Greek sovereign debt crisis

Euro notes and Greek euro coins

The Greek national debt crisis (also Greek financial crisis and Greek depression ) is a crisis of the state budget and the economy of the Republic of Greece that has been ongoing since 2010 . After the elimination of the national currencies and the associated exchange rate mechanism after the introduction of the euro, the development of suitable internal adjustment mechanisms in the euro countries failed. Just one year before 2001 were made accession to the euro zone which was Greece's sovereign debt 104.4% of gross domestic product (GDP). During the global financial crisis from 2007 and the bank rescue program of the Karamanlis government, the Greek national debt ratio rose further from 107.2% (2007) to 129.7% (2009).

In October 2009, the newly elected Prime Minister Giorgos A. Papandreou (PASOK) announced upwardly revised data on debt (from 3.7 to 12.7% of GDP) and other poor economic data. Methodological deficiencies of the Statistical Office of Greece ( ESYE ) and possible political influence on the statistics prompted this correction. The new data resulted in Greek government bond yields rising sharply. In the same year, Papandreou asked IMF boss Strauss-Kahn to set up an aid program for Greece, which the latter refused in order to refer the prime minister to the EU partners. Together with the IMF, they prepared a much larger loan package, which Papandreou originally only wanted to accept after a referendum, which some of the most important euro partners rejected. The Sarkozy and Merkel governments demanded that Greece either accept the loan terms without a vote or leave the euro zone. Since the government was unable to repay due loans , Papandreou gave in, and Greece applied for the three-year aid package on April 23, 2010 without a prior referendum.

An IMF loan of 30 billion euros for Greece was initially increased by the EU to a total of 110 billion euros and declared as a measure to rescue Greece and the euro. While the IMF loans for Greece (also called "emergency loans") have only been adjusted slightly to 32 billion euros to date (as of May 2018) due to inflation, the EU and ECB increased the share of the euro bailout (so-called "emergency guarantees") of the meanwhile three loan packages despite concerns of the successively involved Prime Ministers Papandreou, Samaras and Tsipras to 290 billion euros (=  euro rescue package ). The financial framework granted by the three institutions involved - the so-called “Troika” - is now ten times as high as the aid program launched by the IMF, at 322 billion euros. Of this, 277.6 billion euros were ultimately paid out (as of September 2018). 31.9 billion euros in IMF loans went to the Greek state and 245.7 billion euros in so-called EU guarantees went to European banks.

In March 2015, the European Central Bank (ECB) bought bonds from euro countries . The “institutions” and the Greek government decided, among other things, to make extensive budget cuts. The measures included, among other things, wage cuts, for example in the public service and the minimum wage , general budget cuts and an increase in VAT . In addition, privatizations were carried out. Measures to improve the Greek administration were also initiated. These include the implementation of the administrative reform under the Kallikratis program in May 2010 , the numerical recording of all people working for the state and the review of pension payments to those who may have already died. The amalgamation of the numerous local land registries (υποθηκοφυλάκειο "mortgage office, land registry"), which has been ongoing for years, to form a national cadastre for all around 3.6 million properties should be completed by 2020.

Greece was in recession from 2008 and by 2013 lost around 26 percent of its real (price-adjusted) gross domestic product (GDP). In 2014 there was a minimal increase of 0.4% of real GDP. Despite the haircut in 2012 and despite or due to measures imposed by the Troika, the relative debt level increased from 107.2% to 177.1% of the shrinking GDP from 2007 to 2014. Greece has been in deflation since March 2013 . Unemployment has risen sharply and was around 26 percent in 2014; the problems in the health sector, among other things, had risen sharply.

On January 25, 2015 there was a change of government in Greece . The new ruling party SYRIZA initially continued negotiations on the second program for five months. On the night of June 27, 2015, Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras broke off negotiations and called a referendum . The very next day parliament decided by an overwhelming majority to hold the referendum. As a countermeasure, ECB boss Mario Draghi immediately stopped the flow of capital to the Greek banks, so that Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis was forced to introduce capital controls. In June 2015, international transfers were placed completely under state supervision and only approved in exceptional cases. Cash withdrawals from banks have been restricted to € 60 per day. These restrictions mainly affected the self-employed and companies; the majority of the population supported their government's referendum with 61.3% no votes against the ECB and the EU partners. As a result, Tsipras surprisingly made a U-turn on election night, which Finance Minister Varoufakis did not want to support and resigned.

On July 12, 2015, the heads of state and government of the euro zone unanimously agreed on the framework conditions for starting negotiations on a third aid program, and Athens received a bridging loan of 7.16 billion euros from the EU bailout fund, which had not been used for several years EFSM . The euro finance ministers approved the third aid package on August 19, 2015. The third package was worth 86 billion euros and expired in August 2018. It was processed through the ESM . On August 20, Alexis Tsipras announced his resignation in order to legitimize the revision of his position through re-election. In the parliamentary elections in Greece in September 2015 , Tsipras emerged again as the winner and continued the coalition with the ANEL party.

The third aid program for Greece, which expired in August 2018, was discontinued. The Prime Minister had closed it early, even before the funds provided were used up. Of the originally agreed 86 billion euros, Greece finally accepted to pass only 55 billion euros through to the banks. Instead, Tsipras announced that his country would be able to do without European aid programs in the future. The final payment to Athens of 15 billion euros and a postponement of loan repayments by ten years were agreed by the finance ministers of the euro area.

Credit rating of
long-term liabilities of
Greece (excerpt)

date	Fitch	S&P	Moody's	source
15th Mar 2007			A1
Oct 29, 2008			A1
0Dec 8, 2009 ▼	BBB +
December 16, 2009 ▼		BBB +
Dec 22, 2009 ▼			A2
Apr. 27, 2010 ▼	BBB−	BB + / B	A3
June 14, 2010 ▼			Ba1
07th Mar 2011 ▼			B1
30th Mar 2011 ▼		BB−
0May 9, 2011 ▼		B.
May 20, 2011 ▼	B +
0June 1, 2011 ▼			Caa1
June 14, 2011 ▼		CCC
July 13, 2011 ▼	CCC
July 25, 2011 ▼			Approx
July 27, 2011 ▼		CC
Feb. 22, 2012 ▼	C.
Feb. 27, 2012 ▼		SD
03rd Mar 2012 ▼			C.
09 Mar 2012 ▼	RD
13 Mar 2012 ▲	B-
0May 2, 2012 ▲		CCC
May 17, 2012 ▼	CCC
0Dec 6, 2012 ▼		SD
December 18, 2012 ▲		B-
May 14, 2013 ▲	B-
Nov 29, 2013 ▲			Caa3
...	...	...	...
0Aug 1, 2014 ▲			Caa1
Sep 12 2014 ▲		B.
Jan. 16, 2015 ▲	B.
Apr 15, 2015 ▼		CCC +
Apr. 29, 2015 ▼			Caa2
May 15, 2015 ▼	CCC
June 11, 2015 ▼		CCC
June 29, 2015 ▼		CCC-
June 30, 2015 ▼	CC
0July 1, 2015 ▼			Caa3
Aug. 18, 2015 ▲	CCC
Jan. 22, 2016 ▲		B-
June 23, 2017 ▲			Caa2
Aug. 18, 2017 ▲	B-
Jan. 19, 2018 ▲		B.
February 16, 2018 ▲	B.
Feb. 21, 2018 ▲			B3
June 25, 2018 ▲		B +
0Oct. 8, 2018 ▲	BB-
01st Mar 2019 ▲			B1

Origin and course

Until the change of government in 2009

Greece joined the euro area on January 1, 2001. In a 2004 report, Eurostat found that the statistical data sent by Greece might not be correct. This was attributed to the fact that the Statistical Office of Greece ( ESYE ) had incorrectly evaluated the data available to it and the authorities and ministries had supplied the office with incorrect data. Against this background, Eurostat published a report on the revision of the Greek deficit and debt figures in November 2004, according to which incorrect figures were reported in eleven individual cases in the years prior to 2004.

In January 2010 the European Commission reported again in its “Report on the Statistics of Greece” on methodological deficiencies in financial statistics at ESYE, a lack of political control and political influence on statistical data. Since July 2010, ELSTAT has been a new, non-governmental authority for statistics.

Government balance in% of gross domestic product, according to AMECO data

Long-term bond rates in Greece between 1993 and 2018

Gross domestic product (GDP), national debt in billions of euros and in relation to GDP. Own calculations based on the AMECO database .

According to reports in Spiegel and the New York Times , US banks such as Goldman Sachs and JP Morgan had helped various euro countries such as Italy and Greece in the past ten years to conceal the extent of their national debt . Newly taken out loans were booked as currency swaps , which were not included in the national debt. The use of financial derivatives for public finance was not regulated until 2008. Following regulation by Eurostat in 2008, the Greek government failed to comply with reporting requirements when late reporting of such transactions was requested.

According to a report by Bloomberg Business , the Greek government borrowed more than 2.8 billion euros through a currency swap deal signed with Goldman Sachs in 2001 . With the help of fictitious exchange rates, about two percent of the Greek national debt could be hidden in the balance sheet with this transaction. However, the deal turned out to be unfavorable for the Greek state, probably due to its lack of transparency and complexity, so that a renegotiation was scheduled just three months after the deal, which led to a deal with inflation-linked derivatives . However, these subsequently turned out to be also disadvantageous for the Greek state, so that in August 2005 the Greek government negotiated with Goldman Sachs about the repurchase of the entire bonds by the Greek central bank . The repayment of these derivatives ultimately resulted in an amount of 5.1 billion euros, for the financing of which over-the-counter interest rate swaps were taken out. Allegedly, Goldman Sachs received € 600 million to carry out this deal. Other reports say that expected future income, for example from airport fees and lottery winnings, has been transferred.

From the change of government to the outbreak of the crisis

In the parliamentary elections on October 4, 2009 , the PASOK party won an absolute majority of the parliamentary seats with a 43.9% share of the vote . Two days later, Giorgos Papandreou was sworn in as the new Prime Minister. The increases in social spending promised by PASOK to the voters could not be financed. On October 20, 2009, the new finance minister, Giorgos Papakonstantinou , declared that the budget deficit in 2009 would not amount to around 6 percent of GDP, as stated by the previous government, but rather 12 to 13 percent. It thus exceeded the agreed 3 percent new borrowing limit by far. The promise made by the previous government in April 2009 as part of ongoing deficit penal proceedings to reduce its 2009 national deficit to 3.7% (of GDP) could therefore not be honored. One month after his election as prime minister, Papandreou then contacted IMF chief Strauss-Kahn and, according to his own statements, asked for technical support, which the IMF chief refused and referred to the EU. Strauss-Kahn later presented the conversation in the press in a different light; at that time it was about financial aid. Around the same time, in an interview with ALTER , the future chairman of the ND Antonis Samaras accused the new government of having changed the planned budget for 2009/2010 in such a way that expenditure in 2010 was anticipated and revenues were postponed from 2009 to 2010. As a result of these targeted (but legal) budget changes, the deficit in 2009 jumped from the originally calculated approx. 8% to 12%. The Supreme Court dealt with the matter in 2016 and overturned a previous court judgment in its decision 1331/2016. In doing so, he followed the prosecution's complaint that the Papandreou government had artificially corrected the national deficit upwards in 2009 and the head of the Greek statistics agency ELSTAT covered this correction in order to consciously drive Greece into the memorandum.

The government in Athens agreed with the EU to report to Brussels every two to three months on its savings successes. The ambitious goal set was that Greece wanted to push net new indebtedness by 2012 below the three percent of gross domestic product stipulated in the Stability and Growth Pact . At a special EU summit on February 11, 2010 in Brussels, Papandreou was called upon to implement drastic austerity policies in order to avert national bankruptcy. The expectation of the summit participants that expressions of solidarity with Greece would be sufficient to calm the financial markets was not fulfilled. After long controversies about the design of the aid measures, the heads of state and government of the euro countries agreed at the end of March 2010 to support Greece financially.

Bailout package I for Greece (2010–2013)
in billion euros

Financiers	accept	Paid	Transfer to 2nd program
Euro countries	77.3	52.9	24.4
IMF	30.0	20.1	9.9
total	107.3	73.0	34.3
Source: EU Commission. When it became known that the Troika was planning a second loan package, the Prime Minister prematurely ended the current first one. He thus prevented the transfer of the remaining € 24.4 billion and waived a € 9.9 billion loan, instead he announced a referendum. It was only after Papandreou was overthrown that the EU was able to put together the second package. The refused aid funds totaling € 34.3 billion were contractually agreed upon by the Samaras government following the signing of the second loan package.

Impending insolvency and appeal for help to the IMF and EU

After Strauss-Kahn rejected IMF support and the subsequent lengthy negotiations with the troika made up of IMF, EU and ECB, the risk premiums for long-term Greek government bonds climbed to new record levels. Finally, on April 23, 2010, the Greek government officially applied for financial aid. Under the leadership of Strauss-Kahn, the troika reached an agreement on January 1st and 2nd. May 2010 with Papandreou on an IMF loan of € 30 billion and a guarantee from the EU countries of € 77.3 billion, this time on condition that Greece implements a rigorous austerity program. In order to support banks that hold Greek government bonds, the European Central Bank has accepted Greek government bonds in full face value as collateral since May 3, 2010 , although their creditworthiness is rated as low by the rating agencies.

However, the aid decided for Greece was not enough to calm the markets over the long term. The risk premiums for Greek government bonds continued to rise. In view of these developments, the European heads of state and government agreed at a summit meeting (on May 7th, supplemented by a meeting of finance ministers on May 9th and 10th, 2010) on the establishment of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), which, if necessary, would address the impending insolvency of a Member of the euro zone.

Economic and Political Consequences of the First Memorandum

The economic situation deteriorated as a result; Insolvencies in the private sector and the number of unemployed (quota increase from 8.5% to 12%) increased. Investments, GDP and thus also the tax revenues based on them fell. The risk premiums on Greek government bonds determined on the financial market rose again and in September 2010 almost reached the level of the peak of the crisis in May.

In Greece, economic output contracted by 4.5% in 2010 ( recession ). To counteract this, the Greek government asked the European Commission to simplify the release of certain funds for Greece from the EU structural funds . These funds of 15.3 billion euros could not previously be called up by Greece, as the country cannot raise the necessary contribution due to the austerity measures.

In the first half of 2011, protests against the austerity measures in Greece increased. The then largest opposition party Nea Dimokratia (ND) as well as several other smaller opposition parties turned against the downsizing of the civil service and the announced privatization of state enterprises. Already in November 2010 this led to a split from the ND, in which reform-minded party members founded the new party Dimokratiki Symmachia . There were also conflicts within the government faction of PASOK over the austerity course, which some MPs refused to support. On May 27, the Greek parliament voted against a government proposal for further austerity measures. The EU then demanded a bipartisan consensus from the Greek parliament on debt reduction and made further aid dependent on the Greek parliament adopting a new austerity package. The European People's Party also increased the pressure on its member party ND.

At the end of June 2011, the Greek Prime Minister Papandreou reshuffled his cabinet and appointed, among other things, the previous Defense Minister Evangelos Venizelos as Minister for Economic Affairs and Finance. On June 29, the Greek parliament voted against the votes of most of the ND MPs for a new austerity package that the member states had named in the European Council as a prerequisite for further aid measures.

In the first half of 2011, the Greek new debt amounted to almost 14.7 billion euros - planned for the whole of 2011 was around 16.7 billion euros. Greece had debts of more than 350 billion euros at the time. At the end of 2010, the Greek national debt was 142.8% of GDP; for the end of 2011 the EU Commission expected it to be around 157.7% of GDP.

At a special summit on July 21, 2011, the euro countries agreed on a second rescue package for Greece, despite Papandreou's concerns. Because of the far-reaching consequences for the citizens of this second, significantly larger borrowing, Papandreou once again announced that it would let the citizens decide in a referendum on the EU way out of the crisis and stopped taking up the euro rescue loans. The EU saw no alternative to its path and expressed massive concerns about the referendum. It finally refused to support Papandreou, so that Papandreou withdrew the referendum and resigned as prime minister. Just two weeks later (November 10, 2011) a government of EU technocrats was installed in Athens for six months and immediately called off the next tranche of the first loan package. The rescue package was then stopped (after only 73 of the planned € 107.3 billion); instead, the EFSF and the IMF prepared the second loan package amounting to € 130 billion plus haircut. Shortly after it was signed by the new Prime Minister Antonis Samaras, it turned out that he had to call up the 34.3 billion of his predecessor that had not been used

Consequences of the first memorandum for democracy

On May 1, 2010, Giorgos Papandreou signed a memorandum with the three institutions of the Troika, IMF, EU and ECB. Under pressure from the EU partners, he had previously waived a referendum, and in addition to the IMF loan for Greece that had been applied for, a much larger package to rescue banks in other EU countries (so-called euro rescue) was agreed. For this, on the Day of German Unity in 2010, he and Wolfgang Schäuble received the Quadriga Prize for his “Power of Truthfulness”. Papandreou's laudation was given by Josef Ackermann .
In the next year, Schäuble announced a second package to rescue the euro without prior consultation, whereupon Papandreou - regardless of the price he had just acquired - immediately put all further money transfers for European banks on hold. When he announced on October 30, 2011 that he wanted to hold a “binding” referendum in the same year, the Prime Minister stood up with the words: “We trust the citizens, we trust their judgment, we trust their decision. It is an act of democracy. We have a duty to promote the role and responsibility of citizens “openly against the agreements. Shortly thereafter, he was forced to resign under domestic and foreign political pressure and a former Goldman Sachs employee and ECB vice chairman was installed without election. The Quadriga Prize has not been awarded since 2010 .

