Battle in the Bay of Bergen

Battle in the Bay of Bergen

Part of: Anglo-Dutch War (1665–1667)

Colored engraving by Arnold Bloem (1670)

date	August 12, 1665 greg.
place	Bergen , Norway
output	Dutch victory

Parties to the conflict
England	United Netherlands
Commander
Sir Thomas Teddeman	Pieter de Bitter
Troop strength
15 warships 2 fires	11 merchant ships coastal batteries
losses
112 dead, 309 wounded	29 dead 70 wounded

The battle in the bay of Bergen (often also Battle of Vågen ) on August 12, 1665 ^greg. was a naval battle during the Anglo-Dutch War (1665–1667) . An English squadron under the command of Rear Admiral Sir Thomas Teddeman ambushed a Dutch merchant fleet in the port of Bergen , which was resisting under the command of Captain Pieter de Bitter . The battle ended with the defeat of the English unit and its withdrawal.

prehistory

General course of the war

After the end of the first Anglo-Dutch War in 1654, King Charles II (1630–1685) returned to England . He needed financial means for a government independent of parliament, which he hoped to win through the booty in another war against the United Netherlands . He was supported by the Royal African Company , which wanted to damage the Dutch competition. In the spring of 1665 the war finally broke out.

In the first meeting of the opposing fleets during the war in the naval battle of Lowestoft ( June 13, 1665 ^greg. ) The Dutch armed forces were defeated. They were forced to return to their ports, giving the English fleet control of the important trade routes in the North Sea and the English Channel . Under the command of the Earl of Sandwich (1625–1672) she took up a position at the Dogger Bank to await the incoming convoys from the Dutch colonies. On July 27, 1665 ^Greg. The Earl called a council of war, since news had meanwhile arrived that a Dutch fleet under Vice Admiral Michiel de Ruyter (1607–1676), coming from America, was sailing around Scotland and was now trying to get south into the Dutch ports. Most of the officers were in favor of going directly to the Norwegian coast, where they hoped to intercept de Ruyter. On the following voyage, however, they missed the Dutch fleet, which was moving near the coast and ^greg on August 6, 1665 ^. entered Delfzijl . The English fleet looked in vain for the Dutch ships and was increasingly in distress because their own supplies were running out. When it was learned from neutral ships that a large and richly loaded Dutch convoy was in the port of Bergen , a decision was made in a further council of war on August 9, 1665 ^greg. to send out a formation and ambush these ships. For this purpose, a squadron of 22 warships and 2 Brandern was sent under the command of Rear Admiral Sir Thomas Teddeman (1620-1668).

The East India Company convoy

The Dutch convoy was a large merchant ship belonging to the Dutch East India Company . Twice a year the company sent a convoy to Europe. Since war was about to break out, the command was entrusted to the experienced and battle-tested officer Pieter de Bitter (approx. 1620–1666). The cargo was bigger than ever because it was not known how long a war would affect further deliveries. It was worth over eleven million guilders - more than the annual budget of the Danish king. The convoy left East India on December 25, 1664 ^greg. with the instruction to avoid contact with English associations. When the news of the outbreak of war and the English victory at the Battle of Lowestoft, De Bitter assumed that the English Channel was now impassable, he decided to lead the convoy north around Scotland to reach the Netherlands through the North Sea. In the North Sea, the association got caught in a storm and was dispersed. From June 29, 1665 ^greg. Most of his ships gathered in the port of Bergen. There De Bitter received orders from the mother country, which instructed him to await the arrival of a Dutch escort squadron in the neutral port.

Diplomatic preparations

King Friedrich III. from Denmark; unknown painter

A prerequisite for an attack on Dutch ships in the neutral ports of Norway was the cooperation or at least approval of King Frederick III. of Denmark and Norway (1609–1670). In fact, it was linked to the States General by several treaties , but this did not mean that there were no tensions in the Danish-Dutch relationship. The Dutch monopoly in East India and Africa trade also hampered the development of Danish trade. Furthermore, the lack of Dutch support for Denmark in the Second Northern War (1655-1660) contributed to the deterioration of relations. After the Battle of Lowestoft , King Frederick III approached. the English side. He assumed that under English naval rule many Dutch merchant ships would seek shelter in the Danish ports. In order to rehabilitate the Danish public finances, he toyed with the idea of ​​confiscating these richly laden ships with their goods. On June 24, 1665 ^Greg. The English ambassador Sir Gilbert Talbot suggested to him to use English ships for this purpose and then to divide up the booty. When the king was not averse to this proposal, the envoy informed his government of the Danish willingness to cooperate. Immediately sent the Duke of York (1633-1701) as commander in chief of the English associations appropriate information and authorizations to the Earl of Sandwich. These arrived at the fleet before the council of war on July 17th and formed the basis for the following British operations in Norwegian waters. In fact, Friedrich III was frightened. before breaking with the Netherlands. He assumed that he could maintain his neutral status and still receive part of the Dutch trade goods in return for his standing still. He gave orders to the Danish governors not to take part in actions against Dutch ships, but also not to oppose the British action. Danish participation should not go beyond protests. Sir Gilbert Talbot tried to inform his government that Danish cooperation was no longer to be expected and that the English warships could still attack Dutch ships in Norwegian ports without further agreement. But these letters no longer reached the fleet.

