Euro rescue package

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The euro rescue package describes measures of the European Union and the member states of the euro zone , which are intended to secure the solvency of member states at risk.

This includes:

Bilateral and international law measures

First Greece program

At the beginning of 2010, the assessment of the financial situation of Greece by the capital market players deteriorated so much that insolvency threatened. It was feared that banks that had lent money to Greece would also get into serious difficulties and that this would have had further effects on the euro currency system.

On April 11, 2010, the members of the Eurozone decided to grant aid loans to Greece. These bilateral loans were set up for three years and had a total volume of 80 billion euros. In addition, 30 billion euros came from the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

The donors did not assume any liability for Greece's outstanding debts. In return, the Greek government under Prime Minister Giorgos A. Papandreou ( PASOK ) had to undertake drastic reforms in order to reduce the budget deficit and correct undesirable macroeconomic developments. This included a significant cut in social benefits and tax increases.

In Germany , the Bundestag approved this agreement by enacting the Monetary Union Financial Stability Act . The Republic of Cyprus was also affected by the many Greek banks in its own country. Cyprus incorporated EU regulations into its laws from the start.

European Union action

European Financial Stabilization Mechanism (EFSM)

Based on Art. 122 TFEU, Regulation (EU) No. 407/2010 authorizes the Commission to grant loans to Member States that have got into difficulties. The Council of the European Union decides on this with a qualified majority (Art. 3 of the regulation). The Commission pays the funds from the general budget and refinances itself by issuing loans on the credit market or taking out loans from banks on behalf of the European Union (Art. 2 of the Regulation). In doing so, the regulation breaks the principle that the European Union must not be at fault. The risk of payment default lies with all Member States, not just the countries of the euro zone , because the Commission pledges the budget of the European Union as security and the Member States would have to make additional payments in the event of default or forego payments from the agricultural and other programs .

After the heads of state and government of the euro zone countries agreed on a third program for Greece on July 13, 2015, the Commission considered reactivating the EFSM in order to provide rapid bridge financing. This proposal met with resistance from states such as Great Britain, the Czech Republic and Sweden, which do not belong to the euro zone and do not want to be held jointly liable. British Prime Minister David Cameron objected that the Commission had given him written assurances that his country would not co-finance any further programs. However, the existence and legally binding effect of such a document are disputed.

Some voices see the EFSM as a violation of Art. 125 TFEU , the so-called no-bailout clause . This prohibits the Union and the member states from assuming liability for the debts of other states or taking responsibility for their debts.

European Financial Stabilization Facility (EFSF)

In contrast to the EFSM, the EFSF is a contract under private law between the member states of the euro zone. The EFSF is a public limited company under Luxembourg law that provides loan default guarantees up to EUR 440 billion. It was established on May 10, 2010 by the governments of the euro countries. The default risk of the EFSF programs does not affect all member states of the European Union, only the states of the euro zone. So far, Greece, Ireland and Portugal have received loans from the EFSF. An overview can be found on the EFSF homepage.

In Germany, the Bundestag approved the treaty through the Stabilization Mechanism Act . The constitutionality of this law is controversial. A violation of the no-bailout clause of Art. 125 TFEU ​​is also possible . The member states are bound by this even when concluding international treaties. In the event of a breach, the Commission can initiate infringement proceedings; however, the Commission is generally not expected to initiate such a procedure. The Federal Constitutional Court has dismissed a constitutional complaint against the German approval law; the complainants had alleged a violation of Articles 14 and 38 .

European Stability Mechanism (ESM)

While the EFSM and the EFSF were planned as temporary measures, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) is designed to be permanent. It was originally planned as the successor to the EFSF. As things stand, both institutions will exist in parallel for some time. The aim of the ESM is to set up a permanent mechanism to stabilize the euro. Like the EFSF, it was founded by an intergovernmental treaty between the states of the euro zone.

The legal basis of the ESM is Article 136 of the TFEU , which was added by the European Council on March 25, 2011 : The member states whose currency is the euro can set up a stability mechanism that is activated if this is essential for the stability of the euro - to preserve the currency area as a whole. The granting of all necessary grants under the mechanism will be subject to strict conditions.

