Battle of Chancellorsville
Battle of Chancellorsville
| date | 1st - 4th May 1863 |
|---|---|
| place | Spotsylvania County and Fredericksburg, Virginia, USA |
| output | Confederation victory |
| Parties to the conflict | |
|---|---|
| Commander | |
| Troop strength | |
|
133,868
|
61,500
|
| losses | |
|
17,287 killed
: 1,606 wounded: 9,762 missing / captured: 5,919 |
12,764 killed
: 1,665 wounded: 9,081 missing / captured: 2,018 |
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The Battle of Chancellorsville took place from May 1 to 4, 1863 in the area between the Chancellorsville homestead about 10 miles west and in the small town of Fredericksburg , Virginia during the American Civil War . It was also called Lee's Perfect Battle because of the risky but successful division of the Northern Virginia Army under the eyes of the more than twice as strong Potomac Army under Major General "Fighting Joe" Hooker . The battle was marked by Lee's audacity and Hooker's timidity. The two combined resulted in an overwhelming Confederate victory . The victory was marred only by the mortal wounding of Lieutenant General Jackson , whose circumvention maneuvers had previously contributed significantly to the success of the Confederate.
prehistory
On January 25, 1863, Hooker took command of the Potomac Army from his hapless predecessor, Ambrose Burnside . He immediately began with organizational changes that affected the soldiers on the one hand - there was enough food again and the wages were paid again - and on the other hand reversed the structure introduced by Burnside - the Grand Divisions were dissolved. He formed a cavalry corps from their cavalry units. In addition, he replaced unpopular commanding generals and replaced them with more compliant ones. Major General Daniel Edward Sickles was given command of the III. Corps ; the commander of one of the Grand Divisions , Major General Franz Sigel of German descent , resigned and Major General Oliver Otis Howard was given command of his former XI. Corps. Commanding General of the VI. Corps became Major General John Sedgwick .
General Lee's Northern Virginia Army was far inferior to the Union troops, but had better morale after the Battle of Fredericksburg ; however, their supply situation was tight because they only had the single-track Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac railway line , on which only two trains a day could carry supplies to the army. This applied particularly to the food supply - the surrounding land was exhausted, the horses not needed for the artillery and cavalry had been eaten, and many other horses were starving. The mobility of the Northern Virginia Army was thus considerably restricted. To remedy these problems, Lee sent his cavalry up to 100 miles into the country and his artillery to places where fodder could still be found for the horses. He sent Lieutenant General James Longstreet south with two divisions to protect the capital .
In the north, the standstill on all fronts created considerable pressure to succeed. Lincoln urged Hooker to take the offensive as soon as possible, this time not the capture of the Confederate capital Richmond, but the destruction of the Northern Virginia Army was the goal of the campaign.
Lee had had field fortifications dug 25 miles south of the Rappahannock . Should the Potomac army move, he simply wanted to move troops to where he expected the opposing army. Hooker, for his part, was informed of the supply difficulties of his opponent and in him the plan matured to bypass the enemy and cut him off from his supply lines.
On April 13, Hooker instructed his cavalry corps under Major General George Stoneman to cross the Rappahannock about 30 miles west of Fredericksburg and to interrupt Lee's supply line at Hanover Junction. Then he wanted to attack and destroy the Northern Virginia Army head-on. This plan failed because the cavalry could not cross both the swollen Rappahannock and the Rapidan due to a week's rain.
Course of the battle
preparation
After the weather-related failure of his plan, Hooker intended to tie Lee at Fredericksburg with strong forces, to attack with the bulk of the Potomac Army on Lee's left flank and in the rear, thereby forcing him to evade south. On April 27, three corps and the cavalry marched northwest along the Rappahannock. On April 29, they reached Kelly's ford and crossed the river, turned southeast and crossed the Rapidan at two crossings. The Cavalry Corps began a raid against the Northern Virginia Army supply lines. Two other corps crossed the Rappahannock on April 29 at the United States ford. On April 30, the corps with a total of more than 80,000 men united in the area around Chancellorsville. The two corps, led by Sedgwick, crossed the Rappahannock near Fredericksburg to tie up Lee with around 40,000 men.
