Rapacki plan

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Adam Rapacki, author of the Rapacki Plan named after him

The Rapacki Plan ( pronounced: Rapatz-ki ) is the name given to the plan for limited demilitarization in Central Europe presented to the UN General Assembly on October 2, 1957 by the Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki . The proposal envisaged the formation of a nuclear weapons-free zone , which should include the People's Republic of Poland , the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic . This area was later expanded to include Czechoslovakia .

While the plan was approved by the Warsaw Treaty Organization states, the NATO states rejected it for various reasons. The United States feared a loss of power balance in Europe if the Rapacki Plan were implemented, and the United Kingdom also saw a threat to security for NATO countries due to the predominance of Soviet armed forces in Eastern Europe. The Federal Republic also saw itself prevented from signing a treaty with the GDR due to the Hallstein Doctrine .

In the period that followed, Rapacki submitted several modified versions of the original plan, but ultimately failed, so that the project was not turned into reality.

content

The Rapacki Plan provided for the formation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone, which was to include Poland, the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic. Both the production and stationing of nuclear weapons in these countries and the use of these weapons against them should be prohibited . To monitor compliance with these provisions, a system of ground and airspace controls should be developed, an integral part of which should be a central commission consisting of members from NATO states and states of the Warsaw Treaty, as well as from non-aligned states. In addition, France, Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union should undertake not to place any nuclear weapons or material that could be converted into nuclear weapons in the nuclear-weapon-free zone, not to supply nuclear weapons to the governments within the zone, and not to deliver nuclear weapons against them To deploy states in the zone.

history

Soviet initiatives in the run-up to the Rapacki plan

In the run-up to the Polish nuclear disarmament initiative, there had already been several unsuccessful Soviet demilitarization initiatives. In November 1956, the Soviet Union submitted a disarmament plan to the 11th UN General Assembly, which included a general reduction in the actual strengths of the armies of the great powers, an outlawing of nuclear weapons within two years and a reduction in armaments spending. The West rejected the plan, but with the suggestion that a more limited plan might be viable.

In the spring and summer of 1957, the Soviet Union presented another plan to the United Nations Disarmament Commission , which envisaged a reduction in troop strength to 2,500,000 units for the Soviet Union, China and the United States and to 750,000 for the United Kingdom and France, with others in the future Cuts. In addition, the states involved should refrain from using nuclear weapons and not place other weapons outside their borders. In the future, the production of nuclear weapons should be completely stopped. The monitoring of compliance with these requirements should be made possible by aerial photography in the areas of Europe where NATO forces or those of the Warsaw Pact were stationed. However, this plan could not prevail in the western states either.

Creation of the Rapacki Plan

In this context, the Rapacki Plan was developed in Poland as a regional disarmament project limited to three countries.

There were a number of reasons for this on the Polish side. On the one hand, since the debate that had arisen in 1956 about the nuclear armament of the German Armed Forces in Poland, there had been fears that the Federal Republic might endeavor to regain the areas east of the Oder-Neisse line . While there was a treaty with the GDR in which these areas were assigned to Poland, there was no comparable agreement with West Germany . VR Poland had tried to establish diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic, which however, in accordance with the Hallstein Doctrine, refused. In Warsaw there was therefore a great deal of interest in preventing the Federal Republic from being armed with nuclear weapons, and further disarmament proposals in the Western states were expected to be more successful if they no longer came from the Soviet Union but from Poland. In this way, Poland also aimed to reactivate its traditionally good relationship with the West without breaking away from the Soviet Union and assuming an intermediary position between East and West. In addition, the new freedom of action gained in Polish October was to be demonstrated and more freedom to be gained from Soviet control.