Both the provisions of the credit agreements and the form in which they are implemented have met with legal criticism. Parliamentary participation - the Greek constitution provides for a three-fifths majority for the ratification of such far-reaching international treaties - was restricted. A law was passed with a simple majority, according to which the contracts are valid from their signature. In the opinion of the constitutional lawyer Giorgos Kassimatis, this procedure constitutes a breach of the constitution. In his opinion, the credit agreements violate the basic democratic and social rights and property rights of Greek citizens as well as state sovereignty, for example through the complete binding of the entire Greek state assets . An expert opinion prepared by the Bremen legal scholar Andreas Fischer-Lescano on behalf of several European trade union organizations primarily problematizes the lack of legal binding of the EU bodies when concluding loan agreements. The constitutional lawyer Kostas Chrysogonos criticizes the fact that in the course of the implementation of the conditions of the loan agreements laws are increasingly being passed by decree and that emergency law is used in labor disputes.

Parliamentary elections 2012 and further developments

Bailout package II for Greece (2012–2014)
in billion euros

Financiers	accept	Paid
EFSF	144.6	130.9
IMF	19.8	11.8
total	164.4	142.7
Source: BMF / EFSF; Status: March 2018

Early parliamentary elections were held in Greece on May 6, 2012 . The two large people's parties, Nea Dimokratia (ND) and the social democratic Panellinio Sosialistiko Kinima (PASOK), suffered a sharp drop in votes; both together did not have an absolute majority or government majority in parliament. For the first time, the neo-Nazi and racist Chrysi Avgi entered parliament, as did the right-wing populist Anexartiti Ellines and the left-wing Dimokratiki Aristera . The radical left SYRIZA led by Alexis Tsipras surprisingly became the second largest party. Tsipras' attempt to form a government failed; then Evangelos Venizelos , Chairman of PASOK and Minister of Finance, got the job. His attempt also failed.

Andonis Samaras formed a new government ( Samaras cabinet ) shortly after the general election on June 17th . It was supported by three parties (Conservatives (ND) Socialists (Pasok) and Dimokratiki Aristera ) until June 2013 ; from then on from ND and PASOK.

In December 2014, the Samaras government failed to get a new president elected in parliament : the candidate did not receive the required majority in any of three ballots (details here ). After the failure of the third ballot (December 29th), the President had to dissolve parliament within ten days and call a parliamentary election . The election took place on January 25, 2015.

General election 2015 and further developments

Bailout package III for Greece (2015-2018)
in billion euros

Financiers	accept	Paid
ESM	86.0	55.2
total	86.0	55.2
Source: BMF / EFSF

The early parliamentary election of 2015 was won by the left-wing SYRIZA under party leader Alexis Tsipras with a surprisingly high share of the vote of 36.34% (2012: 27.77%). After Tsipras and Panos Kammenos had been able to agree on a coalition government between SYRIZA and ANEL ( Cabinet Tsipras I ), he was sworn in as Greek Prime Minister the day after the election.

On August 20, 2015, Tsipras announced his resignation, so that another election took place in Greece on September 20, 2015. Syriza received 35.46% of the vote, the conservative Nea Dimokratia 28.10%, the right-wing radical Chrysi Avgi (Golden Dawn) 6.99%, the Dimokratiki Symbarataxi (electoral alliance of PASOK and DIMAR) 6.28% and the right-wing populist ANEL ( Independent Greeks) 3.69%. Tsipras continued the coalition with the ANEL ( Tsipras II cabinet ).

On December 9, 2016, Prime Minister Tsipras announced that he would pay out a one-off total of 617 million euros to around 1.6 million Greek pensioners with a monthly pension of less than 850 euros. On December 15, 2016, the Greek Parliament approved this plan. Other governments of euro countries criticize the fact that the measure was not discussed with them. The ESM euro rescue package then stopped the debt relief that had been agreed shortly before.

causes

External causes

The EEC internal market

After the Greek people freed themselves from a 7-year military dictatorship tolerated by Washington in 1974 , political pressure from their NATO partners was feverishly working on its integration into the EEC . Germany in particular got involved in this and established its political relations with the newly founded parties PASOK and ND in 1974 so that they could develop the necessary political will-formation among the population to accept future membership of the EEC; but in vain. At that time, well over 50% of the workforce on the Greek labor market were self-employed or entrepreneurs. But it was precisely these who feared having to compete within the EEC on their traditional markets with dumping prices from Western European corporations, which would significantly restrict free competition through monopoly. That is why the political election campaign against the ruling conservative ND was extremely controversial. The left opposition even issued the slogan: “Get out of NATO!” And “not into the EEC”.

Despite this criticism, the country joined the EC in 1981. As a result, Greece elected 59% of the left parties in the 1981 parliamentary elections , namely the young Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) and the traditional Communist Party of Greece (KKE, founded in 1918). PASOK achieved a majority of 48.1% with its EC-critical election program, while the KKE, after decades of persecution, achieved a respectable 10.9% (third place) and entered parliament despite being disadvantaged by the new electoral law. After two legislative periods and shortly before the introduction of the internal market, the political mood in the country was once again whipped up. A total of three parliamentary elections and changes in the electoral law were necessary within ten months in order to form a "stable" conservative government under Konstantinos Mitsotakis in April 1990 with a majority of only one vote. In the following July the free movement of capital came into force in the EEC with far-reaching economic consequences (Directive 88/361 / EEC), and in February 1992 Greece also signed the Maastricht Treaty . After just one year, Mitsotakis was again replaced by Papandreou.

The creation of the European internal market was accompanied in the 1990s by the Greek governments with the first reform measures that were in line with the EC, ostensibly to improve the competitiveness of the Greek economy. In fact, however, the national market should be freed from the countless small businesses and thus made more attractive for new investors. At that time the self-employment rate fell very rapidly and has since been around 35% of employees (OECD); despite everything still the highest in Europe. The freed workers were not absorbed by the newly emerging large companies. In fact, in the 90s, additional investment funds flowed into the EC industrialized countries, where capacities were significantly expanded and the markets of the EC southward expansion were flooded with mass-produced goods at dumping prices. The Greek private sector largely withdrew from mechanical engineering and processing, focusing on mineral resources, agriculture and summer tourism. In order not to jeopardize the process of restructuring due to the resulting hardship, the EC supported the country with grants from the Cohesion and Structural Funds, with which, for example, the infrastructure was to be improved. As a result, competitiveness (except for mineral resources) plummeted in just a few years. Consumers in the industrialized EU countries still prefer cheap agricultural products today, some of which are produced in greenhouses with the industrial use of pesticides and fertilizers. In summer tourism, the closer countries Spain, France and Italy are traditionally preferred (although there is currently an increase in Greece). As a result, after joining the EEC, the trade balance was permanently destabilized. At that time the Greek central bank tried to give foreign trade additional impetus by steadily devaluing the drachma, but the benefits were only temporary and the drachma fell significantly in value. In addition, traditional exporting countries have now lost their competitiveness on the Greek markets due to the devaluation. This could only be prevented by a common currency.

Transnational Corruption

Since the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 1977 came into force in the USA, the problem of legal corruption in international trade has moved into the focus of political attention. The idea that in order to fight international corruption it is necessary to prosecute not only those who are passive but at least the same amount of those who are actively corrupt, had prevailed within the OECD . Even then it was recognized that close ties between politics and business were traditionally cultivated, especially in industrialized countries. These relationships were regulated by law and seldom open to legal challenge.

With the expansion of the EEC to the south and in preparation for the later internal market in the 1980s, in the competition between exporting countries, these relationships were expanded to the new markets by means of enormous capital pressure, so that local client networks were gradually displaced from there. Bribes to officials of the southern expansion were still denounced as corruption in the target country, but could no longer be legally prosecuted because in the exporting countries bribes abroad were expressly allowed and in some countries even state co-financed through tax exemptions . Despite deductibility, the mandatory naming of the recipient has now been abolished in the local tax return in order to thwart his prosecution in the context of administrative assistance proceedings in his home country. In addition, a parliamentary motion by the SPD opposition to abolish the tax deductibility of bribes and kickbacks (Bonn, 1993) before the Maastricht Treaty came into force (printed matter 12/4104, German Bundestag - 12th electoral period):

Reason

When calculating the taxable profit, bribes or kickbacks are deductible as business expenses if they are paid for operational reasons. For tax deductibility, it is irrelevant whether the payments are prohibited by law or immoral (Section 40 of the Tax Code). The only requirement for the deduction is that the recipient is named at the request of the tax authorities (Section 160 (1) of the Tax Code).

When paying bribes and bribes to foreign recipients, proof of receipt is even waived if it is certain that the recipient is not subject to German tax liability. By taking bribes to foreign recipients into account, the Federal Republic of Germany encourages active bribery abroad. This contradicts statements made by the German government, according to which great importance is attached to the element of legal security and the fight against corruption in developing countries. It is therefore imperative for the credibility of German politics abroad to lift this contradiction and to abolish the tax deductibility of bribes and kickbacks.

The economic impact of low-GDP countries with traditionally small state administrations and jurisdictions such as Greece has been the subject of controversy. In most cases, however, the practice of bribery was further developed against morality and for economic profit. It was not until 1999 that a “ Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions ” came into force under pressure from the OECD , so that cases of transnational corruption have been legally prosecutable since the beginning of the millennium .

Internal Greek causes

The causes of the financial crisis in Greece are controversially discussed and assessed. The following assessments of possible causes were given in various publications:

Failure to meet the convergence criteria

Interest rates of selected countries

Greece was one of those states which did not meet the EU convergence criteria “in decision year” 1999 with a government deficit of 3.07% of GDP and a debt ratio of around 100%; as participation was possible when the reference value was approached and the trend was “sufficiently negative”, it was accepted into the euro zone in 2001. In fact, only Sweden and Estonia have met the EU convergence criteria at all times since the introduction of the euro.

Contrary to the Maastricht Treaty , according to which a euro country must reduce both the annual budget deficit and the national debt towards the limit even after the introduction of the euro, Greece was unable to reduce the criteria that were exceeded. The interest burden ratio (government interest expense in relation to GDP) fell, but was still higher than that of other euro countries and rose again.

Development of the national debt of several European countries in% of GDP 2000–2011

Methodological deficits in official statistics

The development of national debt and government deficits has been the subject of controversial discussion in the Greek media since the 1990s. In order not to reinforce the resentment against involuntary membership, which has prevailed since joining the EEC in 1981, the economic forecasts were presented consistently positive. When they joined the EURO in 2001, the governments of Konstantinos Simitis ( PASOK ) and Kostas Karamanlis ( ND ) began to play down the economic situation in the press and even manipulate official economic data, which were also passed on to Eurostat . In a "Report on the Statistics of Greece" from January 2010, the European Commission cites as possible reasons on the one hand "qualitative methodological deficiencies in Greek financial statistics at the level of the Statistical Office of Greece ( ESYE )" and, at the same time, a lack of (political) governance and impairment the quality of the statistics through political influence. Since July 2010, ELSTAT has been a new, non-governmental authority for statistics.

High government spending

• Above-average increase in wage costs: In the year the euro was introduced, wages in the private and public sector rose by 12 to 15 percent in 2002, compared with only 1.5 to 5 percent in the previous year. In the following years, too, wage costs rose significantly more than the EU average.

• Lack of transparency in government spending: Inadequate control mechanisms for the award of contracts for large government projects enabled corruption . In particular, the topic of active German corruption in Greece was raised in the German and Greek media. On the occasion of a press conference by Finance Ministers Varoufakis and Schäuble, the journalist Παντελής Βαλασόπουλος insinuated that the German private sector was involved in 90% of corruption cases in Greece in his question, which was much noticed in the two countries.

German armaments companies had fed Athens officials to systematically increase military spending in Greece since joining the EEC. But also areas of medical care have been manipulated by German pharmaceutical companies with bribery payments to optimize profits. Siemens alone "invested" € 100 million in bribes in the Greek administration. The newspaper Το Βήμα reported in July 2010 that a public administration inspection examined a selection of 164 out of around 500 sales contracts for hospital equipment. In all of them, Siemens was the sole applicant to conclude the contract. In addition, purchase and service prices were not negotiated. Above all, the far overpriced service has been earned for years.

• Size and efficiency of the state apparatus : Traditionally, in Greece, too, the rulers in each case provide the members of their party with jobs in the public service, which means that there is a risk that the state apparatus will be inflated and not filled according to competence. In the case of Greece, however, this could not be confirmed from statistical economic data from the OECD, on the contrary:

In the two OECD publications Government at a Glance 2013 and Government at a Glance 2015 , the authors compare public sector employment with the total labor force of all member states. According to this, the share of employees in the public sector (public administration + public companies) for Greece was 19.7% in 2001, increased to 20.7% in 2008 and decreased to 17.5% in 2013. The OECD average was around 19% in 2009 and 2013. The corresponding figures in the euro crisis country Ireland were 17.9% (2001), 18.3% (2010) and 17.5% (2013), in Spain 14.1% (2001), 13.8% ( 2011) and 12.7% (2013).

A census of all public employees carried out in July 2010 resulted in the number 768,000 with a workforce of 4.945 million (15.5%) (for the figures see also the section on the effects of the austerity measures ). In 2011, non-official, economically liberal sources in the German press spoke of around 1.1 million state employees. However, this non-standardized number comes from a list of different dates by the Athens Chamber of Commerce and Industry. For example, all 177,600 members of the military were incorrectly counted, including conscripts. According to the authors' estimate, 550,000 of these government employees are employed on a temporary basis. The Γενικό Λογιστήριο του Κράτους (in German about: General State Audit Office ) estimated that in 2012 the number of public employees had fallen to 727,458 (4.828 million people in the labor force) (15.1%). Because of the dramatic rise in unemployment over the same period, the share of public employees in the total number of employed had increased from 17.5% (2010) to 19.3% (2012), although the absolute number of public employees actually fell by over 40,000 . More information can be found in the Public Administration Reform section .

Number of public employees in administration (blue) and in state-owned enterprises (red) in European countries as a percentage of the respective economically active population (OECD). The corresponding figures for 2012/2013 are only available as a total.
According to the diagram, Norway and Denmark have the largest state administrations, while Greece has the smallest.

• Size and efficiency of the state administration : In contrast to most EU countries, Greece employs the majority of its public employees in public companies (e.g. water, electricity, transport, telecommunications). In 2008 that was 12.8% of the labor force (with a total of 20.7% in the public sector). The public enterprises secure a substantial part of the state revenue. However, they represent an obstacle for private investors in these markets. By way of comparison: in Spain almost all public employees (13.8% see above) are employed in the state administration, not in public companies. In contrast, OECD statistics show that Greece has had the smallest general government of all 16 EU countries included in the statistics for at least a decade and a half . The OECD explains: "With less than 8% of the labor force employed by the government, Greece has one of the smallest government workforces among OECD countries."

Afterwards Greece employed z. In 2008, for example, 7.9% of the labor force in the state administration and thus the lowest proportion of all EU countries shown in the source. Traditionally, more than half of them are employed on a temporary basis. In contrast, as in almost all European countries, Greece does not have a so-called official status , as the German press repeatedly claims. In fact, all government employees (δημόσιοι υπάλληλοι = public employees) are subject to tax and insurance and, in contrast to "civil servants", have the right to strike and the right to terminate the contract. Few of them are permanently employed. The division of annual income into 14 monthly salaries, which is much criticized in the German media, is not a financial advantage for state employees; the division of the 12 monthly salaries into 14 corresponds to a free loan for the state. More information can be found in the Public Administration Reform section .

• Phantom pensioners: A frequently cited example of the inefficiency of the Greek administration is the unusually frequent fraudulent use of social benefits up to long-undiscovered old-age pension payments beyond the death of the recipient (“phantom pensioners”).

In the autumn of 2010, the authorities began to look for them more intensely and ordered that all pensioners should report to the authorities, including those who lived in remote areas or abroad. Shortly before the deadline in November 2011, around 21,000 retirees had not reported who were exaggerated in the press as deceased or "phantom retirees".

In fact, that figure was way over the top, but it served as an excuse for the government to temporarily suspend pension payments to 63,500 recipients. This enabled the pension funds to withhold 450 million euros annually for the time being. In early 2013, after a 2-year study, Labor Minister Giannis Vroutsis presented the actual figures to parliament. According to this, his authority uncovered a total of 41,576 cases of unjustifiably paid payments from all social security funds combined, but only 1020 cases of deceased pensioners. Vroutsis put the total damage to the social security funds at € 420 million per year.

• High military spending: There have been tensions between Greece and Turkey since the 1970s; during this time both countries have rearmed themselves; this is considered an arms race . At times, Athens spent almost six percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) on the military, more than any other NATO country except the United States. Armaments were bought in particular from the USA, Germany and France. During the crisis, Greece ordered two additional submarines in Germany. The troop strength of 128,000 soldiers was reduced to 106,000 during the crisis.