Lee was initially in the dark about the opponent's plan. On April 29, he ordered Major General Richard Anderson with his division to watch over the enemy approach routes. Since Anderson judged the area west of Chancellorsville - The Wilderness - to be unsuitable, he dodged into the open area east of Chancellorsville and set up for defense. On April 30, Lt. General Jackson proposed an attack on Sedgwick, which Lee prohibited because of the artillery superiority of the Potomac Army. It was only when Sedgwick did not attack that Lee ordered Jackson and his entire corps to assemble in the Chancellorsville area. Only Major General Early's division, with 12,000 men, remained in positions opposite Sedgwick's units. The Northern Virginia Army had already fought at the Battle of Fredericksburg from these positions.
Hooker had ordered his commanding generals to stay in the Chancellorsville area until all five corps were assembled and then jointly attack the defeated Confederates, or better yet, repel an attack from favorable positions. The bandages at Chancellorsville dug in. The XI. Corps on the far right of the Potomac Army did not expect an attack by the Confederates, but was convinced that they would be allowed to attack the next morning. Therefore, it did not force itself to defend itself.
1st of May
The Potomac Army's movements were successful. However, Lee made no sign of moving south. Rather, he marched against Hooker with 28,000 men.
After his five corps were assembled at Chancellorsville, Hooker attacked with three corps to the east, the V Corps under Meade on the left, the II Corps under Couch in the middle and the XII. Corps under Slocum on the right. Soon the II Corps had enemy contact with Lafayette McLaws ' division; Meade had no contact with the enemy. When the divisions of the XII. Corps got into enemy contact with Anderson's division, Hooker ordered his corps to break off all attacks and to set up defense around the Chancellorsville homestead. Although the commanding generals only bowed to this decision with a grumble, it was based on a good strategic consideration: The wilderness was covered with dense, almost impenetrable thickets, in which smaller clearings repeatedly offered a field of fire for the defender and thus better repelled Lee's attack could be. Hooker expected that after Sedgwick's corps had rallied, Lee's forces between the two branches of the Potomac army would be wiped out.
The foremost units of Jackson's reached Anderson's burrowing division at around 8 o'clock. Jackson ordered Anderson to prepare for an attack because Hooker's eastward moving divisions were worthwhile targets. Hooker's defensive behavior suited Lee's intention to defeat the two branches of the Potomac Army in turn. But it also became clear to him during the day through constant reconnaissance that the Wilderness was not suitable for an attack and that the center of the Potomac Army was too strong for a frontal attack .
In Lee's assessment of the situation, only a flank attack from the west offered any chance of success. To do this, it was necessary to split the Northern Virginia Army, conduct a 12-mile march, as unnoticed as possible, around the positions of the Union forces, and hope that Sedgwick would not go offensive. While studying maps, Lee Jackson asked:
- "General Jackson, what do you propose to do?" - "Go around here." - "What do you propose to make this movement with?" - "With my whole corps." - "Well, go on." ("General Jackson, what do you propose?" - "Go around here." - "And with which units do you want to carry out this movement?" - "With my entire corps." - "All right, start." )
This decision meant that the 70,000 men in the Potomac Army would only face 14,000 Confederates once the one-day march with the remaining 26,000 men from Jackson's corps began.
2.May
Lee wanted that morning to draw the Potomac Army's attention to the Anderson and McLaw divisions, which he personally led. The strength of the opponent's left wing and center was well known, but Lee had little knowledge of the right wing. He therefore sent his nephew, Brigadier General Fitzhugh Lee , with his cavalry to investigate the XI. Corps. Meanwhile, with soldiers well rested and well taken care of, Jackson set off on the route set the day before.
Even if Lee's plan was very risky, it was based on three realizations.
