Battle of Soltau
The battle of Soltau on June 28, 1519 was the military climax of the Hildesheim collegiate feud (1519–1523).
The collegiate feud had all the characteristics of a typical aristocratic conflict of that time. It was essentially about the distribution of income and territorial claims mainly in the area of the diocese of Hildesheim . However, two aspects made it something special. On the one hand, the main opponents on both sides were members of the Guelph royal family, on the other hand, the hostile parties supported various pretenders for the election of emperors in the Holy Roman Empire . The Braunschweig - Calenberg party, headed by Dukes Heinrich II of Braunschweig-Wolfenbüttel and Erich I von Calenberg , favored the Habsburg Karl (later Emperor Charles V ), the Lüneburg- Hildesheim coalition under Duke Heinrich the Middle and Bishop Johann IV. Advocated the election of Francis I of France as the new emperor.
Traditionally, the dispute was referred to as the “last knight battle in Germany”, which is now considered obsolete, as no turning point is recognizable in the warfare.
Armed forces
The armed forces of the Brunswick were among about 7,000 foot soldiers (including 4,000 conscripts and 3,000 professional " mercenaries ") and 700 armored horsemen ( " horsemen "). The Lüneburgers are also said to have had 7,000 infantrymen, but their cavalry was much stronger with around 1,500 horses. Heinrich's son-in-law, Karl von Egmont, Herzog zu Geldern had sent 400 horsemen, who were led by his bastard son. The Braunschweiger carried 24 guns and an extensive entourage, nothing more is known about the number of guns of the Lüneburgers. In any case, only the lighter cannons could be used for field battles. The professional infantry fought in a compact heap of four . Following the example of the Swiss , the first three to five links led the up to six meters long pike , the back rows were mostly with shorter halberds or similar. equipped. Chance also came two Hands-operated swords and matchlock - Arkebusen before, but they played a secondary role. Nothing is known about the equipment of the excavated.
March and battle order
Both armies marched in the usual form at the time. A forward trot ("lost pile"), which in the case of the Braunschweiger should have counted 1,500 mercenaries, which was accompanied by 300 horsemen and a part of the artillery (probably the pipes suitable for the field) moved ahead . This was followed by the gang of 4,500 men (including 500 mercenaries, accompanied by the rest of the cavalry ) and a rearguard of 1,000 mercenaries. It can be assumed that the entourage consisted of hardly fewer people than the actual army, at least among the Braunschweig people, who carried numerous booty and their war chest with them. Nothing is known about the marching order of the Lüneburgers, but it can be assumed that it was basically similar to that of the Braunschweiger. For reasons that are nowhere explained, the Lüneburgers had let their foot troops fall back, so that on June 28th only their cavalry stood in the way of the Brunswickers.
terrain
After a long, partly parallel march in pursuit, the two armies met around noon on June 28, 1519 northwest of Soltau between the villages of Vahlzen and Langeloh . Both parties each occupied a hill, with swampy terrain extending over a length of about 700 meters in between. The south-facing Brunswick had their wings secured by two moors, the Vahlzener Moor in the west and the Dickmoor in the east (the latter is said to have been much more humid and marshy).
Formation of troops
Exact records of the positioning of the armed forces on both sides do not exist. The Lüneburgers are known to have divided their cavalry into five pennants , four of 225 riders and one of 600 riders. It is assumed that the Braunschweig people essentially retained their marching formation and only gathered their 700 riders in the vanguard. Possibly they also brought the artillery ready for use in the field at the edge of the hill they occupied. It is generally assumed that the two commanding dukes did not agree on the measures to be taken in the face of the enemy.
Course of the battle
Opening fight
Curiously enough, the fight was started by the Lüneburgers, although they only had their (albeit superior) cavalry on hand for the time being. According to Heinrich the Middle's report , three of his little ensigns met the 700 Braunschweig riders head-on. The fourth Lüneburg ensign flanked the opposing cavalry crowd and made them flee quickly to the nearby Vahlzener Moor, where many of the refugees are said to have perished. The large Lüneburg rider ensign (600 horses) had not even intervened in the fighting up to this point. What the Lost Pile of Brunswick (1,500 Landsknechte) did during the cavalry battle is unclear. He must have been so far removed from his own cavalry that they could be flanked and bypassed.