Course of the English operation near Bergen

negotiations

Rear Admiral Sir Thomas Teddeman; Portrait of Sir Peter Lely (1666)

As Rear Admiral Teddeman on the afternoon of August 11, 1665 ^greg. arrived before Bergen, strong southerly storms had driven seven of his ships away. For the meeting with the Dutch trade convoy, he had only 15 warships and 2 fire engines available to him. In front of the bay, a Danish official came on board the HMS Revenge , the English flagship , and declared that it was an act of hostility to enter a Danish port with more than five warships. Assuming that the city's governor, Johan Caspar von Cicignon, was not informed of the agreement, Rear Admiral Teddeman sent a negotiator to the highest local official, the commander of all Danish armed forces in Norway, General Claus von Ahlefeldt . That negotiator was the Earl of Sandwich's cousin, Edward Montagu. In fact, the general had only received orders to hold the Dutch ships in port until the forces were available to take them; further orders would come later. General von Ahlefeldt therefore assumed that the soon-to-be-ready forces meant a Danish fleet. In fact, the courier with the further explanations did not leave Copenhagen until July 24th, and since the journey to Bergen took ten days, he could not arrive on time.

The negotiations between the English and the Danes dragged on all night. General von Ahlefeldt tried to buy time to wait for further orders to arrive. He assured Montagu of his cooperation, but made the condition that the attack should only take place with six ships and only on August 16. Rear Admiral Teddeman firmly rejected the latter in particular. On the one hand, the Dutch would then be better prepared for the attack, and on the other hand, a Dutch navy could appear off Bergen. Although General Ahlefeldt finally only asked for a two-day delay, the negotiations were broken off at dawn with no result. The English squadron was now preparing to attack.

Dutch preparations

Admiral Pieter de Bitter; Engraving by JW Bloem

The port of Bergen was in Vågen, a bay that ran in a U-shape from north to south. The opening of the bay was less than 500 meters wide. The depth of the bay was about one kilometer, while the medieval city, consisting mostly of wooden houses, stretched on its southern bank. On the east bank of the bay opening was the Danish fortress of Bergenhus , and on the west bank were forts and coastal batteries . In order to defend this harbor bay, only a few ships needed to be positioned across the bay opening.

When the English squadron arrived, there were around 50 Dutch merchant ships in Vågen, as well as the ten-ship convoy of the Dutch East India Company (VOC). The latter ships were the most powerful with about 60 cannons each. At first it was unclear among the Dutch how to respond to the threat. Some captains called for an immediate attack. In the end, however, the commander of the convoy, Pieter de Bitter, prevailed with the proposal to set up defense in the bay. First he arranged the six largest ships in a line at the exit of Vågen: in the far west the Brederode , in the center the Gulden Phenix , Wapen van Hoorn , Jonge Prins , his flagship the Walcheren and the Catherina . At the eastern end of the line, in front of the Bergenhus, was Slot Hooningen . Since the available space was thus used up, the Rijzende Zon and three other smaller East Indiamans had to be placed in the second line as a reserve. The other merchant ships, despite having numerous cannons, were less powerful; they were brought ashore by their crews and there directed against the English ships in field works. In addition, Dutch gun crews were sent to the Bergenhus and the other Danish forts to reinforce the crews there.

Course of the battle

Depiction of the battle in the Bay of Bergen. The Dutch East Indiaman; Penschilderij by Willem van de Velde the Elder

Rear Admiral Teddeman completed his own preparations for battle shortly after sunrise. Across from the Dutch line, from east to west, he positioned the Prudent Mary , Breda , Foresight , Bendish , Happy Return , Sapphire, and the Pembroke . This line was so narrow that the ships almost touched. Not knowing how the Danes would react, the admiral positioned his remaining ships in front of the Danish coastal forts. On the east coast, the Norwich lay in front of a Dutch battery north of the Bergenhus. Next to her the Golden Lion and the Society joined, which had the Danish Sverreborg battery on the hill north of the fortress and another Danish fort further north. On the western bank the Guernsey , Revenge , Coast Frigate and the Guinea lay in a north-south line in front of the Danish fortress Nordnes , which dominated the entrance of the bay on an elevated ground. The Martin Galley secured the fortress from the sea side.

