Poznan Question 1848-1851

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The Poznan question in the years 1848 to 1851 revolved around whether a certain area belonged to Germany. The Prussian province of Posen had both Polish and German-speaking residents. From 1848 to 1851, Poznan was part of the German Confederation or the newly emerging German Empire . Among other things, the division of the province into a German and a Polish-speaking area was controversial. In 1851 the old state was restored.

prehistory

Poland after 1815. In light green the so-called Congress Poland as part of Russia, in turquoise the Grand Duchy of Posen as part of Prussia. Krakow (red) was annexed by Austria in 1846.

Poland-Lithuania was a large East Central European state until the 18th century, when Prussia , Austria and Russia annexed the area in several stages . The core of Poland with Warsaw came to Russia in 1815 as Congress Poland . In 1831 there was a Polish uprising which Russia suppressed. In Western Europe the Democrats in particular sympathized with the Polish cause and the restoration of an independent Polish state.

In addition, the Poles made up a minority in Prussia. They were also a minority in the respective Prussian provinces with the exception of the Province of Posen (which was also the Grand Duchy of Posen). At that time 800,000 Polish-speaking, 400,000 German-speaking and 80,000 Jewish residents lived there. The Germans lived mainly in the west, south-west and north ( Netzebruch ) of the province and in the cities. With the often mixed settlement areas, a division that was fair for both sides was impossible.

With the Polish question, the German revolution touched a vital interest of Russia. After all, Poland saw itself as a large empire in eastern Central Europe that reached as far as Kiev and Smolensk . Russia, a British diplomat admitted, would be pushed back into Asia. Every Russian would take up arms against it, as in 1812. Besides Russia, Austria also strictly opposed a restoration of Poland, while Great Britain and France supported it.

Before 1848, the liberal-democratic opposition in Germany saw the Polish people as an ally against the oppressive forces in the east, especially Russia. The zenith of the enthusiasm for Poland was already at the Hambach Festival in 1832, but it flared up again in the March days of 1848. On March 24th, the Prussian king announced a "national reorganization" of the Grand Duchy of Poznan.

On March 31, the pre-parliament decided that Poland should be restored to redress the injustices of the partitions. On the other hand, all of East and West Prussia should become part of the German nation-state, despite the Polish minority in West Prussia. Liberals and Democrats who stood behind these decisions were inconsistent in this regard.

Polarization since the March Revolution of 1848

Poznan Province, 1848

A Polish national committee, founded in Poznan on March 20, asked King Friedrich Wilhelm IV not to let the Grand Duchy of Poznan become part of the German national state. A delegation of southern and western German states under Max von Gagern , like the new Prussian foreign minister Arnim, was of the opinion that a restoration of Poland would trigger a war with Russia that would bring the national, moderate liberal forces behind the king. In this way alone the threatening radical, republican movement could still be pushed back.

But by the beginning of April it became clear that the situation in Russian Poland was stable, while there were still significant pro-Russian opinions in Prussia (including those of the king). Tsar Nicholas I would have accepted the inclusion of the Prussian eastern provinces including Poznan. The text about the national reorganization left many questions unanswered. The king worried about his own position and wanted to change as little as possible, at best to improve the status of the Polish speakers; Foreign Minister Arnim could envision greater autonomy in Posen, but above all thought of Prussia's position in Germany.

A national Polish uprising in April under the National Committee, which saw itself as the Polish state government, took possession of part of Poznan. Since the uprising was connected with attacks against German residents, it cost German sympathy.

The Polish National Committee in Poznan saw itself as the germ of an all-Polish organization, so it did not want to accept any representatives of the German-speaking population. Until a nationwide government has been set up, German speakers should neither participate nor have a say in decisions. As a result, the German-speaking people in Poznan founded their own German-Poznan national committee. This was subsequently seen by the Germans as the beginning of a German-Polish confrontation. The Poles were already thinking of setting up an army to protect themselves internally and externally, the Germans, concentrated in the Netzedistrikt around Bromberg, were already planning to divide the province of Posen.

The provincial parliament, dominated by Poland, voted against joining the German Confederation. A Prussian cabinet order of April 14th determined that the German-speaking areas of Poznan should not take part in the Polish reorganization. On April 22nd, the Bundestag admitted the designated German-speaking areas (officially 593,000 out of 1,300,000 inhabitants in total Posens) to the federal government. On May 2, the Bundestag complied with Prussian requests, including adding the city and fortress of Poznan to the area (with a further 273,000 inhabitants). The rest of the province was to remain with Prussia, but as the autonomous Duchy of Gniezno received its own constitution and Polish administration. In May the Prussian Commissioner General v. Pfuel restored order, on May 9th the last insurgent forces had capitulated.