More information can be found in the section on reducing military spending .

The measures taken by the Greek government to reduce government spending and their effects are described in the section Measures taken by the Greek government .

Low government revenue

Map of the national shadow economies 2013 (in € / capita) in the EU countries. The shades of red correspond to the red bars in the diagram below.

National shadow economy and total GDP in € / capita.

The low level of government revenue in Greece is based on low tax revenue. Different, also controversial reasons are given by different sources. Frequently mentioned reasons are listed below.

• Low income taxes: This is due to one of the lowest employment rates in a comparison of all EU countries. According to EUROSTAT, only around a third of the population in Greece has been in employment for years. A third of them are self-employed. That means only one in five has a job at all.
• Low income and wealth taxes: Greece had cut some taxes in the years before the crisis, which resulted in a reduction in government revenues. In 2007 taxes on income from profits and assets were 15.9% in Greece and 24.4% in Germany; the highest in the EU is in the UK at 42.7%.
• Non-recoverable tax debts: In October 2009, Greek citizens and companies owed the state around 31 billion euros. To increase government revenue, the government increased taxes and levies and introduced various new taxes. The tax investigation was intensified, some defaulting payers were arrested and the biggest tax evaders were published on the Internet in July 2012. Despite or precisely because of these measures within the recession, government revenues fell to a minimum of 84 billion euros by 2014 (EUROSTAT). In July 2016, a list of the biggest tax evaders was published for the second time since January 2012. The listed 13,730 natural and legal persons owed the Greek state a total of around 83 billion euros. The list also includes companies and individuals who are already insolvent, so that a full repayment of the tax debt cannot be assumed. More information can be found in the section on combating corruption and the shadow economy .
• Above-average shadow economy: In Greece, the national shadow economy is traditionally denounced as being above-average in relation to the small population. But in fact this is true as for all Niedrich-GDP countries only for the shadow Economic quote . This is the quotient of the (absolute) shadow economy and the national gross domestic product (GDP). It thus corresponds to the average per capita shadow economy in units of per capita GDP. According to the study "The Shadow Economy in Europe 2013" by the University of Linz, it was 24.3% of GDP in Greece in 2008, the estimates for 2013 and 2015 were 23.6% and 22.0% (corresponding figures for Germany: 14.2%, 13.0% and 10.4%). Due to the high shadow economy - in 2013 it amounted to 43 billion euros - Greece loses tax revenues in the double-digit billions every year. On the other hand, according to the study, the absolute Greek shadow economy per capita lies at € 3,900 / capita in the EU average (for comparison: Germany € 4,300 / capita, Sweden € 6,100 / capita, top runner Luxembourg € 6,800 / capita, see diagram on the right). The following figures were estimated for 2015: Greece € 3,600 / person, for Germany € 3,900 / person shadow economy. More information can be found in the section on combating corruption and the shadow economy .
• Smuggling: It is estimated that the Greek treasury has lost around 25 billion euros in the past 20 years through gasoline smuggling and gasoline fraud. The problems with cigarette smuggling are similar.

The measures taken by the Greek government to increase government revenue and their effects are described in the section Measures taken by the Greek government .

Insufficient enforcement of the EU treaties

Some authors cited the inadequate enforcement of the EU treaties as one of the causes. The ban on assuming liability for debts ( non-bailiff clause ) set out in the Maastricht Treaty has also been undermined.

“1. The Union shall not be liable for the liabilities of central governments, regional or local authorities or any other public law corporation, other public law body or public company of Member States, and shall not assume any liability for such liabilities; this is without prejudice to the mutual financial guarantees for the joint implementation of a particular project. A Member State shall not be liable for and assume no liability for the obligations of central governments, regional or local authorities or other public bodies, other bodies governed by public law or public undertakings of any other Member State; this applies without prejudice to the mutual financial guarantees for the joint implementation of a particular project. "

- Art. 125 (1) in the Maastricht Treaty

Despite early knowledge of the economically critical situation of countries like Greece, the EU authorities have neither effectively addressed the failure of the criteria nor promoted countermeasures. According to the journalist Ursula Welter , the lack of automatic sanctions in the case of increasing debts is objectionable. In the short term, EU countries are allowed to expand their budget balances and debt levels excessively without fear of consequences from the EU.

Abusive Lending

In connection with the Greek sovereign debt crisis, banks are accused of improper lending because, similar to before the subprime crisis , they granted loans although they had already recognized Greece's financial distress. The economic historian Werner Abelshauser reports that he was laughed at at a conference in 2010 when he mentioned the no-bailout clause ; apparently the investors and bankers present did not consider this clause credible. According to other sources, the lenders misjudged the risk. It was not until the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2007 that risk premiums on Greek government debt began to rise.

Low investment

With the exception of 2003, investments have declined since the introduction of the euro, which was criticized because of the high level of investment required.

Mutually reinforcing causes

Both the increasing national debt (repayment burdens) and the rising risk premiums (interest on government bonds) weighed on the Greek budget. After the bank bailout, any deterioration in the economic outlook led to a sharp rise in risk premiums for government bonds. The resulting increase in debt, in turn, increased interest rates, so that causes reinforced each other and led to ever higher costs of capital.

Crisis Management Measures

Actions by the EU, the ECB and the IMF

After Greece officially applied for EU aid in April 2010, the European Union (EU), the European Central Bank (ECB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) agreed with the Greek government on May 2, 2010, to launch a first aid package Loan Facility Agreement ). This first rescue package included aid in the form of loans and guarantees. The second package was decided in February / March 2012 and, in addition to loans and guarantees from the European rescue fund EFSF , included a reduction in lending rates and debt rescheduling (partial debt relief). Private creditors also participated in the rescheduling; However, their contribution of 40.9 billion euros was 100% offset from the 2nd aid package.

Aid packages for Greece

	time	Amount of committed cash transfers	Amount of money transfers made	Financiers	Amortization-free period and due date	interest rate
First aid package	April 2010	107.3 billion euros	73.0 billion euros	Eurogroup 52.9 billion euros IMF 20.1 billion euros	Eurogroup: 10 and 30 years IMF: repaid in 2016	Eurogroup: 50 basis points above the 3-month Euribor IMF: approx. 3.96%
Second aid package	February / March 2012	130.1 (+ 34.3) billion euros	142.7 billion euros	EFSF 130.9 billion euros, IMF 11.8 billion euros	EFSF: maturity 32.5 years on average IMF: maturity 2026	EFSF: no guarantee fee, deferral of some interest payments for 10 years IMF: approx. 2.85 to 3.78%
Third aid package	August 2015	86 billion euros	61.9 billion euros	ESM 61.9 billion euros	ESM: Maturity 32.5 years on average	ESM: approx. 0.86%
Σ	until Aug. 2018	323.4 billion euros	277.6 billion euros	Eurogroup / EFSF / ESM € 245.7 billion, IMF € 31.9 billion	-	-

Measures in a country comparison

	Loans		EURO rescue					total
	(nat.)	IMF	€ zone	Non-€ countries	EFSF	EFSM	ESM
Greece	66.5	31.9	52.9		130.9		61.9	344.1
Ireland	17.5	22.5		4.8	17.7	22.5		085.0
Portugal		26.6			26.0	24.3		076.9
Spain							41.3	041.3
Cyprus		1.0					6.3	007.3
total	€ 166 billion		€ 388.6 billion					€ 554.6 billion

Globalization critics accused those responsible for the design and implementation of the aid packages of "having used hundreds of billions of public money to save banks and other financial actors and, above all, their owners from the consequences of the financial crisis they caused". Instead of helping the Greek people, the measures would rather benefit financial institutions and speculators. A research carried out by Attac Austria in 2013 revealed that “at least 77.12% of the program funds had flowed directly (via bank recapitalization) or indirectly (via government bonds) to the financial sector” from the rescue program for Greece.

As of September 30, 2016, Greece's debt was € 311.16 billion. At this point in time, the main donors with a 68.4% share were other euro countries (the share is made up of bilateral loans, EFSF and ESM), other donors (22.5%), the IMF (4.2%), the ECB (4, 0%) and the Bank of Greece (1.1%). From 2010 to 2015, Greece paid 52.3 billion euros in interest to creditors, and around 70 billion euros is expected by 2018. In a debt sustainability analysis from February 2017, the IMF suggests another extension of the grace period until 2040, an extension of the maturity of Eurogroup, EFSF and ESM loans until 2070, a waiver of interest payments until at least 2040 and interest rates of a maximum of 1.5% for stipulate a term of 30 years for EFSF and ESM loans. This rescheduling (ultimately a renewed debt relief) should help Greece to stimulate the economy on its own and to be able to repay its (then reduced) debts at a later point in time. The proposals are based on an IMF development forecast. The forecast deviates significantly from the forecast of the European Commission from March 2017.

The agreements on the first and second aid package have been supplemented and changed several times. The following table shows the changes:

Eurogroup / ESFS / ESM agreements on aid packages for Greece

designation	time	Name of the change	Changes
First aid package	May 2010	Euro Area Loan Facility Act 2010 (Initial Agreement)	Interest rate: variable; at Euribor oriented in the first three years: 300 basis points above the 3-month Euribor thereafter 400 basis points above the 3-month Euribor Euro countries receive a service fee of 50 basis points Loan maturity: 5 years
	June 2011 (decided in March 2011)	Euro Area Loan Facility (Amendment) Act 2011 (Adapted Agreement)	Lending rate adjusted by 100 basis points in the first three years: 200 basis points above the 3-month Euribor thereafter 300 basis points above the 3-month Euribor Credit maturity increased to 10 years
	February / March 2012	Euro Area Loan Facility (Amendment) Act 2012 (Adapted Agreement)	Lending rate adjusted to 150 basis points above the 3-month Euribor Credit maturity increased to 15 years
	February 2013 (decided in December 2012)	Euro Area Loan Facility (Amendment) Act 2013 (Adjusted agreement)	Lending rate adjusted to 50 basis points above the 3-month Euribor Loan maturity increased to 30 years
Second aid package	November 2012	(Adapted Agreement)	Reduction of fees for guarantees to the EFSF loans by 10 basis points Euribor Loan maturity of both aid packages increased by 15 years Deferred interest on EFSF loans for 10 years Negotiated by the Greek government: debt rescheduling (haircut) of 107 billion euros
Third aid package	August 2015	(Original agreement)

Legal basis of EU and IMF aid

The non-assistance clause of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), Art. 125 TFEU , according to an analysis by the service of the German Bundestag (2010), excludes automatic liability ( obligation to provide assistance) of the European Union and the member states for liabilities of other member states. According to the interpretation, however, it does not emerge from the non-assistance clause how the voluntary assumption of debts by other states ( rescue operation ) is regulated. Because of this article, there was a complaint as to whether the loans granted (including to Greece) by the member states or the EFSF / ESM were lawful. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruled that these measures are compliant with European law.

The International Monetary Fund IMF , based in Washington, has the task of stabilizing the international financial markets.

First Greece program, rescue package from EU and IMF - May 2010

At the beginning of 2010, the assessment of the financial situation of Greece by the capital market players deteriorated so much that insolvency threatened. It was feared that banks that had lent money to Greece would also get into serious difficulties with further effects on the euro currency system.

On April 11, 2010, the members of the Eurozone decided to grant aid loans to Greece. After rating agencies further downgraded Greece's creditworthiness and the risk premiums for long-term Greek government bonds reached record levels, the Greek government officially applied for financial assistance on April 23, 2010.

The European Union (EU), the European Central Bank (ECB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) reached an agreement on January 1st and 2nd. May 2010 with the Greek government on a three-year financial aid program in the form of bilateral loan guarantees totaling 110 billion euros. The donors did not assume any liability for Greece's outstanding debts.

In return, the Greek government under Prime Minister Giorgos A. Papandreou ( PASOK ) undertook to implement radical reforms. The Greek budget should be consolidated within three years to such an extent that the budget deficit would have fallen below 3% by 2014. This first aid program is known by different names: These include “First Rescue Package”, “Greek Loan Facility” and “First Economic Adjustment Program for Greece”.

Of the 110 billion euros initially committed, the IMF initially took on 30 billion euros and the euro zone 80 billion euros as bilateral loan commitments. Decisive for the determination of the quotas of the individual euro states on the 80 billion euro zone was the respective capital share in the capital of the ECB , which in turn is determined every five years according to the respective share of a country in the total population and economic output of the EU. The € 80 billion amount was reduced by € 2.7 billion to € 77.3 billion after Slovakia decided not to participate in the Loan Facility for Greece (GLF). Ireland and Portugal also did not participate, as they applied for or received grants themselves. In total, the loan assistance committed in May 2010 amounted to 107.3 billion euros. In 2010, the guarantee for Germany amounted to 8.4 billion euros, and another 14 billion euros should follow in the following two years. On May 7, 2010, the German Bundestag and the German Bundesrat approved aid to Greece and passed the Monetary Union Financial Stability Act .

The disbursement of the loans to Greece was planned between May 2010 and June 2013. The transfer of the quarterly tranches was linked to compliance with the measures agreed in the restructuring package. This had to be confirmed by joint reports by the so-called Troika , i.e. the European Central Bank , the International Monetary Fund and the European Commission .

Overview of payments to Greece

Period	Eurogroup (Lending Facility for Greece, GLF)	IMF	All in all	Remarks
18./12. May 2010	14.5 billion euros	5.5 billion euros	20.0 billion euros	1st tranche of the first aid package (transferred)
13./14. September 2010	6.5 billion euros	2.5 billion euros	9.0 billion euros	2nd tranche (transferred)
January 19, 2011 / December 21, 2010	6.5 billion euros	2.5 billion euros	9.0 billion euros	3rd tranche (transferred)
March 16, 2011	10.9 billion euros	4.1 billion euros	15.0 billion euros	4th tranche (transferred)
15./13. July 2011	8.7 billion euros	3.3 billion euros	12.0 billion euros	5th tranche (transferred)
14./7. December 2011	5.8 billion euros	2.2 billion euros	8.0 billion euros	6th installment (transferred)
total	52.9 billion euros	20.1 billion euros	73.0 billion euros

The 73.0 billion of the originally promised 107.3 billion euros were ultimately paid out to Greece from May 2010 to December 2011. The remaining, around 34.3 billion euros, “are to be paid out via the EFSF, which also includes the Funding of the second aid package to Greece will be ongoing ”.

See also the section on Financial Consequences for Creditors .

Second bailout package from EU and IMF - July 2011 to February / March 2012

After the first rescue package had proven to be inadequate, a “second” rescue package for Greece was decided at an EU summit of the 17 euro countries on July 21, 2011. The aid package had a total volume of 109 billion euros and can be disbursed by the newly created EFSF , an institution of the participating states, and the International Monetary Fund until 2014 and loaned at the low interest rate of 3.5%. For the repayment of all the funds made available by the rescue fund, Greece was granted a term extension from seven and a half to 15 years.

For the first time, participation by the private financial sector on a voluntary basis was agreed ( voluntary so-called debt haircut (debt relief) ). The net contribution from banks to support Greece should be € 37 billion by 2014. However, Greece had undertaken to reimburse the banks for this default 100% from the aid loans of the second package. Furthermore, a reconstruction plan for Greece was announced at the EU summit in order to promote economic growth. The EU Commission set up a "Task Force for Greece".

The German Bundestag approved an expansion of 29 September 2011 EFSF to.

In view of the uncertainty surrounding domestic political developments in Greece, the agreed payment was initially suspended after Prime Minister Papandreou announced a referendum on the decisions of the euro summit on November 1, 2011 ; Papandreou dropped this plan after two days, but then had to announce the formation of a new government in order to survive a vote of confidence . He was succeeded as Prime Minister on November 11, 2011 by Loukas Papadimos ; he formed a transitional government .

IMF report December 2011

On December 14th, the 'IMF Country Report No. 11/351 'known. In the extensive report, the IMF ruled out additional financial aid for the near future.

“After talks between the Troika and the Greek government, the head of the IMF mission to Greece, Poul Thomsen, said the IMF representatives had not traveled to Athens to discuss a 'new program'. There is a commitment of support from May 2010 for 30 billion euros. More is currently not to be expected. "

The IMF criticized the same as the OECD last week. The OECD had examined all 14 ministries and came to the conclusion in a study that there was neither a vision of the reform goal nor a control for implementation, hardly any communication within the authorities and a complicated administrative network without any coordination. The only way out is a “big bang reform” in the entire government apparatus - that is, radical cuts.

Ratification of the "second" aid package in February and March 2012

The finance ministers of the euro zone agreed in February 2012 on a “second” aid package for Greece, including loan commitments of 130 billion euros (originally 109 billion euros). In return, Greece had to accept more controls and surrender part of its budget sovereignty. The conditions also included setting up a blocked account. The interest rate for the loans from the first aid package was retrospectively reduced to 150 basis points above the Euribor for the entire term . The German Bundestag approved the aid package on February 27, 2012.