The Rapacki plan was first published in the spring of 1957 in the Polish periodical Świat i Polska . In Moscow and Prague , the project initially met with little goodwill, especially since it had not been coordinated with the Soviet Union. In June 1957 Rapacki and Władysław Gomułka traveled to East Berlin, where they received Walter Ulbricht's approval . Over the summer Rapacki tried to get the agreement of the Soviet Union, which he finally succeeded. Rapacki then presented the plan to the UN General Assembly on October 2, 1957, with the words:

“In the interest of Poland's security and detente in Europe, having agreed the initiative with other members of the Warsaw Pact, the Government of the Polish People's Republic declares that if both German states agree to the introduction of a ban on a production and storage of nuclear weapons on their territory, the Polish People's Republic is prepared to introduce on its territory the same ban. "

“The government of the People's Republic of Poland declares, in the interests of the security of Poland and the détente in Europe, in coordination with other members of the Warsaw Pact that if both German states agree to the introduction of a ban on the production and storage of nuclear weapons on their national territory, the People's Republic of Poland is ready to introduce the same ban on its territory. "

- Adam Rapacki, XII. United Nations General Assembly, October 2, 1957

Reactions to the Rapacki Plan

In early 1958, the Polish government sent more detailed drafts of the plan to the governments of the Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Belgium , Denmark , France, Canada and the Federal Republic. The reactions to Rapacki's plans were positive on the part of the Warsaw Pact states and mostly negative on the part of the western states.

Richard Nixon , then US Vice President, and Nikita Khrushchev (right), 1959

Czechoslovakia had already declared its support for the Polish project in October 1957, immediately in connection with the presentation of the plan to the United Nations. Foreign Minister Václav David praised the plan as a constructive step towards future disarmament and added Czechoslovakia to the list of countries participating in the nuclear-weapon-free zone. The GDR also declared its readiness to sign an agreement based on the Polish proposal.

The Soviet Union also supported Rapacki's plan. For them, the project included both the possibility of regaining prestige after the suppression of the Hungarian people's uprising and the possibility of preventing the Federal Republic from being armed with nuclear weapons. The fact that, in return, it lost the possibility of stationing nuclear weapons on the soil of the GDR, Poland or Czechoslovakia had become irrelevant with the successful tests of the ICBM in August 1957. On December 21, 1957, the Supreme Soviet passed a 17-point peace plan, which included the Rapacki plan and a non-aggression pact between NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. In February 1958, the Warsaw Pact states published a declaration in favor of the Rapacki Plan, and after Rapacki visited Moscow for talks with Andrei Andreevich Gromyko , they published a joint communiqué in favor of a nuclear-weapon-free zone. When Nikita Sergejewitsch Khrushchev was interviewed by the Polish newspaper Trybuna Ludu in March 1958 , he emphasized the closer cooperation between the Polish and Soviet governments since 1956 and cited the Rapacki Plan as the best example of this.

In the western states, on the other hand, the Polish project was largely rejected. Only Canada and Belgium saw the plan as a good starting point for further dialogue, while the United States, Great Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany opposed the plan.

John Foster Dulles

The US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had already stated in an article in the magazine Foreign Affairs in 1957 that it was impossible to set military limits because they were impossible to adhere to. In a press conference on January 10, 1958, Dulles spoke out against the nuclear-weapon-free zone. He saw a disadvantage for NATO in neutralizing Germany. If the Rapacki Plan had been passed, the Americans would have lost their ability to position nuclear short-range missiles in West Germany in order to be able to counterbalance the Soviet superiority in terms of long-range missiles and conventional weapons. President Dwight D. Eisenhower also spoke out against the Rapacki plan because it contained nothing on German reunification.

On May 3, 1958, the American ambassador in Warsaw sent the Polish government the official rejection of the United States. The plan was too limited to prevent a nuclear war because although nuclear weapons were to be removed from the zone, other limitations on conventional weapons were necessary to protect Western Europe from the Soviet Union. The adoption of the Rapacki Plan threatens to lose the balance of power in Europe.

On May 19, 1958, the United Kingdom announced its rejection of the Rapacki Plan. The British government saw a threat to security for NATO countries due to the predominance of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe. The French statement was similar.

