricht criterion floor is −3 percent.
(2014, 2015: estimates)
|Cyprus||−2.4%||+ 0.9%||−6.1%||−5.3%||−6.3%||−5.3%||−5.1%||−8.8%||−1.2%||+ 0.4%|
|European Union (27 countries)||−2.5%||−2.4%||−6.9%||−6.5%||−4.4%||−3.6%||−3.5%||−3.0%||−2.4%||−1.7%|
|Germany||−3.3%||−0.1%||−3.1%||−4.1%||−0.8%||+ 0.1%||0.0%||+ 0.3%||+ 0.7%||+ 0.8%|
In parallel to the development of the debt crisis, the rating agencies downgraded the creditworthiness of the countries concerned several times.
Greece was downgraded for the first time in December 2009 and by June 2010 it no longer had an investment grade rating. Ireland, which had an Aaa rating until July 2009 , has not been rated as investment grade since July 2011 (like Portugal). Spain lost its Aaa rating in June 2010, but still has investment grade at A1 , just like Italy, which was downgraded to A2 (ratings from Moody's ). At the end of 2011, Moody's no longer rated the euro countries Greece (Ca), Portugal (Ba2) and Ireland (Ba1) as investment grade. Moody's also revoked this status from Cyprus in March 2012.
Six countries in the euro zone that are not affected by a debt crisis (Germany, Finland, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria) initially continued to have the best possible rating, Triple-A. On January 13, 2012, France and Austria were also downgraded to AA + by Standard & Poor's, which means that, from the perspective of the largest rating agency, only four of the euro countries retained the top rating. Overall, Standard & Poor’s lowered the ratings of nine European countries (France, Italy, Malta, Austria, Portugal, Spain, Slovakia, Slovenia and Cyprus) in the wake of the crisis. On December 18, 2012, Standard & Poor's upgraded Greece several notches to B-.
On March 25, 2010, the countries of the euro zone decided on an emergency plan for Greece, which is threatened with national bankruptcy. Previously, the German Chancellor Merkel had called for changes to the treaty to punish violations of the euro stability criteria more severely. Nicolas Sarkozy ( President of France 2010) and Gordon Brown ( Prime Minister of Great Britain 2010) did not want to support the necessary changes to the EU treaties.
The 2010 contingency plan stipulated that bilateral , voluntary loans from eurozone countries should help Greece first. In second place came the loans from the International Monetary Fund . The ratio should be two thirds (countries in the euro zone) to one third (IMF).
The euro countries contributed 80 billion euros, while the International Monetary Fund (IMF) wanted to grant a loan of 26 billion SDRs (around 30 billion euros).
At that time, the state of Greece had debts of over 300 billion euros.
On March 29, 2010, Greece commissioned a consortium of banks to issue a new seven-year government bond.
The rating downgrades of Greek debt securities posed a problem, as the European Central Bank ( ECB ) only accepted government bonds with a satisfactory credit rating as collateral for lending to banks in the euro area. On May 3, 2010, the ECB passed an "unprecedented exemption". Accordingly, it now recognizes Greek government bonds that are not sufficiently rated as collateral.
Critics accused the European Central Bank of “breaking a taboo in this situation” when it also bought (Greek) government bonds for the first time since it was founded in 1998. In September 2012, ECB boss Mario Draghi even announced that he would buy unlimited amounts of government bonds from EU countries .
In connection with the financial crisis from 2007 onwards, Ireland's property bubble burst and Ireland was one of the first industrialized countries to enter a recession in the third quarter of 2007 . In the fourth quarter of 2008 the economy collapsed by 8%. In 2009 the economy contracted again by 7 to 8%.
Whilst there was previously full employment in Ireland, the number of unemployed has now risen to such an extent that Ireland has again developed into a country of emigration.
Due to the Irish financial and banking crisis (particularly the Anglo Irish Bank ), Prime Minister Brian Cowen asked the European Union and the IMF for help on November 21, 2010 .
At a special meeting of the Eurogroup and EU finance ministers on 27./28. November in Brussels it was decided to provide Ireland with loan assistance totaling 85 billion euros over a period of 36 months. Ireland had to pay interest of 5.83 percent (p. A.) For this. Of this total, Ireland itself paid 17.5 billion euros (including through recourse to Ireland's National Pension Reserve Fund / NPRF), which reduced the amount of external aid to 67.5 billion euros.
The external aid amounting to 67.5 billion euros was raised as follows: 22.5 billion euros came from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 22.5 billion euros came from the joint instrument EFSM (European Financial Stability Mechanism) , 17.5 billion euros In addition, euros came from the EFSF (European Financial Stability Fund). In addition, there were bilateral loans from Great Britain, Sweden and Denmark (Great Britain, Sweden and Denmark do not belong to the euro zone, but they participated in the aid because their banks were also heavily involved in Ireland and now benefited from the euro rescue package): Great Britain granted 3.8 billion euros, Sweden 598 million and Denmark 393 million. According to Federal Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble, Germany was involved in the financial aid with around 6.1 billion euros in guarantees. There was no direct payment from Germany.
The loans flowed in installments, with the Eurogroup and the IMF checking at quarterly intervals whether Ireland was complying with the austerity and reconstruction requirements imposed by the lenders .
The means of the rescue package were planned as follows: 50 billion euros to support the Irish budget, 35 billion euros to further stabilize the Irish banking system.
In the negotiations, the Irish government was able to prevail on one point: The corporation tax in Ireland, which is relatively low at 12.5%, will not be increased. In addition, Ireland was given an additional year to bring its budget deficit back below the 3% of GDP limit set in the euro stability criteria. In return for the aid granted, Ireland had already committed itself to a strict austerity course in order to put its public finances back in order. Consolidation measures totaling 15 billion euros should be implemented within the next four years (10 billion euros in spending cuts, 5 billion euros in income / tax increases), 40% of which as early as 2011.
According to IMF calculations, Ireland should succeed in reducing its record deficit from 32% of gross domestic product in 2010 to less than 10.5% in 2011. This forecast did not materialize: the figure reached 13.1% (for comparison: Greece (−9.1%), Spain (−8.5%) and the United Kingdom (−8.3%) followed).
In December 2011 the Irish government presented its seventh austerity package since 2008; Its aim was to further reduce new borrowing for 2012 and save € 3.8 billion. To achieve this goal, the value added tax was raised from 21 to 23 percent and a tax on real estate was created.
In February 2013, the Irish Parliament declared the settlement bank of the Anglo Irish Bank for insolvent . Ireland's central bank took over the state's borrower's note and exchanged it for long-term government bonds, increasing the volume of outstanding government bonds by a quarter to 115 billion euros. For the Irish government this means a 25 year grace period. The first repayment is due in 2038. Irish Prime Minister Enda Kenny expected this measure to bring Ireland's budget deficit down to 2.4% in three years. GDP growth was 4.8% in 2014. The unemployment rate in Ireland was 11.3% in 2014
The Italian government debt ratio is the second highest in the euro area after Greece (data at # Overview ). According to Unicredit , only 42% of Italy's national debt was owned by foreign creditors in 2009 or early 2010, while around 77% of Greek national debt was overseas.
On December 2, 2009, the European Commission found that Italy, along with other countries, had an excessive deficit under Article 104.6 / 126.6 of the EC Treaty and gave the country until 2013 to reduce the national deficit.
In May 2010 the Berlusconi government approved an austerity program worth 62.2 billion euros. As a result, the annual new debt should be reduced below the 3% of GDP limit by 2012 (see Maastricht criteria ). In 2011, the Berlusconi government adopted two further packages of measures. They aimed at further savings and included, among other things, an increase in VAT by one percentage point to 21%.
At the G20 summit in Cannes in October 2011, Italy asked the IMF to send experts to Rome to monitor the Italian austerity measures as a confidence-building measure for the financial markets. On November 16, 2011, Mario Monti became the new Prime Minister and Minister of Economics and Finance of Italy. His cabinet consisted entirely of non-party ministers.
Since Italy has (had) a high mountain of debt and the austerity measures of the Berlusconi government were partially revised, the financial markets assumed in November 2011 that Italy might need help from the EFSF; Italian government bond yields continued to rise. The situation calmed down when EU Economic and Monetary Affairs Commissioner Olli Rehn assured that Italy needed no help.
In December 2011, Monti brought a first reform package through both chambers of the Italian parliament . It was called "Salva Italia" ("Save Italy"). The volume of austerity packages passed by the Berlusconi and Monti governments in 2011 alone rose to 190 billion. In total, the measures decided between 2008 and 2012 amounted to 330 billion euros.
Furthermore, a debt brake (based on the German model) was decided with the aim of achieving a balanced budget by 2013.
In 2011 over 11,000 companies went bankrupt, a record. The measured average income of Italians in 2011 was 19,250 euros. Almost half of the taxpayers, including the self-employed such as innkeepers and retailers, reportedly earned less than 15,000 euros. Shortly after the new government took office, the Guardia di Finanza massively increased its controls and investigations.
The parliamentary elections in Italy 2013 were after the resignation of Monti on the 24./25. February 2013 preferred. Pier Luigi Bersani's center-left coalition won a majority in the Chamber of Deputies ; there was a stalemate in the Senate. Berlusconi's party PdL received 21.56% of the vote. On February 27, 2013, Italy auctioned new government bonds amounting to 6.5 billion euros (whoever offers the least interest wins the bid). The interest on the ten-year papers rose from 4.17% to 4.83%; those for five-year papers from 2.94% to 3.59%.
Two months after the election ( Pier Luigi Bersani , commissioned by the President, was unable to form a government) Enrico Letta was commissioned to form a government. He succeeded in this; a few days later he and his cabinet were sworn in.
In Italy, between 2008 and 2013, 14.1% of trading companies and 22.4% of companies in the construction sector disappeared. The crisis hit the north much more severely than the south, which before 2008 had only very little industrial penetration.
In December 2013 Matteo Renzi (* 1975) became chairman of the social democratic party Partito democratico (PD). Renzi sharply criticizes the fact that the Letta government (in office since April 28, 2013) did not get any closer to the announced reforms - dismantling the excessive bureaucracy, a new labor law, investing in the ailing education system; nor a new electoral law (a main task and legitimation of this coalition, so that future elections do not produce a political stalemate again). Renzi described the ceiling agreed in the EU for the budget deficit of the member states as "anachronistic"; the Letta government should simply ignore them.
One day after an internal party vote in the PD on February 13, 2014 (Renzi had called for a new government), Letta and his cabinet resigned. The Renzi cabinet was sworn in on February 22, 2014. In June 2014, the EU Commission asked the governments of Italy and France ( Cabinet Valls I ) to improve their budgets for 2015.
After taking office, Renzi promised to implement a monthly reform. He revised this plan because many reforms were being negotiated in the two chambers of parliament.
In May 2015, Parliament approved Renzi's electoral reform. The aim is to achieve more stable governments in Italy. After the reform, the party that received more than 40% of the vote in the election will get 340 of the 630 seats in parliament. If neither party manages this hurdle, there will be a runoff election .
With 480.9 billion euros (as of Ø Aug. 2018), Italy has by far the largest TARGET2 liabilities, which increased particularly strongly from mid-2014 to the beginning of 2017.