The agreement on the second aid package has been amended and amended several times. In November 2012, the measures included:

• Retrospective reduction in lending rates by 100 Euribor basis points from the first aid package
• Reduction of the fees for guarantees on the EFSF loans by 10 basis points (equivalent to 0.1%)
• Loan maturity of both aid packages increased by 15 years
• Deferred interest on EFSF loans for 10 years
• Transfer of the income from the 2013 financial year of a respective national central bank from the Securities Markets Program to the blocked account of Greece

Haircut and official default in March 2012

On the night of October 26-27, 2011, the euro countries drafted - after a preparatory meeting a few days earlier and after a vote in the Bundestag on October 26, 2011 - a plan through which Greece in the long term - until 2020 - again without financial aid Abroad should get along. The basic aim was to reduce the country's debt level from 160% at the time to 120% of gross domestic product (GDP). The positions of the EU Commission from October are given in the 'Occasional Paper 87/2011'. Lenders should exchange their government bonds for new bonds in January. The member states belonging to the euro area should contribute up to 30 billion euros to the participation of the private sector (English private sector involvement - PSI). The “clout of the EFSF” should be increased to one trillion euros through a “ lever ”.

At the beginning of March 2012, the Greek government announced that it had reached an agreement with 85.5% of private creditors on voluntary debt relief of 100 billion euros, although the target figure of 90% was just missed. Since this did not take place with the consent of all bondholders, the ISDA determined on March 9, 2012 that Greece was in default. Reluctant investors should be forced to give up. The haircut is ultimately 107 billion euros in the period from 2011 to 2019. ^[outdated]

Criticism was raised, among other things, because of the late debt haircut adopted by the EU summit, which was previously excluded from politics. The beneficiaries of a later haircut compared to an earlier haircut (around 2009) are private banks that were able to sell their Greek government bonds, some of which were bought by the ECB . However, the ECB itself did not participate in the PSI, which increased the loss of privately held debt to achieve the fixed target of debt reduction. At the time of the haircut in 2012, private creditors still held around a third of Greek government debt. Due to the loss of private creditors associated with the haircut, the proportion of state creditors rose, especially since Greece was recapitalized Greek banks.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) granted loan assistance of 28 billion euros on March 15, 2012 (PM No. 12/85).

Overview of payments to Greece

Period	EFSF	IMF	All in all	Remarks
March 12 to June 28, 2012	74.0 billion euros	1.6 billion euros	75.6 billion euros	The first payment under the second program was made in seven tranches.
December 2012 to May 2013	49.1 billion euros	3.24 billion euros	52.34 billion euros	The second payment was made in four tranches
May to June 2013	7.5 billion euros	1.74 billion euros	9.24 billion euros	The third payment was made in two tranches
July to December 2013	3.0 billion euros	1.8 billion euros	4.8 billion euros	The fourth payment was made in two tranches
April to August 2014	8.3 billion euros	3.6 billion euros	11.9 billion euros	The fifth payment was made in three tranches
Σ	141.9 billion euros	11.98 billion euros	153.88 billion euros

The financial needs and the related financial aid payments were estimated at a total of 163.9 billion euros between 2012 and 2014. Of this, the EU would contribute EUR 144.7 billion and the IMF EUR 19.1 billion.

After the transfer of the last tranche of the fifth payment in August 2014, the fifth review was due, which, if the findings were sufficient, should be followed by the sixth payment by February 28, 2015, the scheduled end of the program. The review dragged on until early elections became apparent in December 2014 and the review process was suspended. On February 27, 2015, an agreement was reached with the newly elected Syriza government to extend the aid program by four months, during which the previous reform plan should be revised and the fifth review should then be completed.

Actions by the European Central Bank

In May 2010, the European Central Bank bought Greek government bonds worth 25 billion euros. The ECB announced that it would accept Greek bonds as collateral regardless of their rating status. In 2011, she continued to buy Greek government bonds.

As part of its " Securities Markets Program " (SMP), the ECB bought between May 2010 and around February 2012 bonds worth 220 billion euros from euro countries that were no longer able to easily refinance their debts on the capital market, including Greek bonds with a nominal value of an estimated 50 billion euros. For this she was massively criticized in Germany. Finally, the Greek central bank can as part of the central banks of the European System of liquidity help in an emergency ( Emergency Liquidity Assistance grant).

Representation of the volume of the austerity package, the shadow economy, GDP and national debt in a bar chart

Measures by the Greek government

The measures listed below have been agreed between Greece and its creditors.

First savings package - March / April 2010

On March 3, 2010, VAT was increased from 19% to 21% with effect from March 15, 2010 and a decision was made to reduce civil servants' salaries. This should save 4.8 billion euros annually. In addition, the Christmas and vacation pay for all civil servants was cut by 20% and all allowances by 30%.

On April 28, 2010, the cabinet decided on an administrative reform with the Kallikratis Plan . A new decentralized orientation of the administration as well as the implicit reorganization of responsibilities should save administrative expenses of 1.8 billion euros annually. Among other things, it was planned to permanently cut the 13th and 14th monthly salary of civil servants.

Second savings package - May 2010

On May 2, 2010, the Greek government decided on a package of measures negotiated with the IMF and the EU. The following measures should save around 30 billion euros by 2013:

• Freezing of civil servants' salaries over 2000 euros
• Reduction of the administrative levels from five to three
• Reduction of city administrations from currently over 1000 to 370
• Deletion of the 13th and 14th monthly salary or monthly payments in the public sector
• Freeze on hiring in the public sector: only every fifth position that becomes vacant in the public sector is to be filled. In autumn 2011, further positions are to be deleted.
• Increase in the average retirement age from 61.3 to 63.4 years
• Increase in VAT from 21% to 23% and increase in taxes on tobacco, spirits and fuel
• Deletion of 13th and 14th monthly payments for pensioners

The Greek parliament passed the austerity package on May 6, 2010.

Third savings package - June 2011

The Greek parliament approved the government's third package of cuts on June 29, 2011. 155 of the total of 300 MPs voted in favor in the roll-call vote, 138 voted against, 5 abstained and 2 did not take part in the vote. By 2015, the Papandreou government wanted to save around 78 billion euros (around 28 billion euros through benefit cuts and tax increases, 50 billion through privatizations and the sale of state property). The adoption of the austerity package was the decisive prerequisite for the release of a further, fifth, tranche from the 110 billion euro first rescue package by the EU and IMF.

Main points of the third package:

• Taxes: The wealth tax will be increased as will the value added tax for various areas. In addition, a “solidarity tax” will be introduced and tax exemptions will be eliminated.
• Wages: By 2015, the number of employees in the public sector is to be reduced by 150,000, the remaining civil servants have to work longer.
• Social benefits: The assets of benefit recipients are to be reviewed and a number of benefits cut.
• Defense: In the coming year the country wants to save 200 million euros on armaments, from 2013 to 2015 it should then be 333 million euros annually.
• Health system: In 2011, 310 million euros and a further 1.43 billion euros are to be cut by 2015 - for example by lowering the state-set prices for drugs.
• Investments: This year, 700 million euros less should flow, half of this sum should disappear in the long run.
• Privatizations: Many state-owned companies are to switch to private hands. For this purpose, on July 1, 2011, a privatization company named Hellenic Republic Asset Development Fund (HRADF) was set up. It is uncertain whether appropriate prices can be obtained for companies in the current situation.

At the beginning of 2012 it became known that privatization was hardly making any significant progress and that the revenues of 11 billion euros promised by Greece for 2012 seem unrealistic.

Announcement of another savings package - September 2011

On September 21, 2011 the Greek government announced new austerity measures. The tax exemption should be reduced from 8,000 euros to 5,000 euros. Furthermore, 30,000 positions in the public service should be cut. Civil servants and other civil servants should be sent to what is known as a “work reserve”. They should receive 60% of their income for a maximum of twelve months before an independent authority should make a decision on whether to continue to work or to dismiss.

The project was withdrawn and there was a change of government.

Papandreou government resigned - November 2011

The then Prime Minister Papandreou announced on November 1, 2011 a referendum on the decisions of the Euro Summit in Brussels on aid to Greece, which were linked to further drastic austerity requirements, but dropped this plan on November 3, after the upcoming loan disbursement of eight billion euros (“Rescue Aid”) to Greece in view of the uncertainties surrounding domestic political developments in Greece. Papandreou put the vote of confidence in parliament on November 4th and received a majority after the announcement that he would form a transitional government with the involvement of the opposition Nea Dimokratia . A new government formed by the non-party Loukas Papadimos in November 2011, which, in addition to a large part of the previous PASOK ministers, included two ministers from the New Democracy and one from the LAOS , undertook to meet the austerity requirements. At the end of 2011, negotiations in the grand coalition were in deep crisis. Even the most urgent reforms had stalled.

The HRADF was legally legitimized by October 2011 and was therefore fully operational.

In 2011, instead of the expected 400 million euros, a total of 946 million euros in tax debts were collected. This is attributed to the establishment of a centralized structure of the tax authorities, as well as to increased tax audits.

Fourth savings package - February 2012

Another austerity package was passed in February 2012.

• Lowering of the minimum wage to 586 euros
• Reduction of the minimum wage for under 25s to 525 euros
• Reduction of the salaries of certain occupational groups in the public service retrospectively from January 1, 2012 by 20 percent
• Reduction of the unemployment benefit to 322 euros
• Reduction of pensions by 10 to 15 percent
• Increase in the co-payment for medication
• Reduction of drug costs in state clinics
• Savings in overtime for doctors
• Reduction in subsidies for cities and municipalities
• Immediate dismissal of 15,000 government employees; by 2015 150,000
• Privatization of state enterprises
• Closing 200 small, inefficient tax offices and recruiting 1,000 new tax inspectors
• Reduce military spending by 600 million euros by 2015

The treatise "The Second Economic Adjustment Program for Greece" or the HRADF provides information on the implementation status of privatization in spring 2012 . In addition to real estate and land, public utilities, road operating companies and lottery licenses are also to be sold. Numerous German companies accompany the sales process. The platform for public tenders has been active since August 28, 2013.

→ Main article : Hellenic Republic Asset Development Fund

Fifth savings package - November 2012

In November 2012, the Greek parliament approved a renewed austerity package worth 13.5 billion euros, which provides for cuts in pensions, salaries, health and social services and the cancellation of child and Christmas benefits.

• Pensions from 1000 euros upwards are reduced by 5 to 15%
• Christmas bonus for pensioners will be abolished
• The retirement age will be raised from 65 to 67 for everyone
• Severance payments for laid-off employees will be reduced
• Elimination of Christmas and vacation pay for government employees
• Cut wages and salaries by 6 to 20% for civil servants
• By the end of 2012, 2000 state employees are expected to take early retirement
• higher personal contributions when buying medication
• Hospital reform
• Alignment of salaries of employees of public-law companies with those of state employees
• no entitlement to child benefit if the family income exceeds 18,000 euros per year

Sixth austerity package - April 2013

The government coalition in Greece agreed in April 2013 on new austerity proposals as part of their reform projects.

• Reform of Public Administration (English: public administration reform )
  • the staffing plan provides for the dismissal of a large number of government employees :
    • By the end of 2013, 4,000 positions (cumulatively) are to be cut in the public sector
    • by the end of 2014 a total of 15,000 civil servants (cumulative) should go
    • this reform project is by evaluating (English: evaluation ), a sensible redistribution of personnel through its Mobility (English: rational reallocation of personnel through mobility ), and a qualitative renewal through layoffs (English: quality renewal through exits ) are achieved. Criteria for any layoffs and specific plan values ​​can be found on pages 130 and 231f. the essay "The Second Economic Adjustment Program for Greece - Second Review May 2013".
• "a new property tax should be levied"

The paper “The Second Economic Adjustment Program for Greece - Third Review July 2013” ​​provides information on the implementation status in spring 2013.

Since 2014, patients in state hospitals have had to pay 25 euros per treatment. By the end of 2014, the HRADF had sold a total of 14 pieces of land and properties, including buildings in Rome, London, Brussels and Tashkent. The building in Rome brought in € 6 million and the one in London € 22 million.

On July 18, 2015, the German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble criticized in an interview that the components of the new program had already been agreed in 2010, but were inadequately implemented. In September 2016, the economic researcher Schrader, IFW Kiel, mentioned that there had been a number of privatizations, but the implementation of the desired reforms would take longer and it remains unclear whether everything will go according to the donors' wishes. In his opinion, the country needs a haircut, it is impossible that Greece can bear the debt completely. By the end of 2015, around 3 billion euros had been generated from the privatizations; there was criticism that the facilities had been sold at low prices.

Seventh and further packages from August 2016

In September 2016 the Greek government decided on further reforms.

• Non-pharmacists can open pharmacies
• In addition to bakeries, all establishments are allowed to sell bread
• Access to the engineering and notary professions will be relaxed
• Farmers lose discounts on fuel
• Shipowners will receive a higher tonnage tax until 2020
• Freelancers and traders are required to pay all of their income tax upfront
• Early retirement at the age of 50 or 55 will be abolished

In May 2017, following demands from the creditors, further cuts were decided, including in pensions. State companies that are profitable have been privatized. For example, the port of Piraeus was sold to the Chinese Cosco Group, and 14 of the 37 Greek regional airports went to the German Fraport AG.

Public administration reform

As a measure to reform the public administration, vacancies have not been filled since 2010 and some of the numerous fixed-term contracts in the public service have not been extended, so that just two years later the public service has increased by around 55,000 to a good 700,000 employees without mass layoffs had shrunk. In May 2012, the non-party Antonis Manitakis took up his post as Minister for Public Administration Reform in the Samara government . In the spring of 2013, the head of the IMF's Troika delegation, Poul Mathias Thomsen , demanded the dismissal of another 15,000 employees, of which 4,000 immediately. As a result, the public service broadcaster was closed in June 2013 and teachers, doctors and school inspectors were collectively dismissed. The administrative reform, however, was not pursued further, and Manitakis resigned.

In September 2013 it was announced that the special leave for officials who sit at a computer for more than five hours a day would be abolished. Introduced in 1989, officials were given one day of special leave every two months. Previously, bonuses for regularly appearing at work and continued payment of pensions from deceased fathers to their unmarried daughters were also canceled.

According to the report “The Third Economic Adjustment Program for Greece- First Review” from June 2016, the number of employees in the public sector (core public sector) fell by 25.9% between 2009 and 2015 . This contributed to a 31.4% reduction in wage costs. After these massive cuts, the wage costs in the public sector as a percentage of GDP are roughly in line with the euro area average (9% Greece and 9.1% euro area).

Combating corruption and the black economy

According to the Greek statistical office ESYE and the OECD , the volume of the Greek shadow economy was put at 65 billion euros annually in 2009; According to research by the Athens newspaper "Kathimerini", 20 billion euros in taxes alone are evaded.

As an example of corruption in Greece, the fakelaki , the sending of cash in an envelope, was discussed in particular by non-Greek media around 2010 . According to Transparency International Greece , in 2009 “the volume was just over 13 percent” of all private households. In 2009 they paid a total of EUR 787 million in bribes. The share of the black economy in GDP was 25% of GDP, a value that is "surpassed by any other country" in the euro area. In Germany the rate was around 15%. However, the non-standardized raw data show a different picture. Greece's shadow economy per capita only corresponds to the EU average and is clearly surpassed by most countries with above-average GDP (industrialized countries).

The corruption perception index describes the perceived level of corruption in the public sector of a state. In 2012, Greece had a value of 36 out of 100, making it last in the EU. The government has implemented some anti-corruption measures over the past few years. In 2015 the value rose to 46 and was on par with Romania and ahead of Italy and Bulgaria.

The Inspector General for Public Administration, Leandros Rakintzis, started an online census of civil servants in mid-2010. Several offenses were uncovered in connection with the census.

In May 2010, the names of tax evaders were published on the Internet, starting with doctors, some of whom had previously declared income below the subsistence level. A tax reform was also decided: From January 1, 2011, among other things, the obligation to make cashless payments for amounts over 1500 euros was introduced.

A newly established special unit of the Greek police deals exclusively with tax offenses. The then Greek finance minister Evangelos Venizelos gave defaulting taxpayers an ultimatum shortly after taking office in November 2011. He called on all people who owe the state more than 150,000 euros to report to the tax authorities by November 24th and settle their debts. Otherwise he will publish their names. On January 22, 2012 the list of 4,152 names was published and 3 months later 185 tax debtors were in custody. In total, the people on the list owed the Greek state 14.8 billion euros.

On September 6, 2012, the Economic Crime Prosecution Division (SDOE) froze accounts of 121 suspected tax evaders and confiscated luxury real estate , shares on the Athens and New York stock exchanges, and investments in insurance companies. Investigations were started against 32 politicians on suspicion of corruption. These were active and former politicians as well as mayors and civil servants.

A tax data CD with around 2000 account holders handed over in 2010 was tracked down again in September 2012 and handed over to the special prosecutor by the chief of the financial police, Stelios Stasinopoulos.

On October 3, 2012, the former executive in the Defense Ministry Giannis Sbokos was arrested for having enriched himself in arms deals with Russian Tor-M1 air defense systems and type 214 submarines from Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft . At the beginning of March 2013, ex-Defense Minister Akis Tsochatzopoulos was imprisoned for eight years for tax evasion and the former mayor of the city of Thessaloniki, Vasilis Papageorgopoulos , was imprisoned for life for embezzlement. In early December 2014, the president of the Greek National Youth Sports Center in Agios Kosmas was arrested for allegedly embezzling 800,000 euros from the center's cash register.

