Putsch of February 21, 1921
The February 21 coup was a successful coup in Persia against the government of Prime Minister Fathollah Akbar Sepahdar . The putsch took place on the night of February 20-21, 1921. He was led by Seyyed Zia al Din Tabatabai and Reza Khan , commander of a unit of the Persian Cossack Brigade . The officers of the Persian gendarmerie Masoud Keyhan and Kazem Khan Sayah as well as the Cossack officer Ahmad Amir-Ahmadi were also directly involved . The coup led to the removal of Prime Minister Sepahdar and the establishment of a new government by Ahmad Shah Kajar, headed by Prime Minister Seyyed Zia al Din Tabatabai. Reza Khan became Commander in Chief of the Cossack Brigade (Sardar Sepah) , Masoud Keyhan Minister of War and Kazem Khan Military Governor of Tehran. Although the coup was successful, Prime Minister Seyyed Zia al Din Tabatabai was only able to stay in office for 100 days. After his resignation, he was replaced as Prime Minister by Ahmad Qavam .
The goals of the coup plotters
Immediately after the coup, Seyyed Zia al Din Tabatabai issued a statement in which he outlined the aims of the coup. He justified the overthrow of the government with the fact that 15 years after the Constitutional Revolution nothing had changed in the balance of power in the country. The country would still be ruled by a small layer of oligarchs who claimed the country's wealth as if it were their birthright. The aim of the coup is to change the balance of power in Iran as part of an extensive reform program.
First of all, a judicial reform must be carried out that allows ordinary people to enforce their rights. The living conditions of workers and peasants must be improved. Schools have to be built and teachers have to be hired. Furthermore, state funds would have to be made available for the expansion of the economy, in particular trade and industry. The Iranian capital Tehran and the other large cities of Iran should receive a development plan and be equipped with squares and parks like in Europe. Foreign policy should be friendly towards all countries. The political situation for which the Anglo-Iranian treaty of 1919 was drafted, and which would in fact have made Iran a British protectorate, has fundamentally changed. For this reason, this agreement should not have any validity. Seyyed Zia al Din Tabatabai stressed that he had been appointed by Ahmad Shah to rule the country as the new prime minister.
The course of the coup
Seyyed Zia Tabatabai had first contacted Brigadier General Mohammad Nachdschawan of the Cossack Brigade whether he would take over the military part of a coup against the Sephadar government. Brigadier General Nachdschawan had refused. As a result, Seyyed Zia Tabatabai contacted Reza Khan, who was ready for a coup if he was given the high command of the Cossack Brigade in return. Ahmad Amir-Ahmadi , also a member of the Cossack Brigade and himself involved in the coup, describes the events before the coup as follows:
“After the decision was made to send a larger unit of Cossacks to Qazvin , Brigadier General Reza Khan came to Qazvin with his troop contingent. He told me that he wanted to go to Tehran to talk to some influential people about whether he could become the commander of the Persian Cossacks . A few days later we met again in Qazvin, and he told me that he had discussed his plan with some people who would have no objection to his plan if the officers, who were more likely to be entitled to the post because of their seniority , did not object would raise. We decided that Reza Khan would write a letter to two senior officers, including my father-in-law Major General Mohammad Tofiqi Sardar Azim. I took the letters to Tehran and received their written consent that they would raise no objection if Reza Khan were promoted to command of the Cossacks. "
On the morning of February 20, 1921, Hassan Arfa , a captain in the second gendarmerie regiment in Tehran, received a call from his commander, Major Scheibani, informing him that there was a rebellion by the Persian Cossack brigade that had not received any pay for months and march to Tehran to get their pay. It is to be expected that around 1000 Cossacks will reach Tehran in the evening. Arfa was ordered to secure the western parts of Tehran with his regiment. When asked whether he should open fire on the Cossacks, the answer was that he should only return fire if he was shot.