Correction of deficit figures and first government austerity package (2010)
In November 2009 the Portuguese government adjusted its budget and put the deficit expected by the end of the year at eight percent. At the same time, several rating agencies gave Portuguese government bonds a negative outlook at the end of 2009. In early 2010, the eight percent estimate also turned out to be too optimistic, with the actual value being 9.3%. In February 2010, after long discussions, the Portuguese Parliament approved the budget for 2012 in principle, according to which the budget deficit should be reduced to around eight percent. On March 6th, the Portuguese government decided on an austerity package. Among other things, this envisaged freezing salaries in the public sector, reducing tax exemptions and cutting social spending; Trade unions had already called for several strikes in advance. Nonetheless, at the end of March , the Fitch rating agency downgraded the credit rating again with a negative outlook (from AA to AA−) with reference to the high deficit figures for 2009. At the end of April 2010, Standard & Poor’s followed suit by downgrading by two notches, after a significant increase in yields on Portuguese government bonds had occurred in the meantime. In mid-May, the government decided to take further austerity measures, including increasing sales and corporate taxes, to help reduce the deficit more quickly. At the end of May 2010, one of the largest strikes in the country to date took place, involving several hundred thousand workers, which was directed against the austerity measures.
The development of yields on Portuguese government bonds calmed down somewhat towards mid-2010, also against the background that the four large Portuguese financial institutions did not need to recapitalize on the basis of the stress test published by the ECB at the end of July.
On September 29, 2010, ahead of a meeting of EU finance ministers, the government announced that it would once again tighten the austerity program; the European institutions welcomed the further austerity efforts. After weeks of negotiations between the minority government of the Social Democratic PS and the Christian Democratic-Conservative PSD , a compromise was reached at the end of October on the details of the austerity measures planned in the budget for 2011, which finally passed through Parliament on November 3rd. In addition to further cuts in social benefits, the measures included, among other things, a step-by-step reduction in salaries in the public sector, an increase in VAT by a further two percentage points and, instead of the previously planned freezing of salaries in the public sector, a reduction in the same. The decision was not able to calm the financial markets immediately - the yield on ten-year bonds reached a new high for the year the next day. In mid-December, ahead of an EU summit, the cabinet decided on a reform package comprising 50 individual measures. On December 23, Fitch corrected its valuation of Portuguese government bonds, which had already been reduced in March, downwards again; the agency justified its step with the further slowed down reduction of the current account deficit and the loss of attractiveness of the financial center.
Resignation of the government and requests for help to the Eurogroup (2011)
Around the turn of the year rumors increased that Portugal would have to follow suit Greece and Ireland in their requests for financial aid from the euro zone, especially after Portuguese government bonds hit a new high in the euro zone in early January. The government around Prime Minister José Sócrates repeatedly rejected this. On January 27, the yield on 10-year bonds exceeded the seven percent mark, which is often viewed as the sustainability limit. After the trend had continued, the European Central Bank resumed its bond purchases on February 10, after weeks of abstinence, and intervened in the market for Portuguese government bonds. In order to regain confidence in one's own solvency, the Portuguese government offered to buy back outstanding bonds on February 16; As the government had hoped, the offer was hardly taken up.
Meanwhile, Portugal was increasingly countering a government crisis. Prime Minister Sócrates announced his resignation in the event that parliament refuses to approve a new government austerity package. The government's defeat in the vote was followed by the resignation of the prime minister on March 23, whereupon the risk premiums again reached a European high (Sócrates remained in office until the new elections in early June). Standard & Poor’s lowered Portugal’s credit rating to the last level before it slipped into junk status. In this climate, the ECB again made extensive purchases of Portuguese bonds at the end of March.
After the yield on ten-year bonds had risen above the ten percent mark in early April as a result of another downgrade by Moody’s , the Portuguese Finance Minister Fernando Teixeira announced on April 6 that it was “necessary” to switch to the “European Union available funding mechanisms ”. Negotiations on this with representatives of the European Commission, the ECB and the IMF began on April 18 and culminated in an agreement on an aid package worth 78 billion euros at the beginning of May. Among other things, it provided for workers in the public sector to forego wage increases until 2013, as well as a special tax on pension entitlements of 1,500 euros per month and a limitation of the payment of unemployment benefits to 18 months. 12 of the 78 billion were earmarked for recapitalizing the banking system. Portugal pledged to return to a deficit of three percent of gross domestic product by 2013 and was able to achieve this for the first time in 2016.
After it became clear that Portugal would achieve the reduction in the budget deficit to 5.9% planned for 2011, the country's financial situation eased significantly.
In May 2013, Portugal successfully placed ten-year government bonds (for the first time since spring 2011, when the Troika put together the € 78 billion aid package for Portugal). The constitutional court ruled that the initiative to cut pensions and public salaries was unconstitutional. Soon after, it was revealed that the budget deficit was 10.7 percent for the first quarter. The prospects of reducing the 2013 annual deficit to 5.5 percent as planned dwindled. A government crisis began in Portugal in mid-2013: First Finance Minister Vítor Gaspar submitted a resignation, then Foreign Minister Paulo Portas . Prime Minister was Pedro Passos Coelho . In the second quarter of 2013, the gross domestic product grew by 1.1 percent (more than anywhere else in the euro area). Portugal also managed to increase competitiveness and overcome the chronic deficit in the current account within two years. Nonetheless, interest rates on ten-year Portuguese government bonds rose from 5.23 percent in May to over seven percent in September due to the political crisis. Before the summer, the country could still issue five- and ten-year bonds; it has been temporarily excluded from the market since a government crisis in June. The three-year rescue program for Portugal ended in May 2014. The budget deficit fell to 4.5% of GDP in 2014, and in June 2015 Portugal paid ten-year government bonds with a yield of 2.6%.
In spring 2017, Prime Minister António Costa's socialist government recorded the lowest budget deficit since the Carnation Revolution of 1974, at 2.1%, for 2016 . The debts were still at 130% of the gross domestic product, but with a further downward trend. In contrast, yields on ten-year government bonds rose further and stood at 4.06% in March.
In addition, the government was again able to repay debts to the IMF ahead of schedule, from which a third of the rescue loans came. The country had thus already repaid half of the IMF funds in spring 2017.
Spain is the fourth largest economy in the euro zone (after Germany, France and Italy) and was the twelfth largest in the world in 2011 .
Bursting the real estate bubble
Between 1996 and 2006 the Spanish real estate market was in an expansion phase with sharply rising prices. This development caused the share of the construction and real estate sector to swell to around 18% of Spanish GDP (2007), and it was this sector of the economy that contributed significantly to the above-average economic growth. However, a so-called real estate bubble formed .
In 2007, at the same time as the global financial crisis began , the Spanish real estate bubble burst too. The Spanish economy fell into recession and unemployment rose.
To date (2013), many Spanish banks have large sums of bad loans on their books. In May 2012, the International Bankers Association (IIF) estimated their volume at up to 260 billion euros. "According to the IIF, they can raise 184 billion euros of this - there is a gap of 76 billion euros."
Economic stimulus programs
The Spanish government decided on several extensive economic stimulus programs from the beginning of 2008 . In doing so, she wanted to counteract an economic downturn with rapidly rising unemployment.
In April 2008, the Zapatero government, re-elected in the parliamentary elections on March 9, 2008 , launched a program that for 2008 and 2009 provided economic stimulus for the economy totaling around 18 billion euros. The program included, among other things, tax refunds to low-wage earners and pensioners in the amount of 400 euros each. The minimum wage should be increased. The wealth tax should be abolished in 2009. Further investments should be made to improve the infrastructure and to build social housing.
In August 2008, the Spanish government passed another economic stimulus package that included spending of 20 billion euros in 2009 and 2010. The money should flow into social housing and help medium and small companies out of liquidity bottlenecks . On 3 November 2008 a two-year reprieve for 50% was for their retirees, the unemployed and self-employed without income mortgage payments decreed .
At the end of November 2008, a new economic stimulus package worth 11 billion euros was launched, including public contracts worth 8 billion euros. Up to 300,000 new jobs were to be created in 2009 through funding for infrastructure projects and funding for the auto industry (800 million euros). This economic stimulus package was part of the proposal proposed by the European Commission at the end of November in view of the effects of the financial crisis in the USA on the European economy. December 2008 adopted by the European Council, Europe-wide program to stimulate the economy totaling around 200 billion euros. At the end of December 2008, an additional increase in pensions by 2.4 to 7.2% and an increase in the statutory minimum wage by 4% to 624 euros (with 14 monthly salaries) were decreed.
On January 12, 2009, the Zapatero government finally presented “Plan E” ( Plan Español para el Estímulo de la Economía y el Empleo - Spanish plan to stimulate the economy and employment ). “Plan E” bundled more than 80 individual measures, some of which had already been planned for 2008/2009, with a total value of over 70 billion euros. According to the EU, the entirety of the projects represented the largest economic recovery plan within the EU.
All these programs did not solve the structural problems of the Spanish economy; for a while they prevented unemployment from rising even more dramatically.
The increased government spending on the various stabilization programs with the simultaneous increasing use of social benefits led to a widening of the budget deficit and increased national debt. The government was forced to take out new loans totaling over 220 billion euros. As a result of this development, the EU Commission initiated an excessive deficit procedure against Spain.
Savings / cuts
In June 2009, the Spanish Economy and Finance Minister Elena Salgado announced drastic cuts in 2010 government spending. In September 2009 the first concrete measures to be taken were announced. In total, the state should have 11 billion more income from increases in VAT and capital gains tax. In addition, expenditure in the state budget should be reduced by 3.9% compared to 2009.
At the end of January 2010, Madrid presented an unprecedented austerity program for the next three years. With budget cuts of 50 billion euros and tax increases, Spain's budget deficit, which last stood at 11.2% of GDP, should be reduced to 9.3% in 2010 and 6% in 2011. In 2013 the EU limit of 3% should then be complied with again.
In May 2010 - after the countries of the euro zone averted a bankruptcy of Greece - the government announced further cuts of 15 billion euros by 2011. On May 27, 2010, this new spending reduction package was passed by the Spanish Parliament with a narrow majority (1 vote).
The cuts and savings in detail: Government investments are to be cut by a good 6 billion in 2010 and 2011. The ministers should receive a 15 percent lower wage. The salaries of public sector employees are to be reduced by 5% in 2010. In 2011, salaries are to be frozen. 13,000 positions are to be cut in the public sector. The birth bonus of 2500 euros each is to be discontinued from 2011. The pensions are not to be increased in 2011 (zero round), with the exception of the minimum pensions. The early retirement to be difficult. In the healthcare sector, lower drug prices are intended to reduce costs. The regional governments are to contribute a further 1.2 billion euros in cuts.
Early elections were held in Spain on November 20, 2011 . Prime Minister Zapatero - he came into office after the elections on March 14, 2004 , was re-elected in March 2008 - announced on July 29, 2011 that new elections would be four months early and announced that he would not run again for the office of district president. The conservative PP under Mariano Rajoy won an absolute majority in parliament and formed a new government.
At the beginning of July 2012, the European finance ministers gave Spain a longer period of time to reduce new debt. In spring, the target for the Spanish budget deficit had already been raised from 4.4 to 5.3% by the end of 2012. It was then increased again to 6.3%. Spain should no longer - as originally announced - push its new debt below the EU ceiling of 3% in 2013, but only in 2014. The delay was justified with the deep recession and the numerous reform measures that the government has already implemented. In August 2012, Rajoy tightened his austerity rate (from 65 billion euros to around 102 billion euros). He was reacting primarily to the significantly higher interest rates that Spain had to pay on new borrowing.