France protested sharply against the division of the Grand Duchy as the “fourth division” of Poland and threatened war. A radical uprising in Paris on May 15, 1848, however, made it impossible for the French government to interfere further. But she also rejected an alliance with Prussia to restore Poland. Britain stayed cool and Russia felt the danger was over.

Debate on poses in the National Assembly

Map of the German Confederation, with the boundaries of the provisional division in Poznan

The Poznan problem caused difficulties when the invitation to the pre-parliament was given, as the Poznan Estates were only specifically invited a few days later. According to this invitation, all of Prussia should belong to the German nation-state. This was the first declaration of intent for the admission not only of East and West Prussia, but also of Poznan. In the pre-parliament, some wanted to forego all of Poznan, out of consideration for Poland (and indirectly Russia), while others wanted to take in all of Poznan. It was finally agreed to include the German-Poznan MPs in the National Assembly and to discuss the Poznan problem there.

The National Assembly did not develop its own concepts and, interestingly, did not follow the historical principle, which "in the case of Schleswig was hyped up as a precedent for founding an empire," said Wollstein. Partitions based on the principle of nationality, with a limit that satisfied all the demands of the Germans, could not serve as a basis for a German-Polish balance.

In the National Assembly in July there was a great debate about Poznan. Here partly contradicting views stood side by side. On the one hand, there was great sympathy for Poland and its revolutionary role, especially on the left. On the other hand, some speakers also spoke of a healthy national egoism that the Germans should show; the 500,000 Germans in Poznan should not be driven out of Germany. Some speakers described the Poles as culturally inferior compared to the Germans, after all it was the latter who built the country through their colonization work. The debate was also overshadowed by the thought of Russia, which could see itself forced to intervene against an independent, revolutionary Poland. In general, for military reasons it is better to expand the German position in Posen, as a protective wall against the East, than to trust in an independent, weak Poland.

Confirmation of the division in Frankfurt

On July 27, the MPs voted with a large majority (342 to 131) to include parts of Posen, as the Bundestag had decided. The Poznan MPs were finally accepted. The Prussian government was called upon to protect the nationality of Germans in the Polish part of Poznan. The final division limit should be specified later. For fear of unrest in Poznan, the central authority did not urge the Prussian government to implement the resolutions quickly. To make matters worse, the Prussian National Assembly in Berlin declared all of Poznan to be Prussian territory on October 19 and 23.

Reichskommissar Schaeffer-Bernstein finally submitted a report on the division of Posen, which the National Assembly debated on February 6, 1849. He had received the order to come to an agreement with the Prussian government. His results therefore also corresponded to their ideas. The aim was to continue to add as much of the territory as possible to the German part and otherwise allow the Poles little “reorganization”. Instead of dealing with minor border adjustments, as requested on July 27, the new plan included an even larger area in the German part.

The National Assembly approved the plan by 280 votes to 124, with 11 abstentions. However, the division became obsolete on October 3, 1851 at the latest, when Posen was again separated from the German Confederation.

literature

  • Walter Bleck: The political parties and the Poznan question in the years 1848/49 . Diss. Greifswald, Hofbuchdruckerei W. Decker & Co., Posen 1914
  • Günter Wollstein : The 'Greater Germany' of the Paulskirche. National goals in the bourgeois revolution of 1848/1849 . Droste Verlag, Düsseldorf 1977, ISBN 3-7700-0474-4 .