At 8 p.m. Ahmad Shah called Arfa and asked about the situation. It was quiet. Around 9 p.m., an advance guard of the Cossack brigade was sighted from the gendarme outpost. At 11 p.m. Arfa learned of shots that had been fired in the center of town. Major Scheibani confirmed by telephone that around 1,500 Cossacks had come to Tehran through the Gomrok Gate together with units of the Gendarmerie Brigade. The police on Tupchaneh Square did not want to surrender and were therefore shot. The situation is calm and Arfa can call his people back to the barracks. The next day everything remained calm. Major Scheibani came to Hassan Arfa and said that the Cossacks had overthrown the government and that the new Prime Minister was Seyyed Zia al Din Tabatabai , that Reza Khan was the new Commander in Chief and that many important people had been arrested.
The new cabinet
On February 22, 1921 (3rd Esfand), Seyyed Zia Tabatabai received his certificate of appointment as Prime Minister from Ahmad Shah. Ahmad Shah offered Seyyed Zia the choice of a title according to his own ideas. Seyyed Zia rejected the common titles of the Qajars and asked if he could not call himself "dictator". Ahmad Shah refused. He said that the award of the title "dictator" would violate the dignity of the monarchy. Ahmad Shah issued a public statement confirming Seyyed Zia Tabatabai as the new Prime Minister. Reza Khan received the title "Sardar Sepah" (Commander in Chief).
With the exception of Reza Qoli Hedayat, Prime Minister Tabatabai's cabinet consisted of people who had not held any leading political office up to that point. The ministries were staffed as follows:
- Prime Minister and Interior Minister: Seyyed Zia al Din Tabatabai
- Foreign Minister: Mahmud Dscham ,
- Finance Minister: Issa Fayz
- Minister of Education: Reza Qoli Khan Hedayat
- Minister of Justice: Mostafa Adl
- Health Minister: Ali Ashgar Nafisi
- Minister of War: Masoud Keyhan
- Minister for Public Works: Mahmoud Khan Movaqar
- Minister of Post and Telegraphy: Taqi Khan Moschir A'zam (Khajawi)
Already in the first days of his government, Seyyed Zia ran into serious difficulties when Mohammad Mossadegh , governor of Fars province , and Ahmad Qavam , governor of Khorasan province , did not recognize the new central government. Seyyed Zia gave a fiery speech in parliament against the corrupt political class that had tenaciously defended its privileges from the pre-parliamentary era and brought the country to the brink of ruin.
In terms of foreign policy, the Seyyed Zia government achieved its first success with the signing of the Soviet-Iranian friendship treaty on February 26, 1921. In the treaty, Iran was guaranteed full territorial integrity. All previous treaties between Russia and Iran, including the Treaty of Turkemantschai of February 22, 1828 and the Treaty of Saint Petersburg, are canceled. Iran, along with Russia, is granted the right to freely navigate its ships in the Caspian Sea with its own flag.
Internally, Seyyed Zia's political reform program envisaged that the entire legal system of Iran should be modernized and aligned with European standards. Seyyed Zia set up a reform commission to be headed by Mohammad Ali Foroughi . The Ministry of Finance was initially closed in order to fundamentally reform the tax and finance system. There was simply a lack of funds to stimulate the economy or to invest in infrastructure. Seyyed Zia had planned a land reform that would distribute the land of the large landowners to the peasants who worked the land as agricultural laborers for the large landowners. It soon became apparent that land reform at the given time was a completely unrealistic proposition. The only thing that the government was able to enforce immediately was a ban on selling alcohol, or rather that shops had to be closed on Fridays and religious holidays. With this measure the new government turned Christian Armenians and the merchants of the bazaar into opponents.
The only stabilizing force inside proved to be the Cossack Brigade under the leadership of Reza Khan. Reza Khan, who as commander in chief of the Cossack Brigade had no position in the cabinet, continued the fight against the separatist movements in northern Iran.
Two months after the coup, Reza Khan and Prime Minister Tabatabai broke out on April 21, 1921. Without Reza Khan's knowledge, Tabatabai had appointed some British officers as advisory commanders to the Persian Cossack Brigade. Reza Khan ordered his soldiers not to obey orders from British officers. He also asked Tabatabai for the post of Minister of War, since as Commander-in-Chief of the Cossack Brigade he would only receive orders from Ahmad Shah and not from the gendarmerie officer and Minister of War Masoud Keyhan. In order to settle the dispute between Reza Khan and Masoud Keyhan, Tabatabai reshuffled his cabinet. Reza Khan became Minister of Defense and Masoud Khan became Minister without Portfolio.