The EU has been demanding pension reform from Spain for years. In September 2013, the government plans to stop pensions automatically from rising with the inflation rate. This should save 30–33 billion euros over ten years. Instead, future increases should be linked to a complex formula. For the first time, the number of pensioners and the financial situation of the social security funds should be included. Rajoy (as of mid-September 2013) dropped a faster increase in the retirement age from the current age of 65 to 67 years.
Labor market reforms
Urged by the European Commission and the IMF to make the rigid working regulations more flexible, the Zapatero minority government implemented a reform in this area.
With the reform, the protection against dismissal was relaxed in order to create incentives for more open-ended employment contracts. In Spain at that time around 25% of all employment contracts were fixed-term ; one of the highest percentages in the EU. Following the example of the German system of short-time work , the law provides for the possibility that companies may modify working hours and, similarly, wages in economically difficult times. Firms that employ and train young people should receive tax breaks. State subsidies for social security contributions are intended to encourage companies to employ long-term unemployed people and unemployed young people in particular.
The IMF forecast that Spain will achieve its stated goal of reducing the budget deficit in 2011 to 6.0% (2010: 9.2%) of GDP. This forecast turned out to be wrong after the end of the year: The state's new debt amounted to 8.51% of the gross domestic product (GDP) in 2011, said Finance Minister Cristóbal Montoro . This means that the previously stated target for 2012 - 4.4% of GDP - is practically unattainable.
On June 14, 2012, the IMF signaled in a statement (“2012 Article IV Consultation with Spain Concluding Statement of IMF Mission”) that it would recommend further reductions in salaries .
Help for ailing banks
On June 9, 2012, the euro finance ministers promised the Spanish government a lump sum loan of a maximum of 100 billion euros for their banks in a conference call. At this point in time, the exact financial needs of the Spanish banks had not yet been determined. The legally binding loan agreement is to be adopted at a (further) Euro Group meeting on July 20, 2012. 30 billion euros could be transferred to the Fondo de Reestructuración Ordenada Bancaria (FROB) by the end of July 2012 . Spain's ailing banks are only to be given the opportunity to avail themselves of the prospect of euro aid after they have made extensive write-downs . I.a. the banks should first write off their preferred shares and subordinated paper in full. "Before government support is contingent on banks and their shareholders will accept the losses and ensure that the transfer of losses of equity and hybrid capital to be fully implemented instruments." The Spanish banks have debt worth about 670 billion euros in the portfolio , a Most of it was issued to retail investors. The German Bundestag approved the aid to Spain on July 19, 2012 (PlenProt in Drs. 17/189).
In August 2013, the Central Bank of Spain announced that bad loans on the balance sheets of Spanish banks had risen to record levels; the share of receivables at risk of default in the total credit volume increased from 11.2 percent (May 2013) to 11.6 percent in June 2013. This value is the highest in Spain since the surveys began. Apparently the effect of the creation of a state “bad bank” (it is called SAREB = Sociedad de Gestión de Activos de la Reestructuración Bancaria) has largely fizzled out.
Aid in four installments
The emergency loans of up to 100 billion euros for ailing Spanish banks were to be split into four tranches and paid out to the FROB between July 2012 and June 2013, supplemented by an extra buffer for a bad bank . This emerges from a document by the EFSF that was announced (made public) on July 9, 2012. At the end of July 2012, the first tranche of 30 billion euros should be paid. Two thirds of this should be made available to ailing credit institutions for equity injections. For example, on September 3, 2012 , Bankia received € 4.5 billion. The bank reported losses of 4.45 billion euros in the first half of 2012. The remaining 10 billion euros are intended to serve as a "long-term safety buffer".
The second installment should amount to 45 billion euros and be transferred in mid-November 2012 after the bank stress tests have been completed. The third installment should flow in late December 2012 to support banks that failed the stress test. The last payment should be made in June 2013 and go to institutions that have not yet built up a sufficient equity base. The establishment of a bad bank for “scrap paper” was also planned for the end of November . This institution ( Asset Management Company - AMC ) should be provided with 25 billion euros.
All this aid should not be counted towards the national debt of the country, so that “Spain has further access to the financial market” . As soon as the ESM was operational, the loans should be transferred from the EFSF to the ESM .
On October 22, 2012, Eurostat announced that Spain had additional debt of 100.4 billion euros (9.4% of GDP) in 2011. In a first calculation in April, the statisticians estimated 91.3 billion euros (8.5%).
Republic of Cyprus
|Feb. 24, 2011||A2|
|30th Mar 2011||A–|
|May 31, 2011||A−|
|July 27, 2011||Baa1|
|July 29, 2011||BBB +|
|Aug 10, 2011||BBB|
|Oct. 27, 2011||BBB|
|Nov 4, 2011||Baa3|
|Jan. 13, 2012||BB +|
|Jan. 27, 2012||BBB−|
|13 Mar 2012||Ba1|
|June 13, 2012||Ba3|
|June 25, 2012||BB +|
|Aug 1, 2012||BB|
|Oct 8, 2012||B3|
|Oct 17, 2012||B.|
|Nov 21, 2012||BB–|
|Dec 20, 2012||CCC +|
|Jan. 10, 2013||Caa3|
|Jan. 28, 2013||B.|
|21 Mar 2013||CCC|
|3rd June 2013||CCC|
|June 28, 2013||RD||SD|
|3rd July 2013||CCC +|
|5th July 2013||CCC|
Initial downgrades, entanglement with Greece and emergency loans from Russia
The Cypriot economy was repeatedly affected by the problems there, in particular due to its links with the Greek financial system. For example, the rating agency Moody’s lowered the country 's credit rating by two notches to A2 in February 2011, referring to doubts about international competitiveness and close ties between Cypriot banks and Greece. Fitch, in turn, also downgraded its credit rating in mid-2011, particularly because around a third of the assets in the Cypriot banking system were directly related to the Greek market; Standard & Poor’s did the same several times. A serious explosion at a military base in July 2011, which destroyed the country's largest power station, not only resulted in considerable real economic damage, which was responsible for repeated devaluations, but also plunged the Republic of Cyprus into a political crisis, in which Follow the entire government resigned at the request of the head of state. In the middle of the year there was a sharp rise in the yields of Cypriot government bonds; after yields on ten-year government bonds had been just over 4% by then, they rose to around 11.5% by August 2, whereupon the Bank of Cyprus, the country's largest bank, warned that the Republic of Cyprus would soon need to use the EFSF.
On August 26, 2011, the Cypriot parliament passed a 3% wage cut for government employees to support the budgetary position, as well as a wage freeze for public sector employees who are about to retire. At the beginning of October, the Ministry of Finance was able to announce the commitment of a loan of 2.5 billion euros from Russia (at a moderate interest rate of 4.5% p. A., Reduced to 2.5% p. A. In mid-2013), which was disbursed in tranches from December. Regardless of this, several rating agencies further downgraded the Republic of Cyprus in the light of increased risks from Greek government bonds, a still strained budget situation in the Republic of Cyprus and a fragile banking system (see below). At the beginning of December 2011, it was decided to raise the sales tax from 15% to 17%.
Utilization of ELA from April 2012 and negotiations on direct EU aid
Even if the European Union or the Eurogroup initially failed to provide rescue packages, the European Central Bank (via the National Bank of the Republic of Cyprus) supported the Cypriot banking system with several billion euros from April 2012 as part of the Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA), according to estimates.
On 25 June 2012, the Republic turned Cyprus, whose ten-year bonds, meanwhile, by all three major rating agencies as "junk" (English junk classified), the fifth euro zone country an application for aid from the euro crisis fund. On the one hand, the application was made against the background of the existing burdens, but was specifically the result of new requirements for the core capital ratio of Cypriot banks by the European Banking Authority (EBA), which demanded a ratio of 9% for the Republic of Cyprus from 30 June; as a result, the country's second largest bank, the Cyprus Popular Bank (“Laiki”), had to raise around 1.8 billion euros - almost a tenth of the Cypriot gross domestic product. The subsequent negotiations on the amount of aid and the associated conditions turned out to be difficult, however, and an agreement was only reached in March 2013 (see the next but one section). The Cypriot government, which was initially also in parallel negotiations with Russia and China, repeatedly rejected the austerity proposals of the Troika delegation made up of experts from the EU Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund and was also in disagreement with them about the causes of problems; Furthermore, concerns in some European parliaments weighed on the discussions that possible support would also benefit the holders of Russian black money accounts.
Doubts about the sustainability of the banking system and ties to Russia
Even at the beginning of the refinancing difficulties in 2011, the Cypriot banking system was repeatedly criticized for being unsustainable. For example, the volume of deposits under the protective umbrella of deposit insurance exceeded the country's total gross domestic product by 20%, which raised doubts about the reliability of the commitments. In addition, the banking system is disproportionately large compared to the country's economic strength; According to estimates by Standard & Poor’s on the occasion of a downgrade in 2011, the assets of the banks amounted to eight to nine times the gross domestic product.
In addition to the previously low corporate income tax in the Republic of Cyprus, there is a double taxation agreement between Russia and the Republic of Cyprus with low taxation of capital income from mutual transactions. This is also the subject of widespread speculation. According to a secret report by the German Federal Intelligence Service (BND) published in the German magazine Der Spiegel in autumn 2012, Russian citizens are said to have deposits of 26 billion euros in the Republic of Cyprus. In a statement from March 2013, Credit Suisse assumes that of the 32 billion euros in deposits that come from non-EU citizens, the majority will be held by Russians; According to media reports, Moody's estimates the volume at around 15 billion euros. Many Russian businessmen have preferred to invest their money in the Republic of Cyprus for decades, partly to avoid political uncertainty in Russia. Figures from Barclays. According to which around 42% of Cypriot deposits are in accounts with more than 500,000 euros, this should underline this importance.
According to reports, the Republic of Cyprus plays a bigger role for investors and traders who conduct transactions via the Republic of Cyprus, among other things in order to benefit from the very low - but partly increased in the course of the crisis - taxation on capital gains and dividend payments; According to the Financial Times , the volume of investment transactions between Russia and the Republic of Cyprus in 2012 was over 90 billion euros. According to the New York Times, Morgan Stanley estimates that about a quarter of Russia's foreign direct investment flows through the Republic of Cyprus. In addition, it is assumed, not only by the Federal Intelligence Service, that the Republic of Cyprus also acts as an arena for money laundering in many cases .
The situation came to a head in March 2013 and an agreement was reached between the Troika and the Cypriot government
On March 16, 2013 (Saturday), the finance ministers of the euro zone finally agreed with the Cypriot negotiators in the presence of the IMF on a rescue package worth EUR 10 billion. The volume thus fell well short of the previously prevailing expectations of around 17 billion euros. According to the decision, in return for the funds made available, Nicosia should share the costs with bank customers amounting to almost 5.8 billion euros; For this purpose, a one-off “stability tax” was planned, which should have been levied on deposits of up to 100,000 euros in the amount of 6.75%, above that in the amount of 9.9% - in return, it was planned to compensate those affected with bank shares of the same value . In order to prevent the large-scale withdrawal of deposits, the Cypriot government, together with the ECB, ensured that no more large electronic transactions could be made. According to a statement by the President of the Republic of Cyprus, Nikos Anastasiadis , on the day of the decision, the Cypriot approval was given in the face of the threat by the ECB not to make the liquidity provided via ELA available to the Cyprus Popular Bank ; He stated that the Republic of Cyprus had been faced with the choice between a "catastrophic scenario of disorderly national bankruptcy or a scenario of painful but controlled handling of the crisis". The participation of bank customers with deposits of less than 100,000 euros in the 5.8 billion to be raised was, according to several media referring to negotiating participants, primarily due to the consideration of the Cypriot government that a burden on wealthy deposit customers of over 10% could lead to a comprehensive capital withdrawal from the Republic of Cyprus.