Attack on the lost pile of the Braunschweiger
While some of the victorious squadrons pursued the fleeing troops, the large Lüneburg cavalryman now attacked the isolated vanguard of the enemy, apparently again seconded by an effective flank attack by the fourth little cavalryman, who had previously acted so skillfully. It seems that the mercenaries quickly succumbed to the “choc” of the enemy cavalry, were blown up and fled into the thick moor. Since this was more muddy than the Vahlzener Moor, it was fatal for an even larger number of fugitives. Thus, only the Braunschweig gang of violence and the rearguard were in the field when the Lüneburg infantry finally appeared on the scene.
Attack on the Braunschweig violence heap
The 4,500-strong force pile of Brunswick had probably not leave the hill. Although the attackers had to go uphill towards him, he offered little resistance. Given the events so far and the fact that it consisted mostly of unprofessional soldiers, this was hardly surprising. Apparently he was not supported by the rearguard, and the latter may even have fled. The Braunschweig heap of violence was attacked head-on by the superior Lüneburg infantry, while the enemy riders swarmed around its flanks. He was wiped out and fled like the lost heap before . If the rearguard were still in the field at this point, they would certainly have been swept away by the escape of the front hit. The real battle was over. Isolated skirmishes are said to have continued well into the night, with the heavily laden entourage carried by the Brunswick and their war chest probably the main target of these skirmishes.
losses
Allegedly, the defeated Brunswick lost not only numerous prisoners (including Duke Erich I of Calenberg) between 3,000 and 3,500 men, many of whom are said to have perished in the moors. In contrast, the winners had only slight losses. The figures vary between 10 and 200 dead. The first number is hardly credible, even if one assumes the most favorable circumstances for the Lüneburgers. Nothing is known of the wounded, although their number usually exceeded that of the dead many times over. The assumption of 3,000 to 3,500 dead on the Braunschweig side is obviously estimated and is probably based on the number of remaining troops that gathered again after the battle. The nobility everywhere complained about the high horse losses in this battle. These could be traced back to the fact that the cavalry at Soltau had to do the main work (which in the case of the Lüneburgers applies at least to the first half of the battle). It is also conceivable, however, that the marshy terrain had become the undoing of many horses.
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A memorial stone has been erected southwest of Munster on today's Munster Süd military training area , near the so-called "Wincklerhöhe". The inscription reads:
“ Sackers-Kruez
At the time of the Hildesheim collegiate feud, the Guelphs fought each other, with a duke bleeding to death here in 1519. During these battles around Soltau, the place MUNSTER was destroyed and the EMHOF burned down. "
consequences
Although Heinrich the Middle and Bishop Johann IV were able to regulate the situation on site in their favor for the time being with their victory at Soltau, the great politics in the empire took a different course. After the Habsburg Karl had been elected as the new emperor, the losing party made various attempts at this to put the victor of Soltau in the wrong. Since they had supported Francis I of France , Charles V's reaction was not surprising. After all, the Lüneburg-Hildesheim party suffered great material losses in the Quedlinburg Recess of 1523. The victor of Soltau, Heinrich the Middle, had been placed under imperial ban and had to seek protection in French exile as early as 1520 , he returned in 1530, spent his last years first in Lüneburg, later in Winsen / Luhe and Wienhausen, where he died in 1532 .
literature
- Udo Stanelle: The Battle of Soltau. In: Lower Saxony Yearbook for State History . Vol. 54, 1982, pp. 153–188 (PDF) (with information on the numbers given here).
- Stefan Felleckner: Notes on the course of the Battle of Soltau (June 28, 1519). In: Gifhorner Kreiskalender 2010. Gifhorn 2009, pp. 102–112 (authoritative for the article, discussion with Stanelle).
- Elsa Varnové: The beginnings of the Hildesheim collegiate feud and the chroniclers Henning Brandis and Johann Oldecop. In: Journal of the Historical Association for Lower Saxony . Vol. 84, 1919, pp. 169–240, here p. 181 ff. (Also dissertation, University of Marburg, 1919).
- Wilhelm Roßmann: The Hildesheimer Stiftsfehde (1519-1523). Edited by Richard Doebner. Gerstenberg, Hildesheim 1908.
- Ernst Andreas Friedrich : If stones could talk. Volume 3. Landbuch, Hannover 1995, ISBN 3-7842-0515-1 , chapter "The memorial stone in Wieheholz", pp. 161-162.
Web links
- Facts from the past that will play a role in Soltau on June 12th, 13th and 14th, 2009. In: "Soltower Kurier" (PDF; 3.7 MB)
Coordinates: 53 ° 3 ′ 27.4 ″ N , 9 ° 46 ′ 21 ″ E