Battle of the Casilinus

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Battle of the Casilinus
Part of: Gotenkrieg
First and Second Gotenkrieg.png
date March / April 554
place Volturno River , Italy
output Eastern Roman victory
Parties to the conflict

Eastern Roman Empire ,
Heruler ( Federation )

Franks ,
Alemanni

Commander

Narses

Butilinus

Troop strength
18,000 20,000
losses

low

heavy

Wars of Justinian I.

The Battle of Casilinus (also Battle of Volturnus or Battle of Capua ) was a military conflict during the Gothic Wars . In the spring of 554 armies of the Eastern Roman Empire and the Franks clashed in it . The latter suffered a crushing defeat.

prehistory

By 493 the Ostrogoths had conquered the entire Apennine peninsula , after the Western Roman Empire had collapsed there in 476 . However, under the emperor Justinian (around 482-565), Eastern Roman troops began to systematically recapture these areas (→ Restauratio imperii ). From 535 there was a war against the Ostrogoths with the aim of reconquering the Apennines. As early as 539, an army of the Franconian Merovingians intervened in the fighting and plundered northern Italy, but without aiming for permanent conquests. After the victory of the Eastern Roman troops under the general Narses (around 490-574) in the battle of Mons Lactarius in 552 (or early 553), the fight against the Ostrogoths was de facto decided in favor of the Romans.

In the spring of 553, however, a Frankish - Alemannic army invaded from the north in order to take advantage of the unclear circumstances for their own conquests. This was under the command of the brothers and dukes Butilin and Leuthari I (both † 554) and is said to have counted 75,000 warriors , according to the late antique historian Agathias , who was not an eyewitness - a number that is certainly far too high because one Such a large army would not have been logistically feasible under the conditions of late antiquity . Narses was still busy with the siege of the remaining Ostrogothic fortresses and initially only sent part of his troops under Fulcaris to meet the new enemy . However, this contingent suffered a defeat in the fall of 553. Narses then decided to let his troops overwinter in fixed cities for the time being. This gave the Franks the opportunity to roam and plunder the entire peninsula. They even divided their armed forces in two. In the spring of 554 part of the army returned from the south of the peninsula. Opposite this, Narses gathered his troops and blocked their way on the Casilinus River near Capua . It is said that Narses and the Herulian foederati in his army had a conflict over disciplinary measures . As a result, the Heruli appeared late for the battle.

Course of the battle

Traditional history

The basis of the tradition is the report of Agathias in the second book of his histories (Agath. Hist. 2,4-9). He drew the following picture of the battle around 580, presumably on the basis of older reports:

Accordingly, Narses took up a position between two forests and arranged his infantry in a phalanx . On the flanks, hidden by the woods, he positioned the cavalry under the generals Valerianus and Artabanes . Behind the phalanx, in which a gap had been left for the Heruli who had not yet arrived, were the lightly armed slingers and archers. The total strength of the army was about 18,000 men.

According to Agathias, the Franks advanced with a strength of about 30,000 men and immediately attacked. They formed the outlines of a pointed triangle that was hollow. Allegedly with this formation they broke into the battle line of the Romans and finally even broke it. The Roman cavalry then attacked the Franks in the flank and back by shooting projectiles and arrows at the inside of the opposite legs of the triangle. Finally the Heruli arrived and threw back the enemy who had broken through. Now, in addition to the cavalry, the entire Roman infantry went over to the attack and destroyed the entire Frankish army with the exception of five refugees.

Source criticism

The important military historian Hans Delbrück (1848–1929), who, however, generally tended to interpret the sources very critically, rejected the traditional account. "I cannot suppress the suspicion that this whole story is a free fantasy ..." He was of the opinion that the army of Narses must have been numerically superior to that of the Franks, especially in cavalry, otherwise his battle line-up must have been that of the Franken would not have towered over both sides. Delbrück thought it was quite possible that the weaker Franconian troops would have tried to overrun the opposing center with a quick, concentrated attack and thus win the battle. According to Delbrück, however, this would not have been possible in the specified formation of a hollow triangle. If the attack column had been pointed, it would have been immediately surrounded. If it had been hollow, the front lines would have lacked the pressure from behind to break through. Delbrück also rejected the statement that the Roman cavalry had fired at the other across one leg of the triangle as unrealistic.

The objection to Delbrück's criticism was that he assumed too much that armies of late antiquity behaved rationally and in line with modern military tactics. However, even in today's research, there is hardly any doubt that Agathias puts the number of Franks involved in the fight far too high. While the number of 18,000 men for the imperial army fits well with the information available about such mobile elite units and therefore appears realistic, the Frankish army should have been at most equally strong. However, it probably comprised only 10,000 to 15,000 men, like most of the armies that the early Merovingians could field.

consequences

After the threat from the Franks had been eliminated, the Italian provinces were administratively annexed to the Eastern Roman Empire by Justinian in the same year. However, it was not until 562 that the last Ostrogothic bases could be taken. And already in the year 568 the Lombards invaded , who snatched the greater part of Italy from the Eastern Romans by 572.

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Hans Delbrück: History of the Art of War , Vol. 2, Berlin 2000, p. 440
  2. ↑ Hans Delbrück: History of War Art , Vol. 2, Berlin 2000, pp. 440f

literature

swell
Secondary literature