On May 6, there was another conflict in the cabinet. Reza Khan demanded from Prime Minister Tabatabai that the gendarmes who were subordinate to the Interior Ministry should be assigned to his ministry. The aim is to merge the Cossack brigade and the gendarmerie to form a new national Iranian army. Prime Minister Tabatabai agreed.
The wave of arrests
The coup was directed against the Iranian political class, supported by the conservative class of large landowners. There was an extensive wave of arrests immediately after the coup. The first arrests were former Prime Ministers Najaf Qoli Chan Samsam al-Saltane, Saad al Dowleh , Abdol Majid Mirza Eyn-al-Dowleh and Abdol Hossein Mirza Farmanfarma . A month after the coup, almost all of the senior politicians and most of the landowners, with only a few exceptions, had been arrested. In total, there were around 200 people. Only the deposed Prime Minister Fathollah Akbar Sepahdar, Hassan Mostofi , Hassan Pirnia , Hossein Pirnia , Najaf Qoli Chan Samsam al-Saltane, the tribal leaders of the Bakhtiars and Saheb Echatiar, adviser to Ahmad Shah and Maghrour Mirza, court minister of Ahmad Shah remained at large.
Those arrested were accused of having unlawfully enriched themselves and paid neither taxes nor levies in the years since the Constitutional Revolution. They were given the prospect of release if they paid 4 million tomans per family in outstanding taxes and duties to the government, otherwise they would be brought to justice and punished accordingly. There was solid evidence of embezzlement, theft, extortion and murder against Abdol Hossein Mirza Farmanfarma and two of his eldest sons Abbas and Firouz. They were threatened with a possible death penalty.
However, the allegations made were not further substantiated. During the reign of Prime Minister Seyyed Zia al Din Tabatabai there was not a single trial. All but Hosein Ali Qaragozlou (Amir Nezam), one of the most important landowners in Kermanshah and Hamadan , refused to make the requested payments. Hosein Ali Qaragozlou paid 25,000 tomans for his release.
Prime Minister Seyyed Zia Tabatabai resigns
Ahmad Shah, who was initially positive about Seyyed Zia Tabatabai, no longer wanted to support his radical reform program. But above all to get the arrested politicians and princes of the Qajar family free again, Ahmad Shah attempted to overthrow Zias. Ahmad Shah instructed Reza Khan on May 23, 1921 to call on Seyyed Zia Tabatabai to resign. After his resignation, he should also leave the country. As a severance payment, he could receive a sum of his choice from the state treasury. Seyyed Zia took 25,000 Toman in cash to cover his travel expenses, resigned and left Tehran. The new prime minister, Ahmad Qavam , immediately released all arrested large landowners. The subsequent payment of the previously requested taxes and duties was waived.
With Tabatai's resignation as Prime Minister and Ahmad Qavams' assumption of this office, the political situation in Tehran initially seemed to normalize again. During the cabinet reshuffle, Reza Khan remained Minister of Defense. The finance ministry was taken over by Mohammad Mossadegh , who had given up his post as governor in favor of a ministerial office in Tehran. Prime Minister Qavam announced a series of reforms such as the introduction of a new legal system, the abolition of the rights of surrender and the hiring of foreign experts to clean up the state finances. His political program thus differed only insignificantly from the aims of the putschists around Tabatabai.
Qavam was not to remain prime minister for even a year. On January 24, 1922, Qavam lost parliamentary support and resigned. However, the new Prime Minister Hassan Pirnia could not last long and had to resign on May 25, 1922. Ahmad Qavam took over the post of prime minister again. During the reign of Qavam there were such important events as the suppression of the separatist movement of Colonel Pesyan , which succeeded with the help of Reza Khan, the reorganization of the Iranian finance and tax system, which was tackled with the support of the American financial expert Arthur Millspaugh . An important goal of Qavam was to reach an economic agreement with the Soviet Union. After this failed because of the Soviet demands for an oil concession in northern Iran, which Qavam refused to grant, Qavam resigned on January 26, 1923.