To combat the shadow economy, political parties are only allowed to have up to three bank accounts with exclusively Greek credit institutions for income. Expenses must be proven by means of a receipt.

Reduction of military spending

The level of Greek military spending has been the subject of public and political criticism since the beginning of the crisis (see section High government spending ). Above all, the way in which the Troika handled and renegotiated existing arms purchase contracts in times of financial hardship met with great misunderstanding. Daniel Cohn-Bendit , co-chairman of the group The Greens / European Free Alliance in the European Parliament, criticized in an interview with Spiegel in May 2010 the demand of the French and German governments not to affect the arms purchase agreements of the previous Greek government. Die Zeit quotes him as saying: “From outside the EU countries intervene in practically all of Greece's rights. ... Only when it comes to the defense budget is it suddenly said that this is a sovereign right of the state. That’s surreal. ”Military expenditure has fallen, but compared to the EU, measured against the lower BIB, it is still above average. Most of the military equipment (especially from the USA, Germany and France) had been imported for years, while the three state-owned armaments companies EAS, ELVO and Larco showed deficits. According to the Süddeutscher Zeitung, the EU Commission demanded in September 2013 that the state-owned armaments companies be liquidated.

Occasional Paper 123 of the European Commission from December 2012, however, contradicts the assessment that hardly any cuts will be made to military spending. It was pointed out that spending on arms imports and military spending has generally decreased since 2009. In 2010, the defense share fell by 1.2 percentage points to 2.2% of GDP. In 2011 this share fell again by 0.5 percentage points. The military procurement (English: military procurement , part of the military expenditures) has fallen from over 3 billion euros (2009) to around 500 million euros (2012). The Greek government fired Larco's managing director in August 2012 because he did not cut employees' salaries.

Military spending Greece
according to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)

Military spending	2015	2014	2013	2012	2011	2010	2009	2008	2007	2006	2005
in billions of euros	4,583	4.169	4.259	4.604	5.128	6.164	7.660	7,219	6.235	6.064	5.652
relative to GDP	2.6%	2.3%	2.3%	2.4%	2.5%	2.7%	3.2%	3.0%	2.7%	2.8%	2.8%
relative to total government spending	5.3%	4.7%	5.3%	4.7%	4.7%	5.4%	6.1%	6.1%	5.9%	6.4%	6.6%

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), military spending fell significantly after 2009 (7.66 billion euros) and has been around 4–5 billion euros since 2012 (2015: 4.58 billion euros). In relation to GDP, military spending fell from an annual average of 3.0% (2000 to 2009) and amounted to an estimated 2.6% of GDP in 2015. According to Eurostat, the figures are similar: according to this, defense spending in 2009 amounted to 7.87 billion euros, it fell to 4.95 billion euros by 2011 and remained at this level in the following years (2014: 4.76 billion euros).

Referendum and follow-up votes

→ Main article : 2015 Greek referendum

The Greek Prime Minister Tsipras abruptly interrupted negotiations with the Eurogroup in Brussels on June 27, 2015 (Saturday Greek local time) and already announced a referendum on July 5 on the conditions set by the lenders in their draft text for further disbursements from the second aid package on. In a televised address he said: “The proposals of our creditors, which clearly violate European rules and also the right to work, equality and dignity, show that the goal of some partners and institutions was not a mutually acceptable solution, but possibly the humiliation of one whole people. ”In the referendum, the conditions of the creditors were rejected by 61.3%. In order to fend off a euro exit and national bankruptcy, both of which would have had a devastating effect on the citizens and the economy of the Republic of Greece, Prime Minister Tsipras signed an aid package of around 53.5 billion euros for three years on July 12, 2015 17-hour marathon session with the entire Eurogroup in Brussels, austerity measures were decided by the Eurogroup and the Greek government that came very close to those that the Greek people had previously rejected. The UN Special Rapporteur for the Promotion of a Democratic and Just International Order Alfred de Zayas and the independent expert on human rights and international solidarity Virginia Dandan welcomed the referendum and criticized the fact that the IMF and the EU had not succeeded in finding a solution apart from renewed austerity To take action as requested by Greek voters. On July 15, 2015, the Greek parliament approved the agreement by a majority with the help of the opposition; other national parliaments still had to vote. Experts questioned the reliability of the Tsipras government and the feasibility of the plans; some estimates put the actual financial requirement at up to 70 billion euros. After the vote in Athens on July 16, the central bank of the Eurogroup promised emergency aid for Greece, but refused to extend the credit line.

Capital movement control

Queue in Athens in front of a National Bank of Greece ATM

The announcement of the referendum sparked a run on ATMs in Greece . In response to the announcement of the referendum, the members of the Eurogroup declared the negotiations on the same Saturday as a failure and prepared for a national bankruptcy of Greece.

The ECB and the Greek National Bank called for banks to be closed as a measure to counter the outflow of capital. Finance Minister Varoufakis, who did not want to actively bring about a Grexit since taking office , but played through it theoretically as an alternative in a small group, suggested the following reactions, which were intended to be reversible:

1. Issuing own promissory notes
2. Declaration of a haircut on ECB bonds since 2012
3. Control of the Greek Central Bank

However, since Varoufakis was only supported by one member of the government, he supported the decision of the Greek government and ordered the following measures to control capital movements at the beginning of the following week for the period up to the referendum :

1. One-week moratorium on any international transfer
2. Maximum cash withdrawal amount of € 60 per day and person
3. one-week closure of all banks and stock exchange trading

Payment default at the IMF

On June 30, 2015, Greece did not repay an installment due to the International Monetary Fund . It was the first developed country to owe this institution an installment. Likewise, the next due installment, amounting to 465 million euros, was not paid on July 13th.

Preliminary agreement dated July 12, 2015

The terms and conditions for further loans negotiated with the euro zone on July 12, 2015 contained rough key points. Within the next ten days, the Greek Parliament passed laws described in the next two sections; the creditors had declared them to be a prerequisite for starting further negotiations.

Decision of the Greek Parliament on July 15, 2015

On July 15, 2015, the Greek Parliament passed the first of the required laws (Law 4334/2015). The government lost its majority, but was supported by parts of the opposition. The main elements of the law are:

• The VAT rates will be standardized at 6, 13 and 23%; numerous goods are taxed higher than before and some (such as medicines) are taxed less.
• VAT discounts for the Greek islands will be phased out, starting with the richest and most touristically interesting islands, with the exception of the most distant islands.
• The standard retirement age for statutory pension insurance will be gradually increased to 67 years by 2021.
• Supplementary pensions will in future be financed by contributions and not from tax revenues.
• Greece once again pledges to actually implement the 2010 pension reform.
• The legal independence of the statistical authority will be strengthened; in particular, the presidential post is to be filled in future in a transparent process based on performance and qualifications.
• Greece is expected to introduce a semi-automatic mechanism that will lead to spending cuts if budget targets are not met.

Decision of the Greek Parliament on July 22, 2015

On July 22, 2015, the Greek Parliament passed the second of the requested priority laws. The government again did not have a majority of its own, but was supported by parts of the opposition. The law comprises two things:

• An implementation of the EU Bank Resolution Directive (BRRD). It is intended to facilitate the resolution of insolvent banks; the directive applies to all member states of the European Union. However, the law will only come into force in 2016 ^[obsolete] ; by then, the Greek banks are to be recapitalized by the European taxpayers with a total of 25 billion euros.
• A reform of the code of civil procedure aimed at speeding up legal proceedings. According to this, oral proceedings are no longer mandatory; Proceedings should begin no later than six months after the complaint has been received. However, the rule that primary residences are exempt from foreclosures remained unaffected.

Pay debt installments; Reopening of the Greek banks

On July 17, 2015, the European Central Bank transferred a bridging payment of 7.16 billion euros to the Euro Central Bank in Athens from funds from the so-called EFSM. On July 20, Athens paid an installment of 4.2 billion euros to the European Central Bank. An overdue payment of 2.05 billion euros was also made to the International Monetary Fund . The Greek Central Bank had already received 500 million euros on July 13th to enable the banks to be reopened. On Monday, July 20, the banks in Greece reopened their counters after three weeks.

Approval in the German parliament for further negotiations

On July 17 in Berlin, the parties CDU, CSU, SPD and Greens authorized Federal Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble, in a roll-call vote with 439 votes in favor, to issue a third aid package for Greece amounting to 87 billion euros within three years up to 2017 ^{[out of date]} / 2018 ^[obsolete] to negotiate. The negotiations are to take place within the entire Eurogroup , with the current government of Tsipras in office in Athens, taking place with less deadline pressure than before in Brussels . The German Chancellor Angela Merkel speaks of the fact that the rules of the Basic Law and EU rules do not allow a so-called haircut , i.e. a haircut of the Greek national debt of 30 to 40% . The German finance minister also relies in particular on Article 125 of the EU treaties, which completely prohibits the reduction of public debt. In addition, on July 18, the European Central Bank approved an ELA sum of 900 million euros to the Greek banking system.

Beneficiary of the benefits

A study carried out under the direction of Jörg Rocholl at the European School of Management and Technology in Berlin and published in 2016 showed that less than 5% of the support payments paid since 2010 have remained with the Greek state. The remainder went to foreign creditors, shifting risks from commercial banks to foreign taxpayers. Scheunemann also comes to the result of less than 5 percent in a contribution by the papers for German and international politics based on the official figures. 10.8 billion euros of the 215.9 billion euros in credit flowed to the Greek state, the rest flowed into interest payments and debt rescheduling from private to public institutions.

repayment

The agreements between Greece on the one hand and the troika made up of the IMF, ECB and EU on the other to deal with the European financial crisis include very different measures.

IMF loans

Traditionally, the IMF offers the applying government so-called “technical” assistance, including a medium-term bridging loan. The technical assistance includes the joint elaboration of an austerity plan, which the elected government would hardly be politically enforceable on its own. In consultation with the applicant, the measures are formulated in a memorandum as conditions for the loan.

While the technical assistance for the Papandreou and Samaras governments corresponded to the usual IMF standards, the associated loan was unusually high at a total of € 31.9 billion. The repayment of the loan as well as the interest payments were clearly regulated. The repayment began in 2013 under the Samara government. The first loan package of € 20.1 billion was finally repaid in 2016 under the Tsipras government. The repayment of the second IMF loan package of € 11.8 billion is already underway and should be completed by 2026. A third IMF loan to Greece under the third memorandum was not agreed. Neither the Greek finance minister nor the head of the IMF saw a need for this.

Payments for the euro rescue

The situation is very different for by far the largest item in the agreements, the € 290 billion in European tax money for the so-called “euro rescue”. There is some confusion here as to whether, and if so, in what form the EU countries will get their money back. While the press is controversial about it, politicians seem to be avoiding a clarifying word here. Former finance minister Yanis Varoufakis pointed to precisely this problem by refusing to sign a third memorandum. He expected from his colleagues in the Eurogroup that the schedule for the formal write-off of these accounting credits would be set in advance and disclosed to the people. But because this is also not politically enforceable - this time with the voters of the 27 EU partners - the Eurogroup takes the position that a refund would actually take place. On the other hand, it is cautiously argued that a possible relief would only be discussed after the completion of the third program on August 20, 2018. In contrast, since the end of the first program and in the recent past, the IMF has made it increasingly clear that the haircut is now due.

consequences

Retroactive effect on the EU

The development of the Greek financial crisis and the approach taken by the EU partners had a serious impact on the British decision in their 2016 Brexit referendum . In an article in the English Daily Express from July 2015, Albert Edwards, global strategist at Société Générale , is quoted as saying: "... this could now tip the balance for the UK's in / out referendum on EU membership ...". Edwards speculated that the British left was getting into argumentation problems over the humiliation of Tsipra by his EU partners. The Labor Party in particular had declared EU membership as “progressive” for years. Now the party base would organize against membership. Edwards, who had been an EU advocate himself until then, would now presumably vote for the exit and he recommended investors to prepare for a possible exit from the UK.

Yanis Varoufakis is quoted in a BBC broadcast by host Andrew Neil that Brussels is responsible for the dissolution of the EU through authoritarian measures. When asked whether the handling of the financial crisis had an impact on the separatist developments in Scotland and Catalonia, the latter gave a differentiated answer. While nationalism had a historical tradition in Scotland, in Catalonia the separatists had only become a majority force by handling the crisis of formerly only 10-15%. He criticized the decision of the Madrid government in 2010 to curtail the autonomy of Catalonia and the subsequent statement by Juncker that this was an internal Spanish matter.

Economic consequences

After a drastic increase in the budget deficit (negative budget balance) in 2008 and 2009 , it fell again in 2010 and 2011, but in 2011 was still above the already very high level of 2007. Also the primary balance , i.e. the budget balance without taking into account interest expenses for the existing debt level, 2011 was still negative. Similarly, primary expenditure is determined as government expenditure without taking into account interest expenditure on the existing debt level.

Development of government revenues and expenditures
(values ​​2012–2015 as of April 2016)

#	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Nominal GDP (nominal GDP) (billion euros)	223.16	233.20	231.08	222.15	208.53	191.20	180.65	177.94	175.69	174.20	177.74
Government revenue (total revenue) (% of GDP )	40.7	40.7	38.3	40.4	42.3	46.6	49.1	47.0	47.9	50.2	48.8
Government expenditure (total expenditure) (% of GDP)	47.5	50.6	54.0	51.5	51.9	55.4	62.3	50.6	55.4	49.7	48.0
Primary expenditure (% of GDP)	42.8	45.5	48.3	44.6	43.4	41.7	43.3	?	?	?	?
Balance (balance budget / net lending) (% of GDP)	- 06.8	- 09.8	−15.6	−10.7	- 09.5	- 08.8	−13.2	- 03.6	- 07.5	+ 00.5	+ 00.8
Primary balance (net lending) (% of GDP)	- 02.0	- 04.9	−10.4	- 05.0	- 02.3	- 03.7	- 09.1	00.4	- 03.9	+ 03.7	+ 04.0
Gross consolidated debt (billion euros)	239.30	263.28	299.69	329.52	355.17	305.09	320.51	319.72	311.67	315.04	317.41

Development of the labor market
(all values ​​as of April 2016)

#	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Population (in millions)	11.036	11,061	11.095	11.119	11.123	11.086	11.004	10.927	10.812
Employed (in millions)	4,564	4,611	4,556	4,390	4.054	3,695	3.513	3.536	3.604
Unemployment rate (Percent of total labor force)	8.40%	7.75%	9.60%	12.73%	17.85%	24.43%	27.48%	26.50%	25.00%

There are high current account imbalances in the eurozone . Greece was particularly affected by these problems and was not prepared for the euro crisis, and due to a higher level of national debt, it had less leeway than other countries in reacting to the financial crisis from 2007 onwards. In addition, according to the assessment of the economist Manolis Galenianos, the Greek governments of the time were lagging behind the outbreak of the financial and euro crisis took the wrong measures. The wrong measures to address this “twin deficit” have resulted in high social costs. The reaction of other European governments was also wrong, as they initially ignored the current account deficits and did not help Greece regain international competitiveness . The lack of credit in Greece for investments and the lack of demand for products in other euro countries as a result of restrictive fiscal policy are named as further current problems.

The government debt ratio has skyrocketed since 2009 (from 129% in 2009 to 164% in 2011). Public sector salaries fell by 30% from 2009 to 2011 and pensions by 10%. The total number of civil servants decreased from 768,009 in 2010 to 712,157 in February 2012.

According to EU information, in the period 2010 to 2011 half of the gap in competition between 2000 and 2009 could be made up.

According to a 2012 report by the World Bank, Greece was among the ten countries in the world that improved business conditions the most in 2011, with only seven countries making greater efforts. Urgent reforms had been tackled and great progress had been made, but further reforms would have to be implemented over the next few years.

While some trading companies withdrew from the country, other activities were expanded, such as the production of 110 different products for export by Unilever (2010) and the new Hewlett-Packard distribution center for Europe, Africa and the Middle East in Piraeus .

In 2012, Rolf Langhammer from the Institute for the World Economy (Kiel) warned the creditor institutions that they would not be able to renegotiate or readjust anything in view of the failure to comply with Greek commitments. According to the first aid package from 2010, budget consolidation through tax increases and spending cuts amounting to 30 billion euros was planned from 2014. Dirk Meyer (Chair of Regulatory Economics, Helmut Schmidt University of the German Armed Forces) points out that this amounts to around 13% of Greek GDP and is therefore illusory in terms of the amount. The practice of all aid programs has shown that Greece is not or cannot keep its promises.

Rating agencies and financial markets

Athex Composite Share Price Index 1974–2012

Price development of a Greek government bond between January 2007 and August 2011

Even before the start of the Greek budget crisis, Greece, as a debtor, was not given top marks by the rating agencies . The three major rating agencies Standard & Poor’s , Fitch Ratings and Moody’s successively lowered their rating codes in the course of the crisis , thus signaling to the financial markets an increased risk of default for Greek loans and government bonds.

On June 14, 2011, the rating agency Standard & Poor's lowered the rating for long-term Greek government bonds by three notches to CCC. As of June 2011, Greece had the worst rating of all rated countries in the world.

In March 2012, Greece was classified as insolvent by both the rating agencies and the ISDA .