Parliament was scheduled to approve the agreement on the following Monday (March 18) - a bank holiday. While the government was already conducting renegotiations, the parliament rejected the slightly modified proposal (accounts with less than 20,000 euros should be excluded, which only amounted to around 300 million euros) on Tuesday night with 36 votes against and 19 abstentions; There were no princes. Shortly before it had already been announced that the banks would be closed up to and including Thursday (March 21); the date was later moved up to Tuesday (March 26th) and then to Thursday (March 28th). The Governing Council increased the pressure on March 21 by formally announcing that the ELA credit lines (the exact extent of which is still unknown) will only be granted until Monday, March 25, and that they will be renewed without a corresponding restructuring program Excluded banks. The Cypriot parliament then passed a package of measures on March 22nd, which among other things authorizes the restructuring of the Cyprus Popular Bank , problematic papers to be outsourced to a bad bank and non-endangered accounts of the largest bank in the country, the Bank of Cyprus, to be transferred; It also authorized the establishment of new, expanded capital controls with the aim of preventing transactions.
An agreement between the Republic of Cyprus and the Troika was reached on March 25th. It provides for the liquidation of the Cyprus Popular Bank and forcibly and completely to outsource deposits from Cypriot citizens with a volume of more than 100,000 euros - a total of 4.2 billion euros - to a bad bank to be resolved, so that the possibility of a complete loss for them Depositor exists; Deposits of less than 100,000 euros will not be used under the agreement, for which the parties involved do not require parliamentary approval due to the resolutions of March 22 (see above), but will be transferred to the Bank of Cyprus , which will be downsized, restructured and should be recapitalized. Deposits in the Bank of Cyprus of over 100,000 euros are meanwhile frozen and will probably later be part of the costs. The Popular Bank's ELA emergency loans amounting to an estimated EUR 9 billion will also be transferred to the Bank of Cyprus . In contrast to the earlier proposal, which was rejected by Parliament, on the one hand only bank customers with larger deposits are affected, on the other hand the measures do not affect all depositors, but only those of the two largest banks in the country. In addition, there is a participation of the shareholders and creditors ( junior and senior ) in the Popular Bank, which will initially be used in full and only later may get money back from the bankruptcy estate. As a result of the agreement, the ECB announced during the day that it would no longer stand in the way of an extension of the ELA loans by the Cypriot central bank.
10 billion aid package from ESM and IMF in mid-2013
At the end of March and mid-April 2013, the Eurogroup approved (with the subsequent approval of the national parliaments surveyed) a new aid loan for the Republic of Cyprus; 9 billion euros will be granted to the Republic of Cyprus in tranches by the European Stability Mechanism (ESM); a further billion will be contributed under the plan by the International Monetary Fund (which later sealed the decision by board resolution). In the light of this aid program, the Republic of Cyprus had already relaxed the restrictions on capital movements at the beginning of April. The Cypriot parliament narrowly approved the memorandum at the end of April; previously, further cuts in public sector salaries and a special tax on property were decided on the Cypriot side. The ECB initiated the step to revise the decision on the non-acceptance of Cypriot government bonds as collateral. Also at the end of April, the Cypriot government relaxed the capital controls and largely lifted them for foreign customers of non-Cypriot banks in the Republic of Cyprus. After further measures required under the moratorium were implemented on the Cypriot side (including the increase in the corporate tax rate from 10% to 12.5% and the increase in the taxation of interest income from 15% to 30%), the Republic of Cyprus received on May 13th the first part of the first tranche (2 billion euros) by the ESM.
The President of the Republic of Cyprus, Nikos Anastasiadis, wrote a letter to the Troika in mid-June, in which he severely criticized the measures that had been decided and, in particular, the involvement of bank creditors and uninsured depositors, which was carried out “without careful preparation”. He also sought long-term liquidity support from the Bank of Cyprus , which had taken over large parts of the balance sheet of the liquidated Cyprus Popular Bank (see above). He justified the need with the bank's thin liquidity position and its importance for the positive development of the Cypriot economy. A strong Bank of Cypris is essential for the rescue program to succeed. The proposals were rejected by the Eurogroup.
Lawsuit filed by Cypriot savers against the ECB and the EU Commission
Savers from Cyprus, who as customers of the nationalized Laiki Bank and the Bank of Cyprus had lost a large part of their assets due to the compulsory levy, sued the European Court of Justice against the ECB and the EU Commission in 2014 and demanded compensation. In September 2016, the ECJ rejected the lawsuit.
Slovenia was the first new member state to introduce the euro after enlarging the EU in 2004 ; it replaced the tolar on January 1, 2007 .
As a result of the financial crisis from 2007 onwards, the economy contracted by 7.9% in 2009, but a lasting recession did not set in.
Most of Slovenia's banks are state-owned; they issued loans totaling 7 billion euros. That corresponds to about a fifth of the country's economic output. According to the IMF, the three largest banks in the country will need around 1 billion euros to recapitalize in 2013. Central bank president Marko Kranjec recommended to the government in office since March 2013, led by Alenka Bratušek , to found a bad bank, to reorganize the state budget and to privatize banks and other companies. As a result of the crisis, the national debt rose from 22% of the gross domestic product in 2008 to 62.6% in the second quarter of 2013.
On April 10, 2013, Slovenia was unable to place as many new government bonds as planned. A week later, however, the country placed more than twice as much as planned in an auction of 18-month bonds worth 1.1 billion euros. The repayment of the loans due in June 2013 was thus secured. Nonetheless, on April 30, 2013 , the US rating agency Moody’s downgraded Slovenia's creditworthiness to “Ba1”, the first level of the speculative area (junk level).
Discussion about German unit labor costs
Just a few years after the introduction of the euro, voices were raised that indicated that the economic problems of the southern European states were also caused by the economic development of Germany. According to Heiner Flassbeck , Germany is permanently falling below the development of unit labor costs dictated by the target inflation rate , since the ratio of real wages and productivity in Germany is falling, which is reflected in a change in the terms of trade with partner countries. However, since there is no longer any compensation within the euro area through a change in exchange rates, those member states of the monetary union that already have limited competitiveness and whose unit wage costs rose in line with target inflation would be forced into a high foreign trade deficit and thus into a budget deficit in the long term. In this context, the low wage increases in Germany and, in this context, the measures to make the labor market more flexible, were ascribed a cause of the economic problems in the euro area.
The President of the European Commission José Manuel Barroso rejected the allegations that Germany had caused the EU's economic problems because of its export strength, because, in his opinion, Germany was the engine of growth. Rather, it is the countries that are responsible for the macroeconomic imbalances in the euro zone that have lived beyond their means and have not respected the budgetary rules of the Stability Pact.
In 2013, EU Social Commissioner László Andor called for a move away from the German model of concentrating on exports and keeping wages moderate in order to compete internationally. "The Commission recommends Germany to stimulate domestic demand through higher wages and introduce broad-based minimum wages." The general minimum wage was in Germany, which came into force by 1 January 2015 minimum wage law introduced. In addition, there have always been statutory minimum wages and lower wages in the individual sectors in Germany .
The German Business Institute, which is close to the employer, contradicted the statement that unit labor costs in Germany were too low. In an international comparison, Germany has one of the highest unit labor costs and important competitors such as the USA and Japan even produce a quarter cheaper. In addition, not only are German exports at a record level, but also imports - the companies in Germany obtain a lot of intermediate inputs from abroad and thus stimulate demand there.
Georg Erber pointed out that the increased competitiveness of Germany due to a lower increase in unit labor costs did not lead to a disproportionate increase in Germany's exports to the euro area. Instead, Germany's exports to countries outside the eurozone increased significantly more than within the eurozone. For the German economy, it is not price competitiveness that is decisive as a competitive factor, but specialization in capital goods and durable consumer goods (e.g. automobiles) as well as high quality standards and the ability to innovate.
Heiner Flassbeck counters this argument by stating that not only the direct trade relations between Germany and the other euro countries are decisive, but so-called “third-market effects” also play a major role.
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- ↑ Spelling according to Duden : Euro crisis , cf. Entry in Duden .
- ↑ a b Advisory Council on the Assessment of Macroeconomic Development : After the EU Summit: Using Time for Long-Term Solutions (PDF; 734 kB), July 5, 2012, p. 1; Jay C. Shambaugh, The Euro's Three Crises in: David H. Romer, Justin Wolfers, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity , Spring 2012, p. 159.
- ↑ Revisiting the effective exchange rates of the Euro (PDF, p. 29 ff.) Martin Schmitz, Maarten De Clercq, Michael Fidora, Bernadette Lauro, Cristina Pinheiro, ECB Occasional Paper Series No. 134 / June 2012, p. 27 ff.
- ↑ Jamal Ibrahim Haidar: Sovereign Credit Risk in the Eurozone . In: World Economics. Volume 13, No. 1, 2012, pp. 123-136.
- ↑ Clas Wihlborg, Thomas D. Willett, Nan Zhang: The Euro Crisis: It Isn't Just Fiscal and it Doesn't Just Involve Greece , September 8, 2010, Claremont McKenna College Robert Day School of Economics and Finance Research Paper No. 2011-03, SSRN and doi: 10.2139 / ssrn.1776133
- ↑ Robert Boyer: The euro crisis: undetected by conventional economics, favored by nationally focused polity , Cambridge Journal of Economics, 2013, Vol. 37, Issue 3, pp. 533-569, doi: 10.1093 / cje / bet013
- ^ Rainer Maurer: The fairy tale of the Nordic savers and the southern spendthrifts. In: Ökonomenstimme. Online , accessed March 24, 2013; Reinhard Gerhold: Purchasing power parity as a link between real and monetary foreign trade theory. Metropolis, Marburg 1999, p. 139.
- ↑ Classically on this Olivier Blanchard and Francesco Giavazzi: Current Account Deficits in the Euro Area. The End of the Feldstein-Horioka Puzzle? In: Brookings papers on economic activity. 2002, No. 2, pp. 147-186 JSTOR ; also as working paper, September 2002, online ( page no longer available , search in web archives ) Info: The link was automatically marked as defective. Please check the link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. (PDF; 544 kB).
- ↑ On the integration process within the Eurozone, cf. Tullio Jappelli and Marco Pagano: Financial market integration under EMU. In: Marco Buti, Servaas Deroose, Vitor Gaspar and João N. Martins (eds.): The Euro. The First Decade. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2010, ISBN 978-92-79-09842-0 , pp. 315–353, here in particular pp. 315–329.
- ↑ For example Krugman: End this depression now! 2012, Chapter 9; Francesco Giavazzi and Luigi Spaventa: Why the current account matters in a monetary union. Lessons from the financial crisis in the Euro area. Discussion paper, September 2010, online (PDF; 660 kB), accessed on June 21, 2012; Florence Jaumotte and Piyaporn Sodsriwiboon: Current Account Imbalances in the Southern Euro Area. IMF Working Paper, WP / 10/139, 2010, Online (PDF; 1.3 MB), accessed June 21, 2012; Deutsche Bundesbank : Monthly report. No. 10, October 2012, online (PDF) accessed on October 23, 2012, p. 15.