- Lee knew which corps he faced, and that if Early was attacked, he could, if not repel, delay the attack at least considerably. The 1st US Corps could no longer reach the Chancellorsville area on May 2nd. And although Lee did not know where the II. And III. Corps found, these would not be able to decisively strengthen the Union troops opposing him.
- The attack, which was reluctantly presented the day before, confirmed Lee that he had correctly assessed Hooker. Like those of his predecessors, he had never had a high opinion of its abilities.
- The Potomac Army had dug in around Chancellorsville. An army that had just dug in would not attack again the next day. And by the time they found out about the Northern Virginia Army's weakness, Jackson's flank attack would have been a success.
The foremost units of Jackson's troops reached Catherine Furnace around 6:00 a.m. The Union's enlightenment had recognized Jackson's departure, but the goal of the movement was not clear. A reconnaissance to the east showed that the Confederates were in positions there. Since this movement could also prepare an attack on the right flank, Hooker warned the commanding general of the XI. Corps, Major General Howard, faced the danger and ordered him to prepare measures for this case. The other interpretation was that the Confederates were moving south. This view prevailed at the headquarters of the Potomac Army.
The commanding general of III. Corps, Major General Sickles, enforced around 1 p.m. that he was allowed to pursue the supposedly evasive southerners. At Catherine Furnace he attacked Jackson's rearguard with two divisions. This dodged south before the attack. Hooker was more convinced than ever that the Northern Virginia Army was on the move. Accordingly, at around 11:15 a.m., he ordered Sedgwick to attack Early at Marye's Height and pinch Lee. This order did not reach Sedgwick until about 4:30 p.m. It was too late to attack that same day.
At around 2:30 p.m. Hooker ordered his commanding generals to prepare for the following day in pursuit of the evasive Northern Virginia Army.
Jackson reached the far right flank of the Potomac Army around 3 p.m. He found the following situation: The Northerners secured to the south, but he was to the west of their positions. Jackson began setting up his divisions on either side of the Orange Turnpike for the attack to the east.
The whole day there had been reports from the Union reconnaissance that large units of the Confederate troops with infantry and artillery were moving along the front of the XI. Corps moved west. Colonel Leopold von Gilsa , commander of a brigade of the XI. Corps, was ridiculed as a coward when he wanted to report the facts to Major General Howard: The Wilderness was so impenetrable that no enemy could get through it. Therefore only two regiments of the 1st Division and two guns north of Plank Road secured westward. Most of the soldiers of the XI. Corps spent the day lounging. They believed they were far from the battlefield.
Jackson's attack began around 5:30 p.m. The weapons of many Union soldiers were assembled into rifle pyramids as the units were preparing evening meals. By 7 p.m. Jackson had already advanced two miles east and had largely wiped out the Schurz 'and Devens' divisions. However, the ranks of the attackers were as confused as those attacked. Jackson ordered a halt at around 7:15 p.m. to order his two forward divisions and ordered Major General Hills Division to attack overhead. It was dark now. The confusion on both sides was great - friend and foe could hardly be distinguished. After an attack by a regiment of the Union cavalry, all of Jackson's units were warned of the danger of a cavalry attack.
Jackson was impatient with these delays. He ordered Hill to accelerate his attack:
- “Press them! Cut them off from the US Ford, Hill. Press them ” (“ Forward! Cut them off the US ford, Hill. Forward ”).
Knowing that his own troops were right behind him, he himself explored the area in front of his own troops on the clear evening in order to be able to give orders for immediate further action. The soldiers who followed did not know that Jackson was in front of them with his staff, but had been warned of cavalry attacks. When they heard the approaching horses of Jackson and his company, they opened fire. Jackson was hit three times and immediately taken to safety. From these shots a gun battle developed, in which the next in the order of command, Hill, was injured.
After these two failures, it was now a matter of maintaining the Confederate forces' confidence in the leadership. Because Brigadier General Rodes was little known, Hill proposed the popular Major General JEB Stuart as the commanding general. However, since Stuart had no knowledge of the current situation, the attack was canceled and should be continued the next day. Jackson's left arm was amputated that night. Lee sent a brief message to regret the injury and congratulate Jackson on his grand victory, not knowing that his best general would die within eight days.