Map of the course of the battle

At five o'clock Rear Admiral Teddeman gave the order to open fire on the Dutch ships. These returned fire. The English ships in front of the Danish forts were instructed not to fire until they were being shot at by the Danes themselves. But the Danes were no longer under a unified leadership, as the Dutch reinforcements opened fire on the English ships with some cannons in the forts. The English then also set fire to the Danish fortifications. Now the Danish garrisons were also forced to defend themselves against the English attack. General von Ahlefeldt gave the order to stop the fire at six o'clock and hoisted the white flag on the Bergenhus. Rear Admiral Teddeman had no way of seeing her, however, as his flagship , the Revenge , was across the bay and surrounded by powder smoke. In addition, General von Ahlefeldt was unable to assert himself in his own fortifications. So he caught the flag again after 15 minutes.

In the hour-long firefight that followed, the Dutch brought their superior firepower to bear. Their ships in the line almost all had 50 to 60 cannons, while only one of the English ships opposite them had more than 46 cannons. The English could not use their fires either, as the wind was blowing towards the open sea. So at 8:30 a.m. they lifted their anchors and drifted out into the open sea. Rear Admiral Teddeman later wrote:

“ In this castle and the forts, they had deployed more than 300 cannons alongside the ships of the East India Company in the harbor. The battle lasted three and a half hours with the wind coming straight out of the harbor so that I couldn't get the lightships in; so many cannons were pointing at me, hitting our cables to pieces that we drifted into each other. The wind was blowing south; the worst place people have ever come to. "

- Rear Admiral Sir Thomas Teddeman (1665)

The English losses amounted to over 400 fallen and wounded, including Edward Montagu and the six captains of the ships that faced the Dutch line directly. Only 41 casualties were due to the fight against the Danish forts. The Dutch had only 99 dead and wounded. The only seriously damaged ship was the Dutch Catherina , which had been hit below the waterline and therefore had to be set aground. The Danish casualties amounted to seven dead and 26 wounded. But some buildings in the city had also been damaged by English cannonballs. (One of them is still in the wall of the cathedral in Bergen; see: picture below left .)

Consequences of the battle

Cannonball in the wall of St. Olav Cathedral

The English fleet withdrew to a nearby fjord . Two days later they received a message from General von Ahlefeldt. This had meanwhile the instructions of Friedrich III. received and was now ready to agree to another English attack on the Dutch ships. Sir Thomas Clifford went to Bergen in disguise to make new arrangements. But this time, too, the general did not want to consent to anything that the Dutch could regard as a hostile act. Danish troops would not take part in the attack, the English would not be allowed to go ashore or use lightships. On top of that, General von Ahlefeldt himself would determine the duration of the attack. Rear Admiral Teddeman distrusted the Danish promises and received additional news from Clifford that the Dutch had stepped up their defense. He then set sail and rejoined the English fleet. General von Ahlefeldt confiscated the cannons and some goods that the Dutch had brought ashore as "payment for his protection against the English."

The Dutch have now sent a fleet to escort the merchant ships from the Norwegian coast to their home ports. But on the way back, the convoy was blown apart by violent storms. Some of the merchant ships then ran into the English fleet and were captured. On September 13, 1665 ^Greg. two great East Indiamans and their escort suffered this fate. On September 19, 1665 ^Greg. Four more ships (one with 70 cannons) fell into the hands of the English. In fact, these were the greatest British victories since the Battle of Lowestoft. Nevertheless, the previous defeat at Bergen contributed to the fact that the Earl of Sandwich lost command of the English fleet a little later. In his place came George Monck, 1st Duke of Albemarle (1608–1670).

Web links

• Vrakrestene etter is posted on Vågen . In: Bergens Tidende , January 7, 2005 (Norwegian)
• Slag in de Baai van Bergen, 12 August 1665 . Dutch Navy (Dutch)

literature

• Michael Breet: Strijd om de VOC-miljoenen - Slag in de haven van het Noorse Bergen, August 12, 1665 . Walburg Pers, Zutphen 2007, ISBN 90-5730-468-6
• Charles Ralph Boxer: The Anglo-Dutch Wars of the 17th Century . Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London 1974.
• Frank L. Fox: A distant Storm - The Four Days' Battle of 1666, the greatest sea fight of the age of sail . Press of Sail Publications, Rotherfield / East Sussex 1996, ISBN 0-948864-29-X
• Roger Hainsworth, Christine Churchers: The Anglo-Dutch Naval Wars 1652–1674 . Sutton Publishing, Thrupp / Stroud / Gloucestershire 1998, ISBN 0-7509-1787-3
• Cyril Hughes Hartmann: Clifford of the Cabal . William Heinemann, London 1937.
• James R. Jones: The Anglo-Dutch Wars of the Seventeenth Century . Longman House, London / New York 1996, ISBN 0-582-05631-4
• Richard Lawrence Ollard: Cromwell's Earl - A Life of Edward Mountagu, 1st Earl of Sandwich . HarperCollins, London 1994, ISBN 0-00-255003-2
• JCM Warnsinck: De Retourvloot van Pieter de Bitter (Kerstmis 1664 - Najaar 1665) . Martinus Nijhoff, 's-Gravenhage 1929