In the course of the financial crisis, the Athex Composite Share Price Index , the leading index of the Athens Stock Exchange , lost massively in value. The leading index fell below 500 points in May 2012, its lowest level in 20 years. A gradual recovery began in June 2012, and the index rose to over 1,000 points by February 2013. At the beginning of May 2013 the index had 970 points.

On December 18, 2012, Standard & Poor's upgraded Greece by several notches to B− and B (long and short-term government bonds). On May 14, 2013 Fitch rated the long-term Greek government bonds with a B−, the short-term government bonds received a B.

Economic Policy Consequences in Greece

Development of unemployment in Greece since 2004

In surveys immediately before the vote on the austerity package in May 2010, a majority of Greeks had spoken out in favor. In November 2010, the ruling socialist party PASOK won the second round of local elections, including the city halls of Athens and Thessaloniki for the first time in 20 years. Nevertheless, there were demonstrations in the city center and other protests: for example, banners were hung on the steep face of the Athens Acropolis. These peaceful actions were mainly carried out by trade unions and communists. In contrast, sat Autonomous in demonstrations against the austerity measures on 5 May 2010, a bank building with incendiary fire, which three people died.

Demonstration in Patras 2011

In the course of the austerity measures, the protests became increasingly fierce. In 2011 there were numerous demonstrations that repeatedly led to confrontations with the police and, in June 2011, Syntagma Square in front of the Athens Parliament building was occupied for several weeks . In addition, from January to June 2011 there were four general strikes against the austerity measures, some of which lasted several days.

Since the outbreak of the crisis, many Greeks have reduced their balances with domestic banks in order to hold them as cash or to transfer them abroad or to foreign banks (“ capital flight ”). Possible motives are fear of taxation, the expectation of a currency reform or fear of bankruptcy of the account-holding bank or fear of a state bankruptcy . According to the TARGET2 balances, capital flight from Greece accelerated in January 2015.

The high unemployment goes hand in hand with many early retirements and the like. a. In addition, because of unemployment, there are no social security contributions. The pension funds have suffered significant losses. Due to low payments, high unemployment and the poor economic situation for companies, the pension funds were short of at least 17 billion euros at the end of 2016. Since the beginning of the economic crisis, the number of farmers has increased by 40,000 in two years.

In June 2013, the IMF stated in a report on the first aid package that it should not have been disbursed because in 2010 Greece only fulfilled one of four conditions. In addition, the requirements of the Troika had not given enough impetus for growth and instead further exacerbated the severe recession, which was inevitable due to over-indebtedness and a lack of international competitiveness . IMF economist Blanchard conceded that the multiplier effect of the budget cuts was stronger than initially assumed. Overall, however, fiscal consolidation only caused a fraction of the recession. Other important causes are the credit bubble-driven growth above the Greek growth potential in the years before the crisis, the lack of or inadequate implementation of structural reforms, capital flight due to Grexit fears, the low level of business confidence in the location and unstable banks.

As a result of the social grievances in the country, caused by the financial crisis and further exacerbated by the austerity measures, right-wing and populist parties have gained a strong popularity.

In the refugee crisis since 2014, Greece was particularly hard hit due to its location as the first European country to receive refugees. Greece was on a preferred refugee route, via which refugees from Africa and Asia primarily came to Europe (alongside Spain, Italy and Malta). This posed major financial, administrative and logistical challenges for the Greek state. This also had a serious impact on the state's pre-existing problems. Ever since a fence was erected on the border with North Macedonia by the local government and with Austrian help, the refugees have accumulated in Greece. An EU-wide distribution of the refugees was initially not possible despite an agreement between the EU heads of government. The transfer of financial aid and the posting of officials to Greece has also been slow.

In September 2016, at the invitation of the Greek Prime Minister, a meeting of the heads of government of the European Mediterranean countries suffering from the financial crisis took place in Athens . The Heads of State and Government of France, Italy, Portugal, Malta, Spain (which sent a representative of the acting head of government) and Cyprus attended. According to Greek government circles, the economic future of Europe and the refugee crisis were discussed there.

Social consequences in Greece

The financial crisis and the reforms that followed led to a deep social crisis in Greece. The recession that started during the financial crisis from 2008 deepened with the start of the Greek debt crisis and continued into 2013. Compared to 2007, Greece's price-adjusted gross domestic product collapsed by 26 percent by 2013. It was not until 2014 that there was a slight recovery for the first time with an increase of 0.4 percent. Private wealth has fallen.

As part of the reforms, taxes were increased sharply and new taxes were introduced. Value-added tax, which was 19 percent before the financial crisis, has been raised to 24 percent, a value in the upper third of the rates within the EU.

Unemployment rose from 7.4% in July 2008 to 27.2% in January 2013. After the repeated cuts in pensions and in the social sector (abolition of the minimum wage, reduction in health expenditure and expenditure on the unemployed), many citizens are poor or from Threatened Poverty. Child mortality has increased - comparable to the situation in other EU countries suffering from a financial crisis - since the reforms were implemented. Many top performers, including entire families, have left the country, which means that Greece is suffering from a flight of talent .

As of October 2016, the minimum wage was reduced by 22%, and wages have fallen by an average of 24% as a result of the labor market reforms. The protection against dismissal is to be relaxed.

Every third child in Greece is at risk of poverty; the share rose from 27.7 percent (2010) to 37.8 percent. The increase in the total number of children at risk of poverty since 2010 is the highest in the EU, while Cyprus ranks second , according to Eurostat .

Since the first rescue package in 2010, the average income of pensioners has decreased from 1200 euros to 833 euros per month by 2016. Every fourth Greek over 65 is considered to be at risk of poverty. For comparison: In Germany, around every sixth new pensioner is currently at risk of poverty.

The financial crisis is also affecting the health system. After pharmacists have not been paid by the state health insurance for months, hundreds of thousands of people insured with Eopyy, the largest health insurance company, have to pay for their medication in cash at the pharmacy and then submit their receipt to the health insurance company. For the chronically ill and destitute, the obligation to pay some of the medication costs oneself endangers medical care.

According to wastewater analyzes in Athens (where about a third of the Greeks live), the use of psychotropic drugs has increased from 35 times ( neuroleptics ) to 11 times ( antidepressants ), depending on the substance class examined . During the economic crisis, the suicide rate in Greece rose significantly in some cases. According to the Greek Ministry of Health, it almost doubled between 2008 and 2011 and in the first five months of 2011 alone was 40 percent higher than in the same period of the previous year. According to the last WHO survey from 2012, Greece still has the lowest rate of all euro countries. The suicide of 77-year-old pharmacist Dimitris Christoulas, who shot himself on April 4, 2012 on Syntagma Square , caused a stir . In his farewell letter he wrote that he would rather end his life with dignity before it becomes necessary to search the garbage cans for food because his pension is no longer sufficient to live a decent life, even though he has spent 35 years without any Paid grants for them.

In addition to the changes expected by the “institutions” in the right to strike and the trade unions, as well as in the pension system, privatizations are to be continued. After the EU Parliament issued a resolution against the privatization of public water supply in September 2015, speaking of "water is not a commodity, but a public good", the "institutions", to which the EU Commission belongs, now expect the privatization of the Greek water supply. Likewise, the railway, several airports, roads and other infrastructure are to be privatized. Half of the expected proceeds are earmarked for debt reduction. When the airports were privatized, the sale to Fraport was met with massive criticism, as documents for the sale became known that not only deal with the sale, but also prove that the Greek state is liable for the company's losses despite the sale.

Financial consequences for the creditors

The creditor structure has fundamentally changed as a result of the aid packages. While Greece was mainly indebted to banks and insurance companies before 2010, in the years that followed it became more and more of a debtor to the euro countries.

In July 2011, banks and investors had agreed to "voluntarily waive an average of 21 percent of their claims". While the Greek government pushed for this voluntary waiver, the federal government resisted these plans and called for a larger debt waiver of at least 50 to 60 percent. In the end, the private creditors waived 53.5% of their debts and also agreed to lower interest rates on the newly issued bonds, so that they lost "more than 70 percent" of their money.

The situation was different for the state creditors: In the first aid package from May 2010, the IMF granted 30 billion euros and the other euro countries 77 billion euros (of which Germany 15.17 billion euros) in aid loans. By the end of 2011, Greece had transferred 380 million euros in interest to Germany for loans due.

In the second aid package from February / March 2012, Greece was lent around 130 billion euros by the ECB and the EU.

As of February 2012, the ECB held Greek government bonds with a value of 56.5 billion euros. When the investments mature, the ECB receives interest in addition to the repayment. As of June 2015, Greece was paying the repayments and interest originally agreed in the aid packages of 2010 and 2012 for its loans received from the IMF and the ECB. The interest rates on the ECB loans are between 2.3 and 6.5%. A period from 2012 to 2037 is planned for the principal and interest payments. In March, May and August 2012, Greece transferred a total of around 11.1 billion euros to the ECB for debt repayment. For 2012, an article in the FTD from March 2012 expected interest of 2.5 billion euros, and by 2037, interest income of 12.7 billion euros should come together. The profits are distributed to the euro countries proportionally according to the size of the ECB financiers. The largest ECB investor, the Deutsche Bundesbank, accordingly receives the largest share of the interest from the ECB. Low interest rates and long terms do not reflect the credit default risk in line with market standards.

Compared to the ECB loans, the recipient countries have to pay lower interest rates for loans originating from the EFSF or the ESM . They are made up of the EFSF's borrowing fee and the administrative costs (see also section Second rescue package from EU and IMF - July 2011 to February / March 2012 ). The EFSF and ESM lenders changed the conditions for Greece several times (see section # Measures by the EU, the ECB and the IMF ). The loan maturity of the EFSF loans was increased by several decades and the interest was deferred for 10 years.

In January 2015, Athens had around 320 billion euros in liabilities. Private creditors accounted for around 20% or 64 billion euros of this. The major European commercial banks have largely sold their Greek bonds. "The German financial institutions currently have 23.5 billion euros there, much less than years ago."

International standpoints and policies on austerity and debt relief

26 well-known economists, including Joseph Stiglitz and Thomas Piketty , positioned themselves in a public letter against EU austerity in 2015 .

In October 2016, the IMF, headed by Christine Lagarde, found that austerity and reform measures alone were not the solution to the crisis and called for a haircut for Greece.

In mid-2016, Prime Minister Tsipras called on the EU to end austerity and an investment program for the countries suffering from the crisis.

US President Obama spoke out in favor of debt relief when he visited Greece in November 2016.

The Portuguese finance minister Mário Centeno spoke out in November 2016 in favor of a haircut on Greece and said that aid to consolidate Greek public finances without the IMF would be acceptable for the EU.

EU Economic and Finance Commissioner Pierre Moscovici spoke out in favor of debt relief in November 2016.

At the end of November 2016, German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble rejected a second haircut or debt relief for Greece.

On December 5, 2016, the finance ministers of the Eurogroup decided on several measures that will allow Greece to provide further debt relief. After Prime Minister Tsipras decided in mid-December 2016 to help pensioners in need with an additional one-off payment and at the same time cut VAT on islands that have been badly affected by the refugee crisis, the Eurogroup froze the previously agreed debt relief. The chairman of the SPD MEPs, Udo Bullmann , announced that Schäuble and Dijsselbloem wanted to bring about a change of government in Greece. He said the Social Democrats in the European Parliament were "dismayed by the attempt by EU lenders to influence the domestic politics of Greece and thus a member of the Eurogroup"; the one-off payments to Greek pensioners with particularly low incomes are fully financed. The aim here is not to restore the economy, but to bring about a change of government. Tsipras spoke of "political blackmail".

On December 15, 2016, Commissioner Pierre Moscovici , who is responsible for EU economic, monetary, tax and customs union affairs, published an article in the Financial Times . A haircut for Greece is essential. Ex-finance minister Yanis Varoufakis accused Moscovici of hypocrisy because Moscovici rejects further austerity, but demands economic growth of 3.5% per year for 10 years from Greece. A few weeks earlier, the ECB ruled out another aid package for Greece. As of December 2016, the Greek government is hoping to be included in the bond purchase program of the ECB and thus in 2017 to have the opportunity to raise money on the market. The IMF's decision on Greece's debt sustainability is expected in January, with the IMF already announced in December that "the austerity measures in Greece have gone too far and that the IMF does not expect any social austerity measures".

Voices in Germany

In April 2010, the majority of Germans refused to support Greece during the financial crisis. In June 2011, 63 percent of the citizens questioned expressed understanding in the survey ARD Germany trend that Greeks are protesting against the drastic austerity measures.

Constitutional complaints by the scientists Joachim Starbatty , Wilhelm Hankel , Karl Albrecht Schachtschneider , Wilhelm Nölling , the manager Dieter Spethmann and the politician Peter Gauweiler (CSU) against the German participation in the European Stabilization Mechanism to support Greece in the financial crisis, the Federal Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe ruled on Rejected September 7, 2011. The Second Senate found that the measures to save the euro are compatible with the Basic Law. The Federal Republic of Germany can therefore help the Republic of Greece with loan guarantees and participate in the future EFSF euro rescue package. However, the judges instructed the German parliament to insist on its right to make financial policy decisions in the event of further euro aid. There should be no automatic mechanism for payments that undermines the rights of MPs. The aid packages must be clearly defined and give parliamentarians the opportunity to control and to exit.

At the end of February 2012, Interior Minister Hans-Peter Friedrich was the first German member of the government to publicly advocate Greece's exit from the euro area: “Outside the monetary union, Greece's chances of regenerating and becoming competitive are certainly greater than in the euro area remains. ”Two days later, the EKD council chairman, Nikolaus Schneider, pointed out that Europe was more than“ a trading center where you can do good business ”and that granting aid loans“ is a question of solidarity ”.

In a broadcast of the ARD television magazine Monitor on March 1, 2012 with the title Greek crisis: The fairy tale of the German paymaster , based on the German cash flow to Greece, which had only been low (around 12.5 billion euros), gave the impression that Germany is profiting from the Greek crisis. For this purpose, an increase in Germany's exports of 50 billion euros due to the weak euro exchange rate was assigned to the Greek crisis (according to Gustav Horn ). In addition, Folker Hellmeyer, chief analyst at Bremer Landesbank, “certified” interest savings of 45 to 65 billion euros due to the low interest rates on German bonds in Germany.

Germany is liable through guarantees under the EFSF and ESM, as part of the ECB and as a member state in the IMF with amounts in the three-digit billion range.

The Greek governments of the time are accused of having already entered into debt to such an extent that insolvency could be expected, but of having concealed this by providing incorrect information. Hans Willgerodt, professor emeritus at the University of Cologne at the time, judged this and the entire debt policy to be fraudulent bankruptcy . He criticized the fact that responsible politicians, civil servants and employees of diplomatic missions or foreign ministries could not be legally prosecuted for this. In addition, Willgerodt accused the big banks involved of improper lending because the big banks had recognized the impending insolvency of Greece and had speculated on assistance from the other countries in the euro zone.

One day before the election in Greece on June 17, 2012, Chancellor Angela Merkel demanded with "unusually sharp words", according to the Focus , a commitment by the Greeks to the agreements made. In August 2012, the Bavarian Finance Minister Markus Söder said “The Greeks are to blame for the problems in Greece and no one else” and demanded that the country “set an example” .

In 2012, the Deutsche Bundesbank advocated a one-off property levy for crisis countries in the eurozone. The Nobel Prize for Literature Günter Grass dealt with the Greek financial crisis and the reactions of the states of the European Union to the crisis in his poem Europa Schande , published in May 2012 . The German EU Commissioner for Energy Günther Oettinger ( EPP ) spoke out on August 10, 2013 that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) should no longer participate in future aid programs for over-indebted euro countries; instead, the EU and the European Central Bank (ECB) should in future manage the programs alone. In support of this, he said that there are many critical voices at the IMF, "which rightly ask why, of all things," rich "Europe is currently receiving 60 percent of IMF aid". In the opinion of the Bundestag member Klaus-Peter Willsch (CDU) it is in any case "unabashed to ask uninvolved third parties for help before your own nest egg has not been used."

With regard to the reporting of the Greek sovereign debt crisis in the German press, there are at least two independent studies from 2015 and 2016. The study from 2015 shows the Süddeutsche Zeitung "Konformität" with the opinion of German politics, while the study from the year 2016 of ARD and ZDF attests to superficial, judgmental and opinionated reporting. Likewise, representatives of the Greek government are said to have spoken less often in the contributions, reforms are always described as measures that have to be implemented without going into the nature of the reforms or reporting in detail on Greek reform progress.

See also

• International financial control in Greece 1898–1978
• National debt of Greece
• ELSTAT
• Euro crisis
• Grexit
• London Debt Accords

literature

• Aristotelis Agridopoulos, Ilias Papagiannopoulos (Ed.): Greece in the European Context: Crisis and Crisis Discourses . Springer VS: Wiesbaden 2016. ISBN 978-3-658-07239-1 .
• Detlef Hartmann, John Malamatinas: Crisis Laboratory Greece . Association A, Berlin and Hamburg 2011, ISBN 978-3-86241-405-5 .
• Georg Erber : Public Debt and Financial Engineering . In: DIW Berlin weekly report . No. 36, 2011, p. 11–19 ( diw.de [PDF; 208 kB ]).
• Oliver Schwarz, Franz-Lothar Altmann, Hansjörg Brey: Greece in the Debt and State Crisis? Causes, consequences and ways out . In: Southeast European Studies . tape 78 . Kubon & Sagner, Munich and Berlin 2012, ISBN 978-3-86688-263-8 .
• Ulf-Dieter Klemm , Wolfgang Schultheiß (ed.): The crisis in Greece: origins, course, consequences . Campus, Frankfurt (Main) 2015, ISBN 978-3-593-50308-0 .
• Winfried Wolf, Nikos Chilas: The Greek tragedy . Rebellion, surrender, sellout. Promedia, Vienna 2016, ISBN 978-3-85371-403-4 , p. 232 .