First, Hassan Mostofi took over the office of Prime Minister. Reza Khan remained Minister of Defense. Mohammad Ali Foroughi became Foreign Minister. Hassan Mostofi had a strong opposition in parliament from the start, led by Hassan Modarres . In addition, there was no backing from Ahmad Shah, so that Mostofi resigned in June 1923 and Hassan Pirnia took over the post of prime minister again. Reza Khan would have liked to become prime minister, but his candidacy was completely hopeless at this point, as he did not have a majority in parliament. Ahmad Shah was also against a Prime Minister Reza Khan at this point. So Reza Khan remained Minister of Defense. After Hassan Pirnia submitted his resignation on October 23, 1923, the Iranian parliament elected Reza Khan as Prime Minister on October 28, 1923.
The communist threat
The extent to which the British military and the British embassy had a hand in preparing the coup has not yet been clarified. What is certain, however, is that the central government of Iran was politically at an end in 1921. Communist troops marched towards Tehran from the north. The Iranian government had already come to terms with the separation of the northern provinces of Iran from the power of the central government and was planning to relocate the capital to the south of the country.
The economic situation was also dire. Iran was facing national bankruptcy. Iran was an agrarian society. Of the 10 million Iranians, 90% made a living from agriculture. A quarter of the inhabitants were nomads. Only twenty percent of the population lived in cities. There was basically no Iranian economy, as the agricultural products were largely self-sufficient or were at most sold on local markets. There was no industry. There was no railroad and only a few hundred kilometers of paved roads. Compared to Iran, Turkey and Egypt already had a rail network of 4,500 km in length at this time.
The northern neighbors of Iran had come under the influence of communist movements. The Red Army occupied the Democratic Republic of Georgia on February 11, 1921 and established a Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic . As early as April 27, 1920, the Red Army marched into Azerbaijan and replaced the Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan with an Azerbaijani Soviet Socialist Republic . An Iranian Soviet Republic was established in northern Iran with the support of the Red Army . The political opponents of the communists saw the danger that all of Iran would come under the influence of communist Russia.
The withdrawal of the British troops
The British troops (NorPerForce) stationed in northern Iran had not succeeded in stopping the advance of the Red Army. For this reason, the British government decided to withdraw its troops from Iran and build a new line of defense in Iraq. In northern Iran, an independent Iranian Red Army had been built with Soviet help. After the withdrawal of the British troops from Iran, the Persian Cossack Brigade was to lead the fight against the Iranian Red Army.
General Sir Edmund Ironside was assigned to direct the withdrawal of British troops and to reorganize the Persian Cossack Brigade with the help of British officers so that they would be able to stop the advance of communist troops on Tehran. General Ironside had the first conversation on this matter with the commander of the Cossack Brigade Sardar Homayun in October 1920. Sardar Homayun had just been appointed by Ahmad Shah and did not refer to himself as a soldier. Homayun owed his appointment as commander-in-chief of the Cossack Brigade less to his military skills than to his personal closeness to Ahmad Shah. To date, Homayun had only had command of the units that accompanied Ahmad Shah in performing ceremonial functions. He had no combat experience and was completely overwhelmed with the position of commander-in-chief. The first inspection of the Persian Cossack Brigade by General Ironside in November 1920 revealed that the soldiers were not wearing winter clothing. Many soldiers didn't even have shoes. The brigade urgently needed to be upgraded before a military deployment. Above all, a commander had to be found who was able to take on the upcoming military tasks. Ironside instructed Col. Smyth to send the Cossack Brigade winter clothing and shoes first.