Individual evidence

1. ^ ^{A b c} Frank L. Fox: A distant Storm - The Four Days' Battle of 1666, the greatest sea fight of the age of sail . Rotherfield / East Sussex 1996, p. 368
2. ^ ^{A b} Roger Hainsworth, Christine Churchers: The Anglo-Dutch Naval Wars 1652–1674 . Gloucestershire 1998, p. 131
3. ^ Charles Ralph Boxer: The Anglo-Dutch Wars of the 17th Century , London 1974, p. 29.
4. ^ Roger Hainsworth / Christine Churchers: The Anglo-Dutch Naval Wars 1652-1674 , Gloucestershire 1998, pp. 128f.
5. ↑ James R. Jones: The Anglo-Dutch Wars of the Seventeenth Century , London / New York 1996, p. 162.
6. ↑ Michael Breet: Strijd om de VOC-miljoenen - Slag in de haven van het Noorse Bergen, 12 August 1665 , Zutphen 2007.
7. ^ ^{A b} Frank L. Fox: A distant Storm - The Four Days' Battle of 1666, the greatest sea fight of the age of sail. Rotherfield / East Sussex 1996, p. 128 f.
8. ↑ James R. Jones: The Anglo-Dutch Wars of the Seventeenth Century. London / New York 1996, p. 163.
9. ^ Frank L. Fox: A distant Storm - The Four Days' Battle of 1666, the greatest sea fight of the age of sail , Rotherfield / East Sussex 1996, p. 130.
10. ↑ The best overview of the course of the negotiations is offered by: Cyril Hughes Hartmann: Clifford of the Cabal , London 1937, pp. 52–61
11. ^ Frank L. Fox: A distant Storm - The Four Days' Battle of 1666, the greatest sea fight of the age of sail , Rotherfield / East Sussex 1996, pp. 132f.
12. ↑ Michael Breet: Strijd om de VOC-miljoenen - Slag in de haven van het Noorse Bergen, 12 August 1665 . Walburg Pers, Zutphen 2007.
13. ^ Frank L. Fox: A distant Storm - The Four Days' Battle of 1666, the greatest sea fight of the age of sail . Rotherfield / East Sussex 1996, p. 133.
14. ^ Frank L. Fox: A distant Storm - The Four Days' Battle of 1666, the greatest sea fight of the age of sail . Rotherfield East Sussex 1996, p. 134.
15. ↑ “They had in ye Castle & Forts upward of 300 Gunns mounted beside ye East India shipps in ye port. The dispute lasted 3 hours & a halfe ye wind right out of ye Port that for my heart I could not gett ye fireshipps in, their beinge soe many Gunns placed on mee that cutt tp peeces our cables, for that wee had like to have drovefoule on another. Ye wind blew right out beinge at South; The worst place that ever men came to. " Quoted from: Frank L. Fox: A distant Storm - The Four Days' Battle of 1666, the greatest sea fight of the age of sail . Rotherfield / East Sussex 1996, p. 134
16. ↑ Seale, Haward, Lawson, Utber, Pierse, Cadman on board the Revenge , although actually captain of the Hambro 'Merchant
17. ^ Cyril Hughes Hartmann: Clifford of the Cabal . London 1937, p. 63
18. ↑ In the English fleet there were ships of first class (80 to 100 cannons), second class (60 to 80 cannons), third class (54 to 64 cannons), fourth class (34 to 54 cannons), fifth class (24 to 34 Cannons) and the frigates as sixth class. "M" stands for "Merchant", a converted merchant ship. Brander are abbreviated with "FS" for "Fire Ship" . See: Roger Hainsworth, Christine Churchers: The Anglo-Dutch Naval Wars 1652–1674 , Stroud 1998, pp. 110f.
19. ^ Cyril Hughes Hartmann: Clifford of the Cabal . London 1937, pp. 64-77
20. ^ Charles Ralph Boxer: The Anglo-Dutch Wars of the 17th Century . Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London 1974, pp. 163f.
21. ↑ Richard Lawrence Ollard: Cromwell's Earl - A Life of Edward Mountagu, 1st Earl of Sandwich . London 1994, pp. 144f.

This article was added to the list of excellent articles on March 19, 2008 in this version .