Web links

Commons : Unrest in Greece  - Collection of pictures, videos and audio files

• An analysis of the crisis at Das Dossier , May 8, 2011
• Barnaby Phillips: The Greek Resistance (Background to the Financial Crisis)
• Debate about the future of the euro - should we let Greece go bankrupt? - Spiegel online article from September 15, 2011 with expressions of opinion from many competent sources
• Internet presence of the Greek cadastre (NATIONAL CADASTRE & MAPPING AGENCY SA) (Greek / English)
• Internet presence of the privatization fund HRADF (Greek / English)
• Publications of the Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs
• Financial crisis in Greece on the information portal for political education
• The euro crisis from a Greek perspective: AGORÁ - From Democracy to the Market - Video from February 5, 2015 in the ARD Mediathek

Individual evidence

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6. ↑ (see Figure 4 for an increase in yield) Did the Troika policy benefit Greece? Federal Agency for Civic Education (bpb), November 2014, accessed on July 8, 2015 . 
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9. ^ ARD-Tagesschau from May 2010: Gigantic sums support the euro and Greece
10. ↑ The IMF loan of US $ 40 billion granted in 2010 (then 30 billion euros) resulted in a total of 32 billion euros due to inflation up to the last tranche in August 2014.
11. ↑ ^{a b c d e f} The flow of money in the crisis states. Sources: EU Commission, BMF / EFSF
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22. ↑ Roland Pichler: Euro countries create financial cushions for Greece , in: Stuttgarter Zeitung , April 26, 2018.
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27. ↑ Creditworthiness: Another rating agency downgrades Greece. In: Spiegel Online . December 16, 2009, accessed July 1, 2011 . 
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32. ↑ Media review: S&P lowers credit ratings for Portugal and Greece. In: FAZ.net. March 30, 2011, accessed March 30, 2011 . 
33. ↑ Standard & Poor's lowers rating: Belief in Greece's creditworthiness is waning. In: tagesschau.de. May 9, 2011, accessed May 9, 2011 . 
34. ↑ Fitch pushes Greece a little further towards the abyss. FTD May 20, 2011; Archived from the original on May 22, 2011 ; Retrieved July 1, 2011 . 
35. ↑ Doubts about solvency: Moody's agency downgrades Greece again. In: tagesschau.de. June 2, 2011, accessed October 31, 2011 . 
36. ↑ ^{a b} Euro crisis: S&P gives Greece the worst credit rating in the world. In: Zeit Online. June 14, 2011, accessed November 5, 2011 . 
37. ↑ Fitch downgrades Athens' credit rating to CCC. Welt online , July 13, 2011, accessed July 14, 2011 . 
38. ↑ Now Moody's is downgrading Greece three notches. Welt online , July 25, 2011, accessed July 25, 2011 . 
39. ↑ S&P ranks Greece even lower in junk status. Reuters , July 27, 2011, accessed July 27, 2011 . 
40. ↑ http://www.stern.de/news2/aktuell/rating-agentur-fitch-stuft-griechenland-weiter-herab-1790380.html ( Memento from September 12, 2012 in the web archive archive.today )
41. ↑ Greece is partially insolvent. Handelsblatt , February 27, 2012, accessed on February 28, 2012 . 
42. ↑ Florian Diekmann: Moody's downgrades Greece to the lowest grade. Der Spiegel, March 3, 2012, accessed on March 3, 2012 : “Moody's has lowered Greece's creditworthiness again - to the lowest level that the rating agency can assign. The reason is the agreement on the haircut for private creditors. Standard & Poor's had also taken this step beforehand. " 
43. ↑ Fitch Ratings : "RD = Restricted Default" in: Definitions of Ratings and Other Forms of Opinion (English :; PDF; 394 kB) from December 8, 2011. Accessed March 9, 2012.
44. ↑ Fitch downgrades Greece. Westdeutsche Zeitung , March 9, 2012, accessed on March 9, 2012 . 
45. ↑ Fitch raises Greece's rating to B-. ORF , March 13, 2012, accessed on March 12, 2012 . 
46. ↑ S&P upgrades Greece. N24 , May 2, 2012, archived from the original on May 4, 2012 ; Retrieved May 21, 2012 . 
47. ↑ Fitch lowers Greece to “CCC” - risk of credit default. In: Focus.de. May 17, 2012, accessed May 20, 2012 . 
48. ↑ S&P rates Athens as a “partial default”. Die Welt , December 6, 2012, accessed December 9, 2012 . 
49. ↑ ^{a b} Successful debt buyback: Standard & Poor's raises Greece's rating by six notches. Süddeutsche Zeitung , December 19, 2012, accessed on December 20, 2012 . 
50. ↑ ^{a b} Fitch Upgrades Greece to 'B-'; Outlook stable. In: FitchRatings.com. May 14, 2013, accessed May 17, 2013 . 
51. ^ Moody's upgrades Greece's government bond rating to Caa3 from C; stable outlook. In: https://www.moodys.com/ . November 29, 2013, accessed March 8, 2014 . 
52. ↑ Moody's takes a more positive view of Greece. In: Handelsblatt.com. August 1, 2014, accessed June 29, 2015 . 
53. ↑ Standard & Poor's upgraded Greece. In: wjs.de. September 12, 2014, accessed June 29, 2015 . 
54. ↑ Rating: Fitch is more skeptical about Greece - Germany remains top. In: finanzen.net. January 16, 2015, accessed June 29, 2015 . 
55. ↑ S&P downgrades Greece's credit rating. In: handelsblatt.com/. April 15, 2015, accessed May 28, 2015 . 
56. ↑ Moody's downgrades Greece's government bond rating to Caa2 from Caa1; outlook negative. In: moodys.com. April 29, 2015, accessed May 28, 2015 . 
57. ↑ Fitch confirms Greece's “CCC” rating. In: finanzen.at/. April 15, 2015, accessed May 28, 2015 . 
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79. ↑ handelsblatt.com: Strauss-Kahn refuses to support Papandreou and refers to the EU
80. ↑ Interview with Antonis Samaras on November 9, 2009, one month after Giorgos Papandreou took over government
81. ^ "Order of the Supreme Court against Papandreou and Georgiou, Head of the ELSTAT Statistics Agency"
82. ↑ The Supreme Court upholds the second instance judgment against the former head of ELSTAT. He intentionally inflated the 2009 deficit so that Prime Minister Giorgos Papandreou could ask the IMF for "technical" assistance.
83. ↑ Spiegel-Online February 3, 2010: Strict austerity course until 2012. EU takes control of Greece's finances
84. ↑ " Blätter ", Chronik, 4/2010, p. 126.
85. ^ Spiegel-Online March 25, 2010: Agreement at EU summit. Euro countries sign rescue pact for Athens
86. ↑ Of the planned 80 billion, only 77.3 were made available, as Slovakia did not participate and Ireland and Portugal dropped out as donors because they themselves came under the bailout fund.
87. ↑ 3 May 2010 - ECB announces change in eligibility of debt instruments issued or guaranteed by the Greek government. ECB press release of 3 May 2010
88. ↑ Alexander Jung / Armin Mahler / Christoph Pauly / Christian Reiermann / Michael Sauga: The hollowed out euro . In: Der Spiegel . No. 20 , 2010, p. 72–76 ( online - May 17, 2010 , see also the graphics).
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92. ↑ ^{a b} Gerd Höhler : A Marshall Plan for Greece . In: Die Zeit online from July 5, 2011
93. ↑ ^{a b} Greece's opposition prevents savings consensus. In: Zeit Online. May 27, 2011, accessed May 28, 2011 . 
94. ^ W. Böhm: Athens opposition under pressure . In: Die Presse from June 23, 2011
95. ↑ Arguing to the end . In: Die Zeit online from June 21, 2011
96. ↑ Greek Parliament approves austerity package . In: n-tv from June 29, 2011
97. ↑ tagesschau.de September 1, 2011
98. ↑ How badly are European countries doing? (As of October 2011; source: EU Commission / Eurostat).
99. ↑ October 31, 2011: Papandreou announces a referendum on Greece's (EU) way out of the crisis.
100. ↑ tagesschau.de
101. ↑ ^{a b} Finally a smile. In: Süddeutsche Zeitung . From July 21, 2011:
102. ^ Spiegel: Papandreou announces referendum
103. ↑ Giorgos Kassimatis, EU violates democratic and European legal culture. On the Troika's loan agreement with Greece. In: Contradiction 61, 31st year, 2nd half year Zurich 2011.
104. ^ Andreas Fischer-Lescano, Troika and Austerity. Legal bindings of the Union institutions at the conclusion of the Memoranda of Understanding, in: Kritische Justiz 1/2014, pp. 2–25. kj.nomos.de (PDF).
105. ↑ Gregory Kritidis, Greece - on the way to measure state? Authoritarian crisis policy and democratic resistance. Hanover 2014, p. 139 f.
106. ↑ International press comments on the election in Greece “Officially ungovernable” at sueddeutsche.de, May 7, 2012, accessed on May 7, 2012
107. ↑ Heribert Dieter : Let the Greek people decide! Since the election on Sunday at the latest, the country has been politically at a dead end. It's time for a referendum: Do the citizens want to stay in the EU? May 9, 2012.
108. ↑ zeit.de: Schäuble thinks Greece's exit is manageable
109. ↑ dpa / Reuters: Greek socialists see opportunity for coalition via zeit.de, May 10, 2012
110. ↑ spiegel.de December 29, 2014: Dimas fails again - new elections in early 2015
111. ↑ The last tranche of € 15 billion is planned for the end of the third program in July 2018.
112. ^ Election results on the website of the Ministry of the Interior
113. ^ After the election in Greece. Continue to rule with your hands tied. In: faz.net. September 21, 2015, accessed December 22, 2015 . 
114. ↑ spiegel.de December 9, 2016
115. ↑ spiegel.de December 6, 2016
116. ↑ FAZ.net December 15, 2016
117. ↑ spiegel.de: The old Tsipras is back
118. ↑ ^{a b} (OECD: Self-employment rate)
119. ^ History of the Balkans, Volume 2, page 436
120. ↑ Since the Second World War, the KKE has been subjected to persecution of its members, including public executions as a deterrent.
121. ↑ The electoral law introduced under the conservative Karamanlis provided for a "reinforced analogy" for the distribution of seats in parliament. The KKE received only 4.3% of the parliamentary seats for its 10.9% vote. The difference was divided between the two larger parties.
122. ^ Anatomy of a decline? Greece and the European Union
123. ↑ US Dollar to Greek Drachma Spot Exchange Rates for 1975 to 2001
124. ↑ Printed matter 12/4104, German Bundestag - 12th electoral term
125. ↑ Parliamentary motion, Bonn 1993: "Report of the Members of Parliament Gunnar Uldall and Gunter Weißgerber"
126. ↑ Has the convergence criteria been cheated? In: EU-Info.de. 2013, accessed October 26, 2013 . 
127. ↑ Kostas Simitis, Jannis Stournaras: Greece and the Euro: Brussels is to blame. In: Süddeutsche.de. May 8, 2012, accessed April 17, 2013 . 
128. ↑ Monthly report July 2011. In: Federal Ministry of Finance. July 2011, accessed April 17, 2013 . 
129. ↑ Michael Martens: Debt Crisis: Greek Tragedy. In: FAZ. June 11, 2011, accessed April 17, 2013 . 
130. ↑ After joining the EEC in 1981, the ruling ND was punished by the electorate a few months later, the socialist PASOK and the communist KKE were elected like a landslide with a total of 59% (+25%). The slogan of the two EEC-skeptical parties at that time was "out of NATO ... not into the EEC" until the elections. However, the two election promises were later not fulfilled.
131. ↑ ^{a b} Debt Crisis. The fatal consequences of the introduction of the euro. In: Focus Online. March 28, 2011, accessed October 5, 2011 . 
132. ↑ 12 Germans and 1 Greek involved in a total of € 62 million in bribery affairs
133. ↑ zdf.de ( Memento from September 18, 2016 in the Internet Archive ) (PDF).
134. ↑ ^{a b c d} Helena Smith: German 'hypocrisy' over Greek military spending has critics up in arms. In: theguardian.com. March 6, 2013, accessed September 28, 2016 . 
135. ↑ BAYER is now also paying bribes to Greek doctors
136. ^ Siemens
137. ↑ tovima.gr
138. ↑ Employed persons means all employees + unemployed, excluding children up to 15 years and pensioners
139. ↑ ^{a b c d} Government at a Glance 2013. In: keepeek.com. OECD, November 2013, accessed September 30, 2016 . 
140. ^ ^{A b} Government at a Glance 2015. In: keepeek.com. OECD, November 2015, accessed September 30, 2016 . 
141. ↑ Michael Martens: Officials in Greece. The superfluous. In: FAZ. September 14, 2011, accessed April 17, 2013 . 
142. ↑ ^{a b c d e} Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs: The Second Economic Adjustment Program for Greece - Second Review May 2013. (PDF; 4.5 MB) Occasional Papers 148 - May 2013. European Commission, May 16, 2013 , accessed on May 23, 2013 . 
143. ↑ OECD: Government at a glance
144. ^ Government at a Glance 2013 - Country Fact Sheet (PDF), OECD
145. ↑ count. Little Greece has 768,000 civil servants. In: THE WORLD. July 30, 2010, accessed April 17, 2013 . 
146. ^ Corinna Jessen: Waste in the debt state. Greeks rage against the Prass economy. In: Spiegel Online. April 29, 2010, accessed April 17, 2013 . 
147. ↑ ^{a b} Athens edition: How Greece wasted the money. In: FAZ. May 2, 2010, accessed April 17, 2013 . 
148. ↑ Greece: Authorities Search phantom pensioners. In: Spiegel Online. August 26, 2010, accessed April 17, 2013 . 
149. ↑ Millions of fraud: Greece allegedly has 21,000 phantom pensioners. In: Spiegel Online. November 26, 2011, accessed April 17, 2013 . 
150. ↑ Social fraud: Greece stops payments to 63,500 phantom pensioners. In: Spiegel Online. February 2, 2012, accessed April 17, 2013 . 
151. ↑ March 29, 2013 madata.gr
152. ↑ Jeremy Bender: Greece's military budget is getting bigger even as the country's economy lurches towards mayhem. In: businessinsider.com. June 29, 2015, accessed September 28, 2016 . 
153. ↑ ^{a b} handelsblatt.com / Gerd Höhler April 10, 2018: Greece and Turkey are arming
154. ↑ SIPRI Importer / exporter TIV tables , SIPRI Arms Transfers Database.
155. ↑ Greece: rescue thanks to submarines? , Spiegel Online, April 19, 2010
156. ↑ Employees and economically active persons by age and gender - annual data (lfsi_emp_a) Last update: 14-07-2016 : -> Labor market -> Employment and unemployment -> Employees and economically active persons
157. ↑ Chief Economist Column - Salvation of Honor for Greece. FTD February 4, 2010; archived from the original on February 8, 2010 ; Retrieved July 1, 2011 . 
158. ↑ Eurostat: Taxation trends in the European Union, 2009 ( Memento of August 29, 2011 in the Internet Archive ) (PDF; 5.6 MB).
159. ↑ Greece publishes list of the biggest tax evaders. In: spiegel.de. July 7, 2016, accessed October 9, 2016 . 
160. ↑ Friedrich Schneider: The Shadow Economy in Europe 2013. (PDF; 1.3 MB) In: atkearney.com. August 12, 2013, accessed September 30, 2016 . 
161. ↑ Black economy. Undeclared work falls to a record low in Germany. In: spiegel.de. February 2, 2016, accessed September 30, 2016 . 
162. ↑ Giorgos Christide: Past the Treasury. The tricks of the Greek gasoline smugglers. Spiegel Online February 26, 2015. As of March 3, 2015.
163. ^ Kai Küstner: Deadline for Greek reform list ends. Anxious wait for the mail from Athens. tagesschau.de. As of February 23, 2015
164. ↑ Ursula Welter: Before the special euro summit: The design flaws of the monetary union. Deutschlandfunk, July 20, 2011, accessed on October 28, 2011 : "Even the core rule of the Maastricht Treaty, according to which 'no one is responsible for the debts of the other', had to be thrown overboard." 
165. ↑ January Dams, Flora Wisdorff: Euro Crisis: Greece threatens Europe with bankruptcy à la Lehman. In: Welt Online. July 19, 2011, accessed October 28, 2011 . 
166. ↑ dejure
167. ^ Beat Ammann: Euro crisis. The Greeks are not to blame alone. In: nzz.ch. August 29, 2012, accessed July 10, 2015 . 
168. ↑ The Nation, July 16, 2015 .
169. ↑ Abelshauser, W. “The Legacy of the Euro - A Brief History of the European Monetary Union”, 2010, From Politics and Contemporary History 43, p. 45.
170. ↑ Liz Alderman, Susanne Craig: “Europe's Banks Turned to Safe Bonds and Found Illusion”, New York Times (online), November 10, 2011
171. ^ Peter Spahn: The debt crisis of the European monetary union. Wiso direkt, Friedrich Ebert Foundation, December 2010.
172. ↑ ^{a b c d} European Commission: Financial assistance to Greece. March 10, 2015, accessed March 12, 2015 . 