The Federal Republic of Germany also spoke out against the Rapacki plan. On the one hand, the Adenauer government advocated nuclear armament as a defense against the East, which was also supported by the majority of German citizens. On the other hand, the signing of an agreement with the GDR would have meant its recognition. Although Rapacki was aware of the German position in this regard, he had received approval in Moscow to have West Germany sign a different contract than the GDR, so that a somewhat unilateral declaration of consent from the Federal Republic would have sufficed. However, Federal Chancellor Konrad Adenauer refused and stressed the unchangeable character of "atheistic communism" in which he had no confidence. No regulation on disarmament and detente could be made as long as the division of Germany was not affected. Gomułka, on the other hand, argued that the question of the reunification of Germany was not topical, but rather that of protecting Europe from a nuclear holocaust. Rapacki warned that nuclear weapons would also be stationed in the GDR and Poland if West Germany opted for nuclear weapons. Propaganda in the direction of the Federal Republic was increasingly used to stir up fear of a nuclear war.

Failure of the Rapacki plan

The Norwegian government invited Rapacki to Oslo for talks on October 31, 1958 , which was seen as tacit recognition of the plan. There Rapacki emphasized in a speech that the reunification of Germany was one of the conditions for a complete normalization of the situation in Europe. In the Federal Republic of Germany this was used on November 8, 1958, after the publication of a modified version of the Rapacki plan on November 4, to appreciate Rapacki's perseverance and flexibility and to declare that the modified plan would be carefully examined.

The Berlin ultimatum , which Khrushchev addressed to the Western powers on November 27, 1958, then took away any further prospect of success from the Rapacki plan. The Federal Republic rejected the plan as a "communist deception".

Rapacki subsequently modified the plan several times, including adding additional provisions regarding the dismantling of conventional weapons after the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone. In the west, he met with little hearing. Sweden made a proposal in 1961 to expand the Rapacki plan, after which Gomułka published a new version of the Rapacki plan with some changes. In 1964 Poland published a final version of the Rapacki Plan, but this too was unsuccessful.

meaning

The Rapacki Plan is considered to be the first détente plan by a politician from a Warsaw Pact state, which was discussed in detail in the West and in some cases also recognized. It was a basis for discussion and not an agreement ready to be signed. Poland, as the initiator of the plan, was seen predominantly as a second-class state power that could be neglected. Despite its flaws, the plan is now viewed in part as a "remarkable company that simply wasn't ripe for its time."

literature

  • Ulrich Albrecht: The Political Background of the Rapacki Plan of 1957 and its Current Significance . In: Rudolf Steinke (Ed.): Germany debates defense - the NATO alliance at the crossroads . Sharpe, Armonk NY 1983, ISBN 0-87332-243-6 , pp. 117-133.
  • Michael Gehler: Neutrality and Neutralization Plans for Central Europe? Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland . In: Dominik Geppert / Udo Wengst (eds.): Neutrality - Chance or Chimera? Third Way Concepts for Germany and the World 1945–1990 . Oldenbourg, Munich 2005, ISBN 3-486-57702-6 , pp. 105-131.
  • Zoltán Maruzsa: Denuclearization in Central Europe? The Rapacki Plan during the Cold War . In: Öt Continens . 2008, pp. 225-264, ISSN  1589-3839 ( PDF ).
  • David Stefancic: The Rapacki Plan: A Case Study of European Diplomacy . In: East European Quarterly . Vol. 21, No. 4, 1987, pp. 401-412, ISSN  0012-8449 .