The German Bundestag and Bundesrat passed the Act approving this amendment to the treaty on June 30, 2012. After the Federal Constitutional Court had rejected the urgent motions against the execution of the law, it was executed by the Federal President. Therefore, the contract came into force on September 27, 2012.

Actions by the International Monetary Fund and the European Central Bank

ECB bond purchases in billion euros since May 2010

The international monetary fund has promised loans totaling 253.5 billion euros.

The European Central Bank (ECB) has lowered its credit rating requirements for European government bonds and is buying government bonds on the secondary market, i. H. not directly from the states, but from market participants who have previously bought them directly from the states or other market participants. This is seen in part as a violation of Art. 123 TFEU , which prohibits the direct acquisition of sovereign debt by the ECB. In the opinion of some, the indirect acquisition should constitute a circumvention. Others see indirect acquisition as a permissible part of the so-called open market policy of the ECB.

Participation of the Member States in detail

The states are involved in the financing both through ESM guarantees and through their share in the International Monetary Fund. The IMF loan is paid from the regular budget of the IMF, in which the EU member states - as well as the other IMF member states, especially the USA as main financier - participate in the amount of their respective share in the IMF. The table below shows amounts only for those Member States that contribute more than 1% of the IMF loan. In addition, the amount of 250 billion euros is the maximum amount of the loan; in fact, only part of it has so far been used for Ireland and Portugal.

The credit volume was limited to 500 billion euros in 2011 and should not be increased further when the EFSF is transferred to the ESM.

country Guarantees in billions of euros Shares of states Total share
(€ billion)
Total
%
on the IMF loan Share in the ESM (€ billion) Greece
rescue plans (€ billion)
ECB bond purchase (€ billion) Target liabilities
(€ billion)
in % Billion €
(EU countries)
bar sureties
companies
IMF (euro countries) EU
AustriaAustria Austria 13.16 2.99 0.83 2.08 2.39 20.93 0.25 2.39 2.87 10.17 41.07
BelgiumBelgium Belgium 16.37 3.72 1.35 3.38 2.98 26.04 0.41 2.98 3.57 12.65 51.99
Cyprus RepublicRepublic of Cyprus Cyprus 0.92 0.21 0.06 0.15 0.17 1.47 0.02 0.17 0.20 0.71 2.89
FinlandFinland Finland 8.45 1.92 0.51 1.28 1.54 13.44 0.15 1.54 1.84 6.53 26.31
FranceFrance France 96.05 21.83 4.23 10.58 17.46 152.81 1.27 17.46 20.96 74.22 294.76
GermanyGermany Germany 127.91 29.07 5.59 13.98 23.26 190.00 1.68 23.26 27.91 98.84 392.40
GreeceGreece Greece 19.71
IrelandIreland Ireland 11.15
ItalyItaly Italy 84.39 19.18 3.16 7.90 15.34 134.26 0.95 15.34 18.41 65.21 257.42
LuxembourgLuxembourg Luxembourg 1.19 0.27 0.28 0.70 0.22 1.89 0.08 0.22 0.26 0.92 4.28
MaltaMalta Malta 0.44 0.10 0.04 0.10 0.08 0.70 0.01 0.08 0.10 0.34 1.41
NetherlandsNetherlands Netherlands 26.93 6.12 1.83 4.58 4.90 42.84 0.55 4.90 5.88 20.81 84.44
PortugalPortugal Portugal 17.56
SlovakiaSlovakia Slovakia 4.66 1.06 0.21 0.53 0.85 7.42 0.06 0.85 1.02 3.60 14.33
SloveniaSlovenia Slovenia 2.24 0.51 0.12 0.30 0.41 3.57 0.04 0.41 0.49 1.73 6.95
SpainSpain Spain 56.10 12.75 2.00 5.00 10.2 89.25 0.60 10.2 12.24 43.35 170.84
EstoniaEstonia Estonia 1.19 0.27 0.04 0.10 0.22 1.89 0.01 0.22 0.26 0.92 3.61
Eurozone 440.00 100.00 20.25 50.62 80.00 500.00 6.07 80.00 96.00 340.00 1,352.70
Other countries 79.75 199.38 23.93 223.30
total 440.00 100.00 100.00 250.00 80.00 500.00 30.00 80.00 96.00 340.00 1,576.00