- ^ Francesco Giavazzi and Luigi Spaventa: Why the current account matters in a monetary union. Lessons from the financial crisis in the Euro area. Discussion paper, September 2010, online (PDF; 660 kB), accessed on June 21, 2012; Florence Jaumotte and Piyaporn Sodsriwiboon: Current Account Imbalances in the Southern Euro Area. IMF Working Paper, WP / 10/139, 2010, Online (PDF; 1.3 MB), accessed June 21, 2012.
- ^ Francesco Giavazzi and Luigi Spaventa: Why the current account matters in a monetary union. Lessons from the financial crisis in the Euro area. Discussion paper, September 2010, online (PDF; 660 kB), accessed on June 21, 2012; Florence Jaumotte and Piyaporn Sodsriwiboon: Current Account Imbalances in the Southern Euro Area. IMF Working Paper, WP / 10/139, 2010, Online (PDF; 1.3 MB), accessed June 21, 2012; Martin S. Feldstein : The Euro and European Economic Conditions. NBER Working Paper No. 17617, online (PDF) accessed June 21, 2012.
- ↑ Note that between saving and negative investment there is, ceteris paribus, a positive relationship to the current account or a positive relationship to the net capital inflow. According to a common simplification, Y = C + I + G + NX ( Y: production or income, C: consumption expenditure, G: government expenditure, NX: net exports) and at the same time Y - T = S + C ( T: taxes; S: private saving) - the disposable income Y − T is either saved or used for consumption purposes. Both equations result in S = I + (G − T) + NX, the so-called savings equation of the open economy: Investment expenditure, the state budget deficit and net exports must be financed from private savings. Changeover yields S + (T – G) = NX + I. From this it can be seen that a decrease in savings must be reflected either in a decrease in investment or in a deterioration in the current account.
- ↑ The current account is always the complement to the balance of payments: A balance of payments surplus always corresponds to a current account deficit of the same amount (double entry).
- ↑ On this development, see the overview in Jakob de Haan: Inflation Differentials in the Euro Area: A Survey. In: Jakob de Haan and Helge Berger (eds.): The European Central Bank at Ten. Springer, Heidelberg a. a. 2010, ISBN 978-3-642-14236-9 , pp. 11-32, doi : 10.1007 / 978-3-642-14237-6_2
- ↑ Jörg Bibow, The euro debt crisis and Germany's euro trilemma (PDF) Working Papers, Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, 2012, p. 14.
- ↑ Ökonomenstimme, Rainer Maurer, The fairy tale of the Nordic savers and the southern wasters
- ^ On the above, inter alia, Francesco Giavazzi and Luigi Spaventa: Why the current account matters in a monetary union. Lessons from the financial crisis in the Euro area. Discussion paper, September 2010, online (PDF; 660 kB), accessed on June 21, 2012; Florence Jaumotte and Piyaporn Sodsriwiboon: Current Account Imbalances in the Southern Euro Area. IMF Working Paper, WP / 10/139, 2010, Online (PDF; 1.3 MB), accessed June 21, 2012; Martin S. Feldstein : The Euro and European Economic Conditions. NBER Working Paper No. 17617, online (PDF) accessed June 21, 2012; Paul Krugman : Anatomy of a Euromess. In: The Conscience of a Liberal. Blog, New York Times, February 9, 2011, online , accessed June 21, 2012; also Ders .: End this depression now! 2012, chap. 9; Hans-Werner Sinn , Teresa Buchen and Timo Wollmershäuser: Trade Imbalances - Causes, Consequences and Policy Measures. Ifo's Statement for the Camdessus Commission. Accessed online (PDF) on June 26, 2012; also Hans-Werner Sinn: Germany's capital exports under the euro. In: vox.eu. Online , accessed June 28, 2012; Daniel Gros: External versus domestic debt in the euro crisis. In: vox.eu. Online , accessed June 28, 2012; Heiner Flassbeck and Friederike Spiecker: The Euro - a Story of Misunderstanding. In: Intereconomics. 46, No. 4, 2011, pp. 180-187, doi: 10.1007 / s10272-011-0381-8 ; Holger Zemanek, Ansgar Belke and Gunther Schnabl: Current account imbalances and structural adjustment in the Euro area. How to rebalance competitiveness. CESifo working paper, No. 2639, 2009, online , accessed October 23, 2012; Deutsche Bundesbank : Monthly report. No. 10, October 2012, online (PDF) accessed on October 23, 2012, p. 15 f., Which also points out that the export sectors in particular were also damaged by the development because investments were made in the non-tradable goods sector focused and they were thus affected by the price increases without a demand balance; Jorge Uxó, Jesús Paúl and Eladio Febrero: Current Account Imbalances in the Monetary Union and the Great Recession: Causes and Policies. In: Panoeconomicus. 2011, No. 5, pp. 571–592, doi: 10.2298 / PAN1105571U , which, however, focus in particular on differences in growth as the cause of the divergence in current accounts.
- ↑ Jay C. Shambaugh: The Euro's Three Crises in: David H. Romer, Justin Wolfers, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2012, p. 173.
- ↑ a b c Barry Eichengreen , Implications of the Euro's Crisis for International Monetary Reform (PDF; 262 kB), January 2012, p. 1.
- ↑ Jay C. Shambaugh, The Euro's Three Crises ( Memento of September 24, 2015 in the Internet Archive ) (PDF) in: David H. Romer, Justin Wolfers, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2012, p. 180.
- ^ Journal for Parliamentary Issues , Gerhard Illing, Sebastian Jauch and Michael Zabel, The discussion about the euro (PDF) p. 160.
- ^ Wihlborg, Clas, Willett, Thomas D. and Zhang, Nan, The Euro Crisis: It Isn't Just Fiscal and it Doesn't Just Involve Greece , September 8, 2010, Claremont McKenna College Robert Day School of Economics and Finance Research Paper No. 2011-03, SSRN: doi: 10.2139 / ssrn.1776133
- ↑ See Expert Council on the Assessment of Overall Economic Development: Annual Report 2011/2012. Online (PDF file, 5.3 MB), accessed on May 9, 2013, Rn. 233 ff. (P. 135 ff.).
- ↑ "16 Ways Out of the Crisis - Concern for Germany and Europe", "Bogenberger Declaration" by experts around the President of the Ifo Institute , Hans-Werner Sinn , FAZ Online December 6, 2011.
- ^ Philipp R. Lane: Capital Flows in the Euro Area , European Commission, Working Papers 497, April 2013, ISBN 978-92-79-28579-0 , doi: 10.2765 / 43795 , p. 22.
- ↑ Robert Boyer: The euro crisis: undetected by conventional economics, favored by nationally focused polity , Cambridge Journal of Economics, 2013, Vol. 37, Issue 3, pp. 533-569, doi: 10.1093 / cje / bet013
- ^ Philipp R. Lane: Capital Flows in the Euro Area , European Commission, Working Papers 497, April 2013, ISBN 978-92-79-28579-0 , doi: 10.2765 / 43795 , p. 22.
- ^ Philipp R. Lane: Capital Flows in the Euro Area , European Commission, Working Papers 497, April 2013, ISBN 978-92-79-28579-0 , doi: 10.2765 / 43795 , p. 22.
- ↑ See Expert Council on the Assessment of Overall Economic Development: Annual Report 2011/2012. Online (PDF file, 5.3 MB), accessed on May 9, 2013, Rn. 233 ff. (P. 135 ff.).
- ↑ a b Journal for Parliamentary Issues, Gerhard Illing, Sebastian Jauch and Michael Zabel, The Discussion about the Euro (PDF) pp. 161–162.
- ↑ Advisory Council on the Assessment of Macroeconomic Development: After the EU Summit: Using Time for Long-Term Solutions (PDF; 0.7 MB), pp. 3, 4.
- ↑ Peter Spahn, David Hume and the Target-Salden (PDF; 64 kB) in: Yearbooks for Economics and Statistics, Lucius & Lucius, Stuttgart 2012, vol. 232, vol. 4, p. 3.
- ↑ See Maurice Obstfeld and Kenneth S. Rogoff: International Macroeconomics. 1996. MIT Press, Cambridge et al. a. 1996, p. 633 f. There is consensus that it is relevant to the course of the euro crisis, cf. only illustrative Paul Krugman: European Inflation Targets. In: The Conscience of a Liberal. Blog, New York Times, January 18, 2011, online , accessed October 18, 2012; Expert council for assessing macroeconomic development: Annual report 2011/2012. Online (PDF file, 5.3 MB), accessed on October 18, 2012, para. 230 ff. (P. 136 ff.).
- ↑ Going back to Robert A. Mundell: A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas. In: The American Economic Review. 51, No. 4, 1961, pp. 657-665 ( JSTOR 1812792 ) and Ronald I. McKinnon: Optimum Currency Areas. In: The American Economic Review. 53, No. 4, 1963, pp. 717-725 ( JSTOR 1811021 ).
- ↑ On this in detail Egon Görgens, Karlheinz Ruckriegel and Franz Seitz: European monetary policy. Theory, empiricism, practice. 5th edition. Lucius & Lucius, Stuttgart 2008, chap. I.2.
- ↑ Egon Görgens, Karlheinz Ruckriegel and Franz Seitz: European monetary policy. Theory, empiricism, practice. 5th edition. Lucius & Lucius, Stuttgart 2008, p. 27.
- ↑ Barry Eichengreen , Implications of the Euro's Crisis for International Monetary Reform (PDF), January 2012, p. 2.
- ↑ See Michael G. Arghyrou and Alexandros Kontonikas: The EMU sovereign-debt crisis: Fundamentals, expectations and contagion. In: Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions & Money. 22, 2012, pp. 658-677, doi: 10.1016 / j.intfin.2012.03.003 , here p. 660; Stefan Gerlach, Alexander Schulz and Guntram B. Wolff: Banking and sovereign risk in the euro area. Discussion Paper, Series 1: Economic Studies. No. 09/2010, online (PDF; 365 kB), accessed on October 19, 2012.
- ↑ Renate Neubäumer, Euro crisis: Not a sovereign debt crisis, but a consequence of the financial crisis , doi: 10.1111 / j.1468-0327.2009.00220.x , Wirtschaftsdienst 2011, 12, pp. 827, 828.
- ↑ Simone Manganelli and Guido Wolswijk: What drives spreads in the euro area government bond market? In: Economic Policy. 24, No. 58, pp. 191-240, 2009, doi: 10.1111 / j.1468-0327.2009.00220.x ; Jürgen von Hagena, Ludger Schuknecht and Guido Wolswijk: Government bond risk premiums in the EU revisited. The impact of the financial crisis. In: European Journal of Political Economy. 27, No. 1, 2011, pp. 36-43; Luciana Barbosa and Sónia Costa: Determinants of sovereign bond yield spreads in the Euro area in the context of economic and financial crisis. In: Banco de Portugal (ed.): Economic Bulletin. Autumn 2010, Online ( Memento of May 13, 2013 in the Internet Archive ) (PDF; 151 kB), accessed on October 19, 2012, pp. 131–150; Luís Oliveira, José Dias Curto and João Pedro Nunes: The determinants of sovereign credit spread changes in the Euro-zone. In: Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money. 22, No. 2, 2012, pp. 278–304, doi: 10.1016 / j.intfin.2011.09.007 .