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ a b Gehler: Neutrality and neutralization plans for Central Europe? Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland . In: Geppert / Wengst (Ed.): Neutrality - Chance or Chimera? Third Way Concepts for Germany and the World 1945–1990 , p. 105, here p. 125; Stefancic: The Rapacki Plan: A Case Study of European Diplomacy . East European Quarterly, 1987, p. 401, here p. 402.
  2. ↑ Gehler: Neutrality and neutralization plans for Central Europe? Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland . In: Geppert / Wengst (Ed.): Neutrality - Chance or Chimera? Third Way Concepts for Germany and the World 1945–1990 , p. 105, here p. 125; Maruzsa: Denuclearization in Central Europe? The Rapacki Plan during the Cold War . Öt Kontinens, 2008, p. 225, here p. 235 f .; Stefancic: The Rapacki Plan: A Case Study of European Diplomacy . East European Quarterly, 1987, p. 401, here p. 402 f.
  3. ↑ a b Gehler: Neutrality and neutralization plans for Central Europe? Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland . In: Geppert / Wengst (Ed.): Neutrality - Chance or Chimera? Concepts of the Third Way for Germany and the World 1945–1990 , p. 105, here p. 126; Stefancic: The Rapacki Plan: A Case Study of European Diplomacy . East European Quarterly, 1987, p. 401, here p. 403.
  4. ↑ Richard Hiscocks: Poland: Bridge for the Abyss? - An Interpretation of Developments in Post-War Poland . Oxford University Press, London 1963, p. 261.
  5. ^ Albrecht: The Political Background of the Rapacki Plan of 1957 and its Current Significance . In: Steinke (Ed.): Germany debates defense - the NATO alliance at the crossroads , p. 117, here p. 125; Gehler: Neutrality and neutralization plans for Central Europe? Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland . In: Geppert / Wengst (Ed.): Neutrality - Chance or Chimera? Concepts of the Third Way for Germany and the World 1945–1990 , p. 105, here p. 126 f.
  6. ↑ Gehler: Neutrality and neutralization plans for Central Europe? Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland . In: Geppert / Wengst (Ed.): Neutrality - Chance or Chimera? Concepts of the Third Way for Germany and the World 1945–1990 , p. 105, here p. 126, 131; Stefancic: The Rapacki Plan: A Case Study of European Diplomacy . East European Quarterly, 1987, p. 401, here p. 404.
  7. ^ Reproduction of the quotation in Maruzsa: Denuclearization in Central Europe? The Rapacki Plan during the Cold War . Öt Kontinens, 2008, p. 225, here p. 255.
  8. ↑ Richard Hiscocks: Poland: Bridge for the Abyss? - An Interpretation of Developments in Post-War Poland . Oxford University Press, London 1963, p. 261; Maruzsa: Denuclearization in Central Europe? The Rapacki Plan during the Cold War . Öt Kontinens, 2008, p. 225, here p. 231; Stefancic: The Rapacki Plan: A Case Study of European Diplomacy . East European Quarterly, 1987, p. 401, here p. 405.
  9. ↑ Maruzsa: Denuclearization in Central Europe? The Rapacki Plan during the Cold War . Öt Kontinens, 2008, p. 225, here p. 231 f.
  10. ↑ Gehler: Neutrality and neutralization plans for Central Europe? Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland . In: Geppert / Wengst (Ed.): Neutrality - Chance or Chimera? Concepts of the Third Way for Germany and the World 1945–1990 , p. 105, here p. 127; Stefancic: The Rapacki Plan: A Case Study of European Diplomacy . East European Quarterly, 1987, p. 401, here p. 405 f.
  11. ↑ a b Stefancic: The Rapacki Plan: A Case Study of European Diplomacy . East European Quarterly, 1987, p. 401, here p. 407.
  12. ↑ Gehler: Neutrality and neutralization plans for Central Europe? Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland . In: Geppert / Wengst (Ed.): Neutrality - Chance or Chimera? Concepts of the Third Way for Germany and the World 1945–1990 , p. 105, here p. 127; Stefancic: The Rapacki Plan: A Case Study of European Diplomacy . East European Quarterly, 1987, p. 401, here p. 407.
  13. ↑ Gehler: Neutrality and neutralization plans for Central Europe? Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland . In: Geppert / Wengst (Ed.): Neutrality - Chance or Chimera? Concepts of the Third Way for Germany and the World 1945–1990 , p. 105, here p. 127 f .; Stefancic: The Rapacki Plan: A Case Study of European Diplomacy . East European Quarterly, 1987, p. 401, here p. 407.