supporting documents

  1. ^ Günter Wollstein : The 'Greater Germany' of the Paulskirche. National goals in the bourgeois revolution of 1848/1849 . Droste Verlag, Düsseldorf 1977, ISBN 3-7700-0474-4 , p. 106 .
  2. ^ WE Mosse: The European Powers and the German Question 1848-71. With Special Reference to England And Russia. Cambridge: University Press 1958, p. 14.
  3. ^ Ernst Rudolf Huber: German constitutional history since 1789. Volume II: The struggle for unity and freedom 1830 to 1850 . 3rd edition, Verlag W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart [ua] 1988, p. 639.
  4. ^ Günter Wollstein : The 'Greater Germany' of the Paulskirche. National goals in the bourgeois revolution of 1848/1849 . Droste Verlag, Düsseldorf 1977, ISBN 3-7700-0474-4 , p. 99 .
  5. ^ Günter Wollstein : The 'Greater Germany' of the Paulskirche. National goals in the bourgeois revolution of 1848/1849 . Droste Verlag, Düsseldorf 1977, ISBN 3-7700-0474-4 , p. 100/101 .
  6. ^ Ernst Rudolf Huber: German constitutional history since 1789. Volume II: The struggle for unity and freedom 1830 to 1850 . 3rd edition, Verlag W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart [ua] 1988, p. 639.
  7. ^ Günter Wollstein : The 'Greater Germany' of the Paulskirche. National goals in the bourgeois revolution of 1848/1849 . Droste Verlag, Düsseldorf 1977, ISBN 3-7700-0474-4 , p. 101/102 .
  8. ^ Günter Wollstein : The 'Greater Germany' of the Paulskirche. National goals in the bourgeois revolution of 1848/1849 . Droste Verlag, Düsseldorf 1977, ISBN 3-7700-0474-4 , p. 102/103 .
  9. ^ Ernst Rudolf Huber: German constitutional history since 1789. Volume II: The struggle for unity and freedom 1830 to 1850 . 3rd edition, Verlag W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart [ua] 1988, pp. 640/641.
  10. ^ WE Mosse: The European Powers and the German Question 1848-71. With Special Reference to England And Russia. Cambridge: University Press 1958, pp. 14/15.
  11. ^ Günter Wollstein : The 'Greater Germany' of the Paulskirche. National goals in the bourgeois revolution of 1848/1849 . Droste Verlag, Düsseldorf 1977, ISBN 3-7700-0474-4 , p. 104/105 .
  12. ^ Günter Wollstein : The 'Greater Germany' of the Paulskirche. National goals in the bourgeois revolution of 1848/1849 . Droste Verlag, Düsseldorf 1977, ISBN 3-7700-0474-4 , p. 117/119 .
  13. ^ Ernst Rudolf Huber: German constitutional history since 1789. Volume II: The struggle for unity and freedom 1830 to 1850 . 3rd edition, Verlag W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart [ua] 1988, p. 641.
  14. ^ Ernst Rudolf Huber: German constitutional history since 1789. Volume II: The struggle for unity and freedom 1830 to 1850 . 3rd edition, Verlag W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart [ua] 1988, pp. 640/641.
  15. ^ Ernst Rudolf Huber: German constitutional history since 1789. Volume II: The struggle for unity and freedom 1830 to 1850 . 3rd edition, Verlag W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart [ua] 1988, p. 641.
  16. ^ WE Mosse: The European Powers and the German Question 1848-71. With Special Reference to England And Russia. Cambridge: University Press 1958, pp. 14/15.
  17. ^ Günter Wollstein : The 'Greater Germany' of the Paulskirche. National goals in the bourgeois revolution of 1848/1849 . Droste Verlag, Düsseldorf 1977, ISBN 3-7700-0474-4 , p. 109-111 .
  18. ^ Günter Wollstein : The 'Greater Germany' of the Paulskirche. National goals in the bourgeois revolution of 1848/1849 . Droste Verlag, Düsseldorf 1977, ISBN 3-7700-0474-4 , p. 186/187 .
  19. ^ Günter Wollstein : The 'Greater Germany' of the Paulskirche. National goals in the bourgeois revolution of 1848/1849 . Droste Verlag, Düsseldorf 1977, ISBN 3-7700-0474-4 , p. 169 .
  20. ^ Günter Wollstein : The 'Greater Germany' of the Paulskirche. National goals in the bourgeois revolution of 1848/1849 . Droste Verlag, Düsseldorf 1977, ISBN 3-7700-0474-4 , p. 165 .
  21. ^ Günter Wollstein : The 'Greater Germany' of the Paulskirche. National goals in the bourgeois revolution of 1848/1849 . Droste Verlag, Düsseldorf 1977, ISBN 3-7700-0474-4 , p. 176/177 .
  22. ^ Günter Wollstein : The 'Greater Germany' of the Paulskirche. National goals in the bourgeois revolution of 1848/1849 . Droste Verlag, Düsseldorf 1977, ISBN 3-7700-0474-4 , p. 180-182 .
  23. ^ Günter Wollstein : The 'Greater Germany' of the Paulskirche. National goals in the bourgeois revolution of 1848/1849 . Droste Verlag, Düsseldorf 1977, ISBN 3-7700-0474-4 , p. 185 .