- ↑ German Advisory Council: “Taking responsibility for Europe” (PDF; 849 kB) pp. 137, 138.
- ^ Marco Pagano: Fiscal crisis, contagion, and the future of euro. In: vox.eu. Online , accessed June 28, 2012; Friedrich Heinemann: The European Debt Crisis: Causes and Solution Strategies. In: Yearbook for Economics. No. 1/2012, pp. 18-41.
- ↑ Die Welt, ECB boss Trichet: There is no crisis in the euro
- ↑ Jens Weidmann: Central Bank on the Debt Crisis in Greece - No Further Risks! In: Sueddeutsche Zeitung. June 14, 2011, accessed December 9, 2014 .
- ↑ z. B. in: Peter Bofinger: Foreword to thinking about Germany. The critical yearbook 2011/2012 Westend Verlag 2011. http://westendverlag.de/westend/buch.php?p=61&n=leseprobe
- ↑ atterres.org
- ↑ Manifeste d'économistes atterrés , cf. especially: Fausse évidence n ° 4: L'envolée des dettes publiques résulte d'un excès de dépenses , German here ( memento of November 24, 2011 in the Internet Archive ), false claim # 4: The rise in national debt is due to excessive spending therein u. a .: The state, which is becoming increasingly indebted than the father, who drinks excessively much alcohol: that is the common notion that is spread by most of the editorialists. But the latest explosion in national debt in Europe and the world is due to something completely different: the rescue plans for the financial sector and, above all, the recession caused by the banks and the financial crisis since 2008. For the full German text of the manifesto see below, literature, Bontrup 2011, from p. 28.
- ↑ The Scientific Advisory Board of Attac ( Memento of December 8, 2012 in the Internet Archive ) in October 2011: "First of all, it must be remembered what kind of crisis we are dealing with: namely a financial crisis that originated in The current crisis is deliberately redefined as a debt crisis, although many countries only got so over-indebted to rescue their banks, for which the states - that is, the population - have to pay. " www.attac-netzwerk.de (PDF; 224 kB)
- ↑ For two years, the financial institutions hoped they could redefine their own crisis as a sovereign debt crisis. Blown! A chance to stop the euro debacle shortly before it dies.
- ^ Albrecht Müller: How the financial and economic crisis is turned into a national debt crisis , February 8, 2011.
- ↑ Cf. Müller in the FAZ of November 23, 2011, www.faz.net , "The financial industry has repeatedly reached into the pockets of the tax authorities. The tax privileges, the subsidies and the rescue packages for the speculators in the financial casinos have the national debt levels ( Debt as a percentage of gross domestic product) in Germany and elsewhere. The consequences are called the “sovereign debt crisis” by PR strategists. This is the second big coup of the strategists in the financial industry and the one with them after the trick with the “systemic importance” of all banks associated politics and media. "National debt crisis" is what they call the disaster that was largely caused by themselves. "
- ↑ www.salon.com , accessed on September 29, 2013: "The eurozone crisis is a bank crisis posing as a series of national debt crises and complicated by reactionary economic ideas, a defective financial architecture and a toxic political environment, especially in Germany , in France, in Italy and in Greece. Like our own, the European banking crisis is the product of over-lending to weak borrowers, including for housing in Spain, commercial real estate in Ireland and the public sector (partly for infrastructure) in Greece. "
- ^ Walter Wittmann: From the financial crisis to the debt crisis. In: Yearbook for Economics . 62, 2011.
- ^ Renate Neubäumer : Euro crisis: Not a sovereign debt crisis, but a consequence of the financial crisis. In: Economic Service . 91. Jg. (2011), H. 12, pp. 827-833, doi: 10.1007 / s10273-011-1308-5 .
- ↑ Le Monde of October 2, 2012, Non au traité budgétaire européen! Translation on: www.nachdenkseiten.de , "Since 2008 the European Union has been exposed to an unprecedented economic crisis. Contrary to what neoliberal economists would like to believe, this crisis is not a sovereign debt crisis. Spain and Ireland are today exposed to attacks from the financial markets, although they are Countries have always complied with the Maastricht criteria. The rise in national debt is a result of the collapse in tax revenues (caused in part by tax gifts to the rich), state aid for private banks and the use of the financial markets to service this debt at excessive interest rates . "
- ^ Paul Krugman, How the Euro can be saved , Der Spiegel, April 23, 2012.
- ↑ Cf. Friedrich Heinemann: The European debt crisis: causes and solution strategies. In: Yearbook for Economics. No. 1/2012, pp. 18–41, here p. 25 ff.
- ^ Economic Commission for Europe , Robert C. Shelburne, Restoring Stability to Europe , July 20, 2012, p. 7
- ↑ OECD: Greece (= OECD Economic Surveys ). August 2011, doi : 10.1787 / eco_surveys-grc-2011-en , accessed on June 13, 2012, p. 25; also Eurostat: gross government debt in% of GDP and million euros (teina225) , accessed on June 13, 2012.
- ↑ Eurostat: gross government debt in% of GDP and million euros (teina225) , accessed on June 12, 2012. [The OECD figures differ significantly from this, as they are based on the GDP figures of the national authorities. See OECD: Central Government Debt. (= OECD National Accounts Statistics (database) ), doi: 10.1787 / data-00033-en , accessed on June 12, 2012, where a decline in relative debt can even be ascertained.] For economic growth cf. OECD: Greece (= OECD Economic Surveys ). August 2011, doi : 10.1787 / eco_surveys-grc-2011-en , p. 24.
- ↑ See Sophocles N. Brissimis, George Hondroyiannis, Christos Papazoglou, Nicholas T. Tsaveas and Melina A. Vasardani: Current account determinants and external sustainability in periods of structural change. In: Economic Change and Restructuring. 45, No. 1-2, pp. 71-95, doi: 10.1007 / s10644-011-9107-y , also as an ECB Working Paper. No. 1243, September 2010, Online (PDF; 1.1 MB); OECD: Greece (= OECD Economic Surveys ). August 2011, doi : 10.1787 / eco_surveys-grc-2011-en , p. 31 f .; Margarita Katsimi and Thomas Moutos: EMU and the Greek crisis: The political-economy perspective. In: European Journal of Political Economy. 26, No. 4, 2010, pp. 568-576, doi: 10.1016 / j.ejpoleco.2010.08.002 .
- ↑ Sophocles N. Brissimis, George Hondroyiannis, Christos Papazoglou, Nicholas T. Tsaveas and Melina A. Vasardani: Current account determinants and external sustainability in periods of structural change. In: Economic Change and Restructuring. 45, No. 1-2, pp. 71-95, doi: 10.1007 / s10644-011-9107-y , also as an ECB Working Paper. No. 1243, September 2010, Online (PDF; 1.1 MB), p. 8.
- ↑ OECD: Current account balance (= OECD Factbook 2010 ). 2010, doi: 10.1787 / factbook-2010-table76-en , accessed June 12, 2012.
- ↑ As an example, Ulrich Pick: There have been signs of the crisis for a long time. In: tagesschau.de. March 3, 2010, accessed June 12, 2012; Suzanne Daley: Greek Wealth Is Everywhere but Tax Forms. In: The New York Times. May 2, 2010, p. A1; Christos N. Pitelis: On PIIGs, GAFFs, and BRICs: An Insider-Outsider's Perspective on Structural and Institutional Foundations of the Greek Crisis. In: Contributions to Political Economy. 31, No. 1, 2012, doi: 10.1093 / cpe / bzs002 . On the problem of the shadow economy in Greece also in detail Stavron Katsios: The Shadow Economy and Corruption in Greece. In: South-Eastern Europe Journal of Economics. 4, No. 1, 2006, pp. 61–80, online (PDF; 313 kB), accessed on June 12, 2012.
- ↑ Cf. Friedrich Schneider: The Influence of the economic crisis on the shadow economy in Germany, Greece and the other OECD countries in 2010: What can be done? Working paper. September 2010, online (PDF; 130 kB), accessed on June 12, 2012 and Ders .: Size and Development of the Shadow Economy of 31 European and 5 other OECD Countries from 2003 to 2011. Working Paper. September 2011, online (PDF; 151 kB), accessed on June 12, 2012. See also Ders .: New Estimates for the Shadow Economies all over the World. Working paper. September 2010, online (PDF; 303 kB), accessed on June 12, 2012.
- ↑ Die Welt: “Mrs. Lagarde is quite right!” June 8, 2012, p. 7.
- ↑ So only Wolfgang Proissl: A case for the World Bank. ( Memento from June 1, 2012 in the Internet Archive ) In: Financial Times Deutschland. May 29, 2012, p. 24; Jeff Randall: It's the corruption, stupid! In: The Daily Telegraph. August 22, 2011, p. 17; Metsopoulos / Pelagides (2011): Understanding the crisis in Greece. in particular p. 19 ff. and Chapter 3.
- ↑ European Commission: Corruption (= Special Eurobarometer. No. 374). February 2012, online (PDF; 4.8 MB), accessed June 12, 2012.
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- ↑ Focus online, April 25, 2014: Numbers corrected upwards. Euro savers admit error in Greek debts
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- ↑ Die Zeit, March 10, 2014: Greece's prices are falling dangerously. A spiral of deflation looms in Greece.
- ↑ FAZ.net December 8, 2014: Parliament passes controversial budget
- ↑ FAZ.net November 22, 2014: Greek contradictions. - The Greeks are worn down and no longer want to hear the word reform. Prime Minister Antonis Samaras would therefore like to get rid of the Troika - and still needs its safety net
- ↑ a b Eurostat: gross government debt in% of GDP and million euros (teina225) , accessed on June 12, 2012.
- ↑ Eurostat: Deficit / Surplus, Government Debt (tsieb080) , accessed on June 12, 2012.
- ↑ Eurostat: Gross Debt-Income Ratio of Private Households (tec00104) , accessed on June 13, 2012. On the problem of OECD: Spain 2010 (= OECD Economic Surveys ). December 2010, doi : 10.1787 / eco_surveys-esp-2010-en , accessed on June 13, 2012, p. 24 ff.
- ^ "Consequences of the Inflation Differences in the Euro Area", p. 26, Henzel, Steffen / Sauer, Stephan, Publisher: Ifo Institute for Economic Research, Munich 2006
- ↑ Thomas Conefrey and John Fitz Gerald: Managing Housing Bubbles in Regional Economies under EMU: Ireland and Spain. In: National Institute Economic Review. 211, No. 1, 2010, pp. 91-108, doi: 10.1177 / 0027950110364103 , also as ESRI Working Paper. No. 315, September 2009, Online ( Memento from September 24, 2015 in the Internet Archive ) (PDF; 321 kB).
- ↑ International Monetary Fund: World Economic Outlook 2010, October 2010, p. 22.
- ^ Commission of Investigation into the Banking Sector in Ireland: Misjudging Risk. Causes of the Systemic Banking Crisis in Ireland. March 2011, online (PDF; 1.3 MB), accessed on June 13, 2012, p. 14.
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- ↑ See Javier Suarez: The Spanish Crisis: Background and Policy Challenges. Working Paper DP7909, Center for Economic Policy Research, 2010, Online , accessed on June 13, 2012, p. 3 f.
- ↑ In Ireland the real estate market had already cooled before that; see. OECD: Ireland (= OECD Economic Surveys ). April 2008, doi : 10.1787 / eco_surveys-irl-2008-en , Chapter 2.