During his inspection tour, General Ironside noticed that the units from Tabriz "made a better impression". After a successful battle against communist fighters at the Manjl gate , the unit had marched to Qazvin to take care of their wounded and to equip themselves. When General Ironsides asked whether he could speak to the commanding officer, Reza Khan was introduced to him. Ironside, obviously impressed by Reza Khan, decided after the conversation that Reza Khan should take command of the Cossack Brigade for the time being. Reza Khan was hired by Ironside to reorganize the brigade and make it operational. Colonel Smyth was given full powers to provide the necessary financial and technical assistance to the Cossack Brigade.
At his first meeting with Ahmad Shah in December 1920, General Ironside failed to convince Ahmad Shah of the need to allocate funds from the Iranian budget to arm the Cossack brigade. Ahmad Shah had other problems. He asked Ironside if he could not organize a cash transport for him, which could transport the Persian and French silver coins in the palace, worth half a million pounds sterling, by truck from Tehran via Baghdad to the Gulf Coast and then on by ship to Bombay . Gene. Ironside suggested that Ahmad Shah sell the coins to the Imperial Bank of Persia , which Ahmad Shah refused. In early January 1921, General Ironside met Reza Khan a second time. The Cossack Brigade was now in better shape than he had seen it in November 1920. Col. Smyth told Ironside that the improved diet and military training under Reza Khan's leadership had greatly increased the brigade's clout and that the British senior officers could soon be withdrawn.
On February 15, 1921, General Ironside met Ahmad Shah for the last time. Ahmad Shah awarded General Ironside the Order of the Sun and Lion and complained that the British were withdrawing their troops from Iran, which could only be detrimental to the British Empire. Ironside recommended that Ahmad Shah Reza Khan be made the official commander of the Cossack Brigade, but received no response. General Ironside had previously informed British Ambassador Norman that the Persian Cossack Brigade would be released from British custody four weeks after British troops had withdrawn from Qazvin. The next day, General Ironside drove to Qazvin and left Iran forever on February 17, 1921 by plane to Baghdad.
There has been much speculation as to whether General Ironside helped prepare the coup, or whether the British embassy was privy to the coup plans. General Ironside writes in his diary:
“I think everyone thinks I organized this coup. I suppose, strictly speaking, I did that too. "
The British ambassador Norman has always denied any involvement in the coup.
The rise of Reza Khan
A few days before the coup, Ahmad Shah had told the British ambassador that
“That he had decided to leave the country as a private person. He spoke to his brother, Crown Prince Mohammad Hassan Mirza, and offered him the throne. He told him that he did not want to know anything about the throne and that he was not ready to take over his successor. If he, Ahmad Shah, went, Iran would become a republic and he could not see what was wrong with an Iranian republic. "
The historical processing of the events of February 21, 1921 was omitted for a long time. There were several reasons for this. The undisputed political leader of the putschists Seyyed Zia Tabatabai left Iran after his resignation and tried to start a new life abroad. The military leader of the putschists Reza Khan was busy building up the army and doing numerous military operations inside Iran against separatist and communist movements. Neither Seyyed Zia nor Reza Khan left any written evidence documenting the preparation and the course of the coup. On the first anniversary of the coup, Reza Khan issued a proclamation to counter speculation that the coup had been organized by the British:
“… I consider it an honor to refer to myself as the driving force behind the coup. It was I who went this way and I have no regrets. ... "
The name Seyyed Zia Tabatabai did not appear in this statement. The other supporters of the coup were not mentioned either.
For this reason, the events of February 21, 1921 gave rise to much speculation. After Reza Khan was crowned Shah Reza Pahlavi, the 3rd Esfand (February 22nd), the day on which Reza Khan received the title Sardar Sepah , was declared a public holiday. Reza Khan had subsequently assumed full responsibility for the coup. The coup was viewed by himself and his opponents as the first step in his accession to the throne.
As part of the historical analysis of the coup, the question was discussed how an officer of the Cossack brigade who had not appeared politically until then could rise to the rank of Shah. In particular, the role of General Sir Edmund Ironside, who commanded the British troops in Iran at this time, moved into the focus of the discussion. The influence of the British Ambassador Norman was also examined, who was dissatisfied with the existing government under Prime Minister Sephadar and was looking for a “strong man” who could take over the post of Prime Minister instead of Sepahdar.