  14. ↑ Gehler: Neutrality and neutralization plans for Central Europe? Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland . In: Geppert / Wengst (Ed.): Neutrality - Chance or Chimera? Concepts of the Third Way for Germany and the World 1945–1990 , p. 105, here p. 128; Stefancic: The Rapacki Plan: A Case Study of European Diplomacy . East European Quarterly, 1987, p. 401, here p. 407 f.
  15. ↑ Gehler: Neutrality and neutralization plans for Central Europe? Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland . In: Geppert / Wengst (Ed.): Neutrality - Chance or Chimera? Concepts of the Third Way for Germany and the World 1945–1990 , p. 105, here p. 128; Stefancic: The Rapacki Plan: A Case Study of European Diplomacy . East European Quarterly, 1987, p. 401, here p. 408.
  16. ^ Albrecht: The Political Background of the Rapacki Plan of 1957 and its Current Significance . In: Steinke (Ed.): Germany debates defense - the NATO alliance at the crossroads , p. 117, here p. 125; Stefancic: The Rapacki Plan: A Case Study of European Diplomacy . East European Quarterly, 1987, p. 401, here p. 408.
  17. ^ Albrecht: The Political Background of the Rapacki Plan of 1957 and its Current Significance . In: Steinke (Ed.): Germany debates defense - the NATO alliance at the crossroads , p. 117, here p. 125.
  18. ↑ Stefancic: The Rapacki Plan: A Case Study of European Diplomacy . East European Quarterly, 1987, p. 401, here p. 408.
  19. ↑ Gehler: Neutrality and neutralization plans for Central Europe? Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland . In: Geppert / Wengst (Ed.): Neutrality - Chance or Chimera? Concepts of the Third Way for Germany and the World 1945–1990 , p. 105, here p. 129; Stefancic: The Rapacki Plan: A Case Study of European Diplomacy . East European Quarterly, 1987, p. 401, here p. 408.
  20. ↑ Gehler: Neutrality and neutralization plans for Central Europe? Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland . In: Geppert / Wengst (Ed.): Neutrality - Chance or Chimera? Concepts of the Third Way for Germany and the World 1945–1990 , p. 105, here p. 130; Stefancic: The Rapacki Plan: A Case Study of European Diplomacy . East European Quarterly, 1987, p. 401, here p. 408.
  21. ↑ Gehler: Neutrality and neutralization plans for Central Europe? Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland . In: Geppert / Wengst (Ed.): Neutrality - Chance or Chimera? Concepts of the Third Way for Germany and the World 1945–1990 , p. 105, here p. 130; tefancic: The Rapacki Plan: A Case Study of European Diplomacy . East European Quarterly, 1987, p. 401, here p. 408 f.
  22. ↑ a b c d e Gehler: Neutrality and neutralization plans for Central Europe? Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland . In: Geppert / Wengst (Ed.): Neutrality - Chance or Chimera? Concepts of the Third Way for Germany and the World 1945–1990 , p. 105, here p. 130; Stefancic: The Rapacki Plan: A Case Study of European Diplomacy . East European Quarterly, 1987, p. 401, here p. 409.
  23. ↑ Gehler: Neutrality and neutralization plans for Central Europe? Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland . In: Geppert / Wengst (Ed.): Neutrality - Chance or Chimera? Concepts of the Third Way for Germany and the World 1945–1990 , p. 105, here p. 130 f .; Stefancic: The Rapacki Plan: A Case Study of European Diplomacy . East European Quarterly, 1987, p. 401, here p. 409.
  24. ↑ Maruzsa: Denuclearization in Central Europe? The Rapacki Plan during the Cold War . Öt Kontinens, 2008, p. 225, here p. 231; Gehler: Neutrality and neutralization plans for Central Europe? Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland . In: Geppert / Wengst (Ed.): Neutrality - Chance or Chimera? Third Way Concepts for Germany and the World 1945–1990 , p. 105, here p. 131.
  25. ↑ Stefancic: The Rapacki Plan: A Case Study of European Diplomacy . East European Quarterly, 1987, p. 401, here p. 410.
  26. ^ "Second Class Power", see Stefancic: The Rapacki Plan: A Case Study of European Diplomacy . East European Quarterly, 1987, p. 401, here p. 410.
  27. ↑ Gehler: Neutrality and neutralization plans for Central Europe? Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland . In: Geppert / Wengst (Ed.): Neutrality - Chance or Chimera? Third Way Concepts for Germany and the World 1945–1990 , p. 105, here p. 131; also Edward McWhinney : Judge Manfred Lachs and Judicial Law-Making . Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague 1995, ISBN 90-411-0125-X , p. 6.