- ↑ See introductory Karl Whelan: Ireland's Sovereign Debt Crisis. Working Paper, UCD Center for Economic Research, 2011, Online (PDF; 833 kB), accessed June 13, 2012; in detail Patrick Honohan: Resolving Ireland's Banking Crisis. In: The Economic and Social Review. 40, No. 2, 2009, pp. 207-231, online (PDF; 1.4 MB).
- ↑ Christoph Giesen: Dismantling the "best bank in the world" . In: Süddeutsche Zeitung , July 2, 2013.
- ↑ Banco de España: Informe Anual 2009. Madrid 2010. Quoted from OECD: Spain 2010 (= OECD Economic Surveys ). December 2010, doi : 10.1787 / eco_surveys-esp-2010-en , accessed on June 13, 2012, p. 38.
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- ^ Ricardo Reis: The Portuguese Slump Crash and the Euro-Crisis . NBER Working Paper No. 19288 August 2013, doi : 10.3386 / w19288 (English, nber.org [PDF; 1.1 MB ]). Here p. 9.
- ^ Ricardo Reis: The Portuguese Slump Crash and the Euro-Crisis . NBER Working Paper No. 19288 August 2013, doi : 10.3386 / w19288 (English, nber.org [PDF; 1.1 MB ]). Here p. 19.
- ↑ OECD: Portugal 2010 (= OECD Economic Surveys ). September 2010, doi : 10.1787 / eco_surveys-prt-2010-en , accessed on June 13, 2012, p. 9.
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- ↑ Eurostat : gross government debt in% of GDP and million euros (teina225) , accessed on June 29, 2012.
- ↑ Eurostat: Deficit / Surplus, Government Debt (tsieb080) , accessed on June 28, 2012.
- ↑ Compact economic data: Portugal. (PDF; 211 kB) In: Germany Trade & Invest. November 2014, archived from the original on September 22, 2015 ; accessed on February 15, 2019 .
- ^ Report for Selected Countries and Subjects. Retrieved February 8, 2018 (American English).
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- ↑ See also tagesschau.de of January 24, 2012, criticism of the Greek reform program: Eurozone increases pressure on Greece
- ↑ EU votes on stricter budget rules , DerStandard, dated September 28, 2011, accessed on September 28, 2011.
- ↑ See also debt crisis: The Brussels Pact in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung of February 1, 2012.
- ↑ a b Council of Experts - Annual Report 2011/12: Taking responsibility for Europe , p. 147 ff. (PDF; 849 kB)
- ↑ Financial resources: EU Commissioner Rehn warns of a new banking crisis . Spiegel Online, September 26, 2011. Retrieved June 10, 2015.
- ↑ Peter Spiegel: Barroso pushes EU banking union . In: Financial Times (registration required) , June 11, 2012. Retrieved July 1, 2012.
- ^ The banking union is available , Handelsblatt.de, March 20, 2014, accessed on February 20, 2015
- ↑ EU Commission for Financial Transaction Tax. In: tagesschau.de. September 28, 2011.
- ↑ Thomas Mayer: Barroso warns of the "death of Europe". In: DerStandard , print edition September 29, 2011. Retrieved October 10, 2012.
- ^ Financial Transaction Tax: Making the financial sector pay its fair share. European Commission, September 28, 2011, accessed November 22, 2011 . Original: "to make the financial sector pay its fair share"
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- ↑ faz.net January 25, 2013 "Fed urged the ECB to borrow dollars"
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- ↑ European Central Bank: December 13, 2012 - ECB extends the existing swap arrangements with other central banks. Press release. Online , accessed March 21, 2013; This: November 30, 2011 - Coordinated central bank Action to address pressures in global money markets. Press release. Online , accessed July 4, 2012; This: December 21, 2010 - Prolongation of US dollar liquidity-providing operations. Press release. Online , accessed July 4, 2012; ECB secures supply of dollars. In: Financial Times Germany. December 22, 2010, p. 16; European Central Bank: 29 June 2011 - Prolongation of US dollar liquidity-providing operations. Press release. Online , accessed July 4, 2012.
- ↑ European Central Bank: December 17, 2010 - ECB signs swap facility agreement with the Bank of England. Press release. Online , accessed July 4, 2012; European Central Bank: August 25, 2011 - Prolongation of swap facility agreement with the Bank of England. Press release. Online , accessed July 4, 2012; European Central Bank: September 12, 2012 - ECB extends the swap facility agreement with the Bank of England. Press release. Online , accessed September 26, 2012; European Central Bank: 16 September 2013 - ECB extends the swap facility with the Bank of England. Press release. Online , accessed October 10, 2013.
- ↑ European Central Bank: September 15, 2011 - ECB announces additional US dollar liquidity-providing operations over year-end. Press release. Online , accessed July 4, 2012; Reuters: Invigorating Dollar Infusion. September 16, 2011.
- ^ Claudia A. Szalay: The ECB intervenes unrestrained. In: Neue Zürcher Zeitung. May 11, 2010, No. 107, p. 25.
- ^ European Central Bank: Summary of ad hoc communication. Related to monetary policy implementation issued by the ECB since January 1, 2007. Online , accessed September 7, 2012.
- ↑ The sterilization of the purchases does not always succeed completely, since the success of the suggestion depends on the interests of the commercial banks. This in turn fluctuates with the daily rates on the money market. See Claudia A. Szalay: The sterilization does not always succeed. In: Neue Zürcher Zeitung. April 8, 2011, No. 83, p. 27.
- ↑ European Central Bank: February 21, 2013 - Details on securities holdings acquired under the Securities Markets Program. Press release. Online , accessed March 21, 2013.
- ↑ European Central Bank: 6 September 2012 - Technical features of Outright Monetary Transactions. Press release. Online , accessed September 7, 2012.
- ↑ a b European Central Bank: 6 September 2012 - Technical features of Outright Monetary Transactions. Press release. Online , accessed September 7, 2012; Claire Jones and Michael Steen: Draghi outlines bond buying plan. In: FT.com. September 6, 2012, online , accessed September 7, 2012.
- ↑ European Central Bank: 6 September 2012 - Technical features of Outright Monetary Transactions. Press release. Online , accessed September 7, 2012; Joseph Cotterill: Seniority, the SMP, and the OMT. In: Financial Times Alphaville. September 6, 2012, online , accessed September 7, 2012.
- ^ Joseph Cotterill: Seniority, the SMP, and the OMT. In: Financial Times Alphaville. September 6, 2012, online , accessed September 7, 2012.
- ^ European Central Bank: April 7, 2011 - Monetary policy decisions. Press release. Online , accessed July 4, 2012; Peter Ehrlich and André Kühnlenz: ECB becomes Bundesbank. In: Financial Times Germany. April 8, 2011, p. 1.
- ↑ European Central Bank: July 7, 2011 - Monetary policy decisions. Press release. Online , accessed July 4, 2012; Claudia Aebersold Szalay: Another rate hike by the ECB. In: Neue Zürcher Zeitung. July 8, 2011, No. 157, p. 25.
- ^ European Central Bank: Key ECB interest rates. Online , accessed July 5, 2012.
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- ^ European Central Bank: July 7, 2011 - ECB announces change in eligibility of debt instruments issued or guaranteed by the Portuguese government. Press release. Online , accessed July 4, 2012; This: March 31, 2011 - ECB announces the suspension of the rating threshold for debt instruments of the Irish government. Press release. Online , accessed July 4, 2012.
- ↑ European Central Bank: 8 December 2011 - ECB announces measures to support bank lending and money market activity. Press release. Online , accessed July 4, 2012; Ralph Atkins and Tracy Alloway: ECB launches new support for banks. In: FT.com Online , accessed July 4, 2012.
- ↑ European Central Bank: 9 February 2012 - ECB's Governing Council approves eligibility criteria for additional credit claims. Press release. Online , accessed July 5, 2012; Claudia Aebersold Szalay: The ECB relies on controlled risk. In: Neue Zürcher Zeitung. February 14, 2012, No. 37, p. 24.
- ^ Joseph Cotterill: Another ECB collateral BBBackstop. In: Financial Times Alphaville. June 22, 2012, online , accessed July 5, 2012.
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- ↑ Claudia Aebersold Szalay: ECB removes Cyprus pledges. In: Neue Zürcher Zeitung. June 27, 2012, No. 147, p. 31.
- ↑ European Central Bank: May 2, 2013 - ECB announces change in eligibility of marketable debt instruments issued or guaranteed by the Cypriot government. Press release. Online , accessed August 4, 2013.
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- ↑ For example Claudia Aebersold Szalay: New deposit regime of the ECB favors secured bonds; Asset-backed securities are moving up a league. In: Neue Zürcher Zeitung. July 19, 2013, No. 165, p. 24. Regarding the European Central Bank decision: July 18, 2013 - ECB further reviews its risk control framework allowing for a new treatment of asset-backed securities. Press release. Online , accessed August 5, 2013.
- ↑ European Central Bank: 10 May 2010 - ECB decides on measures to address severe tensions in financial markets. Press release. Online , accessed July 4, 2012.
- ↑ On this, Izabella Kaminska: On the ECB's 'most significant non-standard measure'. In: Financial Times Alphaville. December 8, 2011. Online , accessed July 4, 2012.
- ↑ European Central Bank: 6 December 2012 - ECB announces details of refinancing operations with settlement in the period from 16 January to 9 July 2013. Press Release. Online , accessed March 21, 2013; Dies: 2 May 2013 - ECB announces details of refinancing operations with settlement in the period from 10 July 2013 to 8 July 2014. Press Release. Online , accessed August 4, 2013.
- ↑ European Central Bank: 8 December 2011 - ECB announces measures to support bank lending and money market activity. Press release. Online , accessed July 4, 2012.
- ↑ However, this includes around 46 billion, which the institutions only transferred from the one-year LTRO of October 2010 to the new instrument. See Izabella Kaminska: LTRO use at € 489.19bn. In: Financial Times Alphaville. December 21, 2011, online , accessed July 4, 2012.
- ↑ Claudia Aebersold Szalay: Long-term ECB money as a best seller. In: Neue Zürcher Zeitung. December 22, 2011, No. 299, p. 23.
- ^ Mary Watkins: Covered bond sales soar amid January flurry. In: FT.com. January 22, 2012, online , accessed July 5, 2012; Claudia Aebersold Szalay: Is the ECB behind good bond auctions? In: Neue Zürcher Zeitung. January 21, 2012, No. 17, p. 37; This: Many myths about the three-year money of the ECB. In: Neue Zürcher Zeitung. February 28, 2012, No. 49, p. 29.
- ↑ Claudia Aebersold Szalay: The banks access the three-year money from the ECB. In: Neue Zürcher Zeitung. March 1, 2012, No. 51, p. 25.
- ↑ faz.net January 25, 2013: "Banks repay ECB crisis aid earlier than expected"
- ↑ European Central Bank: 6 October 2011 - ECB announces new covered bond purchase program. Press release. Online , accessed July 4, 2012; European Central Bank: November 3, 2011 - ECB announces details of its new covered bond purchase program (CBPP2). Press release. Online , accessed July 4, 2012; Claudia A. Szalay: The ECB offers the banks full coverage. In: Neue Zürcher Zeitung. October 7, 2011, No. 234, p. 25.
- ^ Tracy Alloway: European Central Bank to buy € 40bn covered bonds. In: FT.com. October 6, 2011, online , accessed July 4, 2012.