In the meantime, the III. Corps broke off the fighting at Catherine Furnace and took positions at Hazel Grove. From here Sickles attacked the Confederates unsuccessfully that evening; this attack remained the only offensive action by the Potomac Army that evening. The two armies faced each other to continue the battle the next day.
Sedgwick had not attacked Fredericksburg during the entire day. Lee's plan worked.
May 3rd
That night the I. Corps also arrived and took up positions on the right wing of the Potomac Army, based on the Rapidan. The left neighbor was the V Corps Meades. This was followed by the III. Corps under Sickles. All three corps secured to the west. Slocums XII followed. and Couch 'II Corps, defending south and east from their old positions. The remains of the XI. Corps held positions up to Rappahannock with the United States Ford, the Potomac Army's only supply line. In total, Hooker now had 76,000 men available. A front projection of the III. Corps at Hazel Grove, a grove on a bump from which artillery could fight Confederate infantry attacking west as well as working east to Chancellorsville. In addition, the connection between Stuart's corps and the rest of Lee's divisions was interrupted by this front projection.
Jackson's attack the day before had hit the Potomac army badly, but not destroyed it. Still superior in number, largely complete with equipment, and high morale except for those directly affected by yesterday's attack, an attack on the separate parts of the Northern Virginia Army could have been successful one after the other. But the decisive man's morale, Major General Hookers, was broken - he was defeated. During the night, Sickles asked for reinforcements. Hooker refused and ordered the III. Corps back to the height of Chancellorsville. That night he had ordered Sedgwick again to attack and come to his aid.
With Sickles dodging, the Northern Virginia Army was reunited. Lee decided to attack the Potomac Army along Orange Plank Road. Here only the III. and parts of the XII. Corps opposite. Anderson's and McLaw's divisions occupied the IInd and the rest of the XII. Corps so these sickles couldn't reinforce. Stuart's corps attacked at 5:30 a.m. After two hours the Union's first defensive position was taken. The artillery fire from Hazel Grove played a major role in this. The memory of this led to Sickles' mistake during the Battle of Gettysburg of having to occupy a "high ground".
It was noteworthy that both the artillery and many Union infantry units ran out of ammunition and marched backwards from the front to replenish ammunition. The fighting was very tough. The wounded in particular suffered from the undergrowth being set on fire. Many soldiers were burned, while others had ammunition exploded in the cartridge pouches, causing further injuries.
Sickles gave up the infantry and artillery positions on Fair View Hill at around 9 a.m. and moved into a new line of defense near Chancellorsville. Shortly afterwards, while standing on the porch of the Chancellor House, Hooker was hit by a wooden buttress that had been torn from its anchorage by a Confederate projectile and suffered a concussion. However, he refused to temporarily hand over command to the next officer in rank, Major General Couch, and thus contributed to the poor performance of the Potomac Army. Finally, the XII. and the II Corps withdrawn. The Potomac Army took up positions north of Chancellorsville. Around noon the Confederate attack stopped because of exhaustion and because of the Sedgwick relief attack near Fredericksburg on the Plank and River Roads.
At Fredericksburg, Sedgwick attacked Early's positions at Marye's Heights at dawn and was repulsed. Because of the bitter experiences in December 1862, the regimental commanders ordered the further attacks as bayonet attacks and in more detail. In fact, the attackers broke into Confederate positions around 11 a.m., but most of them managed to evade to the southwest. Sedgwick had done what seemed impossible, storming Marye's Height, in which December the Potomac Army had fallen with hundreds of dead. However, he was reluctant to continue the chase.
Lee had stopped the attack at Chancellorsville and first McLaws' Division to VI. Corps sent to meet. The Confederates faced Sedgwick's foremost division at around 3:30 p.m. After fierce fighting, McLaws managed to stop the Union forces because Sedgwick attacked with only one division. When his other divisions approached, the fight was stopped because of the darkness.