173. ↑ ^{a b} Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs: The Economic Adjustment Program for Greece - May 2010. (PDF; 586 kB) Occasional Papers 61 - May 2010. European Commission, May 31, 2010, accessed on March 13, 2015 ( English). 
174. ↑ ^{a b} ESM Annual Report 2016. (PDF; 237 kB) Greece. European Stability Mechanism, June 6, 2017, accessed June 16, 2017 . 
175. ↑ originally 300 plus 50 basis points above the 3-month Euribor
176. ↑ Funds not called from the first aid package.
177. ↑ originally 7.5 years on average
178. ↑ In 2012 the national debt was reduced by € 107 billion. The public sector contributed € 66.5 billion and the private sector € 40.5 billion (Private Sector Involvement, PSI). However, the private sector contribution was 100% compensated by the Greek government in accordance with the 2nd Memorandum.
179. ↑ Bilateral loans from all euro countries except Slovakia, Ireland and Portugal.
180. ↑ This unusually high sum contains 40.5 billion euros, which were reserved for the planned haircut (PSI = 107 billion euros). The Greek government was obliged to use this "loan" to fully (100%) compensate banks that participated in the PSI. In contrast to the private sector (banks), public borrowers such as B. Pension funds accept losses averaging 65% (= € 66.5 billion).
181. ↑ Loan from the national pension reserve fund
182. ^ Bilateral loans from England, Denmark and Sweden.
183. ↑ ^{a b} Attac: Greece "rescue": 77 percent flowed into the financial sector . Attac: Background material: Three years of “Rescuing Greece”: 77% flowed into the financial sector (PDF), accessed on July 8, 2014.
184. ↑ ^{a b} By Christina Hiptmayr: Billions for Greece: Who are the Profiteers? -. In: profil.at. June 17, 2013, accessed April 3, 2017 . 
185. ^ Aid to Greece went to banks and the rich , June 17, 2013
186. ↑ ^{a b} IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS. (PDF; 548 kB) Greece's financial assistance program (March 2017). European Parliament - DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR INTERNAL POLICIES, March 10, 2017, accessed on June 22, 2017 . 
187. ^ ^{A b c d} Egbert Scheunemann: Greece: Verordere Verarmung - sheets for German and international politics. In: blaetter.de. July 2017, accessed August 1, 2017 . 
188. ↑ Euro Area Loan Facility Act 2010. (PDF; 173 kB) Number 7 of 2010. European Commission, February 2010, accessed on March 13, 2015 (English). 
189. ↑ Euro Area Loan Facility Act 2011. (PDF; 142 kB) Number 25 of 2011. European Commission, October 2011, accessed on March 13, 2015 (English). 
190. ↑ Euro Area Loan Facility Act 2012. (PDF; 77 kB) Number 6 of 2012. European Commission, March 2012, accessed on March 13, 2015 (English). 
191. ↑ Euro Area Loan Facility Act 2013. (PDF; 72 kB) Number 1 of 2013. European Commission, February 2013, accessed on March 13, 2015 (English). 
192. ↑ See German Bundestag , Infobrief Bilateral Financial Aid for Greece - Compatibility with Article 125 TFEU (PDF; 180 kB), p. 7.
193. ↑ Lto: ECJ blessing from the euro rescue: Member States may provide each other but give credit. In: lto.de. November 27, 2012, accessed September 30, 2016 . 
194. ↑ Miranda Xafa: Global Imbalances and Financial Stability. (PDF) International Monetary Fund, IMF Working Paper from May 2007.
195. ↑ manager-magazin April 23, 2010: Despite help. What risks remain for Hellas
196. ↑ German Bundestag, DrS 17/1544 - May 3, 2010: Draft law of the parliamentary groups of the CDU / CSU and FDP: Draft law for the assumption of guarantees to maintain financial stability in the monetary union required solvency of the Hellenic Republic (Monetary Union Financial Stability Act - WFStG - See also DrS 17/1561 (May 5, 2010)) Resolution recommendation of the Budget Committee and DrS 17/1562 (May 6, 2010) Report of the Budget Committee on this draft law
197. ^ German Bundestag. Stenographic report 17/39 (plenary minutes May 5, 2010) pp. 3721–3746, agenda item 1: First discussion of the draft of a law introduced by the parliamentary groups of the CDU / CSU and the FDP for the assumption of guarantees to maintain financial stability in the monetary union Solvency of the Hellenic Republic (Monetary Union Financial Stability Act - WFStG)
198. ↑ ^{a b} German Bundestag. Stenographic report 17/41 (plenary minutes May 7, 2010) p. 3989–4022, agenda item 23: Second and third discussion of the draft law introduced by the CDU / CSU and FDP parliamentary groups for the assumption of guarantees to maintain financial stability in the Monetary Union required solvency of the Hellenic Republic (Monetary Union Financial Stability Act - WFStG) + Annexes to this shorthand report: Annexes 2 to 6 - declarations according to § 31 GO
199. ↑ Spiegel-Online May 12, 2010: Graphics: Europe's economy at a glance. Here: Graphic 2: Bulwark against bankruptcy. Rescue measures for ailing euro countries ...
200. ↑ Federal Council. Shorthand report. 869th session (Minutes of plenary 869 (May 7, 2010), pp. 135–147: Agenda item 70: Act on the assumption of guarantees to maintain the solvency of the Hellenic Republic required for financial stability in the monetary union (Monetary Union Financial Stability Act - WFStG))
201. ↑ ^{a b c} “Help for Greece - How the Bundestag voted on the rescue package so far” FAZ.NET February 27, 2012
202. ↑ See government declaration by the Federal Minister of Finance Wolfgang Schäuble of June 10, 2011 in the Bundestag.
203. ↑ debt crisis. Greece expects a second tranche of the IMF / EU aid. In: tagesanzeiger.ch. July 30, 2010, accessed April 16, 2013 . 
204. ↑ ^{a b} Euro crisis: aid to Greece brings Germany 380 million. In: ZEIT Online. March 12, 2012, accessed April 8, 2013 . 
205. ↑ ^{a b c} tagesschau.de , July 22, 2011: How Greece should be saved
206. ↑ faz.net July 22, 2011: Debt crisis. ECB gives way to the dispute over the participation of private individuals - s. here graphic: The creditors of the Greek state (state and institutional investors - large private banks and insurance companies by origin)
207. ^ Spiegel-Online June 26, 2011: Debt Crisis. Who bears the greatest risk of failure - s. here table: Greece's largest creditors
208. ^ Statement by EU Commission President José Manuel Barroso on the special summit
209. ↑ International Monetary Fund: IMF Country Report No. 11/351. (PDF; 2.2 MB) December 2011, accessed April 8, 2013 . 
210. ↑ ^{a b} zeit.de December 14, 2011: IMF paints a bleak picture of Greece's future. - Reforms that are too slow, poor growth prospects: the IMF has reprimanded the Greek crisis policy. And additional financial aid for the near future is excluded.
211. ↑ spiegel.de December 8, 2011: OECD considers Greece completely incapable of reform
212. ↑ oecd.org: country website Greece
213. ↑ OECD: Greece at a Glance: Policies for a Sustainable Recovery (published on March 15, 2010) (PDF; 531 kB).
214. ^ "Bundestag approves second aid package for Greece" FAZ.NET February 27, 2012
215. ↑ spiegel.de March 17, 2012: Athens' hidden billion- dollar risk
216. ↑ PlenProt No. 17/160, Item 1a, BT-Drs.17/8735
217. ↑ ^{a b} Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs: The Economic Adjustment Program for Greece Fifth Review - October 2011. (PDF; 1.1 MB) Occasional Papers 87 - October 2011. European Commission, December 7, 2011, accessed 13 December 2012 (English). 
218. ^ Council of the European Union (ed.): Declaration of the Euro Summit . Brussels October 26, 2011 ( consilium.europa.eu [PDF; accessed October 28, 2011] English: Euro Summit Statement .).
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220. ↑ Hellas averts bankruptcy - aid money can flow. In: Reuters . March 3, 2012, accessed March 3, 2012 . 
221. ↑ Greece haircut: the ECB does not have to bleed in retrospect either. October 8, 2015, accessed November 8, 2019 . 
222. ↑ Wirtschaftsdienst: Wirtschaftsdienst - magazine for economic policy. In: archiv.wirtschaftsdienst.eu. Retrieved April 3, 2017 . 
223. ↑ Greece: The PSI and the process of bank recapitalization (2012-2016)
224. ↑ ^{a b c d} Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs: The Second Economic Adjustment Program for Greece Third Review - July 2013. (PDF; 3.8 MB) Occasional Papers 159 - July 2013. European Commission, July 25, 2013, accessed on November 5, 2013 . 
225. ↑ ECB buys Greek government bonds: Bundesbankers suspect a French plot. In: Spiegel Online. May 29, 2010, accessed November 4, 2011 . 
226. ^ Anja Ettel, Martin Greive: Greek bonds: ECB accepts junk papers as security. In: Welt Online. May 3, 2010, accessed November 4, 2011 . 
227. ↑ wiwo.de February 24, 2012: ECB - Fire accelerator of the euro crisis
228. ↑ Cf. Stefan Ruhkamp, ​​faz.net, August 12, 2012 "Return of the Recession in the Euro Area"
229. ↑ Debt state: Greece increases taxes and cuts salaries. Retrieved May 5, 2010 . 
230. ↑ Die Welt: Life in Greece becomes so uncomfortable. Retrieved May 13, 2015 . 
231. ↑ Greece agrees on even harder savings. Retrieved May 5, 2010 . 
232. ↑ Tagesspiegel of May 3, 2010: V110 billion euros against Athens bankruptcy. Retrieved May 5, 2010 . 
233. ^ ^{A b c} Strikes, protests and riots in Greece. Archived from the original on November 28, 2012 ; Retrieved May 5, 2010 . 
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237. ↑ Euro crisis. Greek parliament passes mega austerity package. In: Spiegel Online. June 29, 2011, accessed January 25, 2014 . 
238. ^ Hellenic Republic Asset Development Fund
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240. ↑ Ferry Batzoglou: Financial gap: Greeks made promises of revenue based on luck. In: Spiegel Online . January 29, 2012, accessed January 25, 2014 . 
241. ↑ Athens announces painful austerity package. Retrieved September 22, 2011 . 
242. ↑ Lutz Haverkamp, ​​Gerd Höhler: Athenian drama, next act: Everything different. In: Der Tagesspiegel. November 4, 2011, Retrieved November 5, 2011 . 
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245. ↑ Oliver Grimm: Athens will probably miss tax target in 2012. In: The press . October 8, 2012, accessed January 25, 2014 . 
246. ↑ Air bookings in Athens. In: Spiegel Online . February 16, 2012, accessed October 6, 2012 . 
247. ↑ Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs: The Second Economic Adjustment Program for Greece - March 2012. (PDF; 1.4 MB) Occasional Papers 94 - March 2012. European Commission, May 15, 2012, accessed on December 13, 2012 (English). 
248. ↑ Online platform for auctioning government real estate. In: http://www.ap-lawoffice.de/ . August 28, 2013, accessed July 10, 2015 . 
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251. ^ Greece: Athens wants to fire 15,000 civil servants. In: Süddeutsche.de. April 29, 2013. Retrieved April 29, 2013 . 
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253. ↑ Real Estate Properties Abroad: Group B. In: http://www.hradf.com/ . 2014, archived from the original on July 3, 2015 ; Retrieved July 10, 2015 . 
254. ↑ Der SPIEGEL of July 18, 2015, p. 31.
255. ↑ dw.com
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258. ↑ Harald Schumann: Power without control (documentary). Arte , February 24, 2015, accessed February 25, 2015 . 
259. ↑ Harald Schumann: Power without control. Tagesspiegel , February 24, 2015, accessed on February 25, 2015 . 
260. ↑ Austerity: Greece is abolishing extra vacation time for PC work. In: Spiegel Online. September 13, 2013, accessed September 14, 2013 . 
261. ↑ Greece is abolishing special leave for computer work. In: FAZ.net. September 13, 2013, accessed September 14, 2013 . 
262. ↑ Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs: The Third Economic Adjustment Program for Greece. (PDF; 405 kB) First Review - June 2016. European Commission, June 2016, accessed on September 29, 2016 (English). 
263. ↑ Corruption and tax evasion. Greece is sinking into the swamp. In: DiePresse.com. August 5, 2009, accessed May 5, 2010 . 
264. ^ Robert Stadler: Lots of Fakelaki in Greece. In: DerStandard.at. February 11, 2010, accessed May 6, 2010 . 
265. ^ Matthias Breitinger: Greece. Turn away from the Fakelaki. In: ZEIT ONLINE. May 6, 2010, accessed May 6, 2010 . 
266. ↑ Black economies of European countries 2013
267. ^ Homepage of the General Inspector for Public Administration
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269. ↑ Gerd Höhler : Greece: "Arrest the tax evaders!" In: Tagesspiegel. May 15, 2010, accessed October 28, 2011 . 
270. ↑ Measures to combat tax evasion in Greece. Kosmidis & Partner Anwaltsgesellschaft, May 2010, accessed on October 28, 2011 . 
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279. ↑ Misappropriation of millions. Greek ex-mayor sentenced to life. In: SPIEGEL ONLINE. February 27, 2013, accessed April 15, 2013 . 
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282. ↑ Christopher Rhoads: The Submarine Deals That Helped Sink Greece. The Wallstreet Journal, July 10, 2010.
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284. ↑ Georgios Christidis: Greek military budget: In lockstep into bankruptcy. In: Spiegel . July 24, 2012, accessed January 25, 2014 . 
285. ↑ Hans-Jürgen Schlamp: Cohn-Bendit on crisis management: “Otherwise everything is gone, bye euros”. In: Spiegel Online . May 7, 2010, accessed January 25, 2014 . 
286. ↑ ^{a b} Eurostat database : General government expenditure by function (COFOG) Product code: gov_10a_exp, updated on 22-Jul-2016.
287. ^ Christiane Schlötzer: Industry without a future: EU calls for the liquidation of the Greek arms industry. In: Süddeutsche.de. September 5, 2013, accessed January 25, 2014 . 
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292. ↑ Greeks announce shock referendum on euro future throwing banking system into turmoil. In: telegraph.co.uk. June 27, 2015, accessed July 20, 2015 . 
293. ↑ UN human rights experts welcome Greek referendum and call for international solidarity. June 30, 2015, accessed July 6, 2015 . 
294. ↑ Anthony Faiola and Ylan Q. Mui: “Compromise on Greece eludes Europe” Washington Post, July 12, 2015
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297. ↑ ^{a b} Yannis Varoufakis: You have lured us into the trap. German Translation of an interview with the New Statesman from July 13, 2015, Neues Deutschland, accessed on July 18, 2015 . 
298. ↑ Απαντήσεις στα ερωτήματα για τον περιορισμό στις αναλήψεις ( FAQ on the limitation of cash withdrawals) , news.in.gr , on Monday morning 29 June 2015 at 7:00 a.m.
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300. ↑ The Telegraph, June 30, 2015
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302. ↑ consilium.europa.eu Declaration of the Euro Summit, Brussels, July 12, 2015 of July 12, 2015
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305. ↑ Ekathemirini of July 23, 2015
306. ↑ Capital.gr of July 28, 2015
307. ↑ Jörg Rocholl, Axel Stahmer: Where did the Greek bailout money go? ESMT No. WP-16-02
308. ↑ The Schröder government with its Agenda 2010 is an exception here . Schröder was able to count on the support of the opposition when it was implemented in 2003-2005, before he was voted out of office in 2005.
309. ↑ Lana Clemens: Britons MORE likely to vote for EU exit after Greek deal leaves lefties in shock over cuts. In: Daily Express . July 21, 2015, accessed January 15, 2018 . 
310. ↑ BBC This Week (19/10/2017)
311. ↑ ^{a b} International Monetary Fund: IMF Country Report No. 12/57. (PDF; 4.0 MB) Retrieved on August 8, 2012 (English). 
312. ↑ Provision of data on deficit and debt 2011 - second report. (PDF; 378 kB) Public deficits in the euro area and the EU27 at 4.1% and 4.4% of GDP, respectively. In: press release euro indicators 149/2012. eurostat, October 22, 2012, archived from the original on September 26, 2013 ; Retrieved April 16, 2013 . 
313. ↑ Provision of data on deficit and debt 2012 - first report. (PDF; 769 kB) Public deficits in the euro area and the EU27 at 3.7% and 4.0% of GDP, respectively. In: press release euroindicators 63/2013. eurostat, April 22, 2013, archived from the original on May 12, 2013 ; Retrieved April 22, 2013 . 
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