- ↑ European Central Bank: October 31, 2012 - Ending of covered bond purchase program 2 (CBPP2). Press release. Online , accessed November 9, 2012.
- ↑ European Central Bank: December 16, 2010 - ECB increases its capital. Press release. Online , accessed July 4, 2012; Jack Ewing: European Central Bank to Nearly Double Its Capital Reserves. In: The New York Times Online. December 16, 2010, online , accessed July 4, 2012; Tim Bartz: The ECB has to pump up euro countries. In: Financial Times Germany. December 14, 2010, p. 1.
- ^ The distinction follows Carlo A. Favero and Alessandro Missale: EU Public Debt Management and Eurobonds. In: European Parliament (Ed.): Euro Area Governance - Ideas for Crisis Management Reform. 2010, online (PDF; 776 kB), accessed on July 2, 2012.
- ^ For example, Paul De Grauwe and Wim Moesen: Gains for All: A proposal for a common Eurobond. CEPS Commentary, April 2009, online , accessed July 2, 2012.
- ↑ In this sense also Giovannini Group: Report of the Giovannini Group - Co-ordinated Public Debt Issuance in the Euro Area. 2000; Jacques Delpla and Jakob von Weizsäcker: The Blue Bond proposal. Bruegel Policy Brief, 2010/03, May 2010, online , accessed July 2, 2012; Erik Jones: A Eurobond Proposal to Promote Stability and Liquidity while Preventing Moral Hazard. ISPI Policy Brief, No. 180, March 2010, online (PDF; 60 kB), accessed on July 2, 2012.
- ↑ See also for the following, inter alia, Sylvester CW Eijffinger: Eurobonds - Concepts and Implications. European Parliament Briefing Note, 2011, online (PDF; 179 kB), accessed on July 2, 2012; on this Angelo Baglioni and Umberto Cherubini: A Theory of Eurobonds. Working Paper, online , accessed July 9, 2012; Jean-Claude Juncker and Giulio Tremonti : E-bonds would end the crisis. In: FT.com December 5, 2010, online ( October 22, 2012 memento in the Internet Archive ), accessed July 9, 2012.
- ↑ For example Jens Weidmann , cf. Marcell Haag, Peter Ehrlich and André Kühnlenz: My name is Bond - Eurobond. In: Financial Times Germany. May 23, 2012, p. 12.
- ↑ See Markus K. Brunnermeier and others: European Safe Bonds (ESBies). September 2011, Online ( Memento from November 19, 2011 in the Internet Archive ) (PDF; 906 kB), accessed on July 2, 2012. Apologies, but the page you requested could not be found. Perhaps searching will help.
- ↑ See the Finnish proposal for the EU summit: Secured bond purchases are up for discussion In: handelsblatt.com. June 28, 2012; before that Heribert Dieter: pledge from the Greeks . In: The time. March 11, 2010, p. 33.
- ↑ a b c d e f Greece leaving the European Monetary Union: Historical experiences, macroeconomic consequences and organizational implementation p. 17 Benjamin Born, Teresa Buchen, Kai Carstensen, Christian Grimme, Michael Kleemann, Klaus Wohlrabe and Timo Wollmershäuser Ifo Schnelldienst 10/2012 - 65th year
- ↑ Barry Eichengreen, The Breakup of the Euro Area (PDF; 308 kB) in: Alberto Alesina and Francesco Giavazz, Europe and the Euro , National Bureau of Economic Research , February 2010, p. 16.
- ↑ Barry Eichengreen, The Breakup of the Euro Area (PDF; 308 kB) in: Alberto Alesina and Francesco Giavazz, Europe and the Euro , National Bureau of Economic Research , February 2010, pp. 22, 23.
- ↑ Advisory Council on the Assessment of Macroeconomic Development : After the EU Summit: Using Time for Long-Term Solutions (PDF; 734 kB), July 5, 2012, pp. 8–9.
- ↑ That is how dangerous the exit from the euro really is
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- ↑ Format : Euro Debt Crisis: The Austro Analysis of Horror , from August 29, 2012.
- ↑ Die Presse : Wifo study: Euro splitting cost jobs , from August 31, 2012.
- ^ Austrian Institute for Economic Research : Advantages of Participation in the European Monetary Union and Consequences of Redimensioning the Eurozone (PDF).
- ↑ Kleine Zeitung : Euro-Aus would be an economic catastrophe ( Memento from April 8, 2014 in the Internet Archive ) , from November 4, 2012.
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- ↑ a mixed word from the former Dutch currency guilder and the German mark or Finnish markka
- ^ Daniel Eckert: Financial expert recommends Germany the Guldenmark. Die Welt , August 13, 2012, accessed November 24, 2014 .
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- ↑ David Böcking: Greece and the Euro Zone: The Almost Impossible Throwing Out. In: Spiegel Online . January 5, 2015, accessed January 6, 2015 .
- ↑ See also end of monetary union: The euro exit is feasible in the FAZ Online on December 31, 2011.
- ↑ Barry Eichengreen: The Breakup of the Euro Area (PDF; 308 kB). In: Alberto Alesina, Francesco Giavazz: Europe and the Euro , National Bureau of Economic Research , p. 12.
- ↑ Internal working paper: IMF predicts hyperinflation for Greece in case of euro exit Spiegel-Online of April 25, 2015.
- ↑ Property taxes - a contribution to the restructuring of public finances in Europe (PDF; 818 kB), p. 10.
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- ↑ Harald Spehl: Bye, capital market
- ↑ Property levy - How the Greens want to collect 100 billion. In: FAZ . January 17, 2011, accessed March 3, 2012 .
- ↑ Die Linke: Property levy is the best debt brake. August 9, 2011, accessed March 3, 2012 .
- ^ Dow Jones Newswires : Financial markets increasingly doubt the will to help Greece . In: Finanz.net , February 16, 2012.
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- ↑ Jay C. Shambaugh: The Euro's Three Crises in: David H. Romer, Justin Wolfers, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2012, p. 169.
- ^ CDS Greece , Bloomberg
- ↑ zeit.de November 4, 2011: The cost of the drachma
- ↑ See Karl Ettinger "First warning signs for a new financial crisis" in Wiener Zeitung of October 4, 2018.
- ^ WZ Online: FMA board member Ettl warns of "geopolitical recession". Retrieved October 6, 2019 .
- ↑ a b Federal Ministry of Finance (Germany): Monthly Report November 2011, p. 104 f. (2.8 MB) ( Memento from January 30, 2012 in the Internet Archive ) (values up to 2008)
- ↑ a b Federal Ministry of Finance (Germany): Monthly Report February 2013, p. 111f (3.3 MB) (values from 2009 to 2012)
- ↑ a b Federal Ministry of Finance (Germany): Monthly Report April 2014 2013, p. 83/84 (2013 values and 2014, 2015 estimates)
- ↑ Der Standard: France - The Chronicle of an Announced Downgrade
- ↑ Euro crisis - Standard & Poor's is punishing Europe with a mass downgrade. Focus Online Money January 13, 2012
- ↑ S&P upgrades Greece by several notches after buying back bonds. December 18, 2012.
- ↑ Debt sinner: Sarkozy and Brown thwart Merkel's exclusion idea on www.handelsblatt.com
- ↑ IMF: IMF Reaches Staff-level Agreement with Greece on € 30 Billion Stand-By Arrangement
- ↑ The Greek economist Gikas Hardouvelis welcomed the fact that Greece is borrowing money from the financial market immediately after the EU emergency plan: “The Greek government has to test the market, and it is good that they do so immediately after the EU agreement on an emergency plan from the previous week has done. " Athens hopes for money from a new bond www.euronews.net (from March 29, 2010 20:18 CET)
- ↑ Greece: Billions in aid and savings package www.euronews.net (from May 3, 2010 6:49 PM CET)
- ↑ EU rescue package works, Euronews, May 10, 2010 .
- ↑ the euro has now been saved, Euronews (10 May 2010)
- ↑ www.manager-magazin.de IMF celebrates Draghi's large risk course Manager-Magazin from September 7, 2012
- ↑ gtai.de ( Memento of the original from March 12, 2010 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice.
- ↑ Ireland is once again a country of emigration (from March 26, 2009 7:56 p.m. on www.euronews.net)
- ↑ a b Federal Ministry of Finance: Meeting of the Euro Group and the EU Finance Ministers on 27./28. November 2010: Help for Ireland - s. here also pdf: Statement by the Eurogroup and ECOFIN Ministers November 28, 2010 ( page no longer available , search in web archives ) Info: The link was automatically marked as defective. Please check the link according to the instructions and then remove this notice.
- ↑ a b EurActiv 29 November 2010: EU supports Irish rescue and drafts permanent plan / with further links
- ^ Spiegel-Online November 28, 2010: EU tips cheap rescue package for Ireland
- ↑ a b c Handelsblatt November 28, 2010: Debt Crisis: Ministers give green light to Ireland's billion dollar aid
- ^ Federal Ministry of Finance: Meeting of the Eurogroup and the EU finance ministers on 27./28. November 2010: Help for Ireland ( page no longer available , search in web archives ) Info: The link was automatically marked as defective. Please check the link according to the instructions and then remove this notice.
- ↑ a b c How are the euro problem children. derstandard.at, September 21, 2011, accessed on September 23, 2011 .
- ↑ http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/
- ↑ Holger Steltzner faz.net February 12, 2013: "Monetary State Financing in Ireland"
- ↑ update of the SVR report (“Economy”) in March 2015 (PDF) p. 4.
- ↑ Countries and markets Title: Italy asserts itself in the crisis ( page no longer available , search in web archives ) Info: The link was automatically marked as defective. Please check the link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. (from March 3, 2010 on Germany Trade and Invest )
- ↑ ec.europa.eu: Overview of ongoing excessive deficit procedures (English) : also Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia and Slovakia
- ↑ sueddeutsche.de November 5, 2011: Italy's government under pressure
- ↑ Spiegel-Online of November 28, 2011: Investor distrust: Belgium and Italy have to pay high interest rates
- ↑ Rome Office of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation : The Reforms of the Mario Monti Government (February 1, 2012)
- ↑ The calculation of the measures: 330 billion ( Memento of September 25, 2013 in the Internet Archive ) (Il conto delle manovre: 330 miliardi; PDF; 798 kB), Il Sole 24 Ore , July 16, 2012, title page (Italian)
- ^ Die Presse : Italy: New austerity package signed and sealed , September 14, 2011.
- ↑ zeit.de April 6, 2012: Is the crisis making Italy depressive?
- ↑ spiegel.de: Italy pays electoral chaos with higher interest rates
- ↑ Business collapse during the Great Depression! In: Corriere della Sera , October 26, 2013.
- ↑ Center-left: A new beginning with Matteo Renzi (country report of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung from Rome)
- ↑ spiegel.de January 11, 2014: Italy's political hope Renzi: The year of scrapping
- ↑ sueddeutsche.de October 5, 2014: Renzi has had enough of Merkel's advice
- ↑ ECB - TARGET2 balances of the euro member states (in English) - Retrieved on February 13, 2018
- ↑ Euro Crisis Monitor Data. ( MS Excel ; 101 kB) Institute for Empirical Economic Research at the University of Osnabrück, accessed on February 13, 2018 (English).
- ^ Thomas Fischer: Timid austerity in Portugal. In: Neue Zürcher Zeitung. January 28, 2010, No. 22, p. 27.
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