Lee ordered Anderson's division to support McLaw in the Salem Church room at around 7 p.m. Early was assigned to attack Sedgwick in the rear. With these forces, about 30,000 men, he wanted the VI. Beat the Union's corps with around 20,000 men the next day.
May 4th
Hooker had let the Potomac army dig in all day. She was in a strong defensive position. An attack by Lee could certainly have been successfully repelled. It is not certain that Hooker knew how weak the Confederates facing him actually were during the day.
Anderson had clarified the position of Hooker early in the morning and determined that an attack would not be promising. When this was reported to Lee, Lee decided to attack Sedgwick with Anderson, McLaws and Earlys divisions at Salem Church. Early had reoccupied the positions at Marye's Heights that had been lost the day before at around 7 a.m. and thus interrupted Sedgwick's connection to the crossing point over the Rappahannock near Fredericksburg.
Sedgwick held a beachhead with three divisions from Banks Ford to Plank Road. He had pontoon bridges built at Banks Ford, as he would not be able to avoid it via Fredericksburg. Gibbons Division secured the passage across the river in Fredericksburg.
Lee attacked Sedgwick's divisions from the west, south and east at around 5:30 p.m. After a short, fierce battle, the VI fell. Corps back to the Rappahannock. Lee's artillery failed to destroy the pontoon bridge. The attack came to a standstill after a short time not only because of the darkness and the difficult terrain of the wilderness, but also because of considerable coordination difficulties. Sedgwick managed to avoid the Rappahannock and dismantle the pontoon bridges. This was preceded by another communication problem between Hooker and Sedgwick. Hooker wanted Sedgwick to hold the ford so that he could use it for his intended attack after evading Chancellorsville.
After the left wing of the Potomac Army no longer posed a threat to the Northern Virginia Army, Lee decided to leave Early in the positions opposite Fredericksburg and the next day to attack and destroy Hooker's large formations with all other parts of his army. To do this, Anderson and McLaws' divisions marched back to Chancellorsville.
General Hooker held a meeting with his commanding generals that night to determine how to proceed. Reynolds, Meade, and Howard were in favor of staying in the good positions, fighting off them, and preparing to attack again. Sickles and Couch spoke out in favor of withdrawing the army over the Rappahannock - Couch only because he no longer wanted to fight under Hooker's command. Hooker decided to withdraw. Unsatisfied with the decision, Reynolds within earshot of Hooker complained:
What was the use of calling us together at this time of night when he intended to retreat anyhow ?! "
"Why should we meet in the middle of the night when he was planning to withdraw anyway ?!"
After the battle
Lee rallied the Northern Virginia Army at Chancellorsville on May 5, preparing to attack the last position Hooker held. In addition, he used force reconnaissance to find weak points in the defensive position of the Potomac Army.
On the morning of May 6th, Lee was in the process of giving the orders for the approach and attack when it was reported that Hooker had given up the positions. Lee was surprised and said to the messenger:
- “Why, General Pender! That is what you young men always do. You allow these people to get away. I tell you what to do, and you don't do it. " “General Pender! That's what you young people always do. You allow these people to escape. I tell you what to do, but you don't do it. "
He ordered his troops to follow the evasive Northerners and inflict as much damage as possible on them.
Whether Lee really intended to attack the Potomac Army's well-developed field fortifications with his inferior forces is disputed. On May 5th he had sent Major General Stuart two messages warning him not to attack the buried enemy head-on and recommending that such an attack not be carried out, since they were well beyond such tactics. But he did not want to give up hope of being able to cause some damage to the evasive enemy.
During the night, as almost always after major battles in Virginia, it had rained heavily. Under his protection and that of his field fortifications, Hooker had evaded the trails through the dense forest to the United States ford. There he had crossed the Rappahannock on pontoon bridges. During this evasion, some of his soldiers believed in another flank march followed by an attack, but the vast majority knew that their army had been defeated, although they had not fought at all.