Cyrus Ghani, who published a comprehensive analysis of the events, writes:
“After the coup of February 1921, the most astute observer could not have foreseen that Reza Khan was destined for the throne. One might have assumed that Reza Khan would have served as Minister of War for a number of years. That he retired as a highly decorated army officer on his newly acquired extensive land holdings after he had completed his main task, the establishment of an Iranian army and ensuring the exercise of power by the central government throughout Iran. Even if you took into account the energy, determination and intelligence of Reza Khan, it was considered completely unthinkable that a soldier of the Cossack Brigade would become prime minister, overthrow a dynasty and the Shah, who was seen as the "shadow of God" and "center of the universe" , could have displaced from his position. "
literature
- Cyrus Ghani: Iran and the rise of Reza Shah. From Qajar collapse to Pahlavi rule . Tauris, London a. a. 1998, ISBN 1-86064-258-6 .
Individual evidence
- ↑ Baqer Aqeli: Ruz Shomar Tarikh Iran . Vol. 1. P. 146. Quoted from: Cyrus Ghani: Iran and the rise of Reza Shah . IBTauris, 1998, p. 200.
- ^ Cyrus Ghani: Iran and the rise of Reza Shah . IBTauris, 2000. pp. 153f.
- ^ Cyrus Ghani: Iran and the rise of Reza Shah . IBTauris, 2000. pp. 169f.
- ^ Hassan Arfa: Under five Shahs . London, 1964, p. 108.
- ^ Cyrus Ghani: Iran and the rise of Reza Shah . IBTauris, 1998, p. 199.
- ^ Cyrus Ghani: Iran and the rise of Reza Shah . IBTauris, 1998, pp. 201f.
- ^ Cyrus Ghani: Iran and the rise of Reza Shah . IBTauris, 2000. p. 207.
- ^ Cyrus Ghani: Iran and the rise of Reza Shah . IBTauris, 1998, p. 177.
- ^ Cyrus Ghani: Iran and the rise of Reza Shah . IBTauris, 1998, p. 205.
- ^ Cyrus Ghani: Iran and the rise of Reza Shah . IBTauris, 2000. pp. 199ff.
- ^ Cyrus Ghani: Iran and the rise of Reza Shah . IBTauris, 2000, pp. 250-288.
- ^ Cyrus Ghani: Iran and the rise of Reza Shah . IBTauris, 1998, p. 190.
- ↑ Malcolm e. Yapp: 1900-1921: The last years of the Qajar Dynasty . In: Hossein Amirsadeghi, RW Ferrier (Ed.): Twentieth Century Iran , 1977, p. 1.
- ^ Charles Issawi: The Iranian Economy 1925-1975 . In: George Lenczowski: Iran Under the Pahlavis . 1978, p. 130.
- ^ Cyrus Ghani: Iran and the rise of Reza Shah . IBTauris, 1998, p. 146.
- ↑ a b Cyrus Ghani: Iran and the rise of Reza Shah . IBTauris, 1998, p. 147.
- ^ Cyrus Ghani: Iran and the rise of Reza Shah . IBTauris, 1998, p. 148.
- ↑ Richard Ulmlman: The Anglo-Soviet Accord. Vol. 3, 1972, p. 387.
- ^ Sir Edmund Ironside: High Road to Command . London 1972, p. 166.
- ^ Richard H. Ullmann: The Anglo-Soviet Accord . Princeton 1977, p. 388. Ullmann quotes from the then unpublished diaries of General Ironside. The diaries were only published in 1977 and in an expanded version in 1994. They do not contain any further information on General Ironside's involvement in the coup.
- ^ Cyrus Ghani: Iran and the rise of Reza Shah . IBTauris, 2000. p. 54, p. 130.
- ^ Donald N. Wilber: Reza Shah Pahlavi: The Resurrection and Reconstruction of Iran . New York, 1975, pp. 62-64.
- ^ Cyrus Ghani: Iran and the rise of Reza Shah . IBTauris, 1998, p. 395.