Proportional financial risk for the Federal Republic of Germany

  • IMF : In the event of the failure of Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain, Germany would be involved in the rescue package of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) with 15 billion euros. The IMF has made 30 billion euros available to rescue Greece. Two billion euros of this come from Berlin.
  • ECB : Government bond purchases: As part of its " Securities Markets Program " (SMP), from May 2010 to around February 2012 the ECB bought bonds from euro countries with a total of around 220 billion euros that were no longer able to easily refinance their debts on the capital market. including Greece bonds with a nominal value of an estimated 50 billion euros. For this she was massively criticized in Germany. Germany is liable for about a third, i.e. for over 70 billion euros (as of February 2012).
  • TARGET2 : Risks are also seen when using the TARGET2 payment system . In May 2011, the then head of the Ifo Institute, Hans-Werner Sinn, criticized the Target system because the ECB was financing the entire current account deficits of the four crisis countries. In the period from January 30, 2012 to May 12, 2012, the Deutsche Bundesbank's target claims against the ECB rose from 466 to almost 644 billion euros, while the target liabilities of the GIIPS states (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain ) compared to the ECB rose from around 500 billion euros to 950 billion euros.
  • EU rescue plan for Greece: The European Union has put together a package of 80 billion euros for the rescue of Greece. The federal government is involved with 27 billion euros.

In total, all rescue packages have a volume of 1,496 billion euros. Germany is liable for 379 billion euros within the euro zone. In the event of a breakup of the currency union, Germany's risk would be much higher - in particular, Germany's entire target claims would then probably be irrecoverable.

criticism

A representative of Mehr Demokratie e. V. hands over signatures

In 2011, 189 economics professors spoke out in a petition against the plan to develop the euro rescue package into a permanent rescue mechanism. Communitating the debts would have "fatal long-term effects for the entire project of European integration". The purchase of high-risk government bonds by the ECB would endanger its reputation and independence, favorable conditions and the liability of the international community would tempt "repeat the mistakes of the past and continue a debt policy at the expense of the EU partners" and the debt crisis will worsen in the medium term.

Since April 12, 2012, an alliance established by the association Mehr Demokratie has been collecting supporters for a constitutional complaint against the approval laws for the European Stability Mechanism and the fiscal agreement . The alliance, which includes not only prominent individual supporters, but also the Free Voters and the ÖDP , is calling for a nationwide referendum on the laws, since they believe that central sovereign rights are irretrievably transferred to non-state institutions. The alliance is represented by the former Federal Minister of Justice Herta Däubler-Gmelin and the constitutional lawyer Christoph Degenhart . On June 12, 2012, thousands of collected signatures were handed over to the President of the Bundestag, Norbert Lammert , calling for a referendum on the euro rescue policy.

Two petitions reached around 13,000 co-signers on the Internet and are “under parliamentary scrutiny”.

While the term " rescue parachute " denotes a rescue parachute , numerous formulations according to which countries "slip under the rescue parachute" show that this metaphor is rather incorrectly referring to an umbrella .