General Hooker moved into his former headquarters in Falmouth on the morning of May 7th and from there issued a daily order in which he paid tribute to the achievements of the Army. The cavalry that had marched before the start of the campaign also returned to the Potomac Army. She had attacked a few minor targets during her raid behind the Northern Virginia Army, but failed to meet Hooker's goal of cutting the lines of communication.
Major General Hooker's behavior during battle is judged differently. After the successful evasion maneuver, he was in a high mood and was convinced that he could defeat the Northern Virginia Army. During the attack on May 1, he was desperate in the face of some imponderables, but was then certain that he would be invincible in his expanded field fortifications. On May 3, he decided - half stunned, in any case without an overview of the situation - to cross the Rappahannock again and to break off the campaign. Many eyewitnesses attribute his discouragement and fickleness to extensive alcohol consumption. He himself put the blame for the defeat on his subordinates - Howard would not have carried out his orders, Couch would not have wanted to work with him, and Sedgwick would have fought badly. Hooker later said:
- “I was not hurt by a shell, and I was not drunk. For once I lost confidence in Joe Hooker, and that is all there is to it. " “I was not wounded by a grenade and I was not drunk. I only lost trust in Joe Hooker all of a sudden and that's all I have to say. "
Consequences of the battle
Hooker had started the campaign with the belief that he had an 80% chance of winning. He had lost it because, first of all, his connections were at the worst level ever in the Potomac Army. This was followed by the inability of his cavalry commander, the commanding general of the XI. Corps and Sedgwick's moderate performance. His own major mistakes were breaking off the attack on May 1st, giving orders to abandon Hazel Grove, and improperly deploying 40,000 men at all.
Hooker's intention was simple and clear. Lee should attack his superior army. The implementation was poor. In the individual battles, however, it became clear that the soldiers of the Potomac Army were on par with the soldiers of the Northern Virginia Army after last year's defeats in battle. Of the 90,000 men who fought during the battle, 17,000 were reported as casualties. In percentage terms, these were significantly less than Lee's losses.
Lee's losses were 22% and the Hookers 13%. The southern states found it much more difficult to make up for these losses. Still, it was an overwhelming victory - one that increased Lee's confidence in his soldiers. But Lee found again that not everyone was familiar with his leadership style. One example of this was the dialogue with General Pender. He had always served under Jackson until now and was unfamiliar with Lee's way of commanding. Jackson had always given detailed instructions, Lee ordered a violent reconnaissance and assumed that this would be carried out until the enemy was actually cleared up and would not be ended after reaching the field fortifications without a fight. Jackson's successor was Major General Richard Stoddert Ewell , who could not replace him. Many Southerners judged the loss of Jackson to be the worst part of the battle and the course of the war.
For about a month the Rappahannock formed the border between northern and southern states. General Lee had been able to convince the government that the victory should be used to shift the war to Union territory. This should u. a. the Union will be prevented from reinforcing Major General Grant's troops outside Vicksburg . The Northern Virginia Army first marched northwest. Hooker followed her reluctantly. Lee's march west of the Blue Ridge Mountains was largely undetected and undisturbed, as he was shielded by his cavalry under Stuart's leadership.
Hooker remained in command of the Potomac Army. It was only when he threatened to resign because of the dispute over the use of the Harper's Ferry garrison that the War Department took the opportunity and replaced the unloved Commander-in-Chief on June 28, 1863 by Major General George G. Meade .
reception
Parts of the Chancellorsville battlefield are now on the grounds of the Fredericksburg and Spotsylvania National Military Park under the care of the US National Park Administration.
The battles of Chancellorsville and the Wilderness in 1864 formed the basis for the 1895 novel written Stephen Crane : The red Bravery Medal (The Red Badge of Courage). The book served John Huston as a template for the film of the same name (USA, 1951).
Part of the battle (Jackson's evasion of the western flank of the Union forces, his wounding and his death) is also portrayed in the film Gods and Generals (USA, 2003), which is based on the novel by Jeff Michael Shaara .
literature
- John R. Bigelow, Jr .: The Campaign of Chancellorsville. A Strategic and Tactical Study . Emphasis. Morningside Bookshop, Dayton, OH 1995 (1910), ISBN 0-8317-1431-X .
- Ernest B. Furgurson: Chancellorsville. The Souls of the Brave . Alfred A. Knopf, New York 1992, ISBN 0-394-58301-9 .
- Gary W. Gallagher (Ed.): Chancellorsville. The Battle and Its Aftermath . University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill & London 2006, ISBN 0-8078-2275-2 .
- William K. Goolrick: Rebels Resurgent. Fredericksburg to Chancellorsville . Time-Life-Books, Alexandria, VA 1985, ISBN 0-8094-4748-7 .
- Edward G. Longacre: The Commanders of Chancellorsville. The Gentleman Versus the Rogue . Rutledge Hill Press, Nashville, TN 2005, ISBN 1-4016-0142-1 .
- Stephen W. Sears: Chancellorsville . Houghton Mifflin, Boston & London 1996, ISBN 0-395-63417-2 .
- Edward J. Stackpole: Chancellorsville. Lee's Greatest Battle . 2nd Edition. Stackpole Books, Mechanicsburg, PA 1989, ISBN 0-8117-2238-4 .
- Daniel E. Sutherland : The Dare Mark Campaign. Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville . University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln & London 1998, ISBN 0-8032-4253-0 .
Individual evidence
- ↑ a b Steve Haas: Troop strength . In: MilitaryHistoryOnline - Battle of Chancellorsville. Status: May 13, 2010
- ^ Fox's Regimental Losses, Chapter XIV, p. 541: Union losses . Status: May 13, 2010
- ↑ Fox's Regimental Losses: Confederation Losses, as of May 13, 2010
- ^ Douglas S. Freeman Vol II p. 523: Lee's assignment to Jackson . Status: May 13, 2010
- ↑ Andrew Dehart: Rumble on The Rappahannock, Jackson's verbal attack order . As of May 13, 2010 also Foote, Vol. II, p. 298
- ↑ Confederate Military History, Volume 3, Chapter XXI: Congratulations to Lee's victory. Status: May 13, 2010
- ↑ California Historical Society Quarterly Hooker's Morale as of December 17, 2017
- ↑ American Heritage Publishing Dissatisfied with Hooker . As of December 17, 2017
- ↑ Confederate Military History, Volume 3, Chapter XXI: Lee's Complaint about Pender
- ↑ Lee to Stuart. Free Lance-Star Publishing, LLC., 2015, accessed December 3, 2015 (English, Robert K. Krick: Lee's greatest victory: Chancellorsville, Part 39).
- ↑ Eyewitnesses - Was Hooker Drunk? Free Lance-Star Publishing, LLC., 2015, accessed December 3, 2015 (English, Robert K. Krick: Lee's greatest victory: Chancellorsville, Part 41).
- ^ American Heritage Publishing. Hooker over hooker . As of December 3, 2017
- ^ Douglas S. Freeman Vol III p. 16: Lee in a letter to Hood . Status: May 13, 2010
- ↑ Stephen W. Sears: Gettysburg . Houghton Mifflin, Boston & New York 2003. pp. 120-123
Web links
- Battle of Chancellorsville. Military History Online, June 4, 2000, accessed December 3, 2010 .
- May 1863: Hooker: “I've got Lee where I wanted him!” Greg Goebel, July 1, 2017, accessed on June 20, 2018 .
- The Battle of Chancellorsville. civilwarhome.com, November 1, 2003, accessed December 3, 2010 (Detailed description of the battle).
- Animation of the battle. civilwaranimated.com, 2007, accessed December 3, 2010 .
- Animation of the first day of the battle. Civil War Preservation Trust, 2009, accessed December 3, 2010 .
Coordinates: 38 ° 18 ′ 37.8 " N , 77 ° 38 ′ 54.2" W.