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. Archive link ( Memento of the original dated February 6, 2017 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice.  @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.bundesregierung.de
  2. Wolfgang Bandilla , in: Grabitz / Hilf / Nettesheim (ed.), The Law of the European Union, 44th supplementary delivery 2011, Art. 125 TFEU, Rn. 14 ff .; Daniel Thym , Euro rescue package: intergovernmental legal construction and constitutional control, in: EuZW 2011, p. 167 ff.
  3. a b Statement on the support to Greece by Euro area Member States, press release from April 11, 2010, and Statement by the Eurogroup, from May 2, 2010, both available at www.consilium.europa.eu, under Eurogroup.
  4. The Federal Constitutional Court understands “rescue package” only to mean the EFSM and the EFSF; Federal Constitutional Court, press release No. 37/2011 of July 9, 2011 here online ( accessed on November 11, 2011)
  5. Wolfgang Bandilla , in: Grabitz / Hilf / Nettesheim (ed.), The Law of the European Union, 44th supplementary delivery 2011, Art. 125 TFEU, Rn. 14 ff.
  6. Law of 7 May 2010, Federal Law Gazette 2010-I, p. 537
  7. EU legislation
  8. Regulation (EU) No. 407/2010 of the Council of May 11, 2010 ( Memento of the original of July 26, 2015 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice.  @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.europarl.europa.eu
  9. Tagesschau from July 15, 2015
  10. Daily Telegraph, July 15, 2015.
  11. Daniel Thym , Euro rescue package: intergovernmental legal construction and constitutional control, in: EuZW 2011, p. 167 ff. (169).
  12. EFSF framework agreement ( Memento of the original dated September 24, 2015 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice.  @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.europarl.europa.eu
  13. a b c Daniel Thym , Euro rescue package: intergovernmental legal structure and constitutional control, in: EuZW 2011, p. 167 ff. (169).
  14. Overview of credits granted to all countries; Loans from other institutions can be found under the country-specific programs, see the programs for Ireland here and for Portugal here (both links were accessed on 10 November 2011).
  15. Gauck signs laws on ESM and Fiscal Compact. (No longer available online.) In: Die Zeit Online. September 13, 2012, archived from the original on September 13, 2014 ; Retrieved September 26, 2012 . Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.zeit.de
  16. Federal Law Gazette III No. 138/2012
  17. Markus C. Kerber , Stefan Städter: The ECB in the Crisis: Independence and Legal Binding as a Tension, in: EuZW 2011, p. 536 ff.
  18. Ulrich Häde , in: Calliess / Ruffert (ed.), EUV / AEUV, 4th edition 2011, Art. 123 TFEU, Rn. 10.
  19. Decision of the Council of Europe of April 20, 2011 (PDF; 171 kB)
  20. http://www.efsf.europa.eu/attachments/201111-efsf-newsletter-n03.pdf
  21. ^ Frank Doll: ECB: Fire accelerator of the euro crisis. In: Wirtschaftswoche. Retrieved August 19, 2018 .
  22. ^ Hubert Beyerle: How Hans-Werner Sinn wanted to criticize the euro rescue package in Berlin and in the end had to defend the euro. In: Financial Times Germany. May 10, 2011, archived from the original on May 12, 2011 ; accessed on August 19, 2018 .
  23. ^ Stefan Ruhkamp: Debt crisis: The Bundesbank demands better collateral from the ECB. In: Frankfurter Allgemeine. February 29, 2012. Retrieved August 19, 2018 .
  24. Stefan Ruhkamp: Analysis of Commerzbank: Target balance forces a transfer union. In: Frankfurter Allgemeine. February 28, 2012, archived from the original on June 7, 2017 ; accessed on August 19, 2018 .
  25. Holger Steltzner: Debt Crisis: The Curse of Inflation. In: Frankfurter Allgemeine. May 12, 2012. Retrieved August 19, 2018 .
  26. Holger Zschäpitz: Economists warn of billions in risk for Germany. In: The world. October 23, 2017. Retrieved August 19, 2018 .
  27. Rescuing the euro could cost billions more. In: Handelsblatt. October 19, 2011, accessed August 19, 2018 .
  28. "The risk with the euro umbrella is no longer calculable". In: Handelsblatt. October 26, 2011, accessed August 19, 2018 .
  29. Philip Plickert : Mass petition by German economics professors: Economists against a larger euro rescue package , Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, February 24, 2011.
  30. More Democracy e. V .: Citizens complain against the undemocratic ratification of the ESM and fiscal treaty. Press release of April 12, 2012. April 12, 2012, accessed April 12, 2012 .
  31. ^ German Bundestag: Petitions
  32. ^ German Bundestag: Petitions
  33. illustrated example from the "